

survey of
THE NATIONAL QUESTION
of
TURKISH KURDISTAN
with
historical background



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Dr. Ismet Chériff Vanly

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Hevra, Komela Soresvanên Kurden Tirkiyê li Ewrûpa

Hevra, Organization of the Revolutionary Kurds of Turkey in Europe

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Important events appear to be shaping themselves as well as taking place in Turkish Kurdistan and the whole Republic of Turkey. These events concern the democratic life and the system of government of the republic; they affect the present and the future of both the Turkish and the Kurdish peoples and are directly related to the Kurdish national question. - Before reviewing and analysing them, it is necessary to give some general data about Turkish Kurdistan and to have a look at its history.

Turkish Kurdistan is, naturally, a part of the territory of the Republic of Turkey, and the country of that part of the Kurdish people who live within the boundaries of this state. It covers what our Turkish friends call - nowadays - the "Dogu Anadolu" ("eastern Anatolia") and the "Guney Dogu Anadolu" ("southeastern Anatolia"), or, to simplify, the "Dogu" ("The East"). In administrative terms, that represents roughly 19 out of the vilayets, or provinces ("il", plural "iller", in Turkish), of the state. With the exception of the western half of the vilayet of Marash (Maras), and, possibly, of some peripheral districts of those of Malatya, Erzurum and Kars, the 19 vilayets which constitute Turkish Kurdistan are the following: Adiyaman, Agri (Ararat), Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir (Diyarbakir), Elazig, Erzinjan (Erzincan), Erzurum, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Marash, Mardin, Mush (Mus), Siirt, Tunceli (Dersim) Urfa and Van. But a part of the vilayet of Sivas, to the east and south-east of Zara, is Kurdish.

Turkish Kurdistan leans against the Syrian, the Iraqi, the Persian and the Soviet borders, to the east and south of a line going schematically from Hatay (Alexandretta) to Ardahan, through the following points: Marash, Elbistan, west of Malatya, Zara, north of Erzinjan, north of Erzurum. - Its surface is about 225.000 km², or 29.3 % of the total surface of the republic, which amounts to 767.000 km² (Great Britain: 215.000 km²; The Federal Republic of Germany: 248.000 km²). The surface of the 19 above mentioned vilayets is 235.000 km².

The total population of the eastern vilayets was, in 1965, 6,329,000 inhabitants (by addition of the figures concerning these vilayets, according to the official Turkish census of October 24, 1965)(1) That of Turkish Kurdistan - including the Zara region, but excluding

(1) See "Census of Population"; by the State Institute of Statistics, Ankara 1969, publication Nr. 568.

the non-kurdish districts of the vilayets of Marash, Malatya, Erzurum and Kars, and account being taken of the non-recorded Kurds (2) - amounting, in the same year, to about 6,250,000 inhabitants, or one fifth of the total population of the republic (31,391,000 in 1965). Out of those 6,25 millions, one million inhabitants of turkish Kurdistan were non-kurdish elements (16 %), mostly Turks. The kurdish elements represents, in turkish Kurdistan, 84 % of the population. On the other hand, in the same year, there were some 1,500,000 more Kurds living amongst the Turks in turkish Turkey (that is outside Kurdistan, in the central and the western vilayets). The followings table will give a better illustration of the statistical situation:

Population	1965	%to Pop of Turkey	Estimations for 1970
Population of the Republic	31.391.000	100.00%	35.516.000
Pop. of turkish Kurdistan.	6.250.000	19.90	7.071.000
Kurds of turkish Kurdistan	5.250.000	16.73	5.940.000
Non-Kurds of tur.Kurdistan	1.000.000	3.17	1.131.000
Kurds of turkish Turkey...	1.500.000	4.77	1.697.000
Kurds of the Republic.....	6.750.000	21.50	7.637.000

The figures of this table concerning the kurdish population were taken from my french manuscript " The Civilisation of Kurdistan: Genesis, Annals and Evolution of the Kurdish Nation" (3). Space is lacking to justify them in the present survey - but I did that fully in that work. My estimation of the total population of Turkey for 1970 (since the official results of the census of 1970 are not yet published) is based on the result of 1965, knowing that the annual increase rate of the population of the republic was calculated by the United Nations to be 2.5 % (4). So, out of some 35.5 millions representing the total population of Turkey in 1970, there are, in all, about 7.6 millions Kurds (both in Kurdistan and turkish Turkey). It goes without saying that, because of the policy of national oppression, the official turkish statistics give exceedingly lower figures for the Kurdish population, which

(2) Estimated by me to be about 100.000 inhabitants. The official turkish statistics ignore the non-recorded elements, but they do exist, specially in Kurdistan.

(3) The original French title being "La civilisation du Kurdistan: genèse, fastes et devenir de la nation kurde"; about 500 pp., to be edited.

(4) Cf. "Annuaire démographique 1967", p.108, by the United Nations.

are to be rejected as completely subjective and non-scientific (5). The population of the republic consists of two peoples: the Turks, representing some 74 % of the whole, and the Kurds, 21.5 %, and of several minority elements representing together some 4.5 % of the whole (Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Circassians, Azeris, etc.)

My figures are very close to those given by Prof. Ismail Besikçi in his excellent article "The Under-Development of Eastern Anatolia" - in Turkish (6) -, published in the Turkish socialist magazine "Ant" ("Oath" February 1971 (7)). A former professor of political science at the University of Erzurum, and later on at the University of Ankara, Besikçi is also the author of a book edited in 1969, in Turkish, concerning the Kurdish question and the problems of the "Dogu" : "The Situation in Eastern Anatolia : its Social, Economic and Ethnical Causes" (8). In his article, Prof. Besikçi - who is a progressist Turk - says that the area inhabited by the Kurdish people ("halk") in the republic covers 18 vilayets, with a total surface amounting to 220.734 km², or 29.9 % of the State territory; the Kurdish population in that area ("Dogu") is given to be 5.903.000 inhabitants in 1965, or 18.8 % of the state population. In his article, the author seems to consider the population of the Kurdish "Dogu" as totally Kurdish. He does not speak, actually, either of the non-Kurds inhabiting in Kurdistan or of the Kurds inhabiting Turkish Turkey. The importance of those "minority" ethnical elements in both parts of the Republic is due to two main factors: 1) the policy of national oppression against Kurds (with attempts of assimilation, implanting Turkish elements in Kurdistan, and transferring by force Kurdish groups or individuals to Turkish Turkey, measures carried out especially in the period between the two World Wars); 2) the policy of economic and social underdevelopment, as pursued, and "planned", one should say, by the Turkish authorities in Kurdistan. This policy is responsible for an immigration current from the East to the economically more developed West - but is compensated, demographically, by a much higher rate of birth in Kurdistan: according to a calculus I made on the basis of Turkish statistics (9) 19.3 % of the Kurdish population are children less than 4 years old, the equivalent percentage being 13.4 % for the Turkish element and 14.7 %

(5) The Turkish official statistics give a decreasing Kurdish percentage: 9.16 % in 1935, and only about 7 % in 1965.-

(6) "Dogu Anadolu'da Geri Birakilmisligu Olusumu".

(7) "Ant" Nr. 10 Feb. 1971, pp 46-73

(8) "Dogu Anadolu'nun Dûzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller" Istanbul 1969

(9) "Census of Population", idem, Part 2, pp 44-47

for the whole population of the republic (10). These two factors, the under-development and the national oppression of the "Dogu", are obviously correlative. - Professor Besikçi also explains the under-development of the "Dogu" by the national oppression - by the "ethnical" cause as he says -, as well as by the law of the unequal development of capitalism. I shall give farther a few examples of the kurdisch under-development in Turkey. -

Socially speaking, the people of turkish Kurdistan are composed of 27 % of city-dwellers, 71 to 72 % of settled peasants, and 1 to 2 % of semi-nomadic tribes. The latter are apparently bound to disappear within a few years (11).

Turkish (Turkey's) Kurdistan is naturally a part of the fatherland of the kurdisch nation, Kurdistan, which has been politically partitioned among the states of Turkey, Persia (Iran), Iraq and Syria, not to mention the kurdisch communities living in soviet Transcaucasia. That is why there are a turkish, a persian (iranian), an iraqi and a syrian Kurdistan(s), the foremost being the most extensive part of the kurdisch country (47%):

<u>States</u>	<u>Total area in sq. km.</u>	<u>Area of Kurdistan</u>	<u>% in the State</u>	<u>% to Kurdistan</u>
Turkey	767.000	225.000	29.3 %	47.4 %
Persia	1.640.000	160.000	9.8 %	33.7 %
Iraq	444.000	75.000	16.9 %	15.8 %
Syria	185.000	15.000	8.0 %	3.1 %
Kurdistan	475.000 km2	100.0 %

The country of the kurdisch nation can be divided into 6 main geographical areas:

1. - Central Kurdistan: astride the turkish iraqi frontier, from the southern shores of the lake of Van to the greater-Zab, including the Hak-kari and the Badinan;

2. - Northern Kurdistan: from the southern shores of the lake of Van northwards to Erzurum, Kars, Ardahan and the soviet border;

3. - Western Kurdistan: which comprises all the kurdisch land stretching to the west of the meridian of Bitlis, as far as Hatay, Marash, Elbistan, beyond Malatya, Zara (the middle upper Tigris being the limit between central and western kurdisch, thus leaving, within the latter geographical area, the Sinjar, the kurdisch regions in northern Syria,

(10) My work "La civilisation du Kurdistan....".

(11) I justified these percentages, on the basis of official Turkish statistics, in the same work.

together with the Diyarbakir, the Dersim, etc);

4.- Southern Kurdistan: which comprises all the part of iraqi Kurdistan to the south and east of the greater Zab: this is the country of Soran and Baban;

5.- Eastern or Old Kurdistan: which comprises the greatest part of persian Kurdistan, from the soviet border up to beyond Kirmanshah to the south, including western Azerbaïjan and the ancient kurdish kingdom or Ardalan;

6.- Luristan, or South-Eastern Kurdistan.

Turkish Kurdistan, commonly called northern Kurdistan, comprises in fact northern Kurdistan and the greatest part of western and central Kurdistan.- Persian Kurdistan, usually called eastern Kurdistan, includes eastern and south-eastern Kurdistan (with greater and smaller-Luristan). Southern Kurdistan - as it is commonly called - includes southern Kurdistan and a part of central Kurdistan (Badinan), together with the Sinjar. The kurdish areas of Syria (that is: northern part of Jazireh, Arab-Pinar and Kurd-Dagh) constitute, as part of western Kurdistan an ethnical prolongation of turkish Kurdistan across the border.- Those considerations are only geographical definitions and have nothing to do with politics.-

The Kurds living in the Republic of Turkey (within and outside Kurdistan) represent the largest part of all the kurdish people, even when we take into consideration the Kurds of the USSR and of other countries (such as Agfanistan and Lebanon). Here are the figures regarding the total kurdish population in the different concerned states of the area (12):

<u>States</u>	<u>Population in 1965</u>			<u>Estimations for 1970</u>	
	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Kurds</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Kurds</u>
Turkey....	31,391,000	6,750,000	21.50	35,516,000	7,637,000
Persia....	24,549,000	4,500,000	18.33	28,548,000	5,233,000
Iraq.....	8,261,000	2,272,000	27.50	9,345,000	2,570,000
<u>Syria.....</u>	<u>5,634,000</u>	<u>500,000</u>	<u>9.00</u>	<u>6,492,000</u>	<u>576,000</u>
TOTALS....	69,835,000	14,022,000	20.08	79,901,000	16,016,000
Kurds of					
the USSR..	-----	150,000	-----	-----	170,000
Other					
Kurds	-----	228,000	-----	-----	264,000
TOTAL of					
KURDS		14,400,000			16,450,000

(12) I justified these figures in the "La civilisation du Kurdistan.."

This table shows that the kurdish element constitutes one fifth (20.08 %) of the total populations of the states of Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Syria, the proportion of the Kurds living within each of those States, to the total number of the kurdish people, being the following in 1965 (13):

<u>Kurds of</u>	<u>% to total of Kurds in 1965</u>
Turkey...46.9 %
Persia...31.2 %
Iraq.....15.9 %
Syria....3.5 %
USSR.....1.0 %
Elsewhere1.5 %
	100.0

As to the importance of the population of Turkish Kurdistan in comparison to that of all Kurdistan (including the non-kurdish or minority elements, but excluding the Kurdish minorities outside Kurdistan), the following table is illustrative (14):

<u>Kurdistan</u>	<u>Population in 1965</u>			<u>Estimations for 1970</u>	
	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Kurds</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Kurds</u>
Turkish K.	6.250.000	5.250,000	84,00	7,071,000	5,940,000
Persian K.	4,400,000	3,900,000	88,64	5,116,000	4,535,000
Iraqi K...	2,247,000	2,057,000	91,57	2,542,000	2,327,000
<u>Syrian K..</u>	<u>480,000</u>	<u>450,000</u>	<u>93,75</u>	<u>553,000</u>	<u>518,000</u>
<u>Kurdistan.</u>	<u>13,377,000</u>	<u>11,657,000</u>	<u>87,14</u>	<u>15,282,000</u>	<u>13,320,000</u>

This table shows that out of more than 15 million people representing the population of Kurdistan in 1970; almost 2 millions are non-Kurds (12.8%). The proportion of the non-kurdish elements is the highest in turkish Kurdistan (16.0%), then in persian Kurdistan (11.3%), then in iraqi Kurdistan (8.4%), and is the lowest in the kurdish areas of Syria (about 6.2%). Equally, the relative and absolute importance of the Kurds living outside Kurdistan is much higher in Turkey than in other states:

(13) According to the figure given by the United Nations (in "Annuaire démographique 1967"), the annual rate of demografic increase is higher in Persia and Syria than in Turkey and Iraq, the rates being: 2.5% for Turkey and Iraq, 2.9% for Syria, and 3.1% for Iran. Should we admit these rates (calculated on the basis of data furthered by the interested governments), the relative importance of the Kurds of each state would be slightly different in 1970 (to the advantage of the Kurds of Persia). But I believe that the increase of the kurdish population is homogeneous.

(14) I justified these figures in "La civilisation du Kurdistan...".

Kurds of		Estimations
<u>non-Kurdish areas</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>for 1970</u>
In Turkey.....	1,500,000	1,697,000
In Persia.....	600,000	698,000
In Iraq.....	215,000	243,000
<u>In Syria.....</u>	<u>50,000</u>	<u>58,000</u>
<u>TOTALS.....</u>	<u>2,365,000</u>	<u>2,696,000</u>

22.2% of the total number of the Kurds of Turkey live outside turkish Kurdistan, the equivalent proportion being 13.3% in Iran; 9.4% in Iraq and about 10% in Syria. These figures, coupled with those representing the non-kurdish elements in the different parts of Kurdistan, reflect the fact that the policy of national oppression, against the Kurdish people, was much fiercer in the Republic of Turkey than in the other concerned states.-

In the tables above, all my estimations for 1970 are based on the annual increase rate of population in the different concerned states, as suggested by the United Nations on the basis of governmental data. These rates indicate that the population increase is faster in Persia (and persian Kurdistan) than in the other countries. I have some two doubts about that; in any case, I think that the growth of the Kurdish population is rather homogeneous in all Kurdistan.

The average population density in all of Kurdistan was 28 inhabitants per sq.Km in 1965 (27.8 in turkish Kurdistan and 40 in all the Republic of Turkey), and about 32.2 in 1970.

Historical background:

It goes without saying that, to the exception of their elements living outside Kurdistan, the Kurds do not constitute, within any of those states, a national "minority", but a cohesive ethnical and national group, a people living in their ancestral country.

Descendants of the ancient Medes and other medis tribes, such as the Kyrtii, the Mards and the Zikurtu (15), the Kurds belong to the indo-european stock, and their language is one of the iranian or aryan family. The affinity between Kurdish, Persian and Pastiche, within the iranian family of languages, is similar to that which exists between German and Swedish; with the germanic family of languages, or between Russian and Polish, within the Slavic family.- The words "Iranian" and "Persian" are not at all identical, the Persians being but only one of the peoples (in plural) who speak iranian languages. Scientifically speaking, the Kurds are Iranians in the same way as the Poles are Slavs - but not more "Persians" than the Poles are "Russians". That is why it could be

(15) On the ethnical formation of the Kurdish people, see the works of V.Minorsky, Nikitine, Mohamed Amin Zeki, T. Whaby, etc., as well as my chapter on the matter in "La Civilisation du Kurdistan...".

adequate to say "persian Kurdistan" instead of "iranian Kurdistan", to distinguish that part of the kurdish country which is included within the Persian Empire, nowadays called Iran but politically dominated by the persian element, from turkish or iraqi Kurdistan. In a sense, as defined above, all Kurdistan is iranian; but this has nothing to do with politics.

The Kurds were Zoroastrians - and partially Christians - till the islamic conquest. They were converted to Islam in the current of the VIIth Century - but not without initial resistance, sometimes very tough to the arab advance. Since that epoch information on Kurdistan became more and more important. The Kurds accepted their new religion quite willingly afterwards, and defended it together with the Arabs. By the beginning of the Xth Century, while the arab power was on its decline, the Kurds became practically the sole protectors of Islam, on military field together with another iranian people, the Daylams (Buyids) : this is what Professor Vladimir Minorsky, from the University of London, calls, in a remarkable study, the "iranian intermezzo", that is the period of kurdish-daylamit (iranian) domination of the Islamic East, between the periods of arab and turkish domination (16).

When the first turks, the Seljuks, came into Turkey and the Middle East, in the current of the XIth Century, the Kurds had been living in persian (old) Kurdistan for two thousand years, and in the rest of their country since the fall of Niniva in 612 before Christ. Since more than one century before the arrival of the Seljuks - who had slowly come from Central Asia to the present russian Turkistan, and whence to the area-, the Kurds had known statehood and were organized in medieval kingdoms which defended the islamic frontier from Byzance and Christendom. There were powerful kurdish states at the epoch:

1.- The Mervanid State, founded by king Badh, who received from the Abbassid Caliph - this Pope of Islam - the title of "Shah Badh the Courageous". This state, the most extensive and the most powerful of the four, covered all present turkish Kurdistan (to the exception of the regions lying to the north of the upper Araxes and to the west of the Euphrates), all present syrian Kurdistan (to the exception of Kurd-Dagh, which was not kurdish) and a part of present iraqi Kurdistan (the Badinan, the Sinjar, together with the arab town of Mosul). Badh had occupied all those areas, and chose Amida (Diyarbakir) as capital. He founded a new kurdish town on the lake of Van, that he called "Shahbaz" and to which a later mervanid sovereign, king Abdel the Just, gave the name of "Adeljawaz" (the present Adelcevaz). Another later mervanid king transferred the capital to Mayafarqin (Silvan) (17).

(16) V. Minorsky, "Sutides in Caucasian History", London 1953.

(17) On these four and other kurdish states and principalities see the classical work "Cheref-nameh" of prince Cheref Khan; M.A. Zeki's "History of the kurdish states and principalities under Islam" (in kurdish);

2.- The Shaddadid State, which covered more than half of the present Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the town of Ganja, near the Kura river, as a capital. This area of the Caucasus was but very partially kurdish and had non-kurdish majorities. Its history was outlined by Prof.V.Minorsky: "New light on the Shaddadids of Ganja" (in "Studies..." , idem.).

3.- The Ravend(id) or Rawadi State, with Tabriz as capital, which covered all present persian Azerbaijan (western and eastern); then kurdish (18).

4.- The Hassanavid State, which covered the regions of Kirkuk, Sulaimani, Sanendaj (Sineh), Kirmanshah and Hamadan, the latter town being also kurdish.

The first three of this kurdish states collapsed soon after the arrival of the Seljuks. These turks adopted the civilization of the area, were good Moslems and had great sultans. The seljuk Turks defended the islamic civilization of the Middle East, with the help of the kurdish people, against the Crusade invasions. During the XIIth and XIIIth Centuries it was the turn of the Kurds, with the rise of the kurdish Ayyubid Dynasty, founded by the great sultan Saladin, to take the leadership of the islamic world and the Middle East. The ayyubid Kurds defended the civilization of the East, with the help of the seljuk Turks, against the Crusade invasions. In the ayyubid armies, about half of the soldiers and generals were Kurds, about another half were Turks (19), some were Circassians, the Arabs being then in a period of complete decline - after the great VIIth islamic Century. Saladin's (kurdish-turkish) armies defeated Richard Coeur de Lion, king of England; Philippe Auguste, king of France; and Frederic Barberousse, king of Germany (the third Crusade). Another kurdish king, the ayyubid sultan Touran-Shah of Egypt, defeated, later on, Saint Louis, King of France, and took him prisoner. The Turks and Kurds were also allied against the invasions coming from central Asia. The seljuk sultan Ky-Qubad of Qonya and the ayyubid sultan Ashraf of Kurdistan and Syria defeated together the mongol army of Jalal al-Din Khwarazm-shah in a famous battle near Erzinjan, on 28 ramadan 627 of the Hegira (August 10, 1230). Saladin was the Charlemagne of the islamic Orient. The Kurdish

(suite de la note (17))

... the works of Prof.Minorsky and of Father Bois, and mine in "La civilisation....".

(18) V. Minorsky, "Appendix" in "Studies...".

(19) See in V. Minorsky, idem., pp. 139-144, the composition of Saladin's army at the battle of Akka (Acre) of 21 sha'ban 585/4 October 1189.

Empire under the Ayyubids covered Kurdistan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Lybia, the Sudan and Arabia, with the Hijaz and the Yemen. The kurdish soldiers were everywhere. Many great Moslems historians and writers were kurds, such as the famous historians Ibn-al-Athir (from Hak kari) and Ibn-Khallikan (from southern Kurdistan).

After the fall of the Ayyubids and Seljuks, Kurdistan was composed of many kurdish principalities and knew a bright civilization. The ottoman-Turks arrived into the west of Turkey in the XIIIth Century and took Constantinople in 1453. They occupied the Balkans and that was the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. Till the beginning of the XVIth Century, Kurdistan was left to its own devices. In 1514, sultan Selim I and the kurdish princes concluded an alliance against the Safawid dynasty of Persia. At the battle of Chaldiran, they defeated shah Ismail. Since that date, most of the kurdish principalities became part of the Ottoman Empire, but kept their internal independence and their institutions. The artisan of that turkish-kurdish charter was a kurd from Bitlis, named mullah Idris Bitlisi the Wise, who became the intimate counsellor of Sultan Selim I. The famous german historian von Hammer - who remains as the best specialist in ottoman history - tells us that "we owe to this Kurd, Idris Bitlisi, the first general history of the Ottoman Empire". That was Bitlisi's work "Hasht-Bahisht", or "Selim-nameh" (20). Moreover, von Hammer tells us that in 1515, sultan Selim asked his counsellor Idris Bitlisi "to travel through the kurdish country from the coast of lake Urmia, the extreme oriental frontier of Kurdistan, to Malatya, its western frontier, in order to receive the homage of the kurdish princes and beys to the sultan" (21).

This text is of the highest importance. It shows that the Ottoman Empire recognized the principalities of Kurdistan, and that this country, in the beginning of the XVIth Century, extended, at this latitude, from Urmia to Malatya: since that date, the limits of Kurdistan did not practically change. On the political and military history of the kurdish states and principalities, one can consult the "Cheref-nameh, Annals of the Kurdish Nation", written in Persian in 1596 by the ruling prince of Bitlis, Cheref Khan, and later on translated into French and Arabic (22).

(20) The manuscript is kept at the Egyptian National Library, Cairo.

(21) "Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman", vol. 4, pp.223-224 (French edition).

(22) The french edition, translated by Charmoy, was edited in Petrograd by Zernov in 1860-75, in 4 volumes; the arab translation is due to Jameel Rojbeyani and was edited by the Iraqi Academy, Baghdad, 1953.

The famous turkish traveller and geographer Evliya Chelebi, of the XVIIth Century, gives full details on the kurdish civilization of the epoch, in his work "Evliya Chelebi siyahet-namesi" (23). There were in total more than forty principalities of different dimensions, some very important and were real states having their own institutions, their traditions and permanent armies. They had remained independent till the rise of the Sa wafi dynasty of Persia. Since after the battle of Chaldiran, most of them - like those of Bitlis, Mahmoudi, Hakkari, Hazo (the present region of Koz luk in the Stiirt), Shirvan, Dersim, Bothan, Badinan, Soran and Baban - became something like buffer-states within the Ottoman Empire, against Persia, while the principalities of eastern Kurdistan had to play the sa me rôle within the Persian Empire, against Turkey. One of the latter was that of Ardalan, which was one of the largest kurdish principalities and had previously an independent history.

The kurdish principalities of the Ottoman Empire were loyal to the sultans. They helped sultan Selim I with their own troops to occupy arab Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Idris Bitlisi was the sultan's companion, toge - ther with many kurdish princes, in the campaign of Syria. The Kurds also participated in the Empire's wars in the Balkans and Europe.

The epoch -from the beginning of the XVth Century till the end of the XVIIth - was that of a kurdish Renaissance, both material and cultu ral. The kurdish society was composed of a great mass of rural fixed e - lements (both peasants and landlords), of another important mass of se - mi-nomadic tribes, and of city-dwellers. The latter were composed of the following elements:

- a) the governing aristocracy (the princes and their own vassals, their families and relatives);
- b) the ministers, secretaries, counsellors, representatives, agents and civil servants of the princes; their officers and permanent troops: elements under the order of the ruling nobility;
- c) the merchants, small or local, and great; the latter, says Evli ya Chelebi, had "business relations with the foreign countries" and some "possessed great capitals";
- d) the chiefs of the craftsmen's guilds and their workers;
- e) a category of rentiers (who did not work);
- f) small employees, servants, sometimes peasants (most of the kur dish towns had gardens);
- g) intellectuals (of different social origins): poets, writers, teachers, ulemas, mullahs, sheikhs, doctors, scientists (yes!).

(23) "Evliya Chelebi's Travels" in turkish, published in 10 vol., Cons - tantinople, 1896-1900.

The bourgeoisie of the kurdish towns was subordinate to the governing nobility. The basic structure of the principalities was feudal, but such also was the structure of the Ottoman and the Persian Empires. Abs^{tr}action being made of the difficult conditions of the peasantry, sometimes reduced to serfdom - as elsewhere in the Middle East at the epoch, Kurdistan was prosperous country in the XVIth Century. Both Cheref Khan in this century, and Chelebi in the next one, give us a colourful and striking picture of the great advancement of Kurdistan in all fields, architecture, urbanism, medicine, education, commerce, handicrafts, etc. Bitlis, capital of the flourishing principality which carried the same name, was - to take its example - a very important city, full of palaces, hotels, schools, mosques, bridges, castles, workshops, café-restaurants, public gardens and fountains, a center of education of great renown, of international trade and of tourism. Chelebi says that the city had a great number of famous scientists, of poets and writers, "seven of whom were considered among the greatest poets of Kurdistan". Cheref Khan speaks of a renowned kurdish astronomer and mathematician. The situation was not different in many other kurdish towns, such as Diyarbakir, Van, Cizre (Jazireh), Amadiya, Sineh and Kirmanshah, the two latter in persian Kurdistan. It is unjust and antiscientific to consider the kurdish people as an agglomerate of "lawless nomadic tribes and backward peasants", without "any national consciousness" - as do affirm the imperialists and the oppressors of this nation - while, centuries ago, they were organized in orderly governments and had an urban life, with prosperous cities, middle classes and a system of education. Although Kurdistan was not unified politically, the kurdish educated elements were conscious of the existence of the Kurds as one nation, and proud of belonging to that nation. In the introduction to his "Cheref-nameh", prince Cheref Khan of Bitlis speaks precisely of "the kurdish nation", of "its qualities and its character", of the dimension of "the kurdish homeland" and the geographical "frontiers of Kurdistan"; in all his work, he shows himself proud of "the great princes, the great kings and the valient knights of Kurdistan". Curiously enough, Cheref Khan had of the nation, in that remote century, a surprisingly modern ethnical conception. To the exception perhaps of the Armenians, none of other peoples of the Middle East had at that time such a national consciousness.

This kurdish Renaissance - which I studied with much more details in my manuscript "La civilisation du Kurdistan...", together with the kurdish medieval civilization - was also marked by the development of kurdish literature written in the national language. One of the oldest and greatest kurdish poets among those who used Kurdish in their works was Mullah Jaziri describes himself as "the rose in the gardens of Bohtan's paradise, and the torch-light of Kurdistan's nights" (in kurdish: Gulê

baxê îremê Bothan im; shebqiraxê shevên Kurdistan im) (24).

Unfortunately, the KURDISH HUKUMATS (Kurdish Governements) and the kurdish autonomous sanjaks, officially recognized as such by the Ottoman Empire under sultan Selim I, could not keep their internal independence over a long period. After the ottoman-persian treaty of 1639, the Empire no longer needed the kurdish principalities as buffer-states against Persia: since that date, and even before to some extent, the sultans endeavoured to transform those small but genuine kurdish states into mere provinces, directly governed by turkish pachas and generals. The kurdish ruling dynasties were unable to present a common united front against turkish attacks. The principalities were attacked one after another, and so they collapsed, one after another, and their ruling families were deposed and exiled. In the Ottoman Empire, the last principality, that of Bohtan, hitherto ruled by the Bedir-Khan family, collapsed in 1847. So also did Persia: the last principality of persian Kurdistan, that of Ardalan, disappeared in 1867. The famous german marshal von Moltke, when still a young captain, took part as officer of the ottoman army in the campaign against the Kurds. He described that war in his "Letters" and in an article (25).

Officially, the destruction of the kurdish principalities was undertaken within the framework of what was called the Tanzimat, that is the movement of reform of the Empire. Actually, the kurdish people lost every thing in the adventure and won nothing. The principalities had gotten old and, possibly, they had anachronistic social structures. But with their fall, was lost the necessary political framework within which people might continue, after genuine reforms, to advance. What happened was exactly the contrary: the Kurds lost their national institutions, their prosperity and their liberty; the kurdish bourgeoisie, instead of getting into the modern industrial stage, lost most of its importance and of its wealth; the importance of the tribal chiefs increased and, with it, the unrest in the country, the kurdish national culture was jeopardized and its advance brutally stopped; the very material civilization of Kurdistan went backwards. The reason for this dramatic situation was simple: the ottoman bureaucracy destroyed the kurdish institutions, but the Empire, with its feudal traditions, offered nothing to replace them and was basically unable - and unwilling - to do anything that might be helpful to the kurdish people. The kurdish schools which flourished under the prin-

(24) On the kurdish classic literature, see "Coup d'oeil sur la littérature kurde", in "Al-Machriq", Beirut, XI, 1955, pp.201-239, and "Connaissance des Kurdes", Beirut 1965, both by the Frejch specialist Father Thomas Bois; see also Basile Nikitine's book "Les Kurdes..." Paris, 1956.

(25) See "Briefe...", Berlin 1841, and "Das Land und Volk der Kurden", in Vermischte Schriften zur orientalischen Frage, Berlin 1892, Band II, pp. 288-298.

capalities crumbled to earth and were not reopened by the imperial administration. Bitlis, Van, Diyarbakir, Silvan, Jazireh and other kurdish towns, which had been capitals dashing with life and full of lofty things became only big villages. The Ottoman administration was interested only in recruiting kurdish soldiers and collecting taxes, relying on tribal chiefs. The result was a growing poverty and an endemic anarchy.

Here is a concrete example: Evliya Chelebi knew personally the last prince of Bitlis, Avdal Khan, and was his guest; he describes him as a man of great wisdom and science; the prince was the author of many books on medicine and botanic and was himself an "unrivelled" medical doctor and watch - maker; he made a watch encrusted in a ring that the turkish traveller had seen on sultan Murad's finger; he manufactured alarm-clocks, with indication of the zodiacal signs; in his palace, he had 44 workshops of different kinds; his private library was rich in thousands of volumes, many of which were rare manuscripts; he also had a collection of old maps of precious miniatures and paintings. As a physician, the prince took care of the population health: Evliya Chelebi saw him making medicines, treating the blind and the elderly. The prince also was one of the wealthiest men of all Kurdistan. This good Avdal Khan was deposed by sultan Murad IV in 1666; his material wealth was looted by general Malik Ahmed pacha, who was the sultan's nephew and military governor of Kurdistan: 80 sacks of gold, 10 caravans of mules; 10 caravans of horses, etc. We know that because Evliya Chelebi, by chance, was present when the inventory was drawn up. Malik Ahmed pacha had already tried to loot the prince in 1638 and had been dissuaded from doing it only because Avdal Khan had bribed him and his officers with gold. He did not lose time, because, meanwhile, he attacked the Kurds of Sinjar and plundered their area. As to the cultural and artistical treasures of the unhappy kurdish prince, they are lost for ever. Chelebi tells that he could save only the precious manuscripts, that a soldier was trying to slash with his knife.

Brought under the light of its social content, the kurdish national movement can be divided into two main periods, each presenting two different phases:

-- an anarchical or old period, with:

1) a "princely" or feudal phase, from the beginning till, roughly, the middle of the XIXth Century;

2) a paternalist or "popular" phase, during the second half of the XIXth Century;

-- a modern or organized period, with:

3) a "bourgeois" phase, roughly from 1900 to 1945;

4) a democratic phase, which is the present one.

1) The "princely" or feudal phase:

The movement was merely the reaction of some principalities to the ottoman policy of centralization. We know that behind the façade of the so-called "Tanzimat" reforms, only arbitrary despotism and backwardness was promised to Kurdistan by the Empire; that the fall of the kurdish principalities meant to stop the march of the kurdish civilization and of the kurdish national culture; that the Kurds lost almost everything in that phase, good or bad, including their own institutions, and won nothing, except trouble and anarchy.

The phase was "princely", because it was led by some princes - naturally to safeguard their privileges -, but also the traditions and the institutions of the nation. It was feudal, because led by kurdish nobility - a nobility on the decline - against that of the Empire. It was anarchical, because led without any program, without any social progressist content, and in disorder: each prince trying to preserve his possessions, sometimes at the expense of the others, or engaging the battle separately, and in despair. It is obvious that such a movement could not succeed, facing a large empire. It was condemned to failure. An example of the movement in this phase was the revolt led by the prince of Soran Miri Kora Mohamed pacha (or the "One-eyed Prince") in 1833-36. Another one was that started by the prince Bedir-Khan of Bohtan, from 1842 to 1847. Bedir-Khan proclaimed his independence and indeed had an ally, prince Nurallah of Hak kari, but they lost the war against the turkish army.

Most of the foreign authors who wrote about the Kurds do not see either this phase or the next one; they see only the modern period and consider that the kurdish national movement began with the XXth Century. Such a view does not correspond with the facts of kurdish history. Both Bedir-Khan, in the first phase, and Sheikh Obeidullah Shemdinan, in the second one, directed their revolts aiming at creating an independent kurdish state. We have seen prince Cheref Khan of Bitlis already speaking of his "Kurdish Nation" in the XVth Century. He did not fabricate the idea of this nation but found it in his society. But, at that time, the idea of the kurdish nation was only an idea: it became movement - indeed without organization - when the successors of sultan Selim began destroying the kurdish principalities, and when the kurdish people began to experience domination and exploitation. In his famous epic Mem-o-Zin, written in kurdish and of which we have a recent integral edition thanks to the Soviet Academy of Science (26), the great kurdish poet Ahmedê Khani expressed in the XVIIth Century the popular feeling of kurdish nationalism. In a way, Khani is the "literary father" of kurdish nationalism. Between him and Cheref Khan, who was born some half a century before the poet,

(26) Moscow, 1962, the kurdish text in 197 pages, with a russian translation, 234 pages and notes, due to M.B. Rodenko, and an introduction by the soviet kurdish professor Kanat Kurdoev.

there is a big difference, a new dimension in the way of conceiving their kurdish nation. Cheref Khan, the historian, was a ruling prince and the head of a great principality; his grand-father and homonym Cheref Khan had received, from shah Tahmasp of Persia, in 1533, the "majestic"- as he said - title of Prince of princes of Kurdistan (27): as such, and altho^{ugh} very conscious and proud of his nation, Cheref Khan could be only content with his destiny; he did not feel the necessity of any change because, for him, everything was in order and for the best: the kurdish nation, courageous and innumerable, the kurdish country interminable, the kurdish knights unrivalled, the kurdish princes great and generous, and himself being on the best possible terms with the two mightiest kings of the epoch, the sultan and the shah. Ahmedê Khani, on the contrary, was a man of the people and described himself as "a poor poet". He was sharply conscious of the misfortunes of his nation and wept over the spectacle of Kurdistan being under turkish and persian domination. In the beginning of his patriotic epic, he enumerated the "incomparable" merits of his nation: courage, audacity, greatness of the soul, and then asked himself: "Why then are the kurdish people so miserable? Why are we condemned, under turkish and persian domination?". He wrote:

Behold: all the country between Arabia and Georgia
 Is kurdish land;
 The Kurds live there as in a citadel;
 The Turks and the Persians are established behind them (...);
 Our nation holds the frontier keys,
 She separates both enemies,
 Strongly as a dam;
 But when the turkish sea and the persian ocean grow rough,
 The Kurds are splashed with blood.

Khani dreamt of a "kurdish king" who would liberate and unify Kurdistan. He urged his countrymen to abandon discord, to obey to each other and to unite for the liberation of the kurdish homeland:

If we were united (...)
 We would be mightiest (...)
 We would raise the wind (...)
 We would attain the realm of science and wisdom.

Cheref Khan's nationalism was static and self-content, that of a governing upper class; Khani's was tormented, passionate and dynamic, that of the people; it appealed to action and contained revolutionary seeds.

2) The "paternalist" or "popular" phase:

Ottoman Kurdistan rose up in arms in large successive revolts throughout all the XIXth Century. Wherever the principalities had collapsed - that is in the largest part of the country -, the revolts were popular:

(27) See the "Cheref-nameh", Iraqi Edition, pp. 446-47.

deprived of staff, of their princes and their hereditary chiefs, the masses rose up spontaneously, but violently, with as sole program to throw the "Rums" (Ottoman turks) out of Kurdistan, or to scape the gendarme and the tax-collector. Such was the large revolt of 1828-29, during the russian-turkish war (28). Sometimes the popular revolt could find a "paternal" chief. The revolt of 1853-55, during the Crimea War, was led by Yezdan-Shêr (Yezdan the lion), who, for sometime occupied all the country between Van and the north of Baghdad. In 1880-81, Sheikh Obeidullah Shemdinan led a revolt in the Hakkari which extended to some parts of persian Kurdistan; he asked for kurdish independence. Although popular, these revolts had no chance to succeed, deprived as they were of any organization and program.

3) The "bourgeois" phase of the modern period:

The first stage of the modern period of the kurdish national movement - a stage which corresponds to the third main phase in the history of this movement - began in 1898, with the publication of the first kurdish journal "Kurdistan". It was led by young intellectuals, lawyers, of ficers and students, who had received modern education and who belonged to the bourgeois middle classes or to the remnants of the old uprooted aristocracy. They were mostly gathered in Constantinople and had a very loose contact with the population of Kurdistan. Some of them, like a few members of the Bedir-Khan family, lived for a while in Cairo and later on in Geneva.

By that time, the idea of modern nationalism, with the concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity of the French Revolution, had penetrated the Middle East. The western modern -ethnical- conception of nationalism had nothing new for the Kurds: their nationalism, as expressed by Cheref Khan and by Khani, and later on by the poet Haji Qader Koyi of southern Kurdistan, had since the XVIth Century ethnical and linguistical foundations. The situation was different with the Turks, for whom the is lamic link had hitherto been the sole cement of the Empire. The Kurds we re not insensitive to ottoman-islamic links: despite of all the vicissitudes of history, they had been the Turks' comrades in arms in all the wars fought by the Empire. Prior to the beginning of the ottoman history, the Kurds had been, under the ayyubid dynasty, the first defenders and the protectors of the islamic world: the seljuk Turks were, then, their partners, sometimes their vassals and their soldiers. But the Kurds' pri mary feeling was that they were Kurds -the national consciousness. The ap pearance of the western ethnical conception of nationalism was, one may say, a revelation in turkish Turkey. The turkish small bourgeoisie, especially the young officers, adopted it! with all that excess which had been the cause of so many wars in Europe. As the impact of the new ideas of

(28) As described by the Soviet Profesor Viltchevsky, Leningrad, quoted by Nikitine.

liberty and self-determination was great on the dominated peoples of the Empire, Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Bulgarians, Albanians, the conflict between their respective emancipation movements and the new-born turkish nationalism became unavoidable.

The Young Turks' revolution of 1908, achieved by young officers adept of the new nationalism, was, however, liberal. It put an end to sultan Abdul Hamid's despotism and endowed the Empire with a democratic constitution of western style. Several kurdish clubs were authorized and, for the first time, kurdish political associations were founded. The Kurds hoped to enjoy their national rights within the framework of the Empire. But the Young Turks's movement suddenly changed policy, showing itself very much against any national concession to any of the subject peoples. During the First World War in 1915, about one million Armenians were massacred in Turkey or obliged to take refuge abroad. The Kurds too suffered great calamities. The Armenian author Arshak Sfrastian says that it is hardly realized that the Kurds, to the north of Mosul, "suffered only a few degrees less than the Armenians during the Great War"(29). The Kurdish historian Mohamed Amin ZEKI, who was a colonel in the ottoman army during that war, gives many examples of these losses in his book "A Short History of the Kurds and Kurdistan"(30). The kurdish losses were, at least, partly due to the policy of the Unionists (the Young Turks' generals then in power): transfer of population, food confiscation, planned famine, etc.

Together with Germany and her central european allies, ottoman Turkey was defeated in the war. The subject peoples of the Empire were to obtain their independence or their autonomy, as laid down in the Sèvres Treaty of 1920. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the emancipation of the subject peoples were a part of the process of decolonization based on the principle of self-determination, as expressed in President Woodrow Wilson's program in "Fourteen Points". The Arabs were to be organized in separate states under mandate. According to the same Treaty (Section III: KURDISTAN, articles 62,63 and 64), ancient ottoman Kurdistan was to be organized in an autonomous kurdish state within the boundaries of Turkey, with the possibility for the kurdish people to obtain their full national independence under some conditions, thus fixed by article 64 of the Treaty:

"... If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the kurdish people within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of

(29)"Kurds and Kurdistan", London 1948, p.74.

(30) Published first in Kurdish, Baghdad 1931, then translated and published in Arabic (by Mohamed Al Awni), Cairo 1936.

these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommend that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over those areas".

"The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey."

"If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion of such independent kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which was hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet".

Inasmuch as the Treaty of Sèvres provided for the liberation of the dependent peoples, it was just. Had the treaty been executed, the Kurds could possibly have been content to enjoy autonomy within the framework of Turkey. But the treaty could not be carried into execution. It contained too many injustices.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson had officially reassured the Turks and promised them "full sovereignty and security" in "all the regions of the Empire where the turkish element was in majority" (31). But the President's Allies, mainly Great Britain and France, followed an imperialistic policy. By the inter-allied agreements of 1916 and 1917, the ottoman possessions, including turkish Turkey, were partitioned into "influence or occupation zones" between France, Great Britain, tsarist Russia and Italy. After the soviet Revolution of 1917, the USSR renounced to the advantages recognized to Russia in the agreements of 1916, and that led only to more greed from the part of the other three western powers, especially England. In 1919, the Smyrna area was militarily occupied by Greece, Adalia by Italy, and Cilicia by France together with Tashnak Armenian levies. Istanbul was ruled by a military allied commission. The treaty itself confirmed the greek domination over Smyrna, placed the Straits (Bosphorus) under international control and the whole turkish economy under the "protection" of Europe. That would have led to the colonization of the country by the western powers.

In spite of the rights granted to the Kurds in articles 62 and 64 the fate reserved for them was no better:

a) First of all, the whole of persian Kurdistan was not to be included in the future autonomous (or independent) kurdish state. Internationally speaking, that was foreseeable, since only Turkey was concerned in the treaty, and not Persia;

b) The kurdish "local autonomy" was to embrace the kurdish-inhabited areas "lying east of the Euphrates" (Art.62): which meant that the

(31) See Jean Pichon, "Le partage du Proche-Orient", p.182.

kurdish areas lying westwards of the Euphrates, Malatya for example, were to be excluded from this autonomy;

c) Thirdly, and most serious, continues article 62, the kurdish autonomous territory was to lie "south of the southern boundary of Armenia, as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27..."

Contrary to Kurdistan, which, first, was to be autonomous within Turkey, Armenia was immediately to be independent (Articles 88 to 93 of the Treaty). The "southern boundary of Armenia" with Turkey (Turkey including Kurdistan) was to be fixed by later arbitration of the President of the United States, says article 89, "in the vilayets of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis". This text implicates that the vilayets of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis would be partitioned between independent Armenia and autonomous turkish Kurdistan. It was practically admitted, in western international circles, that all the country lying between Van, Bitlis, the russian border and the Black Sea would be left to Armenia. But the vilayets of Van, Bitlis and Erzurum were kurdish. In the eastern vilayets of Turkey, there were practically no Armenians left. That was only very partially the result of the unionists massacres of 1915. According to the official french "Livre Jaune" ("Yellow book") published by the french Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1896, on the armenian question, the armenian element represented only 13% of the total population of the six eastern vilayets, then claimed by Armenians to be theirs: the kurdish element, exception being made of the Trebizond vilayet, represented some 82% of the population of the eastern vilayets at the end of the XIXth Century (32). All the northern part of turkish Kurdistan was thus practically to be left to Armenia, and that was a serious problem.

d) All southern Kurdistan (the future iraqi Kurdistan) was practically separated from the rest of the ottoman Kurdistan, and that was made implicit in the last paragraph of Article 64. This part of the kurdish country was occupied by the British after the First World War, and this occupation was internationally illegal, because it occurred after the Mudros armistice with Turkey, which was concluded on October 30, 1918. That was another serious problem. Neither the Treaty of Sèvres nor that of Lausanne could fix the turkish-mesopotamian (iraqi) border, and that gave birth to what was called "the Mosul Question", a diplomatic dispute between Turkey and Great Britain. This border was fixed later on by a decision of the council of the League of Nations, taken on December 16, 1925. According to this decision, southern Kurdistan was left to the newly created and british-sponsored iraqi state, on condition that the Kurds of the area would enjoy self-government. The british and iraqi governments then officially proclaimed their will to "grant" self-government

(32) See in "La Civilisation du Kurdistan..." my study on the Armenian-Kurdish relations in the Middle Age.

to the Kurds of southern Kurdistan - a most solemn promise which was never kept. That naturally led to many kurdish revolt, which culminated in the large and well organized revolution that started on September 11, 1961, under the command of general Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (33). But this is another matter - and a long story.

e) As to the turkish-syrian border, to which reference is made in Article 62; it also rejected to Syria a small part of Ottoman Kurdistan, especially the Jazireh and the Kurd-Dagh areas. This frontier was fixed by the french-turkish agreement of Ankara, October 20, 1921. This situation will give birth to a kurdish problem in Syria.-(34).

To conclude, the autonomous turkish Kurdistan, as provided for in the Treaty of Sèvres; was to be amputated of large kurdish areas to the north, south and west, which were to be abandoned respectively to Armenia, Iraq, Syria and turkish Turkey.- On the other hand, the same western economic colonialism was promised to both kurdish and turkish peoples.

The turkish people rose up in arms against the Treaty of Sèvres, against western domination and greek occupation. That was, basically a revolution of national liberation, which constitute the positive contribution and the progressist face of the Kemalist movement. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk began his movement in the eastern vilayets, amongst the Kurds. He addressed himself to the Kurds and promised them, as naturally to the turkish people, liberty, equality and a happy future. The "Turkish National Pact", proclaimed by the Kemalist movement on January 26, 1920, promised to respect "the ethnic rights" or "the constituent elements" of the empire's "Moslem-Ottoman majority" (that is the Turks and the Kurds). Ataturk addressed himself even to the kurdish tribal and religious chiefs, asking for help. The Kemalists insisted on the "moslem religious ties" and appealed to kurdish-turkish solidarity. They also exploited all the shortcomings of the treaty with regard to the Kurds, especially that important parts of Kurdistan inhabited by a large kurdish majority should be left to Armenia. The fact is that a majority of the kurdish people supported Mustafa Kemal's movement, believing in his promises. There was, therefore, from 1921 to 1923-24, a complete contradiction between the attitude of the majority of the kurdish people and that of kurdish intellec-

(33) See, on this subject, my doctorate dissertation (at the University of Lausanne): "Le Kurdistan irakien entité nationale, étude de la révolution de 1961", pub. by La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, 1970, 418 pp

(34) See my booklets "The kurdish problem in Syria: Plans for the genocide of a national minority" and "The Persecution of the Kurdish People by the Baath dictatorship in Syria", both published in 1968.-

tuals who had been working for kurdish delegation, headed by general Chérif pacha - former Ambassador of Ottoman Turkey to Sweden - who had presented the kurdish national demands to the Peace Conference of Paris. Chérif pacha had presented the kurdish demands in two memorandums of February 6 and March 22, 1919. Section III:KURDISTAN, of the Treaty of Sèvres was the result of a compromise achieved between him and the armenian Delegation under the auspices of Great Britain. This contradiction does not mean that the kurdish people were unwilling to be organized in an autonomous or independent kurdish state. The contradiction was only the result of the kemalist propoganda amongst the Kurds; it also reflects the weakness of the kurdish national movement at that epoch. But, basically, it means that the kurdish people preferred an autonomous Kurdistan within a republican Turkey, in complete agreement and brotherhood with the turkish people, as it was orally promised by the Kemalists, to the autonomous Kurdistan of the Treaty of Sèvres, which would be so imperfect and which could be created only against the will of the turkish people.

The official statements of the turkish Delegation at the Conference of Lausanne (1922-23), and before the council of the League of Nations, in 1925, with regard to the Mosul dispute, leave no doubt that the Kemalists adopted - but only tactically and apparently - a pro-Kurdish attitude at that period. They were literally courting the kurdish people. They recognized the Kurds not only as different people, but also as the partner of the turkish people in the republic and their equal in rights and importance. At the Conference of Lausanne, meeting January 23 1923, Ismet pacha Inonü; head of the turkish Delegation and then Prime Minister, stated: "The government of the great national assembly of Turkey is that of the Kurds as much that of the Turks..." (35), because; he explained, "the real and legitimate representatives of the Kurds have their seats in the national assembly and they take part, to the same extent as the representatives of the Turks, in the government and in the administration of the country..." (not having at my disposal the English edition, I am here translating from the french edition of the minute-book, or summary records, of the conference: see note (35)).-

(35) Here is Inonü's statement, extracted from the official minute-book (procès-verbaux) of the Conference, as published, in French, by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in "Documents diplomatiques, Conférence de Lausanne", Paris 1923: "Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie est le gouvernement des Kurdes autant que celui des Turcs, car les véritables et légitimes représentants des Kurdes siègent à l'Assemblée Nationale et participent, dans la même mesure que les représentants des Turcs, au gouvernement et à l'administration du pays..." (pp283-284)

In reply to Lord Curzon, head of the british Delegation to the same Conference, who had said that the Kurds had not seriously fought on the turkish side during the First World War, and that they were eager to rid themselves of the turkish domination, Ismet Inonü solemnly declared; at the same session, that all the generals and high rank officers of the ottoman army, during the First World War, "were full of respect and admiration for the services rendered and the sacrifices consented by the kurdish people for the sake of the Fatherland's salvation" and that "in the struggle against the sultan and against the vanished government of Constantinople", as well as "in the War of Independance" (against the Greeks in 1920-22) and "in the final offensive which led to the greek defeat", in all that, "the Kurds fought side by side with the Turks for the same ideals..."(translation from French)(36)

Lord Curzon said that the people of southern Kurdistan would enjoy autonomy within the Iraqi State under british mandate: he consequently asked the kurdish Delegation whether Turkey was ready to grant such an autonomy to her own Kurds ? Ismet Inonü's answer was that the government of Ankara "was not a foreign government for the Kurds..", that the autonomy promised to the Kurds inhabiting the Mosul vilayets would only place them "under the dependency of a foreign power ", that, in this case, these Kurds "would not be free in their own country", and that "such a dependency upon a foreign power could not satisfy a dominant race like the Kurdish race"(also translation from French)(37). Inonü literally said that the Kurds

(36)Here is the integral French text,from the same official record:"La Délégation turque considère qu'il est son devoir de déclarer que tous les chefs de l'armée turque ayant participé à la Guerre générale et à la guerre de l'Independance ont proclamé avec respect et admiration les services rendus et les sacrifices consentis par le peuple kurde pour le salut de la patrie.Surtout dans la lutte contre le sultan et contre le gouvernement disparu de Constantinople, dans la défense des différents fronts anatoliens assaillis par nos ennemis, ainsi que dans l'offensive qui aboutit à l'écrasement des Grecs, les Kurdes travaillèrent en parfaite communauté avec les Turcs pour atteindre un même but et réaliser un même idéal"(idem, p.248)

(37)Here is again the French text, from the same official record,by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:"...Il nous reste à traiter la question de l'autonomie, que, au dire de la délégation britannique, l'Angleterre se proposerait, et que la Turquie se refuserait, à accorder aux Kurdes. De tout temps les Kurdes ont joui en Turquie de tous les droits de citoyens ils n'ont donc jamais pu considérer le gouvernement turc,avec lequel, politiquement et socialement,ils ont toujours collaboré,comme un gouvernement étranger...Il n'existe pas un seul Kurde qui voudrait changer une pareille situation contre celle de sujet d'un Etat étranger,dans un territoire qui, quel que soit le nom employé,ne serait en réalité qu'une colonie.Les Kur-

of the Mosul vilayets, if annexed to Iraq and placed under british manda te, would be "colonized".

We know that the Conférence of Lausanne did not settle what was called the "Mosul dispute" or the turkish-iraqi frontier -othecwise the fate of southern Kurdistan. An international inquiry commission was sent to the vilayet, including the Swede de Wirsén, the Hungarian Teleki and the Belgian Paulis. During the discussion of the commission report at the council of the League of Nations, Geneva, XXXVth session, September 1925, a new controversy, about the kurdish people, opposed the turkish Delegation, headed by Mr. Tevfik Rustu Aras, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the british Delegation; headed by the Secretary Amery.- Like Ismet pacha at Lausanne, Mr Aras also made very important statements about the Kurds.- He solemnly said that; with the exception of " a few minority elements" whose number was "insignifiant compared to the total", "the population of the republic of Turkey is composed of two people: the Turks and the Kurds, and these two elements together govern the country". So the Kurds were not a minority in the republic, like Arabs, Armenians or Greeks, for instance, but a people, a nation, like de Turks themselves. He also stated that "the rights of Persia reserved, the government of the Republic of Turkey has, more than any other government, the right to speak on behalf of the kurdish element, of whom the majority lives in Turkey and govern Turkey, together with the turkish people" (translation from JOURNAL OFFICIEL, in French, of the League of Nations, October 1925, p.1336) (38):-

()...des savent que, dans ce cas, ils n'auraient aucune influence effective sur les destinées de leur pays. Les prétendus droits n'impliquant pas la jouissance des droits et prérogatives de citoyens, octroyés aux populations des régions soi-disant autonomes, ne peuvent satisfaire une race dominante comme la race kurde" (Idem p.285).-

(38) Here is the integral text of Mr. T.R. Aras's statement, as published in French in that document of the League of Nations: "La population de la Turquie est, si l'on excepte certaines minorités dont les droits sont assurés par les stipulations ad hoc du Traité de Lausanne - et dont le nombre est comparativement à la population totale, extrêmement réduit - composée de Turcs et de Kurdes: ces deux éléments gouvernent ensemble le pays. On nous demande quel régime nous promettons d'appliquer aux Kurdes du vilayet de Mossoul. est-il nécessaire que je réponde à une telle question? Tous les Kurdes possèdent en Turquie, sans aucune restriction, tous les droits que possèdent les Turcs. Ils ont le droit de devenir députés, ministres, gouverneurs, etc. En réservant respectueusement les droits de la Perse, puissance amie et voisine de la Turquie, le Gouvernement de la République a, plus que tout autre Etat, le droit de parler au nom de l'élément kurde, dont la majorité se trouve en Turquie et gouverne la Turquie avec le peuple turc".-

The head of the turkish delegation to the LON council recognized those facts because Turkey still had a hope, albeit a faint one to recover southern Kurdistan. The fixing of the turkish iraqi frontier was then the only problem which had not been settled. All the others questions created by the Treaty of Cèvres had already been solved, to the satisfaction of the turkish Government, by the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July, 1923. - This treaty replaced that of Cèvres and gave the new kemalist Turkish Republic the necessary consolidation in the international field. The kemalist power felt enough strong to completely change its policy towards the Kurds a short time after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne.

As could be expected, the latter treaty did not speak at all of the Kurds and their existence in the Republic. Articles 37 to 44 provide for an international guarantee in favour of the minority elements living in Turkey, and this treaty is still in force. But did, and do, the Kurds constitute a minority? The turkish delegation to the conference of Lausanne had affirmed that the Kurds were not a minority but a people, and that they were governing Turkey together with the turkish people. Should not that be enough to appease "the conscience" of the great powers who signed of the Treaty? Actually, articles 37 to 44 concern essentially the christian minorities, such as the Armèniens, and were good enough to appease "the universal conscience". The Kurds were not and are not a minority, but one of the two main national groups of the Republic. However Articles 38 and 39 have general and far-reaching effect and, as such, are also applicable to the Kurdish people. As a matter of fact, by Article 38, the Turkish Government binds herself to assure, "to all the inhabitants of Turkey", "full and entire protection of their life and their liberty without any distinction as to birth, nationality, language, race or religion". By Article 39, the turkish government undertakes not to make any restriction to the force use, by any inhabitant of Turkey, of any language, wether in the private relations, in commerce, in religious matters, in the press, in any kind of publication or in public meetings (39). This means that any restriction - whether "legal", administrative or de facto - that can be performed by turkish authorities against the development of the kurdish national culture, or against the use of the kurdish language in the press, in any kind of publication, in public or

(39) Art. 38. - "...Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder à tous les habitants de la Turquie pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langue, de race ou de religion".

Art. 39. - "...Il ne sera édicté aucune restriction contre le libre usage par tout ressortissant turc d'une langue quelconque, soit dans les relations privées ou de commerce, soit en matière de religion, de presse ou de publication de toute nature, soit dans les réunions publiques".

private meetings or in commerce, would be illegal and contrary to the obligations internationally undertaken by the Republic of Turkey. These obligations are always valid: they constitute the very bases which conditioned the admission of the Republic in the international society.

Scarcely had the Treaty of Lausanne been signed, when the turkish government reversed its policy towards the kurdish people. Contrary to the solemn statements made by Ismet pacha, the Kurds were accused to have been the tools of the British and of the sultan, "to have treacherously stabbed Turkey in the back during the First World War and the Independence War". The kurdish representatives in the National Assembly (parliament) were arrested. Needless to say that it was the Kurds who treacherously stabbed in the back and that they were they were cheated. The new turkish nationalism left no place for any kurdish existence. The Kurds were to be assimilated.

Naturally, they revolted. There were three main kurdish revolts in succession: that in 1925, under Sheikh Sa'ïd of Piran; in 1929-31, that led by Khoybun organization and commanded by general Ihsan Nouri pacha; and that in 1937-38, in the Dersim (Tunceli) area. Their history is known (40). I shall only try to bring out their principal characteristics. Those of the revolt of 1925 can be summed up as follows:

a) The revolt was a kurdish national manifestation, provoked by the kemalist policy towards the Kurds, as revealed after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne; it also reflected the disappointment of the kurdish people with regard to the negative evolution of their national question in the international field;

b) Socially speaking; the revolt was an association between the kurdish modern intelligentsia - belonging to the bourgeoisie or to the remnants of the uprooted aristocracy - and the kurdish rural gentry, traditional tribal or religious chiefs. The attitude of the Kemalists made possible, but only to some extent, the remaking of the kurdish unity. To rise up in arms, the kurdish intellectuals relied on the rural nobility; at that epoch, they had perhaps no other alternative. That is why the revolt, although of modern bourgeois inspiration, was socially conservative and traditionalist. Actually, only a part of this traditional rural nobility together with their followers or peasants, rose up with the intellectuals (officers, lawyers, students, etc.); another part adopted an expectative attitude, while a third portion was against the revolt and actively helped the turkish government. The revolt could not succeed;

c) The insurgents tried to exploit the religious feeling of the population and the "atheism" of the kemalist movement. This policy served to accentuate the traditionalist and conservative aspect of the revolt. It also led many foreign observers to think, and the Kemalists to affirm, that the insurrection was of "religious" inspiration and "reactionary".

(40) Cf. Lucien Rambout, "Les Kurdes et le droit", Ed. du Cerf, Paris 1947.

That was indeed too easy; it meant to only outward appearance and not to see the essential, the basic factor: the kurdish national feeling;

d) The revolt, technically, was very insufficiently organized; its political objectives needed more clarification. The kurdish people having been surprised by the events, there was obviously some precipitancy in the preparation of the insurrection.

The revolt failed, as could have been expected. The trial of its chiefs, before the "Independence Tribunal" of Diyarbakir - an emergency exceptional court - in June, 1925, leaves no doubt at all as to the national character of the insurrection. The chief prosecutor began his indictment, published by the turkish press of the time, with this words:

"The causes and origins of the latest revolt which broke out in the eastern provinces of the eternal turkish fatherland are identical with those which in a not too distant past led to the rising of Bosnia and Herzogovenian bordered on three sides by non-turkish and non-moslem races; with those which, in spite of the brotherhood of five centuries, led the Albanians to strike the Turks in the back during the Balkan war, the Turks who have always shown the greatest affection for their compatriots. The ideal and the aim which nurtured the kurdish revolution are the same which corrupted Syria and Palestine".

After the death sentence, the president of the tribunal addressed himself to accused, saying:

"Some of you guided by your egoism, others, led by political ambitions, but all united on one point, that is the constitution of an independent Kurdistan, you went ahead. It is on the scaffold that you will pay the price of your crimes"(41).

Fifty-three kurdish leaders, among them we find Sheikh Said, Dr. Fuad and many intellectuals, were hanged. Many of them died shouting: "Long live Kurdistan!". (42)

The Agri-Dagh or Ararat revolt, of 1929-31, was very much characteristic of the "bourgeois-conservative period" of the kurdish national movement. It had a few differences with that of 1925:

- a) It was the work of a kurdish political nationalist organization: Khoybun (meaning "independence" in Kurdish), founded in 1927;
- b) It had clear political objectives: the independence of turkish Kurdistan -proclaimed by Khoybun and marked by the constitution of a kurdish civil government. This objective may appear to us, in retrospect as a serious political mistake, because we condemn any separatism as contrary to the national interests of both the kurdish and the turkish peoples. But one should consider whether the kemalist move-

(41) See the turkish journal "Vakit" of June 28, 1925, quoted by Rambout, idem., p.27.

(42) See "Glimpses on World History" by the Pandit Jawaher Lal Nehru of India: his letter of May 8, 1933, to his daughter.

ment had left any other alternative to Khoybun.

c) The insurrection was definitely a stranger to any religious consideration. It was doubtless a war of national independence, and it appears as such even to the Turks, as well as foreign moderate observers (43).

d) It was relatively well organized on military grounds - by general Ihsan Nouri as chief commander, a former colonel of the Ottoman army. But geographically, it was too much concentrated on the Ararat area; it was isolated politically, ignored from the world public opinion and condemned to find no comprehension within the Turkish people. The main political objective, illustrative of the old bourgeois nationalism, was too absolute and opposed the Kurds to the Turks as national groups, as peoples. This ideology represented the reaction of the Kurdish nationalism to the still more absolute and exclusive Turkish nationalism. Historically, the Ararat insurrection could hardly be different. Its failure was to be expected.

The Dersim revolt of 1937 was a mere act of legitimate defense against the inhuman measures of population transfer taken by the Turkish government - in application of a discriminatory and repressive "law" promulgated in May 1932. The Turkish Air Force, newly created, was used against the Kurdish civilian population scattered in different points of Turkish Turkey. A number of Turks, mostly refugees from the Balkans, were planted by the government in different points of Kurdistan, with the mission "to civilize the barbarous Kurds".

I have already spoken of the positive contribution and the progressivist aspect of kemalism as a national liberation movement. The policy that the Kemalists practiced against the Kurds and Kurdistan was properly colonialist: that was the reverse side of the coin, the reactionary face of the kemalist movement. If in reality this movement had been only progressivist and the Kurdish revolts guided only by reactionaries, the Kemalists in power, after having hanged the Kurdish "reactionary" leaders and "undeceived" the Kurdish people, ought to have recognized the national and cultural rights of these people, as the associate of the Turkish people in the republic, and to have enabled them to enjoy a better life, more progress and more democracy in Kurdistan, this country being the happy eastern wing of the republic. They did nothing of the sort, but rather the opposite.

The Kurds were looked upon with contempt and, officially, considered as "mountain Turks". All Kurdish publications were forbidden; the Kurdish language was considered as a poor patois composed of two or three

(43) Speaking of the Ararat insurrection, major C.J. Edmonds wrote that it "was definitely a war of liberation in the modern sense": see "Kurdish Nationalism", reprint from "Journal of Contemporary History", London, Vol. 6 Nr. 1, 1971, pp. 87-107. But about the revolt of 1924 he thinks that it was "religious".

thousand heterogeneous vocables of arabic, persian or - naturally - turkish origin (44); at a time, its oral use in public, specially in the administration offices, was considered as an outrage to the turkish honour or a blow to state security; the names of "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" were banished from any kind of publication -while "KURDISTAN" was printed in the right place on all maps of ottoman times. Kurdistan became the unhappy "Dogu", the poor "east", economically neglected and socially exploited. The Kurds themselves, after having been a national group, one of the nations of the empire, became magically an agglomeration of backward populations, without any national tie. They were denied a history and a language of their own. That could have but one name: colonialism, a colonialism as it may be practiced by the governing militarist petty-bourgeois of an economically underdeveloped nation.

As for the turkish history, it was, legitimately, glorified, but, alas! rewritten. Such fabulous peoples as the Sumerians and the Hittites of great antiquity were considered as having been "of pure turkish origin". Again, I have the greatest respect for turkish history and the turkish culture, but; scientifically speaking, all that cannot be taken seriously. Indeed the turkish people do not need to look for historical titles of nobility outside their own history. The Sumerians had nothing to do with the Turks, but with lower Mesopotamia and, consequently, with the people of arab Iraq: the "Sumer Bank" created in Ankara by the Kemalists, to honour the memory of that "turkish" people, can reflect only chauvinism and ignorance of history. But I can understand the existence of the "Eti Bank" in Ankara: the Hittites (Eti) lived in the region of Ankara and central Turkey some twelve centuries before Christ. The modern turkish people inherited that country and, with it, the Hittite civilization: so the Turks are entitled to claim to be the descendents of the Hittites - among many other ancestors, including the pure Turks who came to Turkey after the XIth Century -, exactly as the Kurds are entitled to do the same with the Mitanni, the Gutti and the Kassites of the great antiquity of pre-kurdish Kurdistan. But this does not mean that the Hittites, the Lydians, the Mysians and other autochthonous peoples of pre-turkish Turkey spoke Turkish or that they were already Turks - nor than the Mitanni, the Gutti and the Kassites spoke Kurdish or were already Kurds. The turkish history in Turkey began only after the arrival of the Seljuk and the ottoman Turks, respectively in the XIth and XIIIth centuries after Christ, and it was they who brought the bases of the turkish language to Turkey -exactly as the aryan-iranian original kurdish tribes (the Medics, including the Kyrtii) had brought the base (44) The Kurdish-Russian dictionary of prof. Kanate Kurdoev, Moscow 1960, has more than 34,000 words and 890 pages. The kurdish-French dictionary being prepared by prof. Kamuran Bedir-Khan, Paris, has already more than 55,000 words, although still incomplete.

of the kurdish language to Kurdistan, after the Xth century before Christ. The hittite history had been over for about two thousands years when the first oghuzz seljuk tribes, who had been slowly coming from Central Asia, invaded the plateau of Ankara. The Hittites and other autochthonous peoples of the area basically belonged to what modern science calls the japhetic or Jaucasian human group. They were neither of ouralic-altaik (turkish) nor iranian-aryan (kurdish) origins. They disappeared as such, but not without leaving a living witness of their race and their language: the georgian people of today's Transcaucasia. If the Georgians are Turks, then the Sumerians and the Hittites were Turks!

I apologize for this historical digression. But I do not think I was totally off the subject.

To come back to the negative or reactionary face of Kemalism, it should be added that the turkish kemalist nationalism was identical to that of the Young Turks and the Unionists who persecuted the Armenians and the Balkan people: an essentially petit-bourgeois nationalism, exacerbated by the progressive loss of the empire and yet impregnated with the idea of domination, the nostalgia of old glories, and as much scornful towards the neighbouring peoples; a nationalism dangerously overlaid with racism and pan-Touranistic dreams, despairingly engaged in struggle against the modern principle of self-determination as it may be applied to the others, and all the more chauvinistic as it was professed by young officers of the middle class for whom the nation was more something like a romance than a mass of human beings.

Between the Young Turks' and Kemalists' nationalism there were, however, two differences: the Kemalists had rid themselves at the islamic tie which, under the last days of the empire, could, in a way, still preserve the moslem Kurds and Albanians - to the great Christians' prejudice. The other difference was that, under the republic, there were no longer any christian people, not even Arabs or Albanians, but only Kurds. The Armenians of the republic, as Ismet Inonü said, were only a minority of insignifiant importance, living as such in Istanbul; they no longer represented any "danger", and the Kemalists could generously afford to allow them to open two or three private armenian schools. But the Kurds, as Ismet Inonü also said at the Conference of Lausanne, were there, a bulky nation which might "dangerously match" with the Turkish nation. All the malefices of the new nationalism, all the propensity to domination, all the bitterness of a loss empire, all the might of ghost sultans and of the modern republican army could have but one outlet valve, one object: the Kurds and their country. That is why it was important that the Kurds should become "mountain Turks", and Kurdistan that unhappy "Dogu", an integral part of "the Eternal Turkish Fatherland".

Let us again hear Mr. Inonü, this time delivering a speech as Prime Minister, one day in August 1930, at Sivas. He was inaugurating the Sivas railway:

"The revolt which has lasted for five years in our eastern provinces and which is fanned by intrigues hatched from abroad has today lost half its strength (...) The Turkish nation alone has the right to claim ethnic and racial rights in this country. No other element has this right. The day when this railway reaches the frontier all hesitation will disappear, all intrigue will be without effect in face of this fact which will then be established in absolute fashion"(45).

This decidedly denotes a change from the statements of Lausanne. But I would spare the reader still more beautiful declarations, such as that made by Mr. Mahmoud Assad, minister of justice, August 1930, in which he said that "the Turk was the only lord, the only master of this country", and that "those who were not of pure turkish origin had only one right in this country: the right to be servants"(46).

Since the kurdish question also interested Persia and Iraq, it was advantageous to conclude between these states and Turkey some kind of "holy alliance" against the Kurds. The Treaty of Saadabad signed by the three interested governments responded to that need. Its Article 7 laid it down in this way:

"Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to take measures, in its own sphere, against the formation or activity of armed bands, associations and organizations aiming at the overthrow of established institutions and liable to affect the order or security of any part or frontier of the territory of another party, or liable to affect the authority of the government of that party".

But that anti-kurdish policy, the transformation of Kurdistan into a "Dogu" which, except an official recognition as such, has every property of a colony, was only one of the two serious results brought about by the negative face of the Kemalist movement. The ethnically turkish people did not find all the advantages which could be foreseen after their national liberation. Of course, all the countries of the world have realied some relative progress during the last fifty years, Turkey included. Indeed the Kemalists performed some necessary reforms, nobody would question that. But some of those reforms were only a beautiful facade which left intact the old social structures. The swiss civil law was adopted by the turkish judicial authorities, but did this fact imply any real change in the social structure? The republic was constitutionally proclaimed as a democracy, but was - or is - Turkey a democracy?

The fact is that the Kemalist officers relied on landlords and big merchants to govern the country. The result was a broadening gap between

(45) See the Turkish paper "Milliyet", Nr.1636, August 31, 1930.

(46) See "Milliyet", Nr. 1655, September 19, 1930.

the possessing ruling class and the popular masses, a growing relative misery of the peasantry, of the working class, of the small employees, the small civil servants, the small bourgeoisie. I am not putting in question Ataturk's figure as a national hero, as a liberator, not even as reformist. This negative result was possible due only to his companions. In any case, the kemalist movement, as such, was responsible for it. The successors of the Kemalists, whether belonging to the Popula: ("Halk") Party or to the Justice (pre viously "Democratic") Party succeeded only in aggravating those conditions. The distress of the r and the worker grew. Nazim Hikmet and Yasar Kemal could tell about it much better, and they did. In the German Federal Republic alone there are 417,000 workers from Turkey (June 1971), of whom, about 60,000 are Kurds, who did not find in their country. In spite of independence, in spite of reforms, the fact remains that Turkey is, economically and socially, an underdeveloped country. And the unhappy "Dogu", turkish Kurdistan, is yet much more underdeveloped than turkish Turkey.

But in so far as the social and economic conditions of Turkey are concerned, and in a lesser extent with regard to the Kurds, the worst contribution of the kemalist movement was perhaps not the work of kemalists themselves, but what was done, and is being done, on their behalf, by their successors. The kemalist era is naturally a part of the history of Turkey: it was ended with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's death in 1938, ended with all its performances, its positive and less positive contribution. It was quite natural that the turkish people continued to have the great est affection towards the national hero and his memory. But the figure of the vanished turkish liberator eventually became something of a myth, haloed with all the aureole of liberation. Since 1938, this myth has be en and is being used by Ataturk's successors to fulfil their political designs. It was in the name of the "kemalist principles" that the reactio nary successive governments of landlords, of generals and of merchants brought Turkey, with untold demagogy, to her present miseries. The "kema list principles" became a screen used to cover the ugly face of reaction and fascism, a screen liable to legitimate dictatorships, petty ambitions or sordid interests, something bound to furnish with courage those are not courageous, with imagination those who are dull, or with good conscience those who have none. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk would not have liked that. However, there are thousands of people in Turkey who, confronted with the present state of affairs, long "to return to Ataturk's principles". They are undoubtedly sincere people and honest citizens. But most of them would not be able to tell of what those principles consist. Even if they could, should they not consider that time ave changed? It is a matter of common knowledge to say that evolution goes fast. Turkey of to day is not similar to that of the kemalist era; her problems are very different. What was or may have been good for Turkey in 1930 would not

necessarily be good in 1971. A given situation should be dealt with concretely, and not emotionally.

That leads me to sum up the present situation and to speak of the contemporary or democratic phase of the kurdish national movement.-

The situation today:

I shall not give figures illustrating the economic and social underdevelopment of Turkey, of which the peasantry, the working class and the petit bourgeois are the victims: it would suffice to consult the statistical yearbooks of the United Nations. But it may be useful to illustrate the kurdish under-development in comparison with that of the entire republic, on the basis of figures extracted from official turkish statistics (47). For the comprehension of the following tables, it should be remembered that turkish Kurdistan - non kurdish elements included - roughly represents some 19 vilayets or provinces out of 67 for the whole republic about 29% of its total area and some 20% of its total population:

	<u>19 eastern vilayets</u>	<u>republic of Turkey</u>	<u>East : Republic</u>
% of illiterates	72.0 %	51.0 %	
% of town-dwellers	26.9 %	34.4 %	
Annual agricultural production in mill. of tuks Liras.....	3,556	33,243	10.7 %
Combine-harvesters.	270	5,992	4,5 %
Motor vehicles.....	5,253	80,695	6.5 %
Nr. of bank branches	179	1,981	9.0 %
Public roads in km.	9,083	48,639	18.7 %

In the following table relative to the state of industrialization in 1964, only out of the 19 eastern vilayets are concerned (to the exception of that of Marash):

(47) See, at the State Institute of Statistics (D.I.E.):

- a) Abstract Agricultural Statistics 1965, 1966, 1967 (Tarim İstatistikleri Özeti);
- b) Census of Industries 1964 (Sanayiet İşyerleri Sayımı 1964, Ankara)
- c) Statistical Yearbook 1963 (İstatistik Yilligi 1963); See also at the State Organization for Planning (DPT): "The rural Question" ANKA RA 1967 (Köy ve Köylü Sorunu), as well as the publications of the Ministry of Rural Affairs (K.I.B.K.E.E.)

	<u>18 east vilayets</u>	<u>Republic</u>	<u>East : Republic</u>
State firms	26	257	10.0 %
Private firms	75	2.775	2.7 %
Nr. of workers	17.036	326.000	5.2 %
Nr. of machines	782	5.498	14.2 %
Nr. of electrical motives.....	4.195	98.000	4.1 %
<u>Current-generators</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>4.800</u>	<u>1.2 %</u>

As to the state of agricultural mechanization, it should be noted that, in the same 18 eastern vilayets, there were 3,594 tractors in 1965, 5,237 in 1966, and 6,496 in 1967. The same figures for the whole republic were, respectively: 54,668, 65,103 and 74,982 tractors. From 1965 to 1967, the part of the eastern vilayets relatively increased from 6.6 % to 8.6 %

A peasant family of the eastern vilayets possesses, in average, 730 ares of land (one are being equivalent to 100 sq.m.), 2.8 heads of bovines, 11.2 heads of ovins, and 23 of smaller animals.

In 1965, only 247 villages of the east had co-operative societies, and only 25% of the peasant families had access to agricultural credits, with an average credit of only 631 turkish Liras per family.

The kurdish popular classes are doubly exploited, first as Kurds or inhabitants of the " east and south-east ", but also by the kurdish landlords and big merchants. The kemalist movement had almost completely destroyed the remnant of the old kurdish tribal system - and that was eventually not a bad thing -, but had left intact the great land ownership both in Kurdistan and in turkish Turkey. The old kurdish nationalist families of large proprietors had been exiled, but their properties passed into others hands, mostly kurdish adventurers of peasant origin who proved to be ruthless with their peasants and who, usually, cared little for kurdish nationalism. The next step was in the order of things: the collaboration between the kurdish landlords (naturally to some exception) and the turkish governing class, at the expense of the kurdish people.-

There was a similar change in the towns of Kurdistan, with, however, one difference: the kurdish major merchants and senior civil servants in a word the kurdish high bourgeoisie, not only cooperate with the turkish government at the expense of the kurdish people, but have abandoned the use of their national language for Turkish and claim to be "of pure turkish origin". The phenomena is classical and characteristic of any system of colonialism and national oppression. The regional or local responsables, in Kurdistan of the turkish reactionary political parties in power, whether the "Justice" or the " Popular " Party, are invariably either major merchants of kurdish origin or kurdish landlords. They are, together with the turkish police, the tools used by the turkish government to

oppress and to exploit the kurdish people, to combat the kurdish national movement.-

There are different stages of exploitation, the most exploited being the kurdish peasant. In general, the rural areas are exploited by the towns, Kurdistan as such turkish Turkey, but all to the exclusive benefit of the possessives classes. The kurdish landlords exploit the kurdish peasantry without mercy; they are themselves exploited by the towns' major merchants of Kurdistan, who buy their harvest and sell them manufactured goods (tractors, arms, cloth, sugar, etc); the large merchants of Kurdistan are themselves exploited by those of Istanbul, who have import-export relations with foreign countries and Europe. When a kurdish large merchant becomes too rich, he leaves Kurdistan to become an industrial or a major merchant in Istanbul, or in other big turkish cities. That is why there are only a few private industrial firms in the eastern vilayets. This constitutes another form of exploitation and widens the gap between the east and the west: the kurdish capital, so painfully assembled at the expense of the popular classes, is thus being exported to turkish Turkey and used there. The growing-agricultural mechanization in Kurdistan, which continues in an increasing rate, combined with the great land property, has naturally led to a steady emigration current from the country to towns: each month, uprooted Kurdish peasants in thousands leave their villages willingly or unwillingly, their poor belongings on their back, tramping to the kurdish towns with hope to find jobs and the miserable few piastres necessary to feed their families. Actually they succeed only in increasing number of the suburban sub-proletariat. Because of their redundancy; most of them remain unemployed. Those who are happy to find jobs, because of the rule of supply and demand earn just enough to avoid starvation, but not malnutrition.

The conditions of the petit-bourgeois are only a bit better. The wages of teachers or minor employees, for example, do not enable them to leave the "poverty zone". Even the middle classes find it difficult to have a decent life.-

Such a social field was naturally propitious to the development of socialist ideas and, simultaneously, helped to give the kurdish national movement a completely new face, a new content, new objectives, and a new vigour. It was slowly realized that, save exceptions, the kurdish properties classes were no longer nationalist but more and more allies or the tools of the turkish governing and oppressing classes, that those who were (and are) oppressing and exploiting the kurdish people were (and are) also exploiting the turkish people. Having realized that, the kurdish nationalist became more opened to the socialist ideas, and the socialists -whether Turks or Kurds- more opened to the kurdish national question. Between the kurdish national movement and the socialist movement of Turkey, a rapprochement was taking place: the encounter point was

rather long to come and it was reached only in 1970. This encounter did not and cannot signify the melting of the two movements, but a deep mutual comprehension, co-operation, an alliance which should be widened to embrace other elements and which can alone bring the turkish and the kurdish peoples of the republic to the brotherhood of a fruitful union recognizing their respective national rights, a durable union beneficial to each and to all.

If the western democratic ideas of liberty, equality and self-determination had penetrated the Middle-East by the end of the XIXth century, it was the turn of the socialist ideas to make their entrance, since the Second World War, into this field, more widely into what is generally intowhat is generally called the third world. Combined with the classical concepts of democracy and liberty, the socialist ideas largely contributed to set in motion the wave of decolonization and national liberation throughout the world. They also helped to transform the previously existing national movements, such as the kurdish, into national liberation movements having a social content and opened to the popular classes. In some cases, there was confusion - that is melting - between decolonization or national liberation and socialization: in North Vietnam for example. In other cases, the change was limited to the democratization of old movements led by the possessing classes into popular movements embracing the middle and small bourgeoisies, together with the peasant and the working classes -with more or less socialization- but not identification with socialism. Examples: the arab world in general, the contemporary kurdish national movement. In some arab countries, it is sometimes question of "Arab socialism": a way to distinguish a more or less socialized arab national movement from the Leninist international socialism, merely to keep respectful of the classical values of the arab nation.-

The kurdish national movement was one of the very first of the "Third World" to know the socialist ideas. This happened in the current of the last World War in persian Kurdistan and was favoured by a particular international situation, Persia having then been delivered from her internal fascist groups by the Allied forces, soviet in the north and british in the south. This discovery led to the creation of the autonomous kurdish democratic Republic of Mahabad, in 1946, of short and stormy history (48).-

(48) On the Rep. of Mahabad, see: W. Eagleton Jr. "The Kurdish Republic of 1946", Oxford UP, 1963; A. Roosevelt Jr. "The kurdish Republic of Mahabad" in "The Middle East Journal", Washington, July 1947, pp 247-270; P. Rondot, "Le mouvement national kurde en 1946", in "En terre d'Islam", 2^e Trim. 1947, pp 128-141, and "L'expérience de Mahabad et le problème social kurde", in "En Terre d'Islam", mai-juin 1948, pp 178-183; Thomas Bois, "Mahabad, une éphémère République kurde indépendante", in "Orient", Paris, Nov 29 1964, pp 173-201;

But the most typical manifestation of the kurdisch democratic movement of national liberation is the revolution of iraqi Kurdistan, led by general Mustafa Barzani, the national hero of the kurdisch people, president of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party). By its social and political aspects - but not by its military engagement-, this revolution gives the tuning, today, to the whole kurdisch national movement. As brought to light by the revolution, to the study of which I dedicated my book "Le Kurdistan irakien, Entité Nationale", the general features of the contemporary kurdisch national liberation movement appear to be following -reserve being made of the particular conditions of each part of Kurdistan:

a) Although the kurdisch people constitute but one divided nation, the kurdisch national movement consist actually of as many movements as there are parts of Kurdistan;

b) These kurdisch movements are independent, politically and organically, of one another; but morally, they are naturally linked by a common national and democratic solidarity;

c) The kurdisch national movements do not any longer question the existence of the present states dividing Kurdistan, or their territorial integrity;

d) In each part of Kurdistan, the kurdisch national movement aims at obtaining either kurdisch autonomy or kurdisch statehood on a federal basis, within the framework of the existing states. For instance: autonomy for iraqi Kurdistan within the iraqi Republic; the transformation of the Republic of Turkey into a federation composed of a (genuinely) turkish and kurdisch republic, each having its institutions, the two being united under the authority of one central federal government, representing both of them. The aim of persian Kurdistan, within Persia or Iran, is no different from that of iraqi Kurdistan within Iraq. In Syria, the kurdisch movement struggles to obtain the national and cultural rights of the kurdisch people, without further specification;

e) In each part of Kurdistan the kurdisch movement is led by kurdisch specific organizations: The Kurdisch Democratic Parties, which are organically independent of each other. In persian Kurdistan, we have the "Kurdistan Democratic Party - Iran", the oldest, created in 1945; in iraqi Kurdistan, there is the KDP, together with all the revolutionary apparatus: in Syria, we have "The Kurdisch Democratic Party in Syria". I shall speak farther of the situation in turkish Kurdistan with this respect. These KDP formations are still "illegal", I mean underground in the concerned states, except in the iraqi Republic - thanks to the kurdisch revolution. They defend the interests of - and represent - the workers, peasants, employees, small bourgeoisie, middle bourgeoisie and progressist intellectuals of the kurdisch people;

f) The kurdisch movement of each part of Kurdistan aims at the democratization of the state of which it is a part. Far from retiring within

itself, it feels and is concerned with the general problems of the state and with those which more particularly interest the people representing the ethnical majority in that state. For instance, the national movement of turkish Kurdistan is concerned with any problem interesting the republic of Turkey, whether it be educational, governmental, institutional, constitutional, economical, etc.; the questions of liberty and democracy in Turkey, the exploitation of the ethnically turkish masses, peasants, workers, minor employees, petit and middle bourgeoisies, intellectuals, all such questions are also kurdish questions. That is why the kurdish movement of national liberation in any of the interested states is willing to co-operate with all the democratic forces which are active in that state, and if necessary to join hands with them, with view to achieve that democratization. The achievement of this democratization is a necessary step and a condition to solve the vital problems to which the kurdish and the neighbouring peoples are confronted. But, on the other hand, no true democracy can be established in any of these states as long as the kurdish people are oppressed as a national group and exploited as people - To solve the kurdish national question to the complete satisfaction of the kurdish people is a necessary condition for the realization of democracy. The so-called " democratic " governments which are oppressing the kurdish people and denying their national rights are not and cannot be democratic. I may say more: the recognition of the kurdish national rights will be a sure criterion of democracy; a government will be as much democratic as it is ready to recognize by law, and to respect in fact, the existence of the kurdish people and their national rights.

g) The solution of the kurdish national question on the basis of autonomy or a federalization of the existing states will not be contrary to the right of the kurdish people to self-determination: it will signify the exercise by them of that right in a given historical situation, the present one. The kurdish people, like any other, have an inalienable right to self-determination. Theoretically, this right implicates different solutions: in broad outlines, either a facultative union with the neighbouring peoples within the framework of the existing states, or the constitution of a unified state of Kurdistan with the neighbouring states on a federative or confederative basis. What the face of the Middle East will be in a hundred years, nobody can tell. But, as a nation, the kurdish people have already chosen the way of a facultative voluntary union, or unions, implicating equality, with neighbouring nations.-

In Turkey, the socialist ideas look rather long in having any real impact on the popular masses, whether turkish or kurdish.- That was due to the ferocity with which the kurdish national movement had been repressed under the kemalist, on one hand, and, on the other, to the most chauvinistic conception of turkish nationalism as professed by the turkish governing class and the senior army officers, and to their demagogy.-

But in November 1959, a group of 49 kurdisch intellectuals (lawyers, medical doctors, students, officers, teachers) were arrested and prosecuted accused of "Kürt çüklük" - which means, in Turkish, "Kurdism" or kurdisch nationalism, as opposed to "Türkçüklük", the official ideology of the government. At the same time, many of the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran were arrested in Persia. The two parallel police operations were consecutive to a meeting of the powers of the CENTO Pact, previously the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad was then celebrating Arab-Kurdisch brotherhood and association in the new Republic, as proclaimed in Article 3 of the new (provisional) republican constitution, under general Kassem's government. The impact of the iraqi-arab-kurdisch revolution of July 14, 1958, on the rest of the kurdisch people, was clear.-

In May 1960, the turkish towns were the theatre of large popular and student manifestations. They expressed a general dissatisfaction with the feudal and dictatorial policy of the so-called "democratic" government headed by Adnan Menderes. But under the pretext of "returning" back to Atatürk's principles", the senior army officers confiscated the popular movement on behalf of the higher turkish bourgeoisie. As it could be expected, the military coup d'Etat of May 27 was presented as a "revolution". Indeed, nowadays, all the putsches in all the under-developed countries throughout the world are "revolutions" and, sometimes, "socialist revolutions". After the coup d'Etat, general Gursel, "elected" as President of the Republic by the military "Committee of National Union", exhorted the population of the kurdisch town of Diyarbakir, in a public speech, from a balcony at the town's municipality, in these terms: People of Diyarbakir, people of the East! come, be reasonable: you are authentic Turks and not Kurds". This ridiculous statement, one may guess, could not be much enjoyed by the interested population. The army was seriously contemplating using arms against the eastern vilayets of the "Dogu". On November 11, 1960, general Gursel declared to a swedish journal: "If these incorrigible mountain Turks will not keep quiet, the army will not hesitate to bombard their towns and villages: there will be such a huge blood bath that they will be swallowed up with their country" (49). But Mr. Ismet Inönü, whom we find again as Primer Minister, and who is said to have become respectful "of the formal democracy of the Republic", was said to be opposed to any military operation in the eastern provinces. He scathed the most zealous colonels

From 1938 to 1958, the kurdisch people suffered national oppression almost silently, and with great patience. The kurdisch movement was in its weakest stage, making its "traversée du désert". But since September 1961, the revolution of iraqi Kurdistan has had a far-reaching effect on turkish-Kurdistan, where its impact was even greater than that of the

(49) See "Dagens Nyheter", Stockholm, of november 11, 1960, quoted by "Centre d'études kurdes", Paris, in "La Turquie moderne face au Kurdistan de la Turquie", 1961.

iraqi Arab-Kurdish revolution. New hopes and a new ideology, much more realistic, more democratic, and adapted to the special conditions of turkish Kurdistan, were born. The long patient silence was broken. It should be added that, combined with that change in the mental structure, the "formal democracy of the republic" - in conformity with the constitution of 1961, of western type - had to allow an increasing number of Kurdish manifestations. There is evidence that; under the pressure of facts; the official "theory" of the Kurds being "mountain Turks", as observed in the Kemalist era, was being slowly, but steadily, abandoned. Today, nobody in Turkey, not even the most chauvinistic Turks, would seriously defend such a "theory". But it goes without saying that the chauvinistic elements, whose number is still very important, continue to deny all rights to the kurdish people, and to consider with contempt their history, their language and their culture. There was several examples of kurdish manifestations legally allowed to the turkish authorities - but only within a certain limit. Kurdish publications were tolerated, provided that they were not "imported" from a "foreign" country, for instance from iraqi, persian or syrian Kurdistan, or from Europe, where many kurdish organizations are active. The example of the recorded kurdish songs is the most widespread: previously forbidden, they were - or are - on free sale in all the territory of the republic, and very much enjoyed by the turkish people themselves. They are said to be best-sellers among records, even in turkish Turkey. In 1969, the kurdish writer Kemal Sadilli wrote and published his "Kurdish Grammar", explained in turkish: it was on free sale in bookstores. During the early sixties, the kurdish students at the universities of Ankara and Istanbul could perform could perform kurdish folkloric dances in public. Two bilingual (turkish-kurdish) magazines were successively authorized by the government: "Dicle-Firat" (Tigris-Euphrates) and "Deng" (Voice, in kurdish). But they were closed after a few issues; their articles having been judged too "provocative" by the authorities. Still more significative were the articles - although insufficient and reflecting some negative positions of the turkish bourgeoisie - published on the Kurds and the kurdish "Dogru" by the well-known turkish magazine "Baris Dunyasi" ("Peaceful World"). The magazine was edited by a turkish personality representing a liberal current of the turkish bourgeoisie, Mr. Ahmed Hemdi Basar who; after having been one of Ataturk's earliest companions, had to break with the kemalists. In 1967 or 1968, the kurdish writer Musa Anter published a small "Kurdish-Turkish Dictionary": the dictionary was on free sale, but the editor was many times annoyed by the police, arrested and prosecuted. Another kurdish writer, Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, who dared publish Khani's epical epic "Mem-o-Jin", with the original kurdish text in its entirety and a turkish translation, knew still a worse adventure: the editor was arrested and the book seized by the police. Only a few hundred examples are said to have been saved before the police intervention. But, on the other hand, a small number of kurdish books are republishing in modern turkish

kish, the famous geographical work of Eyliya Chelebi "Siyahet-namesi", which we have quoted. The fourth volume, where the turkish author of the XVIIth century spoke of the principalities of Kurdistan and of kurdish civilization, is not yet published: it is hoped that the new editor will prove to be respectful of the author's text.

But the "importation" of all "foreign" literature on the Kurds, in any language, the kurdish included, was, and is, strictly forbidden in Turkey. This was even legalized by the presidential decree of January 25, 1967, which goes as follows: "It is illegal and forbidden to import into the country and to distribute, in any form whatsoever, any publications, records or recording tapes, of foreign origin, in the kurdish language". This decree was published in the official journal of the turkish Republic on February 14, 1967, undersigned by the President Cevdet Sunay, by the Premier S. Demirel, by three Vice-Prime Ministers and eighteen ministers...

To sum up, the most important consequences, in Turkey and turkish Kurdistan, of the iraqi revolution of 1958 and, specially, of the revolution in iraqi Kurdistan of 1961 - combined with factors proper to Turkey-, were the following:

1.- The development, the democratization and, to a large extent, the socialization of the national movement of turkish Kurdistan. Its aim is to solve the kurdish question peacefully, within a democratic binational turkish-kurdish Federation;

2.- The fact that more and more kurdish members, and later on turkish members of the Labour Party of Turkey - and not the "Turkish" Labour Party - (TIP= Türkiye İşçi Partisi), had to take positions more and more positively in favor of the kurdish cause. The TIP a mixed -multinational socialist party, was authorized by the government;

3.- A growing activity among the kurdish youth, and later on among the turkish democratic youth, especially students, in favour of the kurdish cause and the rights of the kurdish people in the "Dogu".

1967 definitely seems to have been the year in the current of which the new democratic kurdish national movement took deep roots among the popular masses of turkish Kurdistan. The occasion was an article published in the turkish fascist and racist magazine "Otügen", Nr. 40 of April 1967, Istanbul. The magazine belongs or is sponsored by the "Nationalist Movement Party" led by the pan-touranist Colonel Turkes - who puts at the disposal of his Hitler-like militia, composed of some 20,000 touranist people, the rifles and the machine-guns of the republic's army. After having said that the Kurds were a backward people, that they had no history and no culture, that they were all communists who wanted to cut Turkey into pieces, the author of the article suggested that the Kurds should go away from Turkey, because Turkey was the country of the sole Turkish people. Then he added: "When we tell the Kurds their home

truths, they do not blush with shame, because they do not have the faces of human beings". The Kurds naturally protested; they also asked the government to punish the author of the article and to ban the fascist magazine, in application of article 12 of the new republican constitution, which proclaims all the inhabitants of the republic as equal citizens, without any distinction as to their race; their language or their nationality. But the author, "At Siz" as he signed - which in Turkish means "The nameless" - remained in perfect impunity and the magazine was not banned. On the contrary, Mr. "Nameless" - whose name could only be "Pan-Touranist Fascism" - returned to the charge in another article of "Otügen", Nr. 42, June 1967, under the title of "The Howlings of the red Kurds". After having confirmed his "truths" about the Kurds, At-Siz remarked that it was not he, but General Cevedt Sunay himself, the President of the Republic, who, first, had said: "Those who are not Turks may go away from Turkey". He therefore suggested that the Kurds should first demand to the President to render an account of his statement. He also noted "that the Kurds may represent as high as a majority as 100% of the population of the eastern provinces; yet their dreams to establish a kurdish state on the soil of Turkey will always remain a dream comparable to that of the Armenians in a Greater-Armenia". He then gave the Kurds the following advice:

"Let the Kurds go away from Turkey! But to where? To wherever they like! Let them go to Iran, to Pakistan, to India, to Barzani. Let them ask at the United Nations to find them a national home in Africa. Let them go away before the turkish nation gets angry. The turkish race is very patient, but when we get angry we are like lions. Let the Kurds ask the Armenians about us! (...) We are genuine nationalist Turks. The Turks have had a rôle in history, they founded a civilization and created a large state. Our race governed endless territories. But look at the Near East and think how low has become its level since the departure of the Turks. The Arabs were a nation who had made noise, they had once a history and had founded a civilization. But since they get separated from us and joined with the British, they knew only miseries. In a five day's battle, they were put to flight by the coward Jews, and they covered themselves with shame before the world. As to you, you are but a backward society without culture, you founded no state and no civilization (...).

You are only working for kurdish nationalism. You will ask us to recognize your language, to have independent schools, a broadcasting program, and a press distinct from ours. You will continue secret meetings, where you speak of Barzani as your national hero; you will convey him arms through Turkey; you

"will read kurdish poems to your children, and those of you who have attained the level of professorship will take contact with the kurdish organizations in Europe. All that view to create your kurdish state (...).But the day when you will rise up to cut Turkey into pieces; you will see to what a hell we shall send you..."(50)

To that provocation, because such was the case, there was a wide scale reaction in Kurdistan and among the kurdish elements living in turkish Turkey. In a public statement of which copies were sent to the President of the Republic and to the Prime Minister, they wrote, addressing the people of "Otügen" and "the fascist pan-touranist": "We read with regret your articles, because you want to transform the country into a battle field. You must know that there is no force in this world which can compel us to leave our fatherland. Come into the arena and we shall see who, you or us, will be expelled from this country!". The statement was signed by 19 committees representing the university students of - or from - 19 kurdish towns (Agri, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Cizre, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Erzurum, Hakkari, Hınıs (Khinis), Kahta, Karlıova, Mardin, Mush, Siverek, Tunceli, Urfa, Van and Varto). On August 3, 1967, large popular manifestations took place in almost all the towns of the east and southeast, protesting against the attitude of the pan-touranists, but also against the government policy of national oppression and of planned under-development as practiced against the Kurds and their country. In the public appeal launched by the preparatory committee of the manifestations in the town of Diyarbakir, one can read:

"Brother of the east and the southeast!

You who have been neglected for centuries(...)

You who have never lost hope (...)

Today, while Turkey is advancing according a plan, you are left back according a studied plan, and the new five-year development plan will only widen the gap between the east and the west..."(51)

In the appeal of the preparatory committee of the town of Silvan, one can read:

"Brother of the east and southeast! (...)

You, son of the martirized east,who are accused of being primitive!

You know that during the forty-four years of life that counts the Republic, none of your rights has been respected (...)

(50) See, translated into French, more substancial paragraphs of this article in my book "Le Kurdistan irakien,Entité nationale"pp 298-300.

(51) Idem, pp.301-302;

Our areas did not know any real industrial factories in spite of the presence of raw materials in our country. Oil, iron and chromium ores are transported from our regions to Alexandretta, Mersin, Karabok and other towns of the west (...) The government cheat us every year and leaves to us but the crumbs.

Brother of the east! you whose delivrance hour has struck(...) the fascist pan-touranist want to expel you from your fatherland because you speak Kurdish and you are a Kurd (...)

Brother of the east!(...)you must give a reply to those who look at you with contempt because of your ethnical origin and your language(...). You are al least as honourable as the others and your language is as much respectable as the other languages.

You must tell the others that your language is respectable and that you are an honourable man. That is why you will take part in the great manifestation at Silvan, on Sunday, August 3, 1967.. (52)

A short time after the manifestations of 1967, a great kurdish patriot and intellectual, Faîq Buçak, lawyer and deputy of Urfa, was mysteriously assassinated: the turkish police never did find the assassin. His cousin Mustafa Buçak, another intellectual and former deputy, was obliged to seek refuge abroad. In January 1968, other kurdish intellectual including Saîd Elçi, from Diyarbakir, were arrested: accused of being members of a "Democratic Party of turkish Kurdistan", they were detained in a prison of Antalya, then let out on bail, nothing having been retained or proved against them. Their trial is not over.

In spite of the police threat, the manifestations of the "east and southeast" continued in 1968, and 1969, organized by intellectuals and the kurdish Student Federation called "Devrinci Dogu Kültür Ocaklari" (DDKO) - which means the "Revolutionary Cultural Centres of the East". There are possibly about 20.000 kurdish students in the state universities and the private engineering colleges throughout the republic: this is one aspect of the "formal democracy of the republic". In May 1969, two leading members of the DDKO were assassinated in a crowded street by two "unknown" gangsters, who ran away and were never identified by the turkish police: this is another aspect, the hidden face, of the pre sent turkish "democracy".-

At that time, 1969, the "meeting point" was reached - not yet between the national movement of turkish Kurdistan and the turkish left, that is mainly the TIP-, but between the two main tendancies of the kurdish movement, the national -democratized and increasingly socialized, as described above - and the socialist, more and more aware of the reality of the kurdish question. The kurdish socialist tendance was chiefly represented by the kurdish elements who, before, had been militizing within the TIP and who, in increasing number, held their distance from

this party, hitherto unable to adopt a positive position with regard to the kurdish question - we shall try to see why. The change meant a more powerful and more popular kurdish movement, and that alarmed the turkish reactionaries, especially within the army.

The senior army officers began to consider Demirel's government as unable to ward off "the kurdish danger". The government had to strike the Kurds or to resign. Demirel and his Minister of Internal Affairs (Home Secretary), M. Menteseoglu, chose the first solution. Soon after the agreement of March 11, 1970, concluded between the iraqi government and the kurdish revolution and according to which the former recognized the principle of kurdish autonomy within the framework of the iraqi state, the turkish government, once more, inaugurated a policy of terror, provocation and violence against the kurdish people, a policy which is widely known throughout Turkey under the name of "Commando operations in the Dogu". The commando troops, officially organized to combat "banditry", are under the command of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Mr. Menteseoglu indeed did not need to be put under army pressure to use his troops against the kurdish people. - In 1966, after the earthquake which damaged the kurdish town of Varto and killed 3.000 Kurds, he had said, on the spot: "I hear bestial (kurdish) voices coming from under the ruins".

The first kurdish locality to be the theatre of a "commando operation" was Silvan, once the prosperous capital, with Amida-Diyarbakir, of the mighty kurdish mervanid kingdom, and today a small town of about 18.000 inhabitants. Here is a brief description of the operation, by the Kurdish Students Federation DDKO, Information Bulletin Nr. 2, April 25, 1970:

"On April 8, 1970, at dawn, the town of Silvan was besieged by a force consisting of 2.000 commandos and gendarmes, equipped with 200 motor-vehicles, 6 helicopters belonging to the command of the Second Military Region (53), and covered by reconnoitring air-crafts of the armoured brigade of Diyarbakir. The troops entered the town and, till 20 o'clock, for 17 hours, they ransacked the houses in hundreds, without presenting any authorisation for perquisition. The men were taken from bed and led to special camps, where they were submitted to untold torture(...) The commandos assured that they had due authority to act, by decision of the government of the Justice Party, but their action was contrary to the laws in force and to the constitution they behaved as an occupation force in enemy territory".

Almost all the adult male inhabitants of Silvan, exactly 3.144 men, were concentrated outside the town, beaten and insulted: "Dogs! Kurds! Barzani's spies!". The commandos were shouting: "Tell me where did you

(53) Since 1967, the territory of the Republic of Turkey has been divided into three military regions. The second region correspond to turkish Kurdistan.-

hide your arms or I shall violate your wife". Women and children were left inside the town, but many of them were molested. A woman was beaten to death. The operation was, since, repeated in several other small kurdish towns, such as Bingöl, Batman (an oil centre of 40.000 inhabitants), Tatvan, as well as in many villages in the regions of Hakkari, Bingöl, Siverek, Diyarbakir, Mardin.

The "commando operations" are still going on in 1971. It would be useless to say that the population of whole towns cannot consist of bandits and highway rubbers. The aim of this policy is double. First, to terrorize the kurdish people and, consequently, to stop the march of the democratic kurdish national movement. Secondly, to provoke an open kurdish revolt which would constitute a good pretext for a large-scale genocide. The Kurds, as seem to think the Touranists, especially within the army, are too numerous, in spite of all the previous massacres and measures of population transfer; to reduce their number in the official statistics is a good measure, but the reduction is fictive: the right solution would be an apocalyptic blood-bath. But between the nightmare and the reality there are all the forces of the kurdish people, their right to life, their patience, and the solidarity of a growing sector of the turkish people.

This turkish-kurdish solidarity, based on mutual comprehension, on mutual respect, nourished with old souvenirs, with common miseries and common hopes, is a most important factor in the contemporary history of the two peoples. Since the attack on Silvan, it found varying expressions within the turkish progressist youth and student's movements, within the turkish democratic circles, in the new positions of the Labour Party of Turkey - as defined in an official resolution -, and also to some extent in the liberal press of the turkish middle class. An example of the latter, the articles due to Ismail Cem in the well known Milliyet newspaper, June-July 1970, articles describing and denouncing the commandos' action against the Kurds. -

The DDKO statement of April 25, 1970 denouncing the attack on Silvan as actually a joint kurdish-turkish declaration signed by the DDKO and by many important turkish students' organizations (54). The declaration had for title "To the Peoples of Turkey" - "Peoples" being in plural and was sent to the President of the Republic and to the Prime Minister. President Sunay was shocked - not by the commandos' misdeeds and behavior, but "by that shameless turkish youth who speak of PEOPLES in plural within Turkey". It is curious how conveniently a "good conscience" can be acquired simply by ignoring reality, by believing in one's own fictive "truth". I think that Mr. Inonu, at Lausanne, and Mr. Aras at Geneva, had also spoken of Turkey being a republic inhabited by two peoples!

(54) Such as "Turkish Devrinci Gençlik Federasyonu" Istanbul Bölge Yürütme Kurulu" and "Istanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği".

Times have indeed changed. The kurdish question; nowadays, is one of the major subjects of the democratic and liberal turkish press (as well as of the chauvinistic press). The kurdish cause henceforth receives the support of the revolutionary wing of the student movement of Turkey, of the TIP, and, to a certain degree, that of all honestly democratic and liberal-minded Turks. The cooperation between the democratic forces of the the turkish and the kurdish peoples, in broad outlines, is coming a fact. This change is due first to the kurds themselves, especially to their youth, thanks to the courage of the DDKO students, in particular. The DDKO was soon followed by the turkish revolutionary students movement DEY-GENC, and the latter by the TIP.

The Labour Party of Turkey is - or rather was, since it has been forbidden - a legal socialist formation, represented in Parliament, and has always known important kurdish participation. For a while, and till the autumn of 1969, while its President was a Turk, Mr. Mehmet Ali Aybar, its Secretary-General was a Kurd: Dr. Tarik Ziya Ekinçi, a physician and then deputy of the kurdish town of Diyarbakir (some 120,000 to 130,000 inhabitants); since then at time, and for a while, the President was a Kurd, Mr. Mehmet Ali Aslan, an editor from Agri (Ararat), while the Secretary-General was a turkish trade union leader, Mr. Saban Erik. But, confronted to the kurdish question and with other major issues, the TIP split, in 1969, into many different groups. Some of its members naïvely believed that the democratic government could be established by the "young socialist officers of the army" - forgetting the bad experiences which many countries of the "Third World" had known with so-called "democratic socialist governments". which were but military dictatorships. But the most serious point was that, till 1970, and while adopting advanced theoretical positions on items such as "world imperialism" or "turkish reaction", the TIP officially ignored the existence of the kurdish question. Naturally, it soon found itself overstepped by the events, precisely with regard to this question: ahead, the kurdish movement was going on without its support while, on the left, the Dev-Genç organization was beginning to follow the DDKO in the defense of the kurdish cause. Because of the lesson it implies, this situation requires further examination.

Indeed, till 1970, many of the TIP members used to be completely indifferent to - if not contemptuous of - the kurdish question. Especially, nay of its young kurdish elements presented, as late 1969, and possibly till 1970, all the stigmas of a dangerous and ignominious sickness: that of ETHNICAL ALIENATION. Some of them, mostly students from the "Dogu", sincerely believing to be socialist, used to boast - often in bad turkish and with a marked "Dogu" accent - of being "purely Turks" and to scornfully reject their kurdish origin. They wanted to accomplish the World Revolution, to go and fight with the vietnamese or the palestinian peoples, but the DOGU-KURDISTAN did not interest them and deserved only

their contempt. That their very parents were peasants or working Kurds who possibly did not know a single word of turkish, that the "Dogu" people were oppressed, exploited and unhappy, all that did not deserve the interest of their "socialism". Of course, such a "parlour-socialism", ignoring the home reality, cannot be taken seriously in any multinational state based on the domination of one ethnical group representing the majority. It was thoroughly studied by the belgian professor Guy Heraud in his book "Qu'est-ce que l'ethnisme?" ("What is Ethnism?"). It strikes those members of the oppressed people representing numerically the minority and who seek to get themselves integrated in the majority people, in order to obtain social promotion, money, high rank, to enjoy power and consideration. The individuals who are stricken by the sickness, because of their inferiority complex and their torments, become usually the most dangerous elements to their original people, and the most chauvinistic amongst the majority group. Usually, those individuals lack courage. They feel ashamed of their ethnical origin and are opposed to the liberation of their original national group. There is a saying in the Middle East which tells that a man who denies his own origin has no origin and no value. The phenomena strikes first the upper middle class. But when national oppression is very strong and the governmental policy favours the economic development of the territory belonging to the dominating national group (or groups), it may also the workers seeking employment outside their native areas.

Such was the situation in Turkey. One should not blame very much those alienated individuals, because, any of them are, in a way, victims of the system. Perhaps they deserve more pity than contempt. Yet, it is amazing that the racist ideology of the turkish governing class could find some echo and be reflected even in the ranks of a socialist party. This remark only proves how strong is the national oppression which is the lot of the kurdish people in the Turkish Republic. I am by no means making gist to minimize the importance of the last change in the TIP policy towards the kurdish question. On the contrary, a great deal of courage was necessary to defy the powerful turkish reactionaries and to break off the mental habits of the past. Moreover, if the TIP was theoretically bound to take position, since the beginning, with respect to this question, yet it would be difficult, practically, to blame socialist Turks to have kept silence as long as the Kurds themselves did not prove to be particularly active. When the Kurds gave that proof, when they began their mass manifestations, when their democratic vanguard became united and defied the turkish fascism, then, but only then, the turkish democratic forces took position, and positively, but it is good to mention it: an oppressed nation which does not strive for its liberty will never become free. No socialism, no democracy, no humanity will offer liberty as a gift on a tray to such a nation. A dependent nation will recover dignity only in so far as it is ready to sacrifice. Then, but

only then can its potential friends take shape. An indolent nation which gives up will know, in the long-run, only the moral death which means the end of the existence of a national community, as ethnical group and sometimes a physical death.

The Kurds are often quoted throughout the world as an example for courage. But the courage necessary to a dependent nation to recover her dignity, to preserve her identity, is much more moral than physical: it is that of a man who fully assumes his responsibility, who accepts philosophical or political engagement. The kurdish people, thanks to their youth, have proved to possess this kind of courage too.

On July 24, 1970, Mr. Mehmet Ali Aybar, former President of the Labour Party of Turkey, member of the parliament, called upon the government, at the National Assembly (Parliament), to account for their "commando operations" in the "Dogu". Aybar asked the government to stop using arms against the Kurds, because, he explained, "this policy of terror, conceived, I assume, as a preventive measure, will give inevitably foreactions which will not serve the cause of national unity". He also said:

"Since the creation of the republic, our compatriots of the east and southeast have never been treated as equal citizens. Speaking kurdish, those compatriots are submitted to a special treatment, as third-class citizens and the present government is not the first one which has carried out such a policy against them. The policy of terror has always existed in the east and southeast, but the problems cannot be solved in this way. The policy of terror will lead us to a situation contrary to the hopes of those who are carrying out those measures (...).

An end must be put to this policy, so that the compatriots of the east may feel attached to this country and to this national community ..."

The integral text of Mr. Aybar's intervention, together with the reactions which it evoked among the deputies, can be consulted in the summary records of the national assembly (55). This intervention is, in a way, very timorous, and, in another, very courageous. It is timorous, because Aybar did not speak of the Kurds as a nation - in the sociological expression of the term; he did not ask the government to recognize the national rights of the kurdish people; he also called Kurdistan the "Dogu". All that he asked was to stop the policy of terror in Kurdistan, for the sake of "national unity" in the Turkish Republic. As a marxist, he cannot fail to know that the republic is composed of two nations and two countries, one of which is oppressing the other for the time being. He confused "national unity" and the "territorial integrity of the republic", with "national unity" and a free union between two peoples. But, (55) Part III. Vol.8, Setting 1; Meeting 134 of July 24, 1970.

in another way, the intervention was very courageous: it would suffice to remember to what fascist national oppression the Kurds are subjected, and also to know the reaction of some deputies "representing" the "Dogu" in the parliament. I shall spare the reader the details, but two or three "representatives" of the official "Dogu" cowardly insulted Mr. Aybar while he was defending their areas. The intervention was also courageous if we remember that, three or four years before 1970, at an international socialist conference held in Stockholm, the same Mr. Aybar, then President of the TIP, had reportedly answered a foreign journalist that "there was no kurdish question in Turkey". The progress is evident.

Another leading personality of the TIP, Madame Fatma Ismen, member of the Turkish Senate, also asked the government to stop the "commando policy" in the eastern provinces.

Commenting on Aybar's intervention and the deliberation which followed it, Mr. Ismail Cem wrote, in MILLIYET, November 26, 1970 (after praising the orator):

"The deliberation confirmed that there is indeed a problem in the Dogu (...). But the way our representatives are treating this problem is not serious; they continue to adopt an ostrich attitude towards it, hiding their heads in the sand. This attitude makes them responsible to history (...). The point is that Mr. Aybar gave the demonstration that the commandos' activity is contrary to the constitution".

But the most important issue in the matter was the resolution adopted on the kurdish question by the IVth Congress of the Labour Party of Turkey (56), held from October 29 to October 31, 1970. Here is its text:

"The IVth Congress of the Labour Party of Turkey recognizes and proclaims the following:

- The Kurdish people do exist in the east of Turkey;
- Since the beginning, the fascist power of the dominating classes has pursued, towards the kurdish people, a policy of oppression, of terror and of assimilation, which often took the form of bloody operations and persecution;
- Besides the law of the unequal development of capitalism, one of the fundamental reasons of the backwardness of the region inhabited by kurdish people, in comparison to the other regions, is the social and economic policy carried out by the power of the dominating classes, who took into consideration the fact that this region is inhabited by the kurdish people;

(56) To say: the Labour Party of Turkey (or the Worker's Party of Turkey), but not "the Turkish Labour Party". This change in the name of the TIP was officiammy decided, probably because "turkish" does not imply, or excludes "kurdish", while "Turkey", as a state, covers both the turkish and the kurdish peoples.

- That is why to consider "the problem of the east" as a regional development problem will only reflect the chauvinistic and nationalistic views of the power representing the dominating classes;

- Our Party is an implacable opponent of the anti-democratic, fascist, oppressive and chauvinistic-nationalistic currents: its support of the struggle of the kurdish people for the obtention of their constitutional rights and citizenship, and for the realization of all their aspirations and their democratic demands, is a normal and necessary revolutionary duty;

- The socialist Kurds and Turks should work side by side, within the Party, so that the struggle for the expression and for the realization of the democratic demands of the kurdish people and of their aspirations for a flourishing life, on one hand, and the struggle for the socialist revolution, led by the working class and its vanguard which is our Party, on the other hand, will be complementary to each other in one single revolutionary tide;

- To struggle, amongst the partisans, socialist and working circles, and amongst all the working masses, for the annihilation of the bourgeois, chauvinistic and racist-nationalistic ideology, as applied against the kurdish people, bound to achieve the development of our Party;

- The Party considers the kurdish question from the point of view of the socialist revolutionary struggle of the working class and its necessities".

This resolution constitutes an important statement. It appeals a few remarks, but it would be useful, first, to compare it with the resolution adopted by the Second Conference of the Iraqi Communist Party, (ICP), in September 1956, on the kurdish national question. All specific or particular circumstances being reserved, there is indeed some similarity between the national question of Iraqi Kurdistan as it was in 1956 and that of turkish Kurdistan in 1970. As the TIP in 1970, the ICP, confronted with the growing force of the kurdish national movement and of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, was led, for the first time in 1956, to precise its position towards the kurdish national question. To some extent, the people of turkish Kurdistan knew more or less the same experience 14 years later. But here is the resolution of the ICP:

"Article 1.- The territory inhabited by the arab people in Iraq is an integral part of the arab fatherland.

By its political unity, Iraq is an arab state both of the national and the international fields, and is a principal member of the family of arab states.

Article 2.- Iraq, within its present frontiers which were esta

blished by imperialism, includes a part of Kurdistan;

Article 3.- Iraq, consequently, consists of two main nations: the Arabs and the Kurds.

The kurdish people in Iraq is an integral part of the kurdish nation, which is established on its own territory, Kurdistan, presently partitioned among Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The Kurds do constitute a nation possessing all the characteristics inherent in a nation, especially: a stable group of men historically constituted, having a common territory - in spite of its partition imposed by the imperialists, a common language, and possessing the possibilities to establish a national economy oriented towards liberation and national unity".

In its explanatory part, the same ICP resolution continues on:

"It is a matter of common knowledge that the imperialism had torn Kurdistan and had prevented, after the First World War, the creation of a kurdish national state on this territory. It is imperialism which encouraged and continues to favour the policy of national repression practiced (against the Kurds) in Iraq, as well as in Turkey and in Iran" (57).

After the beginning of the revolution of Iraqi Kurdistan, led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the central committee of the ICP, in its meeting of March 1962, recognized in a resolution "the right of the kurdish people to self-determination, including secession and the formation of an independent state". The same resolution also notes that "the kurdish nation, like any other nation, should enjoy its right to decide herself on its own way of life, on its political institutions and on the kind of relationship that Kurdistan will have with the neighbouring countries and peoples" (58) After having recognized the right of the kurdish nation to self-determination, the resolution of the central committee adds: "In the present conditions, the sole valuable solution is to render the arab-kurdish union truly democratic, by the establishment of an autonomous government in Kurdistan, within the unity of the Iraqi Republic".

I have elsewhere fully studied the attitude of the ICP towards the kurdish national question and noticed its positive evolution (59). I have, in particular, noted the contradiction between the second paragraph

(57) See "Our political line for national liberation", by the ICP, September 1956, in Arabic.

(58) See "Report of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party for a just Solution of the kurdish national question in Iraq", March 1962

(59) See "Attitude du Parti communiste irakien" in my book "Le Kurdistan irakien, Entité nationale", pp. 162-177.-

of Article 1 of the resolution of 1956 and Article 2 of the same resolution: indeed if Iraq includes " a part of Kurdistan" (Art.2), this Iraq cannot be (only) "an arab state, both on the national and international fields"; Iraq can only be a binational state, an arab-kurdish state. On the other hand, the resolution of 1956, in another explanatory part (which I did not quote above) had traced traced the way for kurdish national liberation as follows: the Kurds of the iraqi state should, first of all take an active part, through their "common struggle with the arab people of Iraq", in the battle of the arab world against imperialism, for the realization of the Arab unity; once the arab unity is realized and the socialization of the arab world achieved, then iraqi Kurdistan will constitute a solid base for the national liberation of all Kurdistan. I had then criticized this strategy as traced by the ICP for kurdish liberation. It was indeed unrealistic and subjected the interests of the kurdish people to those of the arab world. Arabs and Kurds had indeed to liberate and to democratize Iraq, but the Kurds of southern Kurdistan can by no means be obliged to achieve the liberation, the unification and the socialization of the arab world before thinking of their own liberation. The solidarity between the two peoples being reserved, the "Kurdish question" cannot be a part of the "arab question", as suggests the resolution of 1956. In any way, the people of iraqi Kurdistan did not follow the ICP strategy, but that of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan: the ICP had to rectify its position. The position adopted in the resolution of March 1962 rejoins, in general outlines, that of the kurdish revolution.-

In many ways, the problem in Turkey is different. We do not have here a "turkish world" similar to that of the Arabs. All the question is limited to the republic and concerns only the republic, and that makes fewer theoretical complications. But, the problems of "strategy" being put aside, and in so far as general definitions are concerned, the resolution of the TIP appears definitely to fall short of that adopted by the ICP fourteen years earlier. The ICP statement not only recognizes the Kurds of Iraq as one of the two "main nations" of the State, but, going further, it also admits the existence of Kurdistan as the country of this nation, that the kurdish fatherland had been partitioned by imperialism, and that if Iraq includes a part of Kurdistan, it is because its frontiers had been traced by imperialism. Moreover, the iraqi resolution recognizes the right of the kurdish nation to self-determination. Apparently, there is nothing of all that in the TIP resolution. The Kurds of Turkey are not mentioned as a nation - but as people -, and there is no question of "kurdish national rights". There is mention neither of turkish Kurdistan - but of the "Dogu"- nor of the partition of the kurdish fatherland among several states of the Middle East - to say nothing of the right to self-determination. It is to be noted that this right

to self-determination was recognized to the kurdish people by the turkish revolutionary student organization DEV-GENC.-

Yet, the TIP resolution is most meritorious, especially there where it puts the accent on the necessity to struggle against the racist chauvinistic and nationalistic ideology, as applied against the kurdish people. Although ignoring their rights, Iraq had never denied the existence of the kurdish people, even under the monarchy: such is not the case in present Turkey. On the other hand, the "aspirations" of the kurdish people and their "democratic demands" (parag.5) cover the national rights.-

It goes without saying, however, that it would be better to call things by their name: Kurdistan is Kurdistan, the country of the kurdish people, who do constitute a nation. To call this country "Dogu" - "The East": is reminiscent of the Arabic "Al-Shamal" (The North); used by chauvinist Arabs in Iraq for southern Kurdistan.- The name of Kurdistan was printed on all turkish maps, and used by all the turkish generations during at least seven hundred years, since before the Seljuk Sultan Sinjar of Persia (XIIth Century), till the advent of the republic, to say nothing of the Cheref-nameh, of Chelebi's work or of Sèvres. After the defeat of Ottoman Turkey in the war of 1877-78 against Russia, the turkish government had to sign, successively, in 1878, the Treaty of San-Stefano and that of Berlin. According to Article 61 of the latter treaty, Turkey took the engagement to introduce some administrative reforms in favour of the armenians minority living among the moslem population in the eastern vilayets. The european Corps Diplomatique accredited at Constantinople was asked by the major powers to supervise the introduction of those reforms in the vilayets of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig (all the five having a kurdish majority) and in that of Sivas (the latter having a turkish majority, but partially kurdish). On June 11, 1880, Mr. Goschen, the senior european Ambassador, acting on behalf of the european powers, requested the turkish government, in an official note, to carry out the reforms. Turkey was unwilling to carry them out, partially to avoid putting the empire under the trusteeship of Europe. The point is not here, but in the use made of the name of KURDISTAN in the official turkish note sent, as answer, to the major powers. In his note of July 5, Abedin pacha, Grand Vizir (Prime Minister) and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, answered the Ambassador in the following terms: (the original text is in French)

"(...) In spite of the preoccupations and the difficulties which resulted from the war, the Ottoman Imperial Government has always present in mind to fulfil those clauses and have sent many competent civil servants to all the parts of the Kurdistan and to other vilayets, with the mission to study the best means to (...).

Before ending the present note, I feel that it is my duty to assert

categorically to Your Excellency and to specify that the last official census of the Armenian populations in Van, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Erzurum and Sivas gave the following results: the number of the Armenians amounts to 17 % of the population, that of the other non-moslem communities to 4 %, and that of the Moslems to 79 %

It goes without saying that the Sublime Porte (The Sultan's Government) will inform the powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin of the measures which will be taken for the successive introduction of the reforms in the provinces of Kurdistan and of Anatolia which are inhabited also by Armenians" (60).

The distinction made by the Turkish Prime minister between "Kurdistan" and "Anatolia", mentioned as different countries, both belonging to the Empire, corresponds to well known historical, geographical and ethnical facts. It is necessary to distinguish between "Turkey" being a state, or the territory of a state (whether the present republic or the ancient Ottoman Empire), and "Turkey" being the territory inhabited by the Turkish nation, by the Turkish group. It is this latter Turkey that the Grand Vizir calls Anatolia, and which I above named " Turkish Turkey". The distinction between Turkish Turkey, or Anatolia, and Kurdistan is evident. The territory of the Republic of Turkey is more extensive than Turkish Turkey or Anatolia, because it covers the latter country comprised in the republic.- Turkish Kurdistan is naturally the "east", the "Dogu" of the republic, but not the "Dogu" of Turkish Turkey; it is not "eastern Anatolia". Moreover, "Anatolia" is merely a geographical term, while (Turkish) Turkey and Kurdistan, with their ethnical implication, are much more than that.

To recognize the name of Kurdistan does not signify the disruption of Turkey as a state. The state of Great Britain, (The United Kingdom) consist of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster; the USSR is composed of 16 republics, united under one federal power; so is the case with Yugoslavia, with Czechoslovakia, with the Federal Republic of Germany - the latter although constituting but one nation -, and there are many more I could mention. The European sport federations consider the games between, let us say, English and Scotch national teams (although all British) as international matches. This is what one may name democracy. When Turkish and Kurdish sport national teams can play friendly matches together, the republic will have adopted democracy. To be valid and durable, a union between two peoples should be based on

(60) Cf. "La Nation kurde et son évolution sociale", by Messoud Fany, dissertation at the University of Paris, 1933, pp. 153-159

the mutual respect of their national characteristics, of their culture, and of their economic interests. Such a mutual respect alone can make the prosperity and the force of the whole. The states built on tyranny, on injustice and domination, cannot and will not last for ever. I am sure the day will come when, not only the turkish socialists, but also the turkish liberal middle class will admit the existence of the kurdish people and their rights as a distinct national group and as their associate, under an adequate democratic form, in the state. I am aware of the fact that many people in different countries use the word "nation" meaning of "state". This acceptation is but an extension and a deformation of the original meaning of the term, derived from the Latin "nasci", which means "to be born". It would take too long to review the different definitions to this term by many thinker: Mancini, Renan, Durkheim, Fichte, Hauser, Marx and Engels, Lenin, Stalin and others. In its original meaning, a nation consists of two categories of elements: objective elements (a stable population historically constituted, having a common language, a common territory, etc.) and one subjective element (the collective consciousness, the will to live together, under the same laws, to constitute a state, autonomous within a bigger state, federated with another state, or completely independent: that is the principle of nationalities, based on the concept of liberty and the right of peoples to self-determination). A state does not exclude the existence of smaller states, endowed with internal but not external sovereignty, within its boundaries. Any federation is a state consisting of smaller states. The state of Switzerland, for example, is a federation of 22 smaller states: the area of Genève is officially called "the State and Republic of Geneva"; that of Lausanne is "the State of Vaud" of which Lausanne is the capital, and so on. Each of the 22 federated states (cantons) of Switzerland has its own government, its own parliament, its own flag, its capital, its proper laws, proper finance, proper police force, its own history which is studied in its own schools, together with that of Switzerland. Even each town and each village has its own flag, which may be hoisted together with or without the federal flag: the point does not matter, because there is no animosity, no exclusion, no opposition in the world of Swiss flags. Some of the 22 Swiss states do not exceed in population 50.000 people; but they are all united in one federal government the seat of which is Bern. This town is a double capital, with two governments, that of Switzerland and that of the smaller state of Bern. There are three national languages in Switzerland, all officially equal and of equivalent status: German, French and Italian. On the Swiss banknotes, the same scripts are repeated in the three national languages. Since 1939, a fourth national language was recognized by the federal authorities: Romanch, a special language spoken only by about fifty thousands people living in two or three valleys not far from the Aus-

trian border. Yet, Switzerland did not split into pieces, but on the contrary: her cohesive force comes precisely from the accepted solidarity of her different elements, from her assumed diversity, from an equilibrium between her national groups, and between the federal government and the federated states, an equilibrium which has become a concern to every citizen and was raised to a high political principle. This is a good example of fruitful relationship, of brotherhood and solidarity between different national elements in a multinational state. It is to be meditated.

Is a national state any state the population of which consists of one national group, of one nation. Otherwise, the state will be bi-national, or multinational - even if it is not recognized as such by the constitution, as is the case with present Turkey. However, should the Republic of Turkey continue believing in the fiction of being composed of one nation, I mean should the republic continue confusing "state" and "nation", the question would be of practically no importance provided that the respective specific national rights of both the Turkish and the Kurdish peoples will be recognized and observed. Let the republic recognize the Kurdish national, cultural and economic rights and call herself a "nation" if she likes. After all, the meaning of words is but conventional. But the Kurdish people cannot renounce to very name of their country, Kurdistan, which is a part of their national identity. It is always good to call things by their name.

The TIP resolution of October 1970 was duly hailed by the Kurdish people and their organizations. In a statement of January 1971, the Kurdish Students' Society in Europe (KSSE), member of the IUS, wrote: "This resolution might seem simple and even commonplace to the European reader who ignores the horrible racist political atmosphere in Turkey since the advent of the republic. But those who know it will not fail to consider this as an important event in the politics of Turkey". This was indeed the first time in the history of the republic that a political party authorized by the government issued such an important statement on the Kurdish national question. The socialist Turks are the natural allies of the oppressed Kurdish people. I feel, however, that a further remark is still necessary with respect to the VIIIth paragraph of the TIP resolution, where it is question to unify the struggle of the socialist Turks and Kurds, within this party, "in one single revolutionary tide" in order to achieve the socialist revolution and to solve the Kurdish question. This paragraph sets two problems to the Kurdish movement, one "organizational" and the other ideological. The first problem is the most serious, because there are few ideological differences between the aims of the modern democratic Kurdish movement and those of a socialist party like the TIP. From the point of view of organization, such a party, whatever the merit of its objective positions towards the Kurdish cause might be

cannot lead the struggle of the kurdish people to solve their national question - no more than the iraqi Communist Party in southern Kurdistan, the "Tudeh" party in Iran, or the Syrian Communist Party (to say nothing of the "Beath") in Syria. A Party like the TIP would be unable to mobilize the large masses of Kurdistan, but would be followed only by a part of the kurdish revolutionary intelligentsia, leaving the masses disoriented or indifferent. Nor could it defend the kurdish people with any efficiency against any serious fascist attack of the genocide kind. The kurdish movement of national liberation has always been and is the work of the Kurds themselves, of specifically kurdish parties and organizations. The possibility of its success depends, naturally, on its cohesive force, on its internal democratization, its determination and the degree of its organization, but also on its comprehension of the common interests existing between the kurdish and neighbouring peoples - that is, its capability to find (and merit) support amongst the democratic and socialist forces of the latter peoples, with view to attain common aims. The national question of Kurdistan within the Republic of Turkey can be solved only through the resolute struggle of a powerful and well-structured kurdish democratic party, in close cooperation, if not alliance, with the turkish socialist and truly democratic forces. Ideologically, it would be difficult to identify such a kurdish democratic movement of national liberation with a movement which is not specifically kurdish and which aims achieving the socialist revolution - this in spite of a convergent line of evolution which implies cooperation, alliance, a common struggle between them but not melting. On the other hand it may be asked whether the attempt to achieve the socialist revolution would be a realistic objective in the present conditions of Turkey, whether the political conditions are realized and the socialist elements are strong enough to perform such a step. This seems to be more than doubtful. To achieve the socialist revolution may naturally remain the socialists' ultimate aim; their ideal for tomorrow, an ideal without which they will no longer be socialist. In any case, it is up to the peoples of Turkey to decide, at the right time, whether they want a socialistic or another kind of government. In present Turkey, governed by fascism, there are definitely other tasks and other priorities.

Before they occurred, the "events" of March 12, 1971 had been explained, justified - and, naturally, prepared - by General Tagmaç, chief of staff of the turkish army, and other senior officers. In a statement of January 1 published by the world press (61), the General Tagmaç expressed the "unrest" of the army because "the turkish youth were openly speaking of the peoples of Turkey" and of "the rights of the kurdish people" (61) "Le Monde" January 3, 1971.

ple". In another declaration, published by "Cumhuriyet", February 10, General Tagmaç gave further explanations. He said that the army chiefs were becoming anxious about: 1) the leftist and students activity; 2) the development of "Kürtçülük" (kurdish movement) in the eastern vilayets; 3) the activity of the extreme right movement.

The third point is to be eliminated, as cause of the events. Not indeed because extreme right was inactive: the activity of those elements; whether touranist or religious, is, on the contrary, very intense, and dangerous. But the racist touranist movement is encouraged, armed and financed by a sector of the army, first by ideological affinity, secondly to break the workers' and the students' manifestations in the main cities: this is the classical face of fascism, as was known under Mussolini and Hitler. The religious movement, active especially in Konya and other parts of central Turkey, and in Kurdistan, is the ally of the landlords and reaction.

The kurdish national liberation movement and the turkish-kurdish labour movement, henceforth bound insolidarity and both actively supported by the youth and students' progressist organizations, are the only two reasons which remain. The armed forces which struck Silvan and Batman and which are still striking in the "Dogu", were also used to break the great workers manifestations of Ankara and Istanbul, in June 1970.

On october 15, 1970, some thirty kurdish intellectuals were arrested, including Dr. Tarik Ekinçi, Dr. Canip Yildirim (Doctor of Law from the University of Montpellier, former assistant professor at the University of Ankara), Mr. Musa Anter, Mr. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, and many leading members of the kurdish students' organization DDKO. The former were released on the bail two weeks later, but the students are still in jail (62). The arrest of the latter did not affect the activity of the Revolutionary Cultural Centres of the east.

In the ultimatum of March 12, 1971, which they addressed to the government, General Tagmaç, Gurler (Land Forces), Batur (Air Force) and admiral Eyiceoglu (Navy) said:

"The turkish armed forces have decided to seize power if a new and strong government is not formed in the shortest possible time, in order to put an end to the state of anarchy threatening Turkey and to perform the economic and social reforms mentioned in the constitution.

The Parliament and the government have put in serious danger the future of the Turkish Republic, as they led the country to anarchy, to fratricidal struggle, to social and economic chaos, and as they took away the nation's very hope to attain the level of a modern civilization, which was the aim assigned by Kemal Atatürk.

It is necessary to constitute, according to the democratic rule (62) Among them, to mention: Zeki Tekes, İbrahim Güçlü, Sabri Cepik, Mumtaz Kotan, Nezir Semikanlı, Necmettin Büyükkaya.

les, a strong government able to accomplish, in a kemalist spirit, the reforms ordered by the constitution (...).

If this is not realized as soon as possible, the Turkish armed forces are resolved to directly assume power (...)"

Here we are. In the name of the kemalist spirit of modernism, of law and order, of democracy, democracy is to be killed, the basic public and individual liberties to be suspended, the Parliament to be paralysed, the Kurdish people to accept humiliation, poverty and national oppression or to prepare themselves to be bombarded, Turkey's workers to be content with misery and to stay dumb, the students to read their books and to applaud the nation's silent military heroes. But whose nation?

The title of an article published by a Swiss newspaper sums up the situation well: "Turkey under the sword of Damocles" (63). The government is under the trustsheep of the senior army officers. Needless to say, such a régime cannot be democratic. Mr. Ismet Inönü himself said that the strong government as desired by the army would mean the end of the democratic system. The TIP declared that the change was fascist; its President Mrs. Behice Boran, was arrested. But three days after the military ultimatum, both Mr. Inönü and the dismissed Premier, Mr. Derimel, leader of the reactionary "Justice" Party, changed position and said that they would support the new régime. Mr. Inönü observed, however, that he did not believe that such a "transitory government" would be able to accomplish the necessary reforms. On March 19, Mr. Nihat Erim, a leading member of Inönü's "Popular Republican" Party, was asked by General Sunay to form the strong government. He was presented as an independent personality: actually he had just resigned from his party to assume his new charge.

Since that time, events have proved that democracy could not survive after the ultimatum of March 12. On April 26, the new strong government declared martial law in 11 of the 67 vilayets of the republic, including the Kurdish vilayets of Diyarbakir and Siirt, as well as Ankara, Istanbul and Smyrna. The constitution and the penal code are being amended, in order, said Mr. Erim, "to enable the law to strike as a bludgeon". As a matter of fact, the "law" will consist of "Orders in Council" (64) naturally ordered by General Tagmaç and his partners. "State Security Tribunals" are being created to replace the civil courts in all cases judged critical. The law on associations, public meetings and manifestations is being reviewed, in order to suspend, dissolve or to declare illegal the democratic and Kurdish associations. Censorship of the press has been reinforced. Any article commenting unfavourably on the action of the government and the ultimatum of March 12 is considered subversive and a--

(63) "La Turquie sous l'épée de Damoclès", by Armand Gaspard, in "Gazette de Lausanne" of April 26 and 27, 1971.
 (64) "Le Monde" of 27 to 29 April, 1971.

against the nation's interest. Two days after the declaration of the martial law, turkish, kurdish democrats and liberal minded people were arrested in the hundred not only in the provinces where that law was proclaimed, but all over the territory of the republic, especially, in Ankara, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Mardin and Siirt. The offices of the turkish DEV-GENC and the kurdish DDKO student federations were closed. The two organizations being considered subversive. The Teacher's Trade Union of Turkey and the Social Democratic Federation (were also considered as such and closed). The well known Turkish dailies "Cumhuriyet" read by the middle class educated people and "Aksam" - the official organ of the Labour Confederation of Turkey were suspended for 10 days. The columnist Ilhan Selcuk, from "Cumhuriyet", and Cetin Altan, from "Aksam" with many other journalists, were arrested and prosecuted. - On April 28, General Faik Turun, commander of the First Army; charged with the application of the martial law, justified his new mission by "the kurdish danger". He assured in a public statement that the Kurd were aiming at "establishing" a kurdish state in the east of Turkey. On the same day, Mr. Omeroglu, the new minister of the Interior (Home Secretary), urged the Parliament to vote in martial law. Reduced to the rôle of a registration chamber, the Parliament obeyed and voted in the law: only Mr. Aybar and Mrs. Ismen, the latter a leading member of the TIP, voted against it. All the reactionary and right-wing groups voted for the bill and applauded the repressive measures. In his address to the Parliament, Mr Omeroglu mentioned five "organized and powerful" movements endangering the existence "of the fatherland and of the Republic": the extreme right, the extreme left, the kurdish movement, the syrian subversion in Hatay (Alexandretta), and the activity of "those who are dreaming of establishing a dictatorship" (a hint to a group of officers) - as if the present régime were not already dictatorial.

With respect to the kurdish question, the Minister of Home Affairs assured that "the pro-kurdish activities aim at dividing the national territory into two parts"; he said that "important quantities of arms had been discovered in the east of the country", and accused "the forces of the iraqi kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani of supporting the kurdish separatist activities in Turkey". In his turn, the Minister of Justice, Mr Arar, spokesman of the government (and member of Inönü Popular Republican Party), addressed the Parliament, at the same meeting of April 28, adding "the turkish government had the proof of the existence of a kurdish Independence Party in Turkey" (65)

(65) "Le Monde" of April 30, 1971

On May 2, the new Premier, Mr. Erim, spoke at length in his turn, on "the kurdish danger", of "kurdish separatism", encouraged "by a foreign power". Two days before, on April 30, general Tagmaç, accompanied by the chiefs of staff of the three Armies, had visited Diyarbakir: a way to show the teeth of fascism to the Kurdish people (66).

It goes without saying that those accusations are mere fabrication. How could General Barzani, who sought and obtained some kind of autonomy for iraqi Kurdistan, within the Iraqi Republic, encourage any separatist trend in turkish Kurdistan? The so-called "Kurdish Independence Party" exists only in the imagination of the turkish fascist elements. The only crime of the people of turkish Kurdistan is to struggle for the recognition of their national, cultural, democratic and economic rights by the government of the republic, within the republic, and, in a later stage, together with the turkish people themselves, to peacefully transform the republic into a democratic binational federal state. But for the fascist and racist ideology which has been and is governing Turkey, just to speak of the kurdish people and of their rights is a most serious crime, and constitutes the supreme danger. It is as serious a danger that a large growing sector of the turkish people was speaking more and more favourably of the kurdish people and their rights. As it was recently pointed out in the turkish press (67), it was chiefly this "kurdish danger" which had incited General Tagmaç and his partners to send their ultimatum of March 12. The turkish ruling fascism and its kurdish agents are frightened of the awakening of the kurdish people and of the turkish-kurdish popular solidarity. The present military dictatorship was to be expected since the kurdish people began massive manifestations in the summer of 1967, to remind the government of their existence. The policy of commando operations did not attain its objectives, because the Kurds neither revolted nor became silent. On the contrary, they protested more and more, explaining their conditions, expressing their aspirations. The turkish people protested with them, beginning seriously to study the kurdish national question and increasingly becoming conscious of its importance. Conscious of all that was horrible, singular, ridiculously anachronistic and fascist in the official ideology as applied against the Kurds, in the name of modernism, since the advent of the republic. The military coup d'état was the answer of turkish chauvinistic nationalism, as inherited from Kemalism by the upper classes, to the determination of the kurdish people to recover their national dignity and their rights. It was also the answer to the growing turkish-kurdish solidarity as directly expressed by the TIP and student organizations, by as eminent a professor as İsmail Besikçi, and, indirectly, and moderated by as widely-known journalists as Ahmed Hemdi Basar and İsmail Cem, representing the liberal educated wing of the turkish middle classes. It was the answer to the turkish reaction-

(66) "Le Monde" of May 4, 1971.

(67) See "Milliyet" from March 13 to April 28, 1971.

naries, supported by their tools, the kurdish reactionaries, to what was becoming the prefiguration of a turkish-kurdish genuinely democratic front for a truly modern republic, in which the kurdish people would enjoy their normal rights, and the popular masses a decent life. The TIP and the socialist Turks have been treated so barbarously only since they took position in favour of the oppressed kurdish people.

The false accusations mentioned by ministers Omeroglu and Arar, by the Premier Erim, and by their masters, general Tagmaç and his partners, constitute a good pretext to shed the blood of the kurdish people once all democratic life is completely paralyzed and the working class reduced to the rôle of dumb productive animals. But that is what the fascist generals should not and will never succeed in attaining. They are mistaken if they think that they can smash the conjugate democratic forces of the turkish and kurdish peoples.

The coup d'état of March 12, 1971, reminds one very much of what was called "the Revolution of May 27, 1960", which brought General Gursel to power. At that period, the "revolution" published a new edition, at state expense, of a book written by a man named Sirif Firat, and entitled "The Regions of the East and the History of Varto" (in turkish), which had been published for the first time in 1945. The author tried to prove that the Kurds were "of pure turkish origin". General Gursel himself then President of the republic, wrote the introduction to the second edition, in which he said:

"There is not, in this world, such a people having their own personality and called the kurdish people. The Kurds are not only our compatriots, but also our brothers in blood and race. But because of bad administration and negligence, the people of the east lived in isolation for centuries. Those who want to cut the turkish fatherland into two pieces profit from these circumstances(...).

Turkish intellectuals should know that the activity of kurdism has but one aim: to weaken us and then to smash us. Of course; we should never allow that, because the provinces of the east are not only the door of our fatherland but also its stronghold. We shall do our best to explain these truths to our brothers of the east; if we neglect to enlighten them, they would be unable to know that they are true Turks and to thwart this propaganda. Because of this mean propaganda, the day will come when the country will be partitioned into two parts. But if we lose the regions of the East, it would be difficult to maintain ourselves in central and western Anatolia.

From the point of view of the future of the turkish people and of their fatherland, this question is of utmost importance. Time has come when the turkish intellectuals should become conscious of

the importance of this question. We should awaken and enlighten ourselves reciprocally. This question is vital, is important, is serious. As long as we do not find the solution to this question, we do not find the solution to this question, we do not have the right to be sure of our future" (68).

Those lines remind of Hitler's philosophy and of his hateful geopolitics, in "Mein Kampf":

"Right lies this strength alone" (Mein Kampf, the English edition translated by Ralph Manheim, published in 1943 in the USA by the Boston Houghton Mifflin Co.; p. 653).

"The racially pure movement must not be the champion of other peoples, but the vanguard fighter of its own" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 443)

"The organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the stateforming efficacy of the German element in an inferior race" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 654).

"I was repelled by the conglomeration of races which filled the capital (Vienna), repelled by this whole mixture of Czechs, Poles, Hungarian, Ruthenians, Serbs, and Croats and everywhere, the eternal mushroom of humanity - Jews and more Jews" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 123 : Hitler is speaking here of the Austrian Empire)

"The legal state power in those days was rooted on the anti-German soil of Parliament with its non-German majorities and in the equality anti-German ruling house. (Mein Kampf, idem p. 97: Hitler is also speaking of the Austrian Empire).

"The German bourgeoisie... is pacifist to the point of positive self-abnegation, where internal affairs of the nation or state are concerned... To make possible the waging of any serious struggle the Pan-German movement should above all dedicated itself to winning the masses" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 172)

"Our German people, today broken and defenseless, exposed to the kicks of all the world, are now most in need of that force which will inspire the confidence in themselves" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 411)

"If we wanted territories in Europe, it could only be done at the expense of Russia, and this would mean that the new Reich would again march along the road of the Teutonic knights of old, to obtain by German sword land for the German plow and daily bread for the nation" (Mein Kampf, idem p. 140).

Gursel's philosophy, like Tagmaç's, like Omeroglu's, is a hitlerian philosophy. Commenting the ideals of the "Revolution" of May 1960, a Swedish newspaper of that period noted: "In Turkey, it is always a question of a national unified state. But like many other assertions of new Turkey, this unity is only a fiction. Turkey denies officially the existence of the Kurdish question, which, actually, is the

explosive element that threatens the turkish state(...)

Instead of trying to find out a reasonable solution to the kurdish question, the young officers who made the revolution are threatening the Kurds with repression"(69)

The kurdish movement is indeed threatening the fascism which is governing the "turkish" state, but by no means the state itself. The turkish people are beginning to know it and to be convinced of this fact. In February 1971, a turkish socialist magazine wrote: "Yes, the kurdish peoples does exist in the east of Turkey. But the development of the kurdish movement does not worry us: it frightens only the imperialists and the ultra-nationalist elements among the Turks" (70) More and more Turks know that the kurdish national liberation movement is the best ally of the turkish working and middle classes for a modern, truly democratic, binational federal state, which alone would be bound to last and to prosper. -

On July 20, 1971, the Labour Party of Turkey was declared illegal. precisely because of the position it had adopted in support to the case of the kurdish people. The TIP was actually accused by the government of having violated article 57 of the constitution and articles 87 of the law on associations and political parties. Article 57 forbids any association or political party the activity of which would be judged harmful to "the national unity and the territorial integrity of the turkish republic"; other article forbids any association that would make use of "linguistic or religious differences" with view to destroy "the ethnical unity of the turkish nation", or to develop "a cultur other than the turkish culture in Turkey". The socialist party is guilty of having objectively mentioned a simple and concrete truth: the existence of the kurdish people in the "Dogu" of the republic, and the fact that the Kurds are oppressed, and their country underdeveloped -intentionally. The turkish governing reaction, still following an ostrich policy, continue to believe in the fiction of a republic consisting of one nation. Ataturk had said: "He is a Turk who wants to be a Turk" (71). That is all right, that is democratic. But why should a Kurd not be allowed to remain a Kurd, to become an advanced Kurd, in -and for- the republic? The 7 million Kurds who are citizens of the republic - of the second order- but who do not want to become "ethnically" Turks, should they really

(69) "Dagens Nyheter" of November 16, 1960.

(70) See "Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik" ("Revolutionary Proletarian Clarity") of February 1971.

(71) See "...Le procès visant à interdire le Parti ouvrier" and "Est turec qui veut etre turec", in LE MONDE of 4-5 and 27 July 1971.

ask the United Nations to find them some "national home" in Africa ?

The number of arrested people, all democrats, Turks and Kurds, belonging or not to the TIP, grew. They number today in the thousands. More than six hundred Kurds workers, peasants, but mostly intellectuals, were arrested; they are detained in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir, Siirt and other kurdish towns. There are two concentration camps in Kurdistan full of political prisoners, with barbed wire enclosures, one in the suburbs of Diyarbakir and the other in Siirt. The trial of many of them are going on.

Among the arrested democrats we find Mrs. Behice Boran and Professor Ismail Besikçi, both Turks and leading personalities of the TIP, both accused of having encouraged the so-called "kurdish separatism"; the internationally well known writer Yasar Kemal, politically independent, presented in the world press as " Turk ", but who is native of Van (Kurdistan) and says in his own biography that his grand-father knew only Kurdish; the well known scenario-writer and film-producer Yilmaz Guney, who presented a very remarkable film in the last festival of Canne, also referred to as a "Turk" in the world press, but who is native of Siverek (Kurdistan) and speaks Kurdish. Among other arrested Kurds we find Dr. Tarik Ziya Ekinci, Tahsin and Yusuf Ekinci (brothers of the former, both lawyers from Diyarbakir), Dr. Naci Kutlay (medical doctor from the Ararat area), Mehmet Emin Bozarlan (writer), Mehdi Zana (worker), Ahmet Aras (economist), Rusen Aslan (lawyer), Kemal Burkay (lawyer from Dersim-Tunceli), Dr. Ahmet Melik (medical doctor from Batman), Dr. Oguz Uçok (dentist), Necmettin Büyükkaya, Zeki Tekes (students) - but there are many more. To escape the police, hundreds of other Kurds and Turks are living in the underground.

Those arrested democrats had committed no crimes and have nothing to do with terrorism. The few people who committed terrorist acts were either police agents and provocators, or young students who, in their inexperience, romantically but despairingly confused their isolated acts with what should be the large popular struggle for democracy. The police used such acts as pretexts to paralyze democratic life, to strike at the TIP and the kurdish national movement. Terrorism, which consists by definition of isolated and desperate acts of violence, is the best ally -if not the fabrication - of the turkish reaction. Terrorism will never restore Turkey to democracy and the kurdish people to liberty.

Fascism has undoubtedly won a battle: it should not be allowed to win the final one. To keep silent -especially in the country - would mean to accept defeat, to let the reaction consolidate its power and strangle the people. One does not know what the forbidden TIP would do. What is certain is that fascism cannot eradicate the socialist forces in Turkey.

The socialists should, and surely will, continue the battle - this time un derground, possibly under a new direction and with a new program.

I think that the first task of all the socialist and democratic elements, Turks and Kurds, should be to harmonize and to unite their efforts; if possible within a large democratic front having a common minimum program, with view to combat fascism and to restore the republic to a normal democratic and parliamentary life, to the public and individual basic liberties. There are elements other than socialists in Turkey, within the ranks of the small and middle bourgeoisies, who are against fascism, against any direct or indirect military dictatorship, against the reactionary amendments added to the constitution, and for a number of social and democratic reforms. They are democratic elements, and the socialists should offer to them the hand and the cooperation.

This battle for democracy and against fascism should be only political. It should exclude any act of violence, which might be used by the reaction as pretext for a greater strangulation of the people. This requires, from the socialists, to keep themselves politically organized - under ground - and increasingly active. Especially, they should continue their publications - inside and outside the country - and ensure them the largest diffusion amongst the popular and middle classes.

It goes without saying that this cooperation between the socialists and the democrats of the small and middle bourgeoisies should not be undertaken at the expense of the working and the peasant classes, nor to the detriment of the kurdish people.

The socialists know their present difficulties arose chiefly because of their courageous position towards the case of the oppressed kurdish people. This position, they have to adopt. By no means have they to renounce to it. The socialists should not; and will surely not, allow the fascist reactionaries the satisfaction of abandoning the position they had adopted, of appearing frightened by the repression. On the contrary, they should keep that position and, if possible, bring more precision and more clarity to the resolution of October 1970. The socialist of Turkey should not be afraid of speaking of the kurdish nation and its rights - especially that the Kurds are firmly against any separatism and struggle for a just, free and durable union with the ethnically turkish nation, within a democratic republic.

Finally, the socialists should admit the necessity of a political unity between the two main tendencies of the kurdish movement. This kurdish unity, a sound kurdish organization is necessary for the sake of the kurdish people, for the sake of democracy and of the republic.

The kurdish movement will continue underground, having never been authorized by the government. It must be reorganized, restructured, and, most important, achieve unity and clarify its objectives. The kurdish vanguard elements, whether democrat or socialist, should become united in one single progressist party, which may be called, for instance, the So-

cialist Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SDPTK), or simply the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan. The objectives of the movement should be defined very clearly, perhaps as follows:

- 1.- To combat the fascist régime -politically and not by violence- and the official turkish chauvinistic and racist conception of nationalism;
- 2.- To seek the democratization of the republic, in close cooperation with all the turkish socialist and truly democratic forces. This means to struggle for the constitution of a republican government that would:
 - a.- recognize the existence and the rights of the kurdish people, within the republic;
 - b.- elaborate a new and sound democratic constitution; which should guarantee the public and individual liberties, recognize the existence of the kurdish nation in Kurdistan (Dogu) and its rights, within the territorial unity of the republic and as a partner of the turkish nation;
 - c.- achieve a land reform which would put an end to the feudal system, to the satisfaction of the peasants;
 - d.- improve the standard of living and the working conditions of the working class; raise the wages of the workers and the employees of the petit bourgeoisie, of the minor civil servants and the intellectuals;
 - e.- adopt a well balanced economic development programme;
 - f.- follow a neutral line in matters of foreign policy.
- 3.- To struggle for a special development for the "Dogu-Kurdistan", knowing that the kurdish underdevelopment, as planned and maintained by the reactionary power, is largely responsible for the general underdevelopment of Turkey. When one part of a body is sick, all the body is sick;
- 4.- To struggle for the recognition of Kurdish as the other or second official language, with Turkish, in and of the republic, and as the main teaching language in all the areas inhabited by Kurdish majority (like is the case with German, French and Italian in Switzerland);
- 5.- To struggle for the recognition by the republican government of the name of Kurdistan as the country of the kurdish nation, within the republic -as was the case in the Ottoman Empire;
- 6.- To popularize, since now, as the ultimate objective of the kurdish movement, the idea aiming at transforming the Republic of Turkey in close cooperation with the Turkish people, into a turkish-kurdish binational federal state composed of a turkish republic and a kurdish republic, united under one central government representing both of them and each having its own constitutions and its government within the federation.

Such a unified "Socialist Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan" would be the best ally of all the turkish socialist and truly democratic forces.

Such a party, if well structured and resolute, can alone mobilize the popular masses of Kurdistan. It alone would be able to dissuade the turkish fascist reaction from committing a new genocide in the "Dogu", or organize the kurdish resistance to any large-scale attack that might aim at the destructich of this people.-

This SDPTK - and more generally the kurdish movement - should avoid tumbling down in to that infantile sickness consisting of what one may call a romantic, unrealistic and naïve leftism. It should put the accent on the struggle for the obtention of the kurdish national, cultural, democratic and economic rights, and popularize the kurdish demands through publications both in Kurdish and Turkish, and if possible in foreign languages. The kurdish masses will be more sensitive to a movement that would frankly engage in a political battle for the kurdish national liberation, within the republic and in cooperation with the turkish progressist forces, than to a movement that would romantically launch vague and general slogans about world imperialism or world revolution. What interest primarily the kurdish people is to recover themselves, and to develop the economic resources of their country to the advantage of their masses, all this peacefully and in complete brotherhood with the turkish people. There is indeed an internal exploitation within the kurdish society, we know that most of the kurdish landlords are the tools of the turkish reactionaries, against their own people; but it should not be forgotten that this people, as such, is globally exploited and globally oppressed, by that reaction. This means, to give an example, that the few kurdish landlords who are not agents of the turkish reactionaries, and who are aware of the situation of their people, should not be regarded in advance as spies and agents; they should be respected, inasmuch they may prove to be patriotic and ready to admit the socialist programme of the kurdish movement. But it goes without saying that such good landlords cannot - and should never be allowed to - have a leading position in the movement. The past is over.

Although underground, the kurdish movement should not be afraid of the kurdish nation and her aspirations; it should frankly publicize a clear progra: the turkish people should actually be able to know what exactly are the immediate and the final aims of the kurdish movement. Of course, the turkish reactionaries would demagogically cry shame, separatism, treason, but a growing number of the turkish working, peasant and middle classes would be assured, or reassured, as to the non-existence of any separatist trend within the kurdish movement. This may be repeated, and explained, as many time as necessary. This is a condition to any fruitful cooperation between the democratic forces of the two peoples, a condition for the creation of a turkish-democratic front. The kurdish people and their vanguard should make contact not only with the socialist Turks, but also with the democratic elements of the turkish middle classes. They should explain to them the situation in Kurdistan, convin

ce them of the kurdish anti-separatist stand, and obtain their support for the kurdish aspirations. The kurdish movement should cooperate with any turkish movement that would admit the existence of the kurdish people and be ready to recognize their national, cultural, economic and democratic rights.

To conclude, the kurdish people should convince the turkish people of their willingness to solve their national question peacefully and within the republic. Only fascism is considering to use force to solve this question, but fascism will never be able to solve it by violence. One day or another, the kurdish national question will be solved peacefully, to the complete satisfaction of both the kurdish and the turkish peoples, and for the sake of their union.

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A look at history will show that there were several periods of cooperation between the Kurds and the Turks, followed by periods of friction for which the turkish authorities were responsible. After the initial wars consecutive to the arrival of the Seljuks in the area, there was a very long and rich period of cooperation and brotherhood between the two ethnical groups, first under the Seljukid sultans, then under the Ayyubid dynasty. Under the Ottomans, their relations were also marked by another period of cooperation which began with sultan Selim and Chaldiran and lasted more than one century. During this period, the Kurds helped the Turks even in their conquests and to maintain the Turkish Empire. It ended when the sultans began destroying the kurdish principalities. However, the Kurds fought side by side with the Turks in the First World War. After the defeat, when Turkey was occupied by foreign powers, the Kurds, -as said Ismet Inönü at Lausanne- once more fought in the side of the turkish people, during the war of independence, believing in the kemalist promises about turkish-kurdish partnership. But they were betrayed by the Kemalist and obliged to defend themselves against the attacks of the turkish government, which denied their very existence as a people. The Kurds proved to have always been loyal in their friendship towards the turkish people; but by the turkish government. A new and lasting era of cooperation will mark once more the relations between the two peoples: it is indeed impossible to continue for very long to ignore the national existence of a kurdish people who constitutes one fifth of the total population of the republic. Actually, that era has already begun, but the present cooperation consists of a common struggle dictatorship and for democracy: one day it will be proclaimed as a constitutional principle, under the republican banner, in a democratic binational republic.

A great - but decreasing - number of Turks (of Persian and of Arabs too) are still opposed to the recognition of kurdish rights. They think

that if the Kurds obtain kurdish press and kurdish school, they will demand autonomy or a federative status and, later on complete independence and that Turkey will be thus partitioned. This reasoning is borrowed from fascism. It is only apparently realistic. First, to refuse their rights to the Kurds has proved to be harmful not only to the latter, but also to the Turks (to the Persians and to the Arabs), especially to the working and middle classes. This means dictatorship, underdevelopment, fascism, a huge military and police budget. Secondly, and to follow the nationalistic reasoning, there is no risk that the Kurds become one day strong enough to establish an independent Kurdistan against the will of the turkish, the persian, the iraqi and the syrian government together. What the Kurds wants is to obtain their full cultural, economic, democratic; and national rights, on the basis of autonomy or according to a federalist status, within the framework of the existing states, and in complete cooperation with their neighbours. They do not aim at destroying the existing states, but want to humanize them with democracy, justice, equality. Finally, and perhaps most important, the time will come, even in the Middle East, when the aberrations of nationalism, as professed by the present governing classes, will begin to disappear. Then, the sacred international frontiers which partition the kurdish nation will progressively lose their importance, and their significance, in the minds of the Kurds themselves and of their neighbours. Then, no turkish general may think that the creation, for instance, of some "All Kurdistan cultural council", across the political frontiers, would be "subversive". Later on the peoples of the area may judge it necessary to conjugate their interest and to unify themselves within some large federation, or confederation, in which the kurdish people cannot fail to have the place they deserve. Why to try to destroy by force political frontiers which are bound to be shaded off by time itself, and finally to disappear under the pressure of new mental structures, of new ideals, of a better comprehension of common interests, of a lasting friendship ?

That time is still far in the future. In Turkey, today is but a battle against military dictatorship, against fascism and reaction against a Hitler like nationalistic ideology, a battle for democracy and liberty. I am confident that the turkish and kurdish peoples, with their youth, and united will win it. Meanwhile, the outside world has not the right to keep silent , to observe as a spectator the rights of man being trodden down.

The democrats of all countries, whatever might be their ideology, are urged to ask the turkish government to release the political prisoners, Turks and Kurds, who have been deprived of their liberty because of their political convictions.-

Liberty to Behice Bqran, to Ismaïl Besikçi, to Yasar Kemal, to

Yilmaz Guney, to the Ekinçi, the Bozarslan and th the thousands of men and wcmen who know the prison because they love their people and their country

Liberty, liberty ! you will shine again over Turkey, you will smile again and give the joy to the green valleys, todays darkened sorrow, of the Kurdish land.

Roma, August 1971

Ismet Chériff Vanly

