

Hizmet Movement's Effects on PKK Recruitment and Attacks

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Abstract

Strategies and the effects of civil society in conflict resolution are understudied. State agencies, governments or security forces, are seen as major actors, and researches pay more attention to their efforts. This is the case for Turkey's Kurdish problem as well.

This paper looks at the strategies and efforts of Turkey's largest social movement, Hizmet Movement (aka Gulen Movement), in predominantly Kurdish populated areas of Turkey; and measures its effects on PKK recruitment and attacks. In order to measure movement's effects it develops an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to test its hypotheses. Findings of the regression analyses show that the activities of the Hizmet Movement, especially its educational activities, decrease both the number of recruitments and attacks of the PKK.

Keywords

Hizmet Movement, Gulen Movement, PKK, Turkey, Conflict Resolution.

Turkey has spent more than 300 billion dollars in its struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK)) (Econorm 2009). More than 40 thousand people died, thousands were wounded, and millions left their homes (Kirk 2008). Turkish military forces killed 32 thousand PKK militants and captured 14 thousand between 1984 and 2008. 5, 560 civilian died and 6, 482 Turkish soldiers were killed during the same period (Hurriyet 2008). Since 1984, the Turkish army has launched 25 cross-border operations in different scales to PKK training camps mainly in Northern Iraq.

In intrastate conflicts, usually the state actors' efforts are considered essential in conflict resolution processes. Turkey and its Kurdish conflict is also not an exception. Main actors in the conflict have been the PKK, the Turkish Military, and the Turkish elected government[s]. It has been these actors' strategies that drawn the most attention. However, recent studies suggest that civil society groups also contribute a great deal to resolving conflicts.

This paper focuses on one of Turkey's most influential social movements, the Hizmet Movement's- also known as the Gülen Movement- and its involvement in the resolution of conflict in Turkey's Kurdish issue. Especially its educational activities in Kurdish populated region of Turkey have contributed to resolution of the conflict. The Hizmet Movement, one of the largest social movements in Turkey, has mobilized thousands of people to open private schools, and tutoring centers throughout the region. While these educational institutions bring education to thousands of Kurdish students, they also decrease their involvement in PKK activities.

First section briefly looks at the role of

civil society in conflict resolution in general; following section defines the Hizmet Movement and presents data related to its activities in the Kurdish region, and then, analyzes its effects on the PKK's terrorist activities.

Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution

The role of non-state actors in conflict resolution is an understudied topic (Rupesinghe and Anderlini 1998, Orjuela 2003). Recent research suggests that civil society is more effective in providing peace than state actors, because civilian groups are less visible, less expensive and more flexible (Ross and Rothman 1999). Van Tongeren (1998) states that civil society groups are successful due to being less constrained by narrow mandates, and being able to talk to several parties without losing credibility. Thus, they can deal directly with the grassroots population better than state actors.

Especially in ethno-political conflicts, informal interactive conflict resolution is extensively used as an important strategy. Interactive conflict resolution is an organized process of structured communication between the parties of the conflict. This process aims to help resolve conflicts by transforming and improving relations, and increasing understanding between the groups (Fisher 1997). It assumes that only "authentic, open, constructive, cooperative, and effective face-to-face communication among participants themselves can lead to its defined goals of understanding, mutual recognition, respect and generally improved relations between the sides" (Fisher 1997). According to this model, causes of conflicts can be economic, political, and psychological; in any case, communication is important for conflict resolution (Ellis and Maoz 2003). With some other theories, Allport's

(1954) social psychological contact theory forms the foundation of interactive conflict resolution strategy. According to Allport, a contact can be effective in improving inter-group relations and especially in reducing mutual prejudice.

Ross (2000) situates interactive conflict resolution strategies into two major theories of practice of conflict resolution. According to Ross, first, conflict transformation theory assumes causes of conflict as real problems of injustice and inequality expressed through socially and culturally constructed meanings. Thus, interactive conflict resolution strategies try to transform relations by producing justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation through moral growth. Second, Ross applies the theory of community relations. Community relations theory assumes the conflict to be an ongoing polarization, hostility, and distrust between parties which aggravate existing tensions. Interactive conflict resolution methods try to improve communication and understanding. Especially in ethnic conflicts, these methods aim to promote tolerance, acceptance of diversity, and encourage structures that protect the rights of all (Ross 2000).

Scholars and policy makers suggest that this communication is not only be established between leaders of the groups but also between and within every aspect of communities at large, both formal and informal, and at the individual and collective levels (Ellis and Maoz 2003).

The existing research suggests that for conflict resolution to take place states and other actors should address necessary social, political and economic issues. For a sustainable peace, and a complete resolution of the conflict, it is also necessary for the societies to engage in communication. In other words, in a successful, complete conflict

resolution, there are works to be done by governments, communities, and individual citizens (Goldring 2004).

The Hizmet Movement and Its Activities in Southeast Turkey

Involvement of civil society groups in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey has increased in the recent years. As the largest and most influential social movement in Turkey (Yavuz 2003), the Hizmet Movement's activities are especially worth studying. Due to its size and influence, the Hizmet Movement has become an actor not only in the Kurdish conflict, but in any social and political matter in today's Turkey. It has engaged in every level of social life in Turkish society.

The Hizmet Movement is a civic social movement rooted in moderate Islam. It is one of the largest and most influential social movements not only in Turkey, but most probably in the Muslim countries in general (Ebaugh 2011). Mr. Gülen himself has become a role model for millions of Turkish youth (Ahmed 2007). The movement is committed to education, dialogue, peace, social justice, and social harmony, and has established thousands of education and dialogue institutions throughout the world (Cetin 2010, Ebaugh 2011).

The movement is also very active in the Kurdish populated region. While its activities directly affect the resolution of the Kurdish problem, they also indirectly affect the PKK recruitment and activities.

Although people in the movement state that they do not specifically target the PKK and its activities, their work decreases support and sympathy for the PKK in the region. The PKK leadership is also concerned

with the Hizmet Movement activities. Some of the PKK leaders have stated that due to educational activities of the movement, the number of PKK's new recruits has dropped dramatically (Member1 2010, BILGESAM 2010).

In general, the Kurdish population of Turkey has been one of the most conservative and traditionalist groups in Turkey (Ates 2010). Due to the Hizmet Movement's success in combining modernity and tradition, the movement has been welcomed and embraced by at large part of the Kurdish population. In return, the movement's pacifist teachings and acceptance of state authority have decreased sympathy towards violent groups (including the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah¹).

Recent police reports and private organization reports show that in the regions where the Hizmet Movement operates schools and tutoring centers, crime rates, and the PKK activities had dropped dramatically (Chief 2010). Students who attend these educational institutions tend to avoid violent actions and protests (Chief 2010). Many of the interviewees stated that after becoming involved with the Hizmet Movement they had become less sympathetic towards the PKK².

1 Turkish Hizbullah is a different radical Islamist terrorist organization which operates in Kurdish regions of Turkey, and unrelated to the well-known Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon.

2 During the summer of 2010, I traveled all over the region, visiting 8 major southeastern cities, and conducted interviews with more than a hundred people. A business man in Siirt said that his brother joined the PKK and got killed. He was about to join when he was in high school, but after he met with the people from the movement, he changed his mind. With the help of HM courses, he went to a university in the western part of Turkey. After graduating from the university he came back to his home town, and established his own business. Now, he is part of HM, and works to find scholarships for students. He said that his story is very common in the region.

The Hizmet Movement's educational activities also increase cultural exchanges and integration between the ethnically Kurdish and the Turkish people. Most of the better universities are located in the western or central part of Turkey. Due to the success of the Hizmet Movement's educational efforts, almost half of the students from the movement schools continue their studies at those universities (Director 2010).

Although the movement has generally kept a low profile, the PKK did not shun from targeting the movement affiliated educational institutions. However, the PKK is careful when dealing with the movement due the movement's popularity with the Kurdish people. Most of the Kurdish people I have interviewed in the region stated that people there are very grateful to the movement and would not let the PKK harm its activities.

In a recent statement, Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK chief in prison, also recognized the importance and the influence of the Hizmet Movement for the democratization of Turkey and suggested that the PKK should engage with the movement (Ocalan, Final decision will come in June 2010). Leading figures in the movement immediately refused any engagement with the PKK. One of Turkey's experts on the Kurdish issue, Dogu Ergil, who published one of the very first report on the issue, stated that Öcalan's call for engagement 'stems from the worry that the movement is a serious political rival and can work on the PKK's grass roots to cut off a large number of youths from the organization. Additionally, Öcalan has come to realize that the movement has gained enough support and popularity both in southeastern Turkey and the Kurdish part of Iraq. This popularity is based on providing schooling and training courses to enter universities' (Ergil 2010).

With regards to the PKK, Mr. Gülen himself clearly condemns any form of violence and terrorism. He strongly argues that there is no place for terrorism in Islam. He preaches and writes against violence, anarchy and terror since the late 1970s (Cetin 2008). Gülen does not target the PKK specifically, but terrorism and terrorist organizations in general.

In Gülen's philosophy, the means of any desired good should also be good. In other words, in order to bring a good, all the ways and methods used should also be legitimate and good. Therefore, terror and terrorism cannot be justified in any case (Gundem 2005).

According to Gülen, while economic and cultural grievances are part of the problem, the perception of the Kurdish people that they have been abandoned by the state is also an important element. In the resolution, he suggests that the state should embrace its citizens regardless of their background. The state should attend its citizens' needs and desires whether they are economic or cultural. Representatives of the state, such as security forces and bureaucrats should respect the values of their citizens (Gulen 2007).

Gülen states that the power of the state might have blinded its reasoning and the state might have used force to overcome the problem by pressure. While this could solve the issue for a short time, in the long term it would create bigger problems. Gülen also suggests that while security forces should deal with criminal activities, they should be very careful in distinguishing innocent people from criminals and terrorists. A state should not oppress its people (Gulen 2007).

On the other hand, Gülen does not expect a resolution only from the government or the state. He suggests that the people of Turkey should embrace the people of the

region. People living in the other parts of the country should also feel a responsibility and engage in the conflict resolution. In this matter, for Gülen, education, interaction between people, and dealing with the poverty are the main remedies for the problems of the southeast (Gulen 2007).

Educational Activities

Educational activities of the Hizmet Movement in the eastern and the southeast region can be analyzed in three categories: university preparation centers, schools, and tutoring centers. People in the movement have established these institutions in remote areas, where often no person had continued in school beyond age fifteen. Now, hundreds of students from these villages have been accepted for university studies in medicine, engineering, genetics, and business (Avci 2009). For instance, people inspired by Mr. Gülen operate the only private high school and the only university preparation centers and tutoring centers in the town of Nusaybin with a population of around 100,000 at the Syrian border. Hundreds of students attend these institutions (Kalyoncu 2008).

University Preparation Centers (Dersane)

In the Turkish educational system, all high school graduates take a nationwide state-managed university entrance exam. Students are placed into the universities according to their scores on this exam. Each year around 1.5 million students take this exam. In order to get a high score and be placed in a good university, it is very common for students to attend university preparation centers along with high school. While students attend regular high school classes during the week days, they take courses at a

university preparation center during weekends. These privately owned preparation centers have become a big part of secondary education. Due to the competitive structure of the system, almost every student attends these centers.

In Turkey, the Hizmet Movement is known more for its university preparation centers than its schools or other educational institutions. There are hundreds of such centers operated all over Turkey. Almost all of the most successful centers in the country are affiliated with the movement.

The movement operates university preparation centers in the Kurdish regions, too. In fact, the movement's first educational institutions were university preparation centers in the region. The first university preparation center opened in Diyarbakir and Sanliurfa in 1988 (Member2 2010). These centers were the first of their kind in these cities, as were other Hizmet Movement affiliated educational institutions.

Initially, these centers started with 40 to 50 students. When the students who attended these centers succeeded to get admitted to the major universities, they became popular, and the number of their students increased dramatically.

While the number of these centers did not increase rapidly in the first few years, starting in 1991 new centers and branches began to open in different cities. Between 1993 and 1995 the number of these centers increased dramatically. Now, there are university preparation centers not only in the cities but also in towns and large villages. There are more than a hundred movement-affiliated university preparation centers with more than 90 thousand students³ (Di-

rector 2010). In some towns, these centers are the only educational institutions besides the public schools (Kalyoncu 2008).

One teacher explained the interest to these centers and the movement in general as follows:

These people want their children to go to university and save their lives. Education is the only hope for most of these people. The region has been abandoned, and they did not have good schools for a long time. When we came here and opened these centers and help their kids to go to university, it was like we saved their lives. Countless times, I was thanked by parents of our students with high gratitude. People of the region are tired of violence and terror. They want good education, good life and peace. Students also would like to get [an] education and go to university. But they have not been given any chances. If you come to our centers in the middle of the night, say at 9 or 10 pm, you would see our classrooms full of students. There are two reasons for this: first, they really want to go to university and thus [are] working hard; second, their homes are overcrowded, each family has seven-eight children, and these students do not have suitable study-environment, therefore, they stay at our centers until 10-11 pm (Teacher1 2010).

In addition to these university preparation courses, there are also private high school preparation centers operated by the HM. In Turkey's educational system, there is also a nationwide state-managed exam

3 This data covers 16 eastern and southeastern provinces that are mainly Kurdish populated. These

provinces are: Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Gaziantep, Mardin, Mus, Sanliurfa, Siirt, Sirmak, Tunceli, and Van.

for entry to selected public and private high schools. Students are placed to better high schools according to their test scores.

Private Schools

Private schools that are affiliated with the movement are also very active in the region. These schools provide high quality education for students from kindergarten through grade 12. These schools are not as numerous as the preparation centers, but there are schools in every city, and also in every major town. These schools charge tuition, but almost 20-25% of students receive full scholarships (Director 2010).

In some cities, these schools are the only private schools. Most of the schools are the best schools in the region. They follow state curriculum with additional international curriculum. The language of instruction is English. School facilities and the technology they have are above the public school standards.

In addition to tuition, these schools are financially supported by local businessmen. While some of these schools were built by western businessmen, most of them were built by the wealthy families of the Kurdish region (Member1 2010).

Children of the wealthy families of the region, and the upper-class scale state bureaucrats mostly attend these schools along with the financially supported successful students of the low income families. By themselves, these schools provide an environment of integration for both ethnic and class differences.

There are also more than ten similar schools in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq inspired by the Hizmet Movement, including a university in Erbil (Akşam 2008).

Tutoring Centers

The movement's latest initiative in education is tutoring centers (or reading centers for an accurate Turkish translation-*okuma salonlari* in Turkish). Although, there are tutoring centers all over Turkey, they are mostly concentrated in the eastern and southeastern regions.

These centers are smaller than the preparation centers with 200 to 300 students per center. Since these centers are for low income students, they are mainly located in low income neighborhoods and suburbs.

Unlike the schools and preparation centers, these tutoring centers are free of charge, and are run specifically to help low income students. These centers are operated by non-profit organizations that are affiliated by the Hizmet Movement. Only students whose families are below minimum wage level are admitted to these centers. Students' needs, including books, test materials and even sometimes clothing are provided by these centers free of charge (Director2 2010).

The earliest of these centers opened in 2003 in Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir, and Batman, the largest cities in the region. Now, there are tutoring (reading) centers in every city, town, and even some villages. Although, their number constantly changes, as of summer 2010, there are more than two hundred reading centers serving more than 50thousand low income students.

These centers apply the same curriculum of any other private preparation center. They are all for middle school students who are studying for the nationwide high school placement test. These schools only accept students who in at the 8th grade and would the take high school placement test. 80% of their students are placed in some sort of better high school than regular test-free state

high schools (Director2 2010).

Besides preparing students academically for the test, these centers also provide social, sportive, and cultural activities, including sport tournaments, trips to other parts of the country, and aid distribution.

The non-profit foundations that manage and operate these centers also provide material aids to the families of these students. If a student gets placed in a high school in another city, foundations provide scholarships and accommodations for them in the cities they go to. Each year, approximately two thousand high school students from these low income families are placed in better high schools in the western part of Turkey, and they receive full scholarships from these nonprofit movement-affiliated foundations (Director3 2010).

According to some founding members of these centers, the PKK is especially disturbed with these centers. Due to the PKK's high activity in low income regions and suburbs, it perceives that these centers as a threat to its recruitment efforts. In fact, according to the reports of the police and government agencies, the crime level, and police stoning by children have dropped dramatically after these centers opened. One of the city governor stated that 'children who used to throw stones at police, now are offering tea to patrolling officers in their neighborhood' (Director2 2010).

In addition to these educational institutions, university students inspired by the Hizmet Movement also provide free tutoring for the low income family students in their neighborhood. These students are usually referred to as *abi*- Turkish for elder brother⁴. Since, these activities are not for-

mally organized and managed it is difficult to obtain any data. However, it is assumed that the number of students who are tutored by these university students is also very high especially in the larger cities which house a large university (Student 2010).

Fellowship Activities

Gülen highly values close personal relations. He states that even small personal contacts can make big differences and can established cultural and social bridges between people. He emphasizes that personal contact between the people in the west and the east can help to eliminate the sense of abandonment that the people of the east. For him, these personal contacts are as important as educational activities and economic investments (Gulen 2007). In a video statement posted on the internet, he stated:

Even a rose that you give to your fellow or a smile on your face towards a fellow can change things which millions of dollars cannot. The people of the region feel abandoned by its state, by its country, but by reaching out and visiting them in their homes, you can show that you did not abandon them, and you are there with them (Gulen 2007).

People in the Hizmet Movement organize activities of cooperation, visits, and aid distributions throughout the east and southeastern regions. There is one national and several regional aid and solidarity foundation that are inspired by the movement.

The *Kimse Yok mu* (Anybody There? - in

called with a title. For close ages, an elder male person is called with a title "abi", same for the women, an elder women is called with the title "abla". There are also other titles for more age differences.

4 In Turkish language, elder people are not called by only name. Anybody who is older should be

Turkish) foundation is one of the biggest nationwide aid organizations in Turkey and is affiliated with the Hizmet Movement. The foundation gathers donations throughout Turkey and Europe and distributes these donations all over the world. In its activities in Turkey, due to economic grievances in the southeast, the foundation allocates 70% of its donations to the eastern and southeastern regions (Sonmez 2010).

Especially during the sacrifice feast⁵, the foundation organizes campaigns of aid distributions in the region. In these campaigns, aid is distributed by the people of the western regions who visit people of the southeastern regions in their homes. The foundation not only aims to distribute aid but also to encourage interaction between the people of the west and the east. During a four day sacrifice feast campaign starting on December 30th, 2006, 18,073 people from the west went to 35 cities in the east to personally meet people and share their grievances. More than 103,000 families in the east and southeast regions were visited and received gifts of food (Kirk 2008). These campaigns continue every year with increasing participation (Dadas 2010).

Local aid foundations also organize similar campaigns of distribution of food, clothing, toys, and money. These foundations organize health screening campaigns in suburbs and rural villages. Doctors and health personnel from other parts of the country participate in these screenings. The first of these health screenings started in 2004 and over 20,000 people were screened in that year. These campaigns continue each year, and more than 50,000 people are now

screened annually (Director3 2010).

The Effects of HM's Educational Activities on the PKK

The Hizmet Movement opened its first educational institution in the Kurdish region in 1988. This number almost doubled every year both. Both graphs show an exponential increase with particularly large increases coming after 2003. In 2009, the Hizmet Movement reached 289 educational institutions with 84282 registered students in the Kurdish populated areas. The number of new students attending Hizmet Movement educational institutions increased at an average rate of 3,371 students per year, while the average increase in student number was 1,737 before 2002, this increased to 8,544 after 2002. The number of educational institutions increased yearly at an average of 11.5, while the average increase in educational institution number is 4.1 before 2002, this average increased by 30 after 2002. This increase both in student numbers and institution number is mainly due to free tutoring (reading) centers. While the Hizmet Movement was operating only preparatory centers and private schools before 2002, it started to open free tutoring centers for low income students during that year.

Data Dependent Variable(s)

Activities of the PKK are measured by using two variables: annual number of PKK attacks and annual number of PKK militants. PKK attacks are defined as armed attacks against either civilians or security forces by the PKK. PKK militants are defined as the individuals who took arms under the PKK.

Annual Number of PKK Militants: The

5 Sacrifice feast is an Islamic holiday in which the able Muslims are required to sacrifice animals and distribute their meats to needy people.

number of annual PKK militants is obtained through different sources, which include Abdullah Ocalan's statements, Turkish military sources, Turkish Police sources, media reports, academic publications, former security personnel, and former PKK militants.

For earlier years (1984, 1988), Ocalan (1988) talks about the number of PKK militants, and complains about why it had not reached a better number. Ozdag (2010) provides data for years 1984, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2005, and 2007. Marcus (2007) states the annual number of PKK militants for the years 1991, and 1999. Ulsu (2010) gives the number of militants for 2007. Turkish military spoke persons also provide numbers for certain years during press conferences. Finally, I have personally asked retired military personnel and former PKK militants who left the PKK and currently live in Europe. The number of PKK militant data might be manipulated by both the PKK and the Turkish security forces for propaganda purposes. These former militants and retired military personnel, compared to Turkish security forces and the PKK, have less motivation to manipulate the numbers. Although, they were not able to provide certain numbers, but approximates, their general estimates helped me to check other sources of data.

For the missing years, I assumed a linear increase between the years and calculated numbers accordingly; I interpolated the data.



Annual Number of PKK Attacks: Data for the annual number of PKK attacks is obtained from two main sources. One of the main sources for this data is the Office of Chief of General Staff, Office of Command of General Gendarmerie, and the Office of National Police. This dataset was gathered and published by the journalist Nedim Sener at

Milliyet Newspaper on June 24, 2010 (Sener 2010). The second important source for this data is set of publications from the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (TESEV 2006, TESEV 2008). While Sener provides data between 1994 and 2009, TESEV publications provide data between 1984 and 2007.

Independent Variables

Annual Number of HM Students: The data related to the number of students that are attending to the Hizmet Movement inspired institutions is collected through field research. This data covers 16 eastern and southeastern provinces that are mainly Kurdish populated. These provinces are for the following provinces: Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Gaziantep, Mardin, Mus, Sanliurfa, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van. Main sources of the data are regional directors, or superintendents of these institutions. The HM inspired educational institutions operate under several foundations. Each foundation has many educational institutions, such as schools, preparation centers and tutoring centers. However, there are central offices for each foundation which oversee many institutions. Usually, all of the educational institutions in or near a province are operated under the same foundation.

Figure 1. Number of Students Attending Hizmet Movement (HM) Institutions and Number of HM Educational Institutions in Kurdish Regions over time



Other Independent Variables

Although not analyzed in this paper, other possible effective independent variables are also included in the regression analyses. These variables are: percentage of public investment in Kurdish regions (in total public investment), developments in Kurd's minority rights, Kurd-

ish ethnic party's vote (percentage in the total vote), Ocalan's active leadership in the PKK (as a dummy), annual number of eliminated PKK militants by the Turkish security forces, annual military spending, and cross-border attacks into Northern Iraq (as a dummy).

Data Analyses

Correlation Results

Table 1. Correlation between # HM Students and Annual Number of PKK Militants and PKK Attacks

	HM Students	# of PKK Militants	# of PKK Attacks
HM Students	1		
# of PKK Militants	-0.0620	1	
# of PKK Attacks	-0.2312	0.4416	1

Table 2. Correlation between HM Institutions and Annual Number of PKK Militants and PKK Attacks


	HM Institutions	# of PKK Militants	# of PKK Attacks
HM Institutions	1		
# of PKK Militants	-0.0648	1	
# of PKK Attacks	-0.2146	0.4416	1

Both number of students and institutions are negatively correlated with the annual

number of PKK militants and annual number of PKK attacks. The absolute value of the correlation coefficient is greater for annual number of PKK attacks (correlation coefficient -0.2312) than annual number of PKK militants (correlation coefficient -0.0620).

This may suggest that the number of students attending HM educational institution is more effective on PKK recruitment than its attacks.

Figure 2. Comparison of Number of HM Students with Annual Number of PKK Militants and Attacks over time



Regression Results

By using the annual number of PKK militants and the annual number of PKK attacks as dependent variables two different OLS regression models are tested. For the first model, the annual number of PKK militants is treated as the dependent variable while the second model uses the number of PKK attacks.

Model-A:

Where the annual number of PKK militants used as the dependent variable;

$$PKKMil = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ocalan + \beta_2 MilSpend + \beta_3 ElimPKK + \beta_4 CroBor + \beta_5 PubInv + \beta_6 MinRight + \beta_7 KurdParty + \beta_8 GMStu + \varepsilon$$

Model-B:

Where the annual number of PKK attacks used as the dependent variable;

$$PKKAttack = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ocalan + \beta_2 MilSpend + \beta_3 ElimPKK + \beta_4 CroBor + \beta_5 PubInv + \beta_6 MinRight + \beta_7 KurdParty + \beta_8 GMStu + \varepsilon$$

Where,

PKKMil = Annual # PKK Militant

PKKAttack = Annual # PKK Attacks/ Annual # PKK Attacks-START

Ocalan = Ocalan as the Head of the PKK (1 when Ocalan was the head of PKK, 0 when he is in prison)

MilSpend = Annual Military Spending (%GNP)

ElimPKK = Annual # of Captured/killed PKK Militants

CroBor = Cross border Attack (1 if there is cross border attack, 0 if not)

PubInv = Public Investment (% of total PI)

MinRight = Minority Rights Index

KurdParty= Kurdish Ethnic Party Vote (% of total vote)

GMStu = Annual # of GM Student

Hypothesis: Number of PKK attacks and militants decrease as the number of students attending the Hizmet Movement affiliated institutions increases⁶.

There are six versions of each model, below tables present the results:

⁶ Since this paper focuses on only the effects of HM student numbers on the PKK, other hypotheses are not included in this paper.

Table 4.5. Overall Findings in Model-A (Annual Number of PKK Militants as Dependent Variable)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PKK Militant Number	PKK Militant Number	PKK Militant Number	PKK Militant Number	PKK Militant Number	PKK Militant Number
L.PKK Militant Number	0.970*** (11.89)	0.929*** (12.72)	0.912*** (22.48)	0.947*** (12.33)	0.973*** (15.28)	0.847*** (62.56)
Ocalan	-2012.518 (-1.43)	-2984.791* (-2.11)	-1023.667 (-1.45)	-2781.127* (-1.83)	-2678.251* (-2.09)	-179.671 (-0.87)
Military Spending	310.178 (0.44)	326.756 (0.53)	247.470 (0.75)	107.492 (0.18)		
CapturedkilledPKK	-0.348** (-2.71)	-0.267** (-2.37)	-0.428*** (-6.52)	-0.261** (-2.14)	-0.240** (-2.22)	-0.008 (-0.34)
CrossborderAttack	1293.681 (1.70)	1707.926** (2.23)	1375.043*** (3.75)	1460.105* (1.92)	1309.243* (1.85)	175.133 (1.24)
GovernmentInvestment	361.390*** (5.29)	390.378*** (6.62)	241.691*** (6.94)	385.346*** (6.03)	405.634*** (6.82)	
MinorityRights	-64.175 (-0.69)	-92.769 (-1.13)			-81.945 (-0.97)	
KurdishEth2	-316.542* (-1.77)	-391.765** (-2.44)	-65.225 (-0.70)	-331.882* (-1.92)	-404.649* (-1.95)	
# of GM Students	-0.063 (-1.65)		-0.040** (-2.14)		-0.077** (-2.17)	0.007 (0.87)
L.# of GM Students		-0.096** (-2.28)		-0.086* (-1.83)		
L.MinorityRights			-28.325 (-0.62)	-67.422 (-0.73)		38.515* (1.88)
L.Military Spending					243.962 (0.37)	33.884 (0.26)
L.GovernmentInvestment						6.545 (0.49)
Constant	661.997 (0.24)	2173.120 (0.79)	-332.066 (-0.23)	1884.956 (0.60)	1644.145 (0.65)	-584.178 (-1.03)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25	25

t statistics in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; L (lagged) one year.

Table 4.6. Overall Findings in Model-B (Annual Number of PKK Attacks as Dependent Variable)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PKK Attack Number	PKK Attack Number	PKK Attack Number	PKK Attack Number	PKK Attack Number	PKK Attack Number
L.PKK Attack Number	1.084*** (11.79)	1.081*** (13.20)	1.132*** (13.74)	1.084*** (13.59)	1.041*** (10.83)	1.032*** (10.06)
Ocalan	-939.938 (-1.19)	-1440.446 (-1.73)	-1159.323 (-1.70)	-1537.360* (-1.92)	-590.111 (-0.70)	-191.859 (-0.31)
Military Spending	-167.540 (-0.48)	-294.937 (-0.96)	-490.405 (-1.66)	-369.477 (-1.29)		
CapturedkilledPKK	-0.170** (-2.25)	-0.166** (-2.38)	-0.167** (-2.47)	-0.168** (-2.47)	-0.177** (-2.19)	-0.148* (-1.76)
CrossborderAttack	629.032 (1.46)	849.349* (1.97)	402.953 (1.08)	784.755* (1.97)	726.079 (1.57)	70.875 (0.17)
GovernmentInvestment	150.667*** (3.88)	146.567*** (4.22)	160.400*** (4.65)	151.035*** (4.48)	150.460*** (3.75)	
MinorityRights	-105.670** (-2.15)	-75.328* (-1.77)			-105.839* (-1.89)	
KurdishEth2	-24.277 (-0.25)	-67.187 (-0.73)	17.349 (0.21)	-4.370 (-0.05)	65.062 (0.49)	
# of GM Students	-0.059** (-2.73)		-0.051** (-2.76)		-0.061** (-2.61)	-0.036 (-1.53)
L.# of GM Students		-0.063** (-2.64)		-0.071** (-2.94)		
L.MinorityRights			-67.591 (-1.55)	-88.173* (-1.99)		-99.292 (-1.59)
L.Military Spending					-333.039 (-0.76)	19.926 (0.05)
L.GovernmentInvestment						113.902** (2.67)
Constant	3173.719* (1.98)	3208.759* (2.00)	3099.029** (2.15)	3807.779** (2.30)	3317.467* (1.97)	2052.521 (1.19)
Observations	25	25	25	25	25	25

t statistics in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; L (lagged) one year.

Values for both the number of schools and number of students was gathered, in regression analysis only the number of students is included due to high correlation between the two variables. Each variable reflects very similar results when included separately.

Annual number of students attending to the Hizmet Movement affiliated educational institutions is statistically significant in most of the regression in both Model-A and Model-B. The lagged variable of HM students also shows similar results, and is statistically significant. In all of the regression models and versions, the signs of the HM students are negative, except in the column 6 of Model-A.

In Model-A where the annual number of PKK militants used as the dependent variable, for every 100 student attending to the HM institutions, the number of PKK militants decreases by 4-7 annually. For the lagged variable, each 100 students are tied to an annual decrease of 9-10 militants.

In terms of PKK attacks, for every 100 students, the annual number of PKK attacks decreases by 5-6 attacks. In the lagged variable, it is 6-7 attacks annually. The lagged GM student number has a larger effect on both the militant and attack number. It means that the effect of the number of GM students on PKK size increases over time. These results indicate that the hypothesis is true. The data shows that the size of the PKK decreases as the number of students attending to Hizmet Movement affiliated educational institutions increases. The analyses also show that the annual number of students attending to the HM affiliated institutions has a negative effect on both annual number of PKK militant and attacks. According to the analyses, HM's educational activities affect the recruitment process of

the PKK more than its attacks. This may be explained by the effect of students attending to the GM affiliated educational institutions. These children and youths stay away from the PKK or any other terrorist activities, which decreases the number of PKK militants, whereas the PKK attacks may be launched strategically independent of number of recruitment.

Conclusion

Although the Hizmet Movement does not directly target the PKK activities (as stated by the people in the movement) its activities indirectly decrease both the number of PKK attacks and recruits.

Of course, there are some other factors that affect the PKK attack and militant numbers other than the HM student number, but this paper's analyses support the idea that both the attack and militant numbers of PKK decline when the number of students attending to HM educational institutions increase. This may result due to two conditions: (1) since the HM promotes peaceful coexistence and discourages criminal activities in general, students who are involved with the HM are less likely to involve in PKK and its activities, (2) the PKK recruits especially from suburban areas where students are less motivated for education, the HM provides education, with these extensive educational activities, the HM diverts the students' attention to education. Students who are involved with extensive educational activities are less likely to involve in any kind of criminal activities, including the PKK activities.

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