ململانێی سیستەمی ئیسلامیی قاعیدە و داعش
لەگەڵ سیستەمی دەوڵەتی نەتەوە لە رۆژهەڵاتی ناوەراست
لێکۆڵینەوەیەکی بەراوردکارییە دەربارەی ستراتیژی و ئایدلۆژیایان

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Abstract

Both al-Qaida and ISIS had left significant bearing on international relations of the Middle East. This impact led to the emergence of a serious challenge to the Middle East's political landscape which emergent in post World War I according to Sykes–Picot treaty of 1916. Although both organizations belong to Salafi Jihadism which is a part of global Jihad, they had different focuses and orientations which have hitherto not explained fully. The focus of this paper is to discuss the differences in their world views and methods of operations to change the Middle East political and security order.

پوخته

هەر یەکێك لە قاعیدە و دەوڵەتی ئیسلامی لە عێراق (داعش) کاریگەرییەکی یەکجار زۆریان لە سەر پەیوەندییە نێودەوڵەتییەکانی وڵاتانی رۆژهەڵاتی ناوەراست بەجێهێشت. ئەم کاریگەرییە زۆر بە روونی لە سەر نەخشەی سیاسی و ئاسایشی ناوچەکە بە دیاردەکەوێت کە لە دوای جەنگی جیهانی یەکەم هاتبووە کایەوە. بۆ زانیاری هەردوو رێکخراوەکە لە بزوتنەوەیەکی جیهادی سەلەفی جیهانین، کە بە دوای سیستەمێکی ئەمنی هەرێمی دەگەرێن، کە بنیادنرابێت لە سەر بیرورۆ وعەقیدەیەکی ئیسلامی رادیکالیانه، هەمیشه لە سنوری وڵاتانی نەتەوەیی تێ دەپەرێت کە پەیماننامەی سایکس-بیکۆ لە ساڵی ١٩١٦ بۆ وڵاتانی دیارکردبوو. لەگەڵ ئەوەی هەندێك لە بیروراری سیاسی و عەسکەریان هاوبەشه بەڵام ناکۆکی و دووبەرەکی زۆریش لە نێوان ئەو دوو رێکخراوە تێبینی کراوە کە لێکۆڵەرەوەکان زۆر بە روونی باسیان نەکردووه. بۆیه ئەم توێژینەوەیه تیشك دەخاته سەر جیاوازی ئەدەبیاتی نێوان ئەم ئەم دوو گروپه لە روانگەی سیاسی و عەسکەری بۆ گۆرینی سیستەمی ئەمنی لە ناوچەکه.

الخلاصة

ترك كل من القاعدة وتنظيم الدول الاسلامية في العراق (داعش) تاثيرا كبيرا على العلاقات الدولية لدول الشرق الاوسط. وقد شكل هذا التاثير تعديا كبيرا على الخريطة السياسية ونظام الامني الاقليمي الذي ظهر بعد الحرب العالمية الاولى. علما ان التنظيمين الارهابين المذكورين يكونن من حركة الجيهادية سلفية العالمية التي تسعى لاجاد نظام أمني اقليمي جديد مستوحات من عقيدتهم الاسلامية الراديكالية التي تريد تجاوز ما اسمته حدود الدول قومية التي رسمتها معاهدة سايكس-بيكو ١٩١٦. رغم بعض التشابه في المنطلقات الايدلوجية وأساليب التحرك السياسي والعسكري هناك خلافات ملحوظة في الرؤى واسلوب العمل بين التنظيمين الارهابيين والتي لم تناولها بعد الباحثين بقدر الكافي. وتركز هذه الدراسة على الاختلاف الموجود في أدبيات التنظيمين المذكورين ونشاطاتهم السياسية والعسكرية لتغير النظام الامني الاقليمي.

1.Introduction

In order to appreciate the impact of Al Qaeda and ISIS on international relations, we need to put the growth of these terrorist organizations in their world, regional, and local contexts. Since the end of cold war in 1989 , we are experiencing a world in which international order is being deconstructed and reconstructed as we speak by economic inequality, authoritarian rule, populism, rising crime and violence. This is a world in which we are witnessing that much of the power, which has been in the past prerogative of the state, has been transferred to non-state actors. The traditional premise that viewed state as the primary actor is being enormously challenged. The weakening role of states in global politics has long been predicted as a consequence of globalization. Evidently, this is coming true. The traditional western values monopoly of international norms has been seriously questioned. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi has proclaimed an Islamic State with himself as the rightful caliph and attracted foreign fighters from all corners of the world. All while the traditional "political actors have watched from the sidelines several directions both internally and externally by non-state actors and individuals" (Balbi, 2016). In his thorough study on the impact of ISIS on the international affairs (Armed Non-Sate Actors in International Relations: A study of the ISIS, Norton press 2019,) Ashim Dhakal writes functionalism and neo-functional may only partially serve as theories to explain the impact of the phenomenon of Non-state actor in international relations. He further elaborates that Samuel Huntington thinks of ISIS and other Non-state actors in term of clash of civilizations. Religion has been less theorized in understanding international relations in the west due to the fact there was a tendency to keep religion out of theories of international relation. This was due to legacy in the western world which viewed religion as a pre-modern phenomenon and the emergence of state has made it irrelevant in understanding international relations. This secular and modernist approach to international relations was developed due to the writings of K.Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. However, for a proper understanding of (ANSA), and especially ISIS and al-Qaeda, Dhakar thinks we need to move from western –based paradigm of thinking in international to non-traditional paradigm in which religion forms an important ingredient of the theory of international relation.

It is important to note that ISIS's worldview is a reading of the concept of Ummah, which is a metaphysical way of binding the Muslims throughout globe, into two worlds: world of Islam and that of Kufr (infidels). According to this worldview Muslims organizations and individuals need to be mobilized against the most dominant but evil force of the world crystalized United States and its allies in the international Zionism (Allison, 2016). The concept of Hijah (migration) constitutes an important ingredient of ISIS's worldview; therefore, we noticed that above 50% of ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq were from European countries (Dhakal, 2019). ISIS's use of videos and other digital social media was the main source of their mobilizing activities and recruitment (Dhakal, 2019). This is an indicator that the technological revolution, especially social media, has enabled non-state actors to leave their profound impact on international relations.

1.1 Objectives

The following are the main objectives of the research:

•To study the roots of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

•To shed light on the ideological roots of these two organizations and their international relations.

•To analyze the strategy and tactics used by Al Qaeda and ISIS when interacting with regional and international actors.

•To articulate the difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in their strategy and ideology.

1.2 Research Problem

This research is intended to provide clarifications for Al Qaeda's and ISIS's ideologies through evaluating and analyzing their strategies, and their effects on the national security of the Middle East. Due to the emergence of these two organizations the Middle East political arena is facing a hurdle that they need to overcome, to regain and maintain their political influence.

1.3 Research Question

The main question which the paper will try to address is what are the roots of Al Qaeda and ISIS? And how their approaches affected the international relations? And how their political conviction colour their outlook to international relations? What makes both al-Qaeda and ISIS so socially destructive? Was its ideology or the feeling of alienation and repression in the hand of Shiite-dominated elite in Middle East made people in Sunni triangle of Iraq, for instance, initially receptive to these forms of terrorism? This article also investigates a secondary issue what are the reasons that has turned these two organizations to resort to such brutal and violent actions towards everyone not agreeing with their ideology and interpretations.

1.4 The importance of Research

The significance of the topic under instigation lies in its focus on undiscussed aspects of the devastating socio-economic impact al-Qaeda and ISIS had on Middle East societies. In addition, to understanding their ideologies and strategies, and also understanding the terror activities left behind by Al-Qaeda and ISIS, is essential for re-building the post conflict civil society in the Middle East. Moreover, the research will give academics and investigators to obtain accurate findings associated with their research.

1.5 Methodology

The methodology we use in approaching our main argument is a comparative approach and it is, to a large extent, content analysis and analytical approach to the discourse of the two organization's rationale in approaching international relations. In addition, we have used, in general, a qualitative approach to data gathering. Moreover, we have utilized the relevant primary sources in presenting the data while carrying out content analysis. The gathering data in the field would have enriched the paper greatly; this was unattainable due to security concerns, and access problems. However, our access to the literature dealing with the subject matter, in several languages, has been a good compensation.

1.6 The Structure of Research

In presenting the data, the article gives first roots and structures of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Then we have presented the strategy, ideological and financial roots of both organizations and their organizational structure which account for how their different approach to the issue of the security and political order of the Middle East. We have also allocated sections for the differences between them.

2. Nation-State System in Middle East

The Arab revolt of 1916-1918 aided colonial powers in ensuring that the Ottoman Empire was ousted as World War I came to an end in the early nineteenth century. The McMahon-Hussein letter correspondences exchanged between the two refers to a series of ten letters spanning from 1915 to 1916 prior to the revolt. Sir Henry McMahon used to be the British High Commissioner in Egypt and Hussein Bin Ali was the Sharif of Macca. In their letters, Britain promised the Arabs independence and sovereignty in the Middle East, barring parts, in exchange for Arab support in weakening the Ottomans (Matheswaran, 2018).

An initial agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement was struck between the British and the French in 1916. Content of this agreement was in direct contrast with the McMahon-Hussein letters. Post WWI, Britain and France continued to have vast economic, political and cultural interests in the region which also represented an easy passage to their colonies in Asia (Matheswaran, 2018).

The agreement has been widely criticized in recent years, particularly after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, because of the borders established by the British and the French. To many Arabs, these borders were not only a symbol of foreign imperialism but also showed a lack of understanding of the Middle East. As such these borders were rejected by terror groups such as Al Qaeda & ISIS, as they also do not present any unification in accordance with Islamic principles (Miller, 2016). In addition, Islam and its vision of the Umma, (the word Umma represents the larger Arab nation) seem to be in direct conflict with the Westphalian territorial states (Geng, 2019).

Understanding Sykes-Picot is also central to understanding the ideology (or at least the propaganda) of Al-Qaeda and ISIS which have been the most prominent challengers on the concept of nation-state system in Middle Eastern political agenda and has dominated the political-diplomatic discourse in the region and among policy makers, analysts, and pundits interested in its affairs. For example, ISIS, the most recent fervent challenger of the nation-state order of the Middle East, has made an unwavering effort to declare "the end of Sykes-Picot" and it claims to be a functioning state, it is thus undermining the 'legitimate' nation-state governments of not only Syria, but the rest of Middle Eastern states. In 2014, ISIS posted a video showing the group breaking down the physical boundaries between Syria and Iraq, making the symbolic declaration that all have united as "one people" under the new rule of ISIS and that any call to uphold national frontiers is obsolete and sacrilegious (Bilgin 2016).

The emergent of these two groups and their ongoing activity in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Rabinovich quoted to Robin Wright, a journalist and scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, argues that "the map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters." Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: "A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too". Both Al qaeda and ISIS were against this regional order and wanted to destroy it as it will be explained below (Rabinovich, 2014).

3. The Roots and Structure of Al Qaeda

Al-Qaida and ISIS are in the same boat with all other terrorist organizations in having a structure and arrangements, which are depended on a model through which the individuals, groups, and society are integrated and assimilated too. Terrorist groups are found to be part of the social and political contexts in communities and they share the setting of a grouping or order that they evolve in (Crenshaw, 2000).

As far as the origins of the name "al Qaeda" (the base) is concerned, there has been a number of theories one of which is originated from a computer file source which discloses the identities of Arab old warriors of the

Afghanistan conflict (the database) which is found in (the secret base) deep in the mountains of Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden's1 assumed high-tech headquarters are found. Though the drawings are thoroughly fictional, they are striking. The American media which attended and detected the U.S. military operations in October 2001 in Afghanistan disclosed such news. Though it had a long mythical status, the name of al Qaeda, which straight away drew the attention of media goes back to the events of August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings2. Osama bin Laden himself played a great role in keeping the mystery surrounding the name as he never mentioned it before the events of September 11. In their internal communications, the terror group leaders usually mention the Arabic word (Al Jema'a) which is an intentionally neutral naming standing for "the society" (Chaliand & Blin 2007).

Historically, the origins of Al-Qaeda go back to the Afghan revolt against the Soviet invasion in 1979. Fighting the invaders and defending their fellow Afghan Muslims, thousands of volunteers all over the world particularly from Middle East came to Afghanistan as mujahedeen and warriors. It was in the mid-1980s, that Osama bin Laden was known to be the donor and prime financier for an organization that was responsible for recruiting Muslims from mosques worldwide. Soon thousands of those who were called "Afghan Arab" mujahedeen joined and supported the Afghan revolutionaries and played an influential role in defeating Soviet forces later on. As far as their number is concerned, it is not easy to give an exact estimate. That is, according to Abdulla Anas, one of their leaders, their overall number is not clear due to finding some of them in the front lines, having some of them working as doctors in Peshawar, and tens of them were performing the duty of teachers in religious schools, and official institutes or organizations. Anyhow, Hamid Gul, the former Pakistani intelligence chief puts their number at approximately 38,000. (Al Jazeera News, 2004).

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to his original homeland, Saudi Arabia where he established an organization the aim of which was to help old warriors of the Afghan war. As a result, many of them went on fighting elsewhere (including Bosnia). Thus, this organization became the foundation of al-Qaeda and that is not all about Bin Laden's efforts in terms his organization. That is, Bin Laden got the chance to meet radical Islamic thinkers and study with them. It is assumed that he may have already been establishing al- Qaeda during the conquest of Iraqi's troops of Kuwait in 1990. Being outraged due to the permission given to U.S. troops to be settled in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, Bin Laden reacted against government policy and his anti-government activities resulted in his being expelled from his original homeland in 1991 (Hayes et al, 2017).

The main reasons that stand beyond the establishment of al Qaeda could be distinguished by the following factors some of which point out the origin and growth of al Qaeda: Afghan war legacy, political clashes and western negligence of Muslim interest besides socio-economic hardship in addition to the state repression

the Muslims encountered in their countries (Ali, 2004).

Notably, it is quite clear that the structure which was built in Afghanistan has been abolished in a way that bin Laden and most of his fellows have been captured or got murdered. Despite of having no central bases for Islamic militancy these days, no one can ignore that Al-Qaeda philosophy or "al- Qaedaism," worldview has faded out. That is, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist groups in addition to many individuals as well as groups are found to upkeep this philosophy which becomes a fundamental internationalist ideology. Nevertheless, very few of them are attributed to bin Laden or those who were around him substantially. Consequently, there are groups that are only part of al- Qaeda in the very strict sense which only take the steps of Bin Laden's precepts, models, and methods in a way that they adopt nearly the same style of al- Qaeda. Hereby, Israeli intelligence services would rather use the term "jihadi international" than "Al- Qaeda" (Bruke, 2009).

Accordingly, al-Qaeda is considered in its fullest sense to be defined as the amalgamation of international Islamic terrorist groups and associations that have the same philosophy and vision in common. In explaining Al-Qaeda's outlook to international relations we deem it necessary to address the following three issues:

3.1 Strategy

Al-Qaeda's strategy of action is shaped to a large extent by the impact of its ideology. The foreigners find it illogical since it appears to be inspired by unreasonable hatreds on the part of its members that are totally unrealistic in their goals, and eager to kill innocent men, women, and children. Weighing ends and means, taking alternative approaches into its accounts, and calculating costs and benefits, al-Qaeda, follows other terrorist groups on the ground and behaves in the same way. Making rational suppositions on the basis of these percepts, the movement may confirm such unsound precepts (Rabasa et al, 2006).

In order to be successful in their efforts, al- Qaeda worked on drawing a plan having at least one of the following distinctive features: 1) Standing against America and having an exhaustive war against it and its associates through making them suffer bitterly. 2) In attempting to present struggle with the United Sates as a conflict with religious dimensions, mainly as a war the present-day crusader Christians and Jews, they were trying to attract and win the sympathy of the Muslim masses. 3) Intending to stimulate its followers wherever they were worldwide, regardless of their being organically its followers or just have followed its strategy so as to gain their independence as it was announced by Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri3, who was then figure number two in Al-Qaeda Organization. 4) The existing Muslim governments in the Muslim World have tried to keep a distance from them in order to avoid being their legitimate targets .It appears al-Qaeda strategy focused to a large extent on non-Muslim government in their desire to be seen as vanguard in the fight against the Jews, the Crusaders and the Americans (Assadi and Lorunser, 2007). In 1998, Al-Jazeera interviewed with Usama bin Laden after the African embassy bombings on August 7, 1998 and U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan. Bin Laden asserted:

"Our duty—which we have undertaken—is to motivate our Ummah to jihad for the sake of God against America and Israel and their allies. And we are still doing this, motivating people; the popular mobilization that happened in these last months is moving in the right direction to remove the Americans from Muslim countries" (The Guardian, 2001).

Depending on the experience Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist and author, who has spent a period of time in prison with Al-Zarqawi, writes that al- Qaeda's strategy is composed of seven stages. This strategy seems to have not changed and it has been incorporated into Al- Qaeda's Strategy for action for the year 2020. The phases are as follows: "The Awakening" stage which was assumed to last from 2001 to 2003. This phase aims at inciting the United States to attack a Muslim country through conducting a strike on US territories that leads to killing many innocent civilians. "Opening Eyes" phase which was assumed to last from 2003 to 2006. The aim of this stage is to focus on young men and identifying them as the cause that turn the al- Qaeda group into a movement. "Arising and Standing up" stage which expected to last from 2007 to 2010. Concentrating on Syria as, al-Qaeda carried out additional attacks during this phase. In Hussein's viewpoint, al-Qaeda had plans to attack other existing foreign forces in the Arabian Peninsula. Due to the deteriorating popularity and power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula, Al- Qaeda anticipated to be able grow rapidly among the people in this region. Targeting the US economy and military infrastructure, the focal focus of attack of this stage was assumed to be on oil suppliers and cyber terrorism. Between 2013 and 2016 another stage appeared and the focus was on declaring the project of an Islamic Caliphate. Likewise, there was the declaration of an "Islamic Army" and the "fight between believers and non-believers" which is called "total confrontation". Finally, by 2020 "Definitive Victory" which was another phase of al Qaeda's plan and was assumed to be completed by the end of that year (Yassin, 2005).

3.2 Ideology

Armborst (2009) thinks that there is a close relationship between contemporary terrorism and religious terrorism. That is, contemporary terrorism is often found to be equal with religious terrorism, and more so with Islam. The reason beyond the appearance of the image of an "Islamic danger" is the fact that Jihadi violence is no longer counted as a threat to the countries of the Middle East only; it also threatens the domestic security of Western countries as well. As a matter of fact, the image of so-called "Islamic terrorism", like all stereotypes, is of help to empirically deal with a complicated subject. Such mental shortcuts are found to be at the expense of factors such as details, subtle relations and broader background, and refer to terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as two complexities that are sometimes inadequately perceived. In general, the religious fundamentalism isn't inevitably attributed to violent or even terrorist activism; it has something to do with jihadist.

Though the descriptions of the principles and views directing al-Qaeda and its fellows in terms of ideology

definitely achieve the target, few serious efforts have been made to give justification to the use of the term "ideology" in terms of the Salafi-jihad—the guiding doctrine of al-Qaeda, its associates, fellows and offspring (Moghadam, 2008).

A belief in the correctness of jihad is what joins al-Qaeda's members and sympathizers. Sometimes, assassinating 'renegade' Muslims and calling for jihad (holy war) are what distinguishes 'jihadist' which is the implication of Al-Qaeda's ideology. Although it is obviously opposite to almost all Islamic religious thought and school, it is stemmed in the works of two modern Sunni Islamic intellectuals: Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhabi and Sayyid Qutb (Haynes, 2004). It is on their beliefs, not their operations that the successes of Al-Qaeda depended on. Calling for jihad and finding it as an inevitably pillar of faith is Al- Qaeda's message which seems to be successful must be considered as a victory for the group. Hereby, in an effort to show this success a range of jihadist groups around the Muslim world and the Islamic State announced that they did the attacks on Western targets. Likewise, in contrast to a local focus, the idea of global jihad is found to be more conventional. The 1990s witnessed the presence of some dozens of foreign volunteers fighting in Tajikistan, Algeria, and Chechnya, but Bosnia was the center of several thousand as it was their most popular destination. In sharp contrast, more than 40,000 foreigners have recently joined the fighters in Syria and Iraq and this shows that anti-U.S. feeling in the Middle East is so strong that Al- Qaeda can to some extent declare credit for this. Hereby, it is such attacks that pushed the U.S. into taking steps like the extensively detested conquest of Iraq (Byman, 2017).

Generally, For Al Qaeda, jihad is more than just a tactic or strategy; it is a theological imperative, binding on all Muslims. Zawahiri, in particular, argues for the necessity of jihad to restore Islam to its proper place. In his memoirs, Knights under the Prophet's Banner, Gregg quoted to Zawahiri contends that ''no solution is possible without jihad,'' and ''jihad is the only solution" (Gregg, 2010).

In addition, Al-Qaeda's ideology also releases the idea of the state as unauthentic and calls for the unification of the Ummah, the global Muslim community to defeat the threats it faces. Bin Laden's demand of war most clearly demonstrates the call for reunification. He believed that fighting to liberate Muslim land from non-Muslim hands is necessary, but that the eventual goal is the reunification of the Ummah:

''This is the time to be firm, so be firm and know that your unity and cooperation for the liberation of the Islamic holy places is a sound step toward the unification of the nation's ranks under the banner of one God'' (Usama Bin laden, 1996).

This statement appeared to be calling for a more literal unification of the Ummah as a means of consolidating power to defend the dar-al Islam. Moreover, Al Qaeda asserted the need for transnational unity that transcends the state system and creates a defensive barrier against Western influence in Middle East. This is directly affected on the concept of nation-system in Middle East.

3.3 Finance

 Financial matters dealing with terrorism involves raising funds and delivering it to the group that has de-voted itself for terrorist activity. The late Al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was not believed to be the only wealthy Saudi, from a wealth family, who supported and donated his financial empire to the establishment and growth of Al Qaida terrorist organization. According to a report by 9-11 commission, Bin laden was un-able to enjoy supporting his terror organization after 9-11 terrorist activity that took place in New York. He then managed to flee to Afghanistan in mid 1990s. He was also prohibited from the use of his inheritance from Saudi Arabia and was stripped of his personal properties in Sudan. Once in Afghanistan, he enjoyed his refuge and the support from Taliban and he managed to set up a network of his personal contacts from the rich and the wealthy Saudi families who supported his cause during the Afghan war against Russia. In the 1980, one can conclude to a certain degree that many of these donors were from the gulf region in general and from Saudi Arabia in particular (Bruno, 2010). Al Qaeda donors and their financial facilitators were raising money from conscious and unwitting donors, mosques and sympathetic imams, and nongovernment orga-nizations such as charities. Before 9/11 al- Qaeda's money went to support its operations, its training and military apparatus like Taliban and intermittently other terrorist organizations. Since 9/11 al- Qaeda's money has been used to fund operations and operatives and their families (Roth et al, 2004).

Moreover, local instability and local support in many of the country in the Middle East takes advantage for Al-Qaeda's income, particularly in Yemen, to occupy territories, consolidate its hold in the region and so pro-duce sizable income streams. The organization succeeded in taking over Mukalla, an important central port city in Yemen. Their control of the city, held until April 2016, generated about 2 million dollars a day for the organization from collecting protection fees and taxes, as well as pocketing an additional 20 million dollars from plundering local banks. In addition, generally Al-Qaeda of the Middle East continues to create ongoing revenue streams from kidnapping and ransom payments, as well as donations from charities of wealthy no-tables, primarily from the Gulf States (Zehorai, 2018). According to Statista, 2020, (figure 1) Al-Qaeda was the fourth richest terrorist organization in the world, with around 300 million U.S. dollars in funds at their disposal.

It is clear that, the financial outcomes that al-Qaeda earned in the Middle East created a direct impact on the unsteadiness of some countries' economy, politics, social, and security. The Middle East countries tried to have a challenge against the threats of al-Qaeda, above all the economical menace.

Figure 1: The Richest Terror Organizations in the World (modified from Statista, 2020).

3.4 Al-Qaida and International Relations

The aim of al-Qaeda to rebuild an Islamic caliphate via aggressive and armed struggle against USA and its allies in the west. The most apparent difference between al- Qaeda and other groups or characters is its use or adoption of fierce measures to arrive at political conclusions. Al-Qaeda doesn't believe that the nationalistic anti-imperialism and Pan Arabism that appeared in the twentieth century were able to sort out the prevalent problems the Islamic community suffers from. It supports a complete turmoil of the global order and thinks that there is no space for any sort of compromise solution, steady change, or reform within the current states that capture the lands where its caliphate is to be (J, M. Matt, 2010).

Al-Qaeda has adopted internationally a revolutionary and violent viewpoint towards international relations and it seems that the US plays a focal role in terms of this view of the world. It is first essential to recognize that al-Qaeda is, in fact, a goal-driven organization so that one can determine a persuasive connection between al- Qaeda's strategic goals and how it utilizes terrorism through which the goals could be achieved. Driving the United States and its supporters out of the Islamic world is also one of the more immediate goals of al- Qaeda which is given the priority to be achieved. Hereby, al -Qaeda finds the United States the principal barrier in front of performing the Islamic vision of the group. Though Osama bin Laden, who was famous for his role in Afghanistan offered the Saudi royal family the help of his own mujahedeen to free the small

Middle Eastern state (and protect Riyadh's oil fields) directly after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Saudis authority preferred to host U.S troops at the expenses of bin Laden and his fellow mujahedeen (Libicki et al, 2007).

Further, the destruction of the state of Israel was one of al-Qaeda's basic goals since its inception and it remained to be so after it had expanded the organization in financial and military capacities. It is quite clear that Israel has been seen as the focal point of almost all Islamic extremism in the Middle East .al-Qaeda could not escape this too. Al-Qaeda could not disregard this stand because the liberation of Palestine is a prerequisite to be able to assume the status of a leader of global jihad. It took the most extreme line for the destruction of Israel, its citizens, and allies wherever in the world they may be. This stand gained the organization the worldwide support of all extremist groups to the extent where all attacks these terrorist groups have made can be attributed to the Al-Qaeda umbrella (Essays UK, 2018).

Furthermore, the formation of emirates, in other words, having a certain part of a territory under its control that would be ruled according to sharia law has been al-Qaeda's main and final objective since its inception. A single empire for all Muslims which is known as caliphate was to be made-up of many emirates (Brüggemann, 2016). It seems that al- Qaeda finds the foundation of a Muslim common wealth is be the first step to find a space for itself in the nation state order which has been in place since post-War 1 in the Middle East. It is noteworthy to point out that the lists of objectives of al- Qaeda do not include any reference to any sort of attacks against the United States or its allies. Rather, the process of attacking the U.S. is introduced and considered to be a way to achieve these goals and this shows that suggesting that U.S. assessments of al-Qaeda's efficiency have a serious mistake at their very foundation. Habeck, M who writes 'a confusion of our enemy's means and ends' thinks that the value of such error cannot be understated. He views that being able to stop and prevent al-Qaeda from attacking the U.S. through their current counter-terrorism indicates that they didn't only save lives but also have found out how to put an end to the terrorists exclusively. This is if, on one hand, al -Qaeda's chief purpose is to attack the U.S. On the other hand, if targeting Americans was just one of the ways that al- Qaeda has been following on its way to achieve other larger goals, then our CT efforts might have only incompletely frustrated the group but there might be other fields in which their goals could be reached more easily (Habeck, 2012).

4. The Roots and Structure of ISIS

In order to get an idea about the approach Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has in terms of the international relations; it is necessary to understand how ISIS emerged, its structure, and why it depends on violence as a means to achieve its goal. It seems that the group set out working in a universal form and it has been counting to a large extent on al- Qaeda during its formative phase. Hereby, it seems that it had been deeply under the influence of the success of the Jihad in Afghanistan (Idahosa, 2016). In order to provide an accurate worl-

dview of ISIS, we need to give a brief and precise historical background of the evolution of ISIS from the first moments of its formation till the now.

The Islamic State Terror Group (ISIS) has been the source of death and chaos in the Middle East and beyond (Edwards, 2015). The early beginnings of the ISIS can be traced to the old Jordanian worrier, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi4 who established first al- Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004, a year after the US –led invasion of Iraq and after his allegiance to Bin Laden. He was hoping to rise rapidly among the ranks of the organization and to have a distinguished career by committing vicious crimes against helpless civilians and military men alike. However, the duration of al- Zarqawi's leadership was too short as he was murdered in a US airstrike (BBC NEWS, 2015). As a result, in October 2006, Abu Ayyub al-Masri replaced him. Then, Abu Ayyub al-Masri used the name of Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) instead of the name of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and he appointed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader. In 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi got killed in a joint US-Iraq operation and met the same fate of al-Zarqawi. From April 2010 onwards, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi5 became the chief in charge of ISIS and he also changed the name of the group to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Ningthoujam, 2014).

The branches of the Islamic State are found in the following parts of the world: Iraq, Sham (this part in-cludes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel), Hijaz (Saudi Arabia, and other gulf states), Yemen, Egypt, Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania), the land of Habasha (Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti), Khurasan (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, India, and parts of China), Andalaus (Spain, which is the same name that was used during the Islamic government), Orobpa (Europe), Anatolia (European part of Turkey), Kurdistan (parts of Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran), and Qoqaz (Caucasus area). Thousands of followers are also assumed to be found in the West. With such a wide spread expansion and so much support, one can assume that this terror organization has achieved more than what Al Qaida did in the past (Shamieh & Zoltan, 2015).

The ability of Islamic State to occupy a wide territory of Iraq in 2014 shocked the statesmen and experts who didn't expect that the Islamic State would achieve their projects that were distinguished by brutal actions like highly publicized beheadings, systematized sexual slavery, mass killings of religious minorities, and other slaughters (Byman, 2016). Some observers think that ISIS came into existence unexpectedly and out of noth-ing whereas the organization did not arise in a linear fashion. In fact, ISIS is obviously a different outcome from al-Qaeda and it is a product of its time, geography and circumstances; it was the result of the extreme brutality, cruelty and exceptional circumstances which were associated with of spasms of the war in Iraq (2003-2011), and the Arab spring. To be to the point, ISIS has been described by some western writers as the inevitable result and consequence of broader global course of Islamization that emphasizes the stresses be-tween religiosity and modernity added by a growth in Islamic violence and militancy (Oosterveld and Bloem, 2017).

For this reason, western scholars think that the existing international order in general and US in particular have to pay a greater attention than what we have now in order to cope properly the threats emanating from the Islamic State. For example, McCants, W. finds the Islamic State one of the deadliest and most effective Salafi-jihadist6 groups in modern history as they exceeded even al-Qaida in brutality and danger to the world peace and security. Likewise, Kilcullen, D. has the same viewpoint and he writes that the Islamic State ISIS presents "a larger, more unified, capable, experienced and savage enemy, in a less stable, more fragmented region, with a far higher level of geopolitical competition, and a much more severe risk of great-power con-flict, than at any time since 9/11" (Jones et al, 2017).

4.1 ISIS's International Relations

Experts on Salafi Jihad think unanimously that ISIS as a state will not stop short of doing any think to achieve its strategy. Actually, it is debatable to deal with the issue of whether the Islamic State was really a state or not and it is not easy to make a decisive decision in terms of the Islamic State strategy of action since some still argue that the Islamic State strategy lacked a strategy of action before it loses the lands under its control. Nevertheless, there was the concept of a grand strategy as a theme despite of not expressing this strategy plainly (Harmon and Curry, 2016).

Making use of pledges of allegiance from the side of local jihadist groups, ISIS made its own strategy of ac-tion in the international arena to rule the areas under its control in Iraq and Syria and include other Muslim regions. Meanwhile, there were more than hundred groups who have pledged allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. In a word, ISIS was looking forward to controlling the region and administers the caliphate; increasing the sovereignty of caliphate into other permissive areas; and making use of and weakening areas not under its control (Gunaratna, 2016).

The military capacities and strategic planning of Baghdadi in terms of terror operations are the things that the warfare strategy and territorial success of the Islamic State relied on. In tandem with the warfare strategy of the Islamic State, their military capabilities affected their success to a great extent. In Lister's viewpoint this was due to the significance of the military component in the identity and personality of the Islamic State as a terror organization. As far as the warfare is concerned, the Islamic State had the ability to keep its military power strong, and had the power to impose defeats on their enemies, and seizing several strategic border crossings within Syria. US weaponry that USA had provided to the Iraqi government, surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank weapons, Humvees, tanks and (unarmed) surveillance drones were what the Islamic State could take after they overcame Syrian and Iraqi armies (Al-Kahwati, 2018).

Notably, the Islamic State was able to exploit the Internet and social media as a strategy through which con-vey a message of cruelty for the sake of attracting the attention of those young Muslims from different parts

of the world who would like to join its organization, or even those who could conduct attacks alone without the support of others. Its message has been the source of inspiration for those young Muslims who were peripheral in Europe and the West, and it has inspired second- and third-generation immigrants (some of them with a criminal past) who are isolated, unsatisfied, feel that they lost identity and belonging, hating the societies that are not able to embrace them, and confronting a future which is depressed and expects few prospects for progress and self-actualization (Ganor, 2015).

4.2 Salafiya Jihadism of ISIS versus the Middle East State- System

The Islamic State (ISIS) is defined to be a terrorist, rebel group the nature of which is jihadist Sunni, a self-declared caliphate7, established on a wide region. The group is known as a non-recognized state from the technical perspectives as they announced that they would not recognize the existing nation state borders in the Middle East and had stated goals of no regard for any international laws and norms. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as their chief in charge who alleged that he would be "imam and caliph of all Muslims" and his caliphate would work to expand to all territories which he viewed as a part of Muslim land (Sroka et al, 2017). The fate of locals in those areas was all the same to the great powers. With a stroke of the pen, Sykes firmly drew a hooking line - from roughly Kirkuk, Iraq to Haifa, Israel - which gave France control of northern territories and Britain control of the south."The artificiality of state formation has caused numerous conflicts over the last few decades," said Henner Fürtig, director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at GIGA research institute in Hamburg. "These questions haven't been solved for a century and burst open again and again, in a cycle, like now with the ISIS advance in northern Iraq" (DW, 2014).

The agreement resulted in a region with states composed of a variety of ethnic groups and religions. The terror group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would like to erase those borders, calling for an all-Islamic state in the form of a greater caliphate. The group's name makes it clear, Fürtig said, that they hope to undo the boundaries they view as Western-imperialist impositions. ISIS wants to form a new Islamic caliphate, Fürtig said. For ISIS, the golden age of this form of government was in the last 400 years of Ottoman rule. They are overlooking one thing, though: For Arabs, that period was one of foreign rule by the Ottoman caliph. Nevertheless, the group sees the caliphate as the natural form of government for devout Muslims, Fürtig said."I'm not talking about feasibility," he added. "I'm talking about what, to some extent, is disseminated successfully in propaganda" (DW, 2014).

Having this intention and the desire to get expanded, the group renamed itself and used the name of Islamic State. That is, they frankly wanted to declare that: "the legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations is rendered null and void after the expansion of the Caliph's authority and the arrival of his troops" (Sroka et al, 2017).

Notably, the Islamic State, like al- Qaeda, is recognized to be in touch with a movement in Islamic political thought called Jihadi-Salafism, or jihadist for short. The group's leaders clearly stick to this movement. For example, in an audio address which dates back to 2007, then-Islamic State leader Abu Umar al-Baghdadi called Muslims "To all Sunnis, and to the young men of Jihadi-Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) in particular, across the entire world to join ranks". Likewise, in the same year his deputy considered the fighters of the Islamic State to be part of "the current of Jihadi-Salafism" (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2012). Also, on July 21, 2012, he stated, "My dear (Muslim) community: As we did not lie against God when we announced the Islamic State, so we do not l anhaj), and it has not, nor will it ever, substitute or abandon these". ie against God when we say that it will persist...It will persist upon its creed ('aqida) and its path (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2012).

It seems that, Jihadi Salafism is known to have a contemporary political interpretation of Islam. While most Muslim intellectuals are in total agreement that ISIS is a serious risk to the world order, they do not agree with some western scholars who attributed its violence to Islam. Most Muslims scholars including those in the west argue that ISIS has no reliable space and no authentic roots in Islamic ideology. Hence, in general most of the Islamic scholars have condemned ISIS and its brutality, extremism, and whatever is considered to be "non-Islamic" behavior. In addition to the government of Saudi Arabia as well as the country's clerics and the grand mufti of Mecca, a coalition of over 100 scholars all over the world issued such condemnations. Even those who were Wahhabi and Salafi had viewed ISIS's beliefs to be non-Islamic (Ababakar et al, 2014).

Takfir8 was another feature of the Islamic States (ISIS's) ideology. The Jordanian jihadist, Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, who is known as the major forerunner and foundational ideologue of the Islamic State played a great role in conveying the theology and the core ideology of takfir which is the process of declaring someone to be an apostate and this rationale was used for killing Muslims who did not share their view on Islam including Shi'i Muslims. Leaving the fold of Islam is very easy from the perspective of ISIS who considers those who fail to rule according to a narrow definition of God's law unbelief or non-believers. This is what turns the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, among many others, traitors against Islam in the view of ISIS (Hassan, 2016).

It can be argued that, the mentioned ideology appears to be a powerful calling for a more literal unification of the all Muslims as a means of merging power to protect the dar-al Islam. Moreover, ISIS asserted the need for global unity of Muslim that transcends the state system and creates a defensive barrier against Western influences in the Middle East. This could make a direct affection on the concept of nation-system in Middle East. It could make a dangerous threat over the all Western countries' sovereignty and political borders.

4.3 Financial Strength of ISIS

ISIS made use of the financial assets which were a critical tool to present its worldview on international arena. The ISIS stands for a new form of terrorist organization which is depending on financial funding for achieving its missions. Understanding the nature and problem of terrorist funding procedures associated with the group is of help to justify why it grew and developed rapidly during the period 2014-2016. That is why, scholars believe that ISIS was able to grow very quickly and mange to extend its activity in scope in quality and quantity over a wide geographical territory (Martin & Solomon, 2017).

Controlling oil fields was one of the many sources that ISIS basically received its revenue from. That is, ISIS was selling these resources to local customers or regional states by means of middlemen to control and earn such revenue (FATF Report, 2015). Furthermore, millions of citizens and people who were under ISIS control and command suffered from the imposed taxes. The sources and the nature of these taxes were not the same since some of them were just like normal state taxes while other taxes were assumed to be religious taxes and there were road and customs tolls for vehicles crossing ISIS-held territory. There were also taxes levied by ISIS officials on smuggling drugs and weapons. ISIS imposed another tax which was known as a levied departure tax of up to US$1,000 from those able to pay to depart ISIS region (Blannin, 2017).

ISIS was to control vital resources within both sectors of industry and agriculture in Syria and Iraq, and another crucial financial source was the banks. Before ISIS has lost access to state banks which had fallen to its control in northern and western Iraq, ISIS took at least $500 million that were found in these banks when they fell under their control. Another nasty way for earning money that ISIS depended on was through kidnapping people and asking money for their rescue. According to an estimation by the U.S. Treasury ISIS made $20 million to $45 million through this method only in 2015 (Clarke et al, 2017). Thus, it is clear that ISIS owned a varied funding collection. Accordingly, one can conclude that ISIS had all necessary financials means to challenge the existing political order in the Middle East and make a serious threat to the national security of many countries beyond Middle East.

According to a study that concluded by Stefan Heibner, Peter R. Neumann, John Holland McCowan and Rajan Basra in the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence indicated that the ISIS's sources of revenue are different and closely tied to its territory. They are: Texas and fees, oil, kidnapping and looting, confiscations, fines and also they estimated that ISIS's income from 2014 to 2016. For example, as indicated in figure 2, in the years since 2014, ISIS's annual revenue has declined significantly: from up to $1.9b in 2014 to a maximum of $870m in 2016. (Heibner et all, 2017).

It can be said that, the financial outcomes that ISIS got in the Middle East had a direct influence on the insta-

bility of some countries' economy, politically, socially, and security. The Middle East countries tried to have a challenge against the threats of ISIS, above all economical menace.


Figure 2: ISIS's Income, 2014-2016 (range averages) (modified from Heißner et all, 2017).

5. Differences between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS)

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) which are two radical jihadist groups perceive that Western culture and hegemony are a threat posed to Islam Dom and ridding the world from such a threat is a goal they want to achieve. Nevertheless, this common belief did not rule out that the differences between them with regard to the doctrine and political priorities. These differences were so serious that eventually leads to clashes (Gunaratna, 2005).

Notably, new security challenges in the international level in general and the Middle East in particular has been created and resulted from the transformation of terrorism of al- Qaeda , which was mostly hit and run operation , to the threat posed by (ISIS) as a state with a lot of destructive means at her disposal. The latter had managed to have a standing army, well-equipped with most up to date weapons, and capable of adopting the conventional fighting styles that conventional army followed in war. That is, to say ISIS made use, among other things, of more conventional military tactics and used assault rifles and grenades in their attacks. ISIS has captured and occupies wide lands in northern Syria and Iraq where it announced a caliphate. Al-Qaeda adopted a different war strategy as it has not searched for sticking to its occupied areas as much

as it has been concentrated on performing dreadful attacks that would drew the attention of people in international media. For example, the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya in 2013 shows that it had kept on performing high-profile and complicated assaults which were similar in scope and intensity to the attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon on September 11. Al-Qaeda also to establish an Islamic Caliphate but seems to have focused on attacking the enemies of Islam in their home to leave Muslim land. Consequently ISIS's focus on establishing caliphate first was a spoiling for al- Qaeda in term of political strategy (Wong, 2014).

The fundamental objective of al- Qaeda was to defeat the corrupted "renegade" regimes that are found in the Middle East and establish "true" Islamic governments in their place. Nevertheless, the United States is still its main enemy which is regarded as the root cause of the crises of the Middle East. Al- Qaeda had targeted the United States hoping to finally persuade the United States to put an end to its support for these Muslim regimes and depart the region altogether, and this will pave the way for attacking such regimes easily (Byman, 2015). Further, the Islamic State (ISIS) does not adopt al- Qaeda's "far enemy" strategy and it prefers the "near enemy" strategy on a regional level. Thus, the Islamic State does not target the United States; it focuses on "renegade" regimes in the Arab world namely the Assad regime in Syria and the Haider Abadi regime in Iraq (2014-2018). Preferring to purify the Islamic community first by attacking Shi'a and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups, Baghdadi followed what his predecessors did (Bertrand, 2015). For instance, in 2004 and especially after his group had joined al-Qaeda the central leadership of al-Qaeda was already critical of Zarqawi's intense use of violence and severe execution of sharia law. They were afraid that such belief and this behavior might affect negatively the long-term goals of the global jihadist project. Without doubt, having such type of dissimilar viewpoint is originated from the fact that al-Qaeda's central leadership promoted abolishing the renegade governments of the Middle East as a way to purify Islam whereas Zarqawi's focus was more on purifying society from the internal kefirs (unbelievers) (A. Y. Zelin, 2014).

The amount of the posed threat to the international relations of the Middle Eastern states is one more dissimilarity points between Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The attacked targets of al –Qaeda outside Middle East were limited in extent compared to the numerous attacked targets of ISIS in Europe, Africa, and Asia which resulted in greater instability in the world. It is believed that the decisive way that US-led Coalition dealt with ISIS was a very necessary one to cope the threat and damage to world peace which ISIS had (Monday, 2016). The attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in January 2016 displayed the capacity of ISIS to attack at the heart of Europe. The constant capacity to stimulate small cells of radicalized sup¬porters found in the West to launch attacks on their behalf increased the influence of these groups. Such supporters, who have claimed to be members of terrorist group without ever paying even pilot visits to popular safe havens such as Iraq,

Paki¬stan, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen, were the source of the great majority of plots in the West. It seems that Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, the terrorist who killed 84 people with a 19-ton truck in French city of Nice in 2016, was one of such supporters (Simcox, 2016).

6. Conclusion

Al-Qaeda and ISIS posed the most dangerous threats to the national security of many governments of Middle East and the peace and security of world as a whole. Al-Qaeda as a Salafi Jihadist organization had managed to deliver serious blows to the national security of many countries in the Middle East and world peace. The doctrine of Salafi Jihad had no regard for any norms of Westphalian system of international relations and the political order established in the Middl East after World War 1. Since its founding as terrorist organization ISIS, which has also based its legitimacy on Salafi Jihad, had posed a more serious challenge to the world security in general and the existing political order in the Middle East in particular than al-Qaeda. ISIS is on records condemning the international political order and not recognized the so-called western enforced Sykes-Picot arrangement of the Middle East .As such, al -Baghdadi demanded allegiance from all Muslims worldwide. For the first time after eight decades, the national borders between Syria and Iraq had disappeared in ISIS's caliphate .The group started to commit heinous and barbaric crimes only to instill fear and force others Muslims to fall in line.

They even started to target civilian in the west. ISIS had created a much serious threat to the world order than al-Qaeda did due to its much more sophisticated planned terror war, the financial means at her disposal, and effective use of social media. Consequently by using alienated Muslim youth in the west through its digital media, ISIS terror groups had managed to reach cities such as Melbourne, Manchester and Paris. With such crimes, the group was categorized as an International terrorist group with tremendous amount of danger to the world peace.

Although the Islamic State regarded itself to be an independent state, all states and countries of the world defined it as a terrorist organization due to its actions. Despite of its not being an officially recognized state, it managed temporarily to take and hold on to some territories in Iraq and Syria, just to show that is has all of the aspects of statehood. With such a form of transnational terrorism that was practices by ISIS, the world felt the need to come up with a combined international effort to challenge the threat. US along with the rest of the coalition forces mustered huge international efforts against it in Iraq and Syria. However, many scholars preferred that it should be dealt with such groups like al Qaeda and ISIS by attacking the root of the problems and what brought them to existence in the first place.

Notes:

1.Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, was born in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, in 1957. Bin Laden joined the Afghan revolution to stand against the invasion the Soviet Union in 1979. Bin Laden worked on creating al-Qaeda network after Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, and he tried to expand the attacking power of his organization to achieve global strikes against Western interests. As a result, September 11, 2001 witnessed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The end of bin Laden's life story was on May 2, 2011 when President Barack Obama declared that bin Laden had been assassinated in a terrorist compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Robinson, A. (2001). BIN LADEN BEHIND THE MASK OF THE TERRORIST. Arcade, USA, New York. PP:4-9.

2.In August 1998 there were two huge bombings using massive trucks loaded with explosives. One was detonated   outside the US Embassy in Neirobi, Kenya and the other in front of the US Embassy in Dar As Salam, Tanzania. A total of 224 persons were killed, including 12 American nationals and 4500 persons were injured. The Saudi exiled Al Qaida terror leader Osama Bin Laden was accusing to be the master mind behind both attacks. Biography.com Editors. (February 9, 2010). U.S. embassies in East Africa bombed. A&E Television Networks. [Online] Available from: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-embassies-in-east-africa-bombed   (Accessed 15th December 2018).

3.Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda leader, was born on June 19, 1951, in Maadi- Egypt. He stood out as one industrious boy that excelled in school. He joined his first Islamic group when he was just 14 years old. He graduated from Cairo University Medical School in 1974 and got his masters in surgery procedures in 1978. Even though he attained such high degree of specialty in medicine, he did not pursue his medical profession. Instead, he joined the radical Islamic Jihad to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1979. With a joint publication with Al Qaida Leader Osama Bin Laden, he officially integrated the Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Al Qaida. Al Zawahiri became one of the most wanted by the FBI after the events of September 11 2001. Up to now, his whereabouts have remained a mystery but, according to the videos and statements that he releases, it is suspected that he lives among some tribes in Pakistan.To outline al Qaeda ideology, al Zawahiri published a book entitled Knights under the Prophet's Banner in 2001.

4.Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, another influential terror figure, was born in Zarqa, Jordan in October 1966. His large family belonged to the trans-Jordanian Bani Hassan tribe which are famous of its loyalty to the royal Hashemite family. Being one of the most vital terrorist in Iraq and head of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda branch, he depended on his terrorist strategy to grow wave of bloody terrorist attacks such as suicide bombing attacks and car bombs in 2004 primarily against the American and coalition forces in Iraq and at Iraqis cooperating with

the Americans (especially Shi'ite Muslims). For further readings, refer to Michael, G. 2007 The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Defence Studies Vol. 7, No. 3, p 339.

5.Baghdadi - real name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri - was born in 1971 in the central Iraqi city of Samarra. Pre-modern Sunni scholars believe that his claim that his religious Sunni Arab family was descended from the Prophet Muhammad's Quraysh tribe was a key qualification for becoming a caliph. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced to be ISIS's caliph, Arabic for "successor," in the mid 2014 and continued till he got killed in an airstrike in 2019. Baghdadi assumed to be the religious, political, and military leader of all Muslims. Nobody knew exactly where was Baghdadi hiding himself after the fall of ISIS's caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Though he had been declared dead or seriously wounded more than once, he reappeared in ISIS propaganda recordings, most recently in August 2018. Finally, the U.S. government announced on October 27, 2019, that he had been killed in a raid by U.S. forces in Syria by U.S. forces. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi was appointed by ISIS as Baghdadi's successor. For further readings, refer to BBC NEWS. (28 October 2019). Who was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? [Online] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50200392 (Accessed 17th December 2018). And also see Counter Extremism Project. (n.d). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [Online] Available from: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi(Accessed 17th December 2018).

6.Driving the threat of Sunni Islamic terrorism worldwide, Salafi-jihadism exists as a strategic issue. AS a kind of political and social reaction to appearances of this threat, whether in the Middle East or the West, a constant theme is rejection of Salafi-jihadists' claims to legitimacy as members of the Islamic faith. This paper exposes that claim by following the lineage of Salafism historically and ideologically, from the early centuries of Islam to the rise of Salafi-jihadism in the 1980s. In detail see Wimhurst A. (2016). Nothing to do with Islam: The historical origins, ideology and strategic threat of global Salafi-jihadism. Australian Defence College, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS). P 1.

7.Caliph in Islamic religion is considered a political and religious leader to the entire Muslim world and he is the successor to the Prophet Mohammed. Historically, Shura that represents a community consultation, and one of the earliest forms of democracy in Islam, played an influential role in choosing Caliph, just like the days were the four Caliphs ruled the Islamic world after Mohammed. Furthermore, see Adnan Alshdaifat, Sh. (2016). The Re-Birth of Islamic Caliphate against Jordan: Present and Putative Policy. DAR Publishers/The University of Jordan. Dirasat, Shari'a and Law Sciences, Volume 43, Supplement 1. P 593.

8.The word "takfeer" as an Islamic term is defined to be the process of declaring someone to be an apostate from the religion. Details about the word Takfeer and its various derivatives were unknown to the early scholars. However, its concept is driven from Quran and the Sunna sect of Islam and a few statements by early scholars. The principle of "Takfeer" falls into two categories: one is " Takfeer Al Mutlaq (absolute)", and the other is "Takfeer al- Muayyan (specific)". There are also those scholars who add a third category to the principle of Takfeer, they call it " Takfeer al-Kullee (the total takfeer)", meaning the total Takfeer. Furthermore, see GREEN C, A. (2009) THE KHAWAARIJ AND THE CREED OF TAKFEER: DECLARING A MUSLIM TO BE AN APOSTATE AND ITS EFFECTS UPON MODERN DAY ISLAAMIC MOVEMENTS. MASTER THESES. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA. P 63. And also see Zalmi, M, I. (2014). Quranic Research Group. Ihsan Publishing and Distribution. First Edition. P 167.

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