

**THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE:
THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH AND BRITISH
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES 1922-1923**

by
Sevtap Demirci

**Dissertation submitted as part fulfilment for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International History
The London School of Economics and Political Science
United Kingdom, March 1997**

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THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

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ABSTRACT

By the end of the First World War the Ottoman Empire had been defeated and was in a state of disintegration. The Mudros Armistice which ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in October 1918 was the final stage of this process; the Treaty of Sèvres which followed the Armistice confirmed it.

However, the National Independence Movement which emerged in Anatolia from the ruins of the Empire rejected the proposed peace terms and set itself up as an alternative government based at Ankara. It drew up the National Pact which set out the desiderata of the Nationalists, and it won a decisive victory over the Greeks who landed in Anatolia in 1919. This military victory made a peace conference imperative and enabled the Turks to negotiate peace terms with the Allies on an equal footing. The peace treaty which was signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923 finalised the Turkish Peace Settlement, putting an end to the centuries-old Eastern Question.

The object of this dissertation is to examine the motives and strategies of Britain and Turkey at the Lausanne Conference in their efforts to obtain the peace terms best suited to their interests. The focus throughout is on the factors influencing the attitude of the delegations, the instructions they received from their respective foreign ministries and the formulation of their strategies.

The thesis consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter presents a brief account of events prior to the Conference.

Chapter II deals with the historical background by giving a summary of the political and military events leading up to the Conference.

Chapter III gives an account of the strategies of Britain and Turkey and aims to assess the respective strength and weakness of the two parties prior to the Conference.

Chapter IV examines the negotiations between Britain and Turkey during the first phase of the Conference. The central axis of this examination is the Turco-British strategy which shows the critical shift in the policy of the Turks following their realisation that peace could not be made unless they came to terms with Britain.

Chapter V investigates the events following the breakdown of the Conference to the re-opening with the second phase. It covers the measures taken by both sides to be in a stronger position vis-à-vis each other in preparation for the second phase of the negotiations.

Chapter VI discusses the negotiations and the final settlement, concentrating mainly on the strategies of both sides in the second phase of the Conference.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many sources for assistance in the completion of this dissertation. It is with sincere pleasure that I acknowledge first of all the debt I owe to Bogazici University, Istanbul, whose generous grant made the research and writing of this dissertation possible. I am also indebted to LSE for assistance from two Research Funds.

My profound gratitude is due to Professor Donald Cameron Watt, who supervised me until his retirement and from whose intellectual stimulus I have benefited over the last three years.

No words can adequately express my gratitude to Dr David Stevenson who took over the supervision of my work from Professor Watt. Without his kindness and invaluable suggestions concerning both content and presentation, this dissertation could not have been written.

Many other people have been generous with their time and knowledge. My thanks are due to Miss Irene V. Morris, former Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge, for her assistance and constant encouragement during the writing of this dissertation. I would also like to record here a special note of appreciation to Dr Dogan Ozkaya and to Dr Rosa Bracco.

A dissertation of this nature would be impossible to write without the assistance of those who are in charge of the archives, and I welcome the opportunity to express my appreciation of the courtesy and helpfulness of the staff at the Public Record Office.

I would like especially to thank my mother, who relieved me of various responsibilities and whose continuous support, encouragement and patience enabled me to concentrate fully on completing my dissertation.

I dedicate this work to my daughter Elifcan, who, despite the fact that she has recently had so little of my time and attention, has always shown great love, as well as interest and understanding beyond, her years.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAB	Cabinet Office
Cmd.	Command Papers
CO	Colonial Office
CON	Confidential Print
DBFP	Documents on British Foreign Policy 1918-1939. First Series, London.
B DFA	British Documents on Foreign Affairs
FO	Foreign Office
FRUS	Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States of America. Washington D.C.
GNA	Grand National Assembly
Hansard	Parliamentary Debates. London.
IRO	Oriental and India Office Collections.
Lozan I	Lozan Telgraflari I, 1922-1923. Ankara.(Lausanne Telegrams)
Lozan II	Lozan Tegraflari II, 1922-1923. Ankara
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
T.B.M.M.	Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
TPC	Turkish Petroleum Company
WO	War Office

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I

INTRODUCTION

" ...International diplomacy is a type of nightmare chess match, played amidst blinding fog, in which the pieces change shape or melt away, players mysteriously transform themselves, rules abruptly alter in mid-move, and no one is quite sure what the prizes are. Yet this need not discourage. It is the constant fluctuation, the infinite range of possibilities, that make diplomatic history so stimulating a subject. This is its special excitement, that it presents problems to which there are many possible solutions and equally many ways of arriving at those solutions." Clayton, G. D., *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*. London, 1971, pp. 246-247.

The Ottoman Empire, which participated in the Great War on the side of the Central Powers, was defeated by the Allies and compelled to sign the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918. Following the Armistice the Allies worked out, in line with their war-time secret agreements, the details of the peace treaty which was signed by the Ottoman delegation in August 1920 at Sèvres. The Treaty of Sèvres was the Allied solution to the centuries-old Eastern Question but not the final one.

The end of the War witnessed not only the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire from the political arena but also the emergence of Britain as the dominant Power in the Middle East. Britain, as a victor with a vast amount of newly acquired territories, extended its commitments in Mesopotamia, the eastern Mediterranean and India, all of which formed the key stones of the Imperial strategic system following the war years. Within this geographical area Turkey became of crucial

importance to Britain as far as military, political and strategic factors were concerned. Britain could not afford to have Turkish affairs settled without its direct and active participation. Therefore, soon after the Armistice Britain took the leading role in settling Turkish affairs, which resulted in the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, the 'death warrant' of the Ottoman Empire.

This partition plan, however, encountered difficulties when a Turkish Nationalist Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged in Anatolia and grew swiftly into a major power forcing Britain and its Allies to revise their position. The envisaged plan suffered another blow when the Nationalist Movement, now at war with the British-backed Greece, gained a significant victory. The Mudania Convention, which followed the Greek defeat, was sufficient for Britain to realise that unless peace negotiations started immediately it would be impossible to secure its own vital interests. The Lausanne Peace Conference was thereupon convened providing a platform upon which age-old accounts could be settled. But it took five years altogether from the initial Mudros Armistice to complete the general peace settlement, and it was not until July 24, 1923 that the final peace treaty was signed at Lausanne. With the coming into force of the treaty on August 6, 1924, peace was at last formally established in the region.

The Lausanne Conference was the culmination of a long and troublesome struggle which started with the Declaration of Amasya on June 21-22, 1919, a document incorporating views expressed by Mustafa Kemal on the necessity of ensuring the sovereignty and independence of Turkey; these views were subsequently endorsed by Nationalist Congresses held in Sivas and Erzurum as the National Pact of Turkey. With the decisive victory of the Turkish forces over the Greek army, the first stage of the National Struggle had been won. With the Mudania Convention, which followed the further successful advances of the Turkish army right up to Chanak, the second part of the long battle was

accomplished: it put an end to hostilities and opened the way to the Lausanne peace negotiations.

At Lausanne the third stage began, namely that of diplomacy; that is, the transferral of the initiative from the soldiers to the diplomats. Once diplomacy took over, the nature and the conduct of relations between Britain and Turkey dramatically changed, and the Conference proved a suitable platform for the establishment of a policy of reconciliation. As Evans rightly observed, 'Turkey had much to gain from a negotiated settlement and the restoration of normal relations with Europe and much to lose if it stood on its military victory and defied Europe. On the other hand, Turkey had much to offer, from economic privileges to influence in a strategically important area of the world. The Allies could deny to Turkey the benefits of a restoration of relations, economic aid, and such additional stability as would be afforded by a recognition of the Nationalist regime.'¹ Rational and pragmatic thinking as well as a realistic assessment of the circumstances determined the course of the negotiations and encouraged the two parties towards a gradual rapprochement.

Despite its crucial place in the history of International relations in general, and that of Turkey in particular, the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922-1923 has rarely been the subject of scholarly investigation. The current state of work dealing with the Conference is not altogether satisfactory, as it does not go beyond what has already been said and is often a repetition of the same ideas in different forms. Apart from the continuous output of hasty monographs and conference papers, academics from Turkey and abroad seem content to treat this subject as a chapter in a book or by tossing off an article on it for a magazine or a newspaper.

¹ Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 376.

The few scholarly investigations in English are by Busch, Dockrill and Goold, Howard, Evans, and Sonyel. Busch's *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923* is an authoritative work dealing with British diplomacy during the period concerned as it makes good use of British archival material. Howard's *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923* is an informative study of the issues discussed at the Conference. Dockrill and Goold's *Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-1923* investigates British policy towards the entire peace settlement after the First World War and examines at length the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the events leading up to the Conference, of which it gives a brief account. Evans' *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914-1924* considers the diplomacy of the Great Powers in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its significance for American foreign policy. It also deals briefly with the role of the United States in the Lausanne negotiations. Sonyel's *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Nationalist Movement*, while examining Nationalist diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne, gives a brief but thorough account of the negotiations at Lausanne. All these works, along with Helmreich's *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920*, are useful as background reading and as general reference works for the period.

The major works in Turkish are Bilsel's two-volume *Lozan*, and a publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Türk Dis Politikasında 50 Yıl: Lozan; 1922-1923*. A third work, Kurkcuoglu's *Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri* may also be mentioned as providing useful background to the Conference; one of its chapters deals specifically with the Straits and the Mosul questions, which were the two main interests for Britain at Lausanne.

In all of these works, discussion of the Lausanne Conference is limited in scope and generally restricted to little more than a chapter. While the proceedings

and protocols reflecting the official side of the Conference have been examined, the factors influencing the attitude of the delegations, the instructions they received from their respective foreign ministries, and the process of formulation of their strategies remain to be investigated. These gaps in empirical information and lack of a deeper analysis need to be addressed in order to obtain a fuller and truer picture of this important international event.²

Although a number of works concerning specific aspects of the Conference have been produced, no exhaustive attempt has been made to investigate the evolution of diplomatic strategies between Turkey and Britain. This dissertation represents the first full-length scholarly account of the Lausanne Conference, and in particular the first work to present an analysis of negotiating strategies and diplomatic relations between the two countries based on Turkish and British primary sources.

The primary aim is to provide a chronological and documentary account of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic strategies during the Conference; to direct attention to particular incidents and trends that illustrate the changing nature of relations between Great Britain and Turkey; and subsequently to assess the significance and consequence of the Conference with regard to Turkish and Middle Eastern History. The focus throughout is on what went on behind the closed doors of the Conference, how the parties formulated their strategies and what factors affected the way these strategies were carried out.

The dissertation consists of six chapters. The introductory chapter presents a brief account of events prior to the Conference as well as discusses sources used during research and the perspective taken in the analysis of the subject.

² Kemal Oke, *The Lausanne Conference, 1922-23: Themes and Sources in the Archives of Great Britain' Atatürk Türkiyesinde Dis Politika Sempozyumu, 1923-1983*. (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari, 1984), p.70.

Chapter II deals with the historical background by giving a summary of the political and military events leading up to the Conference.

Chapter III explains the grounds that made an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement necessary, and also the questions to be settled before the Conference.

Chapter IV gives an account of the strategies of Britain and Turkey and examines the negotiations between them during the first phase of the Conference. The central axis of this examination is the Turco-British strategy which shows the critical shift in the policy of the Turks following their realisation that peace could not be made unless they came to terms with Britain.

Chapter V investigates the events from the breakdown of the Conference to its re-opening with the second phase. It covers the measures taken each side in order to gain a stronger position vis-à-vis the other in preparation for this second phase of the negotiations.

Chapter VI discusses the negotiations and the final settlement, concentrating mainly on the strategies of both sides in the second phase of the Conference.

It should be noted that unless otherwise specified, all the correspondence cited are telegrams. The research material consists of all British official documents and private papers in public archives and of all Turkish documents available at the moment. Because of their comprehensiveness and availability, British archival resources constitute the major part of the primary sources of the dissertation. The Conference was the subject of a vast deal of private and public correspondence and official documents; all of these are to be found in British archives, and the majority

of them are open to public consultation. Foreign Office,³ Cabinet Office, War Office and Colonial Office documents, together with the private papers of the Prime Ministers and the Secretaries of State reveal the policies pursued at the highest level. The Command Papers and Parliamentary debates have also provided much information on British policy at the time of the Lausanne Conference.

By contrast, Turkish archives are still practically inaccessible. The Turkish Foreign Ministry documents which are available only cover the period prior to 1914, and the documents beyond that date are for the most part uncatalogued, lying in a chaotic disarray of bundles and bags. Much archival material about military-strategic issues of the period is available, but documents on the policy-making process at the highest level are rarely accessible. Nevertheless, several published Turkish documents have helped to throw some light on the issues treated in this work, and have in some cases been useful in filling gaps in the information available from British sources.

³. FO records kept in the PRO are an indispensable source of information on the Lausanne Conference. The documents catalogued under the title of "The Eastern Conference: Lausanne" consist of fifty-three files and cover the correspondence between the British delegation at Lausanne and Whitehall.

II

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFERENCE

The Eastern Question and the European Solution

On the eve of the Lausanne Conference, the Eastern Question, an expression used to indicate the problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, had been a focal point of European and British diplomacy for over a hundred years.¹ The heartland of the Ottoman Empire, Asia Minor, along with Constantinople and the Straits and Turkey-in-Europe beyond the capital, had been traditionally at the core of the Eastern Question.² The root of the matter was the inability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its territorial integrity. The more the economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers in the Empire grew and the ensuing rivalries became visible, the more firmly the Eastern Question became established as a priority on the agenda of international relations. Real peace and stability were further away than ever, since the decline of the Ottoman Empire opened up too many possibilities of advantage to too many rival powers. Thus the Question, for a century and a half, remained the most lasting and intractable of all diplomatic questions. As Anderson argued, most of the major crises from 1856 to the outbreak of World War in European politics were due to 'a possible, a probable,

1. Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Goold; Peace Without Promise, Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23. (London: Bastford Academic and Educational, 1981), p.132.

2. Dockrill and Goold; Peace Without Promise, p.181; On the subject see: Anderson, M. S., The Eastern Question. (London: Melbourne, 1966); John Marriot; The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); Gerald D. Clayton., Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli. (London: University of London, 1971); Malcolm E. Yapp., The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923. (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 47-97; Alan Palmer., The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. (London, 1992).

or an actually threatening partition of the Ottoman territory'.³ The Crimean war, the 1878 Congress of Berlin and the Great War all illustrate different Powers' attempts to settle the Eastern Question. The Great War was but the culmination, so far as Turkey was concerned, of this long process of dissolution. 'Not only was the problem inescapable,' as Clayton stated in his analysis of the Question, 'but it was also apparently insoluble.'⁴ The Powers' irreconcilable aims, and their unsuccessful efforts to agree on a partition of the Empire in a series of bargains, prolonged the solution of the problem and continued to affect the nature of international relations for a long time to come. As Albrecht-Carrie aptly put it : 'Had it not been for the inability of the Powers to agree on a division of the Ottoman Empire, "the sick man of Europe" would have died sooner than he did.'⁵ But their rivalries made the fate of the question for a century or more the most permanent of all the sources of international conflict and the most intractable of all European political problems.

In the early years of the twentieth century, diplomatic complications in the Eastern Question which arose from the decline of the Ottoman Empire resulted in important and rather rapid developments towards their solution. Following the First World War, the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire, the destruction of German influence, and the change of regime in Russia had made the rivalries of the Great Powers more 'limited and innocuous than at any time for the last century and a half'.⁶ This appearance of equanimity was, however, quite deceptive. The indefinite nature of the whole situation and the prolonged uncertainty as to how to partition the Empire seemed to take a more decisive path after the defeat Turkey suffered in the First World War. Following the Armistice of Mudros of 1918,⁷

3. Harry Howard., The Partition of Turkey, (New York: Fertig, 1966),. p. 19.

4. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, p. 9.

5. R. Albrecht-Carrie., Twentieth-Century Europe, (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 14.

6. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 388.

7. Cmd. 53, 1919. 'Terms of Armistice Concluded between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.'; Sir Frederick Maurice., The Armistices of 1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 85-87; Gwyne Dyer., 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918' Middle East Studies, 8, (1972), pp. 143-178, 316-348; D. I. Shuttleworth., 'Turkey From the Armistice to the Peace'

which technically meant Turkey's surrender to the Entente, all Ottoman possessions came under Allied occupation. The Paris Conference beginning in January 1919 witnessed a bitter struggle between the Powers as to the ultimate fate of the Ottoman territories. Once more the Eastern Question was not only to prove a stumbling block on the road to world peace but it was also to give rise to grave difficulties between the Great Powers so that the drawing-up of terms of peace was seriously impeded by a series of acrimonious inter-Allied disputes. Their difficulties were increased, moreover, by the suspicion with which they increasingly tended to regard each other's activities in the Near East.⁸ Therefore the controversy emerging from a divergence of views and clash of interests 'not only disturbed and threatened the orderly processes of the Peace Conference, but actually prevented a settlement of the Near Eastern question at Paris.'⁹

The Allies made another attempt after February 12, 1920 in London to produce a solution to the long-lasting Eastern Question. During the discussions which lasted until April 10, the Supreme Council endeavoured to find a solution acceptable to all parties. After much discussion accord was reached on the main questions regarding the partition of the Empire. By the time the Supreme Council reconvened at San Remo on April 18, 1920 most of the basic decisions regarding

Journal of the Central Asian Society, 11, (1924), pp. 51-67; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur., Yeni Turkiye Devletinin Hariçi Siyaseti. (Istanbul: Milli Mecmua Basimevi, 1934), pp. 22-30; Ali Turkgeldi., Mondros ve Mudanya Mutarekelerinin Tarihi. (Ankara: Guney Matbaacilik, 1948); Tefik Biyiklioglu., Turk Istiklal Harbi: Mondros Mutarekesi ve Tatbikati. (Cilt I, Ankara, 1962); Gwynne Dyer., 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918. I- The Turkish Decision for a Separate Peace' and 'Turkish Armistice of 1918. II-Lost Opportunity: The Armistice Negotiations of Moudros' Middle Eastern Studies, 8 (1972), pp. 143-178, 313-348.

⁸. The term 'Near East' has been used in the text to denote an area comprising of Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and the Levant (the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and its hinterland).

⁹. Henry H. Cumming., Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East; The Decline of French Influence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), p.75. Because the Great Powers were so busy with their European peace terms, (January to June 1919 in Paris, April 1920 at San Remo, July 1920 at Spa, January 1922 in Cannes, May 1922 in Genoa) they failed to attribute at the beginning of 1919 the importance to the Turkish settlement that it later acquired.

the Turkish Peace Treaty had already been made, and a nearly complete draft of the treaty was in existence.¹⁰

The draft treaty, which eventually was to be signed by the Ottoman Government on August 10 at Sèvres,¹¹ was drawn up on the model of all the previous treaties which had been made between victors and vanquished since the 1918 Armistice. The Ottoman government felt it had no option but to sign the treaty which in fact passed a sentence of death upon the Empire. Damat Ferit, the Grand Vizier, stated that a 'reasonable man saw there was no alternative to signature except destruction'.¹² Sultan Vahdettin's policy was to accommodate the Allies, particularly the British, in the hope of a lenient treaty. However, his appeal to the King of England 'to intervene with other Entente Powers in order to alleviate the severity of the treaty in those of its clauses which are incompatible with independent state and to save from (? partition), at least (? the) Turkish speaking provinces', did not help improve the situation.¹³ No articles were discussed or negotiated. The treaty was entirely contrary to the policy of the integrity and independence of Turkey, the policy of preserving a compact territory and defensible frontiers. Not only did it detach territories of enormous extent from Turkey, it also imposed upon the territory left to the Turks a strict Allied supervision. If Turkey failed to observe the provisions of the treaty, the Allies could modify these provisions.

10. Paul C. Helmreich., From Paris to Sèvres. The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920. (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974), p. 291.

11. Cmd. 964 (1920) Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920; Helmreich, From Paris To Sèvres, pp. 314-337; G. F. Abbott., Greece and the Allies 1914-1922. (London: Methuen, 1922), p. 221; Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge., Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948. (Geneva, 1950), pp. 21-22; Sir Reader Bullard., Britain and the Middle East. From Earlier Times to 1963. (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp. 81-82; J. C. Hurewitz., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-1956. (Vol. II. New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 81-87.

12. WO32/5737 File No. 0152/5520, July 23, 1920, Admiral de Robeck to the War Office.

13. Ibid.

In a private meeting held with Admiral John Michael de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Istanbul, the Sultan also pressed his points regarding Turkey's need for help and support from Britain rather than the joint assistance of the Allies: 'We had been born up by the hope that we could rely on British assistance in the future. Turkey was sore stricken and her wounds were deep. She needed the helping hand of a friend, if she were to survive.' Robeck Papers, August 23, 1920, De Robeck to Curzon.

Although Istanbul was allowed to remain as the capital under Turkish sovereignty, the Straits would be under the control of an international commission and were to be open both in peace and in war to vessels of commerce or of war. A large area around the city of Izmir was to be administered by Greece, after which it was to be incorporated into Greece if a local parliament and plebiscite so decided. Turkey renounced in favour of Greece its sovereign rights over the whole of Thrace (Trakya) and the islands in the Aegean Sea, namely Imbros and Tenedos, and agreed the Dodecanese should be given to Italy. While Armenia was recognised as a free and independent state with its boundaries determined by the arbitration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas was envisaged, securing for the Kurds the right to appeal for independence to the Council of the League of Nations. All the Arab provinces of the Empire were surrendered, and under the Tripartite Agreement¹⁴ of the same date, August 10 1920, the Empire was divided into zones of influence, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia being placed under the mandates of France and Britain.¹⁵ Moreover the capitulatory regime¹⁶ would continue to exercise a profound effect on all aspects of Ottoman life.

With the presentation of this treaty to the Ottoman government, the Allies believed they had finally reached a solution to the Eastern Question. The survival or total destruction of the Empire now depended upon whether the treaty would be

¹⁴. Cmd. 963, (1920) Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting Anatolia. Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 87-89.

¹⁵. Cmd. 1176, (1921) Draft Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine as submitted for the Approval of the League of Nations.

¹⁶. For centuries the Ottoman Empire had granted financial and judicial concessions to foreigners. While the judicial capitulations placed foreigners outside Turkish civil law and made them subject to the laws of their respective countries, the financial capitulations made foreign business firms independent of Turkish control and exempted foreigners from taxes. After the outbreak of the First World War the Ottoman government unilaterally abolished the capitulations. The Allies refused to recognise this action and sought to reimpose the capitulations in the Treaty of Sèvres. The National Pact, however, had called for their abolition, and this was to be a vital issue at Lausanne. For the history of the Capitulations see: Cmd. 1814, XXVI, Memorandum read by the Turkish delegate at the meeting of December 2, 1922 of the Commission on the regime of Foreigners. Annex. pp. 471-480; Bilsel, Lozan. II, pp. 28-127; Nasim Sousa., The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. Its History, Origin and Nature. (Baltimore: John Hopkins 1933); Philip M. Brown., 'The Capitulations' Foreign Affairs, 1 (June 1923), pp. 71-80.

signed. The rising Nationalist movement in Anatolia put an effective brake on this quick solution; as a consequence of this unrest, although under pressure from the Allies the Ottoman government signed the treaty, the Assembly did not ratify it. The Treaty was bound to cause repercussions in Turkey. It discredited the Istanbul government and helped to increase the popularity of the Nationalists who practically had the support of the whole of Turkey in their categorical protests that the Istanbul delegation did not, in any way, represent the Turkish people and had no authority to conclude a treaty on behalf of Turkey. They expressed their determination to fight in order to avert its realisation; their alternative to this treaty was the National Pact (Misak-i Milli).

British Policy towards the Turkish Question

Traditional British policy towards the Ottoman Empire had been to maintain the independence and integrity of the Empire. Strategic concerns had been the prime motives behind the policy: The Straits, the route to India and the Persian Gulf which Britain had long considered to be within its sphere of influence, Cyprus and the Suez Canal, and keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean to avoid a threat to Britain's eastern empire. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, which had been very close during the nineteenth century, began to cool somewhat towards the end of the century. The Ottoman Empire's participation in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers led Britain to reconsider completely its traditional policy. Britain's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could no longer be maintained by preserving and supporting the Ottoman Empire as the latter was now an enemy power. Britain consequently reversed its policy and sought the partition of the Ottoman Empire.

Secret discussions about the partition of the Ottoman Empire began as early as 1915. During that year the Istanbul Agreement of March 18, 1915 was concluded

between Britain, France and Italy, who all agreed to Russia's possession of Istanbul and the Dardanelles. The Treaty of London, of April 26, 1915 recognised Italy's demands in the Dodecanese and pledged it a share in the eventual disposal of Anatolia. The Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded between Britain and France on May 16, 1916 provided for wide British and French spheres of influence in the Arab territories of the Empire. The agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne of April 17, 1917 gave a sphere of influence to the Italians in the Aegean and the Mediterranean coastline of Anatolia. Finally, by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 Britain favoured the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.¹⁷ In less than two years of war, Britain's policy regarding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was thus totally reversed. Following the Mudros Armistice of 1918, the occupation of various parts of Turkish territory and the encouragement of the Greek occupation of Izmir in May 1919, by virtue of a decision by the Supreme Council based technically on clause 7 of the Armistice,¹⁸ were clear indications of the complete reversal of nineteenth century British policy of support for the existence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹

During the period under consideration British foreign policy was conducted by Conservative or National governments. British policy towards the Middle East immediately after the War was directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lord Curzon), Acting Foreign Secretary from January 1919 and Foreign Secretary proper from October that year, and by the Cabinet Eastern Committee which he had

17. For the text of the treaties see: Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 11-12, 18-22, 25-26.

18. Article 7 gave the Allies the right to occupy any strategic part of the Ottoman Empire in the event of a situation arising which affected their security.

19. Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres, pp. 86-106; F. S. Northedge., The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers, 1916-1939. (London: London School of Economics: G. Bell, 1966), p.131; W. N. Medlicott., British Foreign Policy Since Versailles. (London: Methuen, 1940), p.49; Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.364; Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, pp. 190-199; E. H. Carr., Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War. (London: Longmans, Green, 1939), pp. 50-53, 130-133.

initiated.²⁰ The key to Curzon's Middle Eastern policy was his firmly held belief that British imperial interests in the Middle East could only be ensured by the 'destruction of Turkey as an expansionist power and as the centre of Pan-Islamic feeling.'²¹ Expelling the Turks from Constantinople (Istanbul) was also part of this policy.²² Curzon's desire was shared by Lloyd George, who throughout his administration retained an anti-Turkish bias.

The opposition to Curzon came from the India Office and the War Office. In the India Office, Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, strongly objected to Curzon on the grounds that such treatment of Turkey might offend Muslim feelings in India and subsequently cause unrest. Similarly Sir Henry Wilson was critical of Curzon's stance and suggested that in order to achieve peace in the Middle East Britain 'should make love to the Turks'. Wilson thought it vitally important to get the Turks on the British side and he strongly criticised the Cabinet policy of backing the Greeks in preference to the Turks and the suggestion that the Empire was 'much safer with a hostile Turkey'. He described this attitude as 'an astonishing frame of mind to be in' and urged the Cabinet to establish friendly relations with Mustafa Kemal and Nationalist Turkey.²³ In 1920 it was apparent from Wilson's letters that the government and the army held different opinions on Turkey.²⁴ Wilson insisted that rapprochement with Turkey was necessary,

20. For further information about how British policy towards the Middle East was formulated by various departments see: Helmut Mejcher., 'British Middle East Policy 1917-1921: The Interdepartmental Level' Journal of Contemporary History, 8 (1973), pp. 81-101.

21. Keith Jeffery., British Army and the Crisis of the Empire, 1918-1922. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 40-41.

22. CON12798 Memorandum, (1920). Protest of Lord Curzon against Cabinet Decision to retain the Turks at Constantinople. See also: Elizabeth Monroe., Britain's Moment in the Middle East. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), p.53.

23. Keith Jeffery (ed.), The Wilson Letters. The Military Correspondence of Field Marshall, Sir Henry Wilson, 1918-1922. (Avon, 1985), Nos.: 154, 159, 168 See also John Robert Ferris., The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926. (London, 1989), p. 102.

24. Jeffery, Wilson Letters, No. 164.

otherwise they would have 'a rough time in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Constantinople'.²⁵

Despite urgent warnings from India and the War Office the British government was reluctant to modify its policy, and it took much longer for the British than for the French and Italians to realise that a strong power was emerging in Anatolia, and that in the changed circumstances following the First World War, they would not have the means to impose an imperialist policy on Turkey. 'This is a new Turkey' commented Major-General Charles Townshend criticising the attitude adopted by the government, 'with new aspirations and a wonderful spirit for self sacrifice and liberty; this does not seem to be understood in England'.²⁶

It was only after Woodrow Wilson's refusal²⁷ of an American mandate over Istanbul and the Straits that the British government began to lose interest in the idea of expelling the Turks from Istanbul. British policy was revised and an alternative plan was formulated: that of maintaining the Sultan in Istanbul and of imposing on him the terms of peace which would satisfy the interests of Britain.²⁸ However, the lack of consensus between the Cabinet, the War Office and the India Office, and the diverse and conflicting interests of the Allies which surfaced during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 made it impossible for Britain to settle the Turkish question at Paris. Fresh talks were held between Britain and France in December to establish policy-guidelines for the coming London Conference of February 20 where the partition of Anatolia was further discussed and the occupation of Istanbul was decided.

²⁵. Ibid. No. 159.

²⁶. FO371/7946/E9114/3288/44, July 27, 1922, Memorandum; Townshend's enthusiastic remarks about Turkey and the Turks did not receive a warm welcome in British political circles where he was criticised for favouring the Turkish side. Rumbold called him 'the sort of English counterpart to Pierre Loti or Claude Farrare'. FO800/253 Tu/22/18.

²⁷. The United States had not been involved in the wartime treaties and was not bound by them and its insistence on self determination conflicted with these agreements. Therefore Wilson suggested that the peace settlement should be made under the aegis of the League of Nations.

²⁸. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, pp. 49-50.

After almost a month of debate, on March 16 General Wilson, British Garrison Commander at Istanbul, with the support of an English dominated force, occupied Istanbul. Britain was now militarily and politically in a better position to enforce peace terms in line with its policy considerations. However the final details had yet to be worked out. The San Remo Conference of April 24 1920 provided a platform upon which Britain furthered its objectives by obtaining Mesopotamia and Palestine and concluding an oil agreement with France by which it secured a share of the economic spoils of the Ottoman Empire. On May 11, 1920, the terms of the treaty which three months later was signed at Sèvres, were officially transmitted to the Ottoman government. Britain saw the treaty as the last stage in the realisation of its long planned objectives, Turkey regarded it as the beginning of a lengthy and troublesome struggle which would finally attain the aims it sought.

Turkish Response: The Nationalist Movement

The two years between the Armistice of Mudros and the Treaty of Sèvres witnessed the steady growth of a Nationalist Movement in Anatolia. In 1920 this movement transformed itself into the Grand National Assembly sitting at Ankara and with representatives from many parts of the country.²⁹ Following its inauguration in April 23, 1920 the Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal³⁰ as President

²⁹. The Assembly which was opened on April 23 under the personal guidance of Mustafa Kemal declared itself to be temporarily invested with all powers, both executive and legislative, and it deputed its executive power to a Council of Commissioners, of which Mustafa Kemal himself, as president of the Assembly, became ipso facto the head. Thus did the 'Ankara Government' come into being. The Grand National Assembly claimed to be the sole exponent of the will of people, and it formally denied the right of any other authority to take decisions or enter into agreements involving the destiny of Turkey. Nevertheless, for more than two years, there existed two governments in Turkey, a *de facto* government at Ankara, and the government of the Sultan, which the Allies treated as the *de jure* government, at Istanbul. The latter merely existed in virtue of the Allied occupation and gradually sank into greater impotence and finally, on November 4, three days after the decree of the Grand National Assembly abolishing the Sultanate, Tefvik Pasha, the last of the long succession of Grand Viziers, resigned his office, and Istanbul became a simple administrative district of the new Turkish state.

³⁰. In May 1919, only a few days after the Greek landing in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk, the founder of the Republic) arrived at Samsun on the Black Sea with the title of Inspector General of the 9th Army Corps. From there he began his mission to form a National Movement against the Greek invasion. On his career and role in the Turkish Nationalist Movement see: Lord Kinross., Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation. (London, 1990); Sevkett Sureyya Aydemir., Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal. 1922-1938. (Cilt III, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1981); Bilal Simsir., Ingiliz Belgelerinde Ataturk 1919-1938. (Ankara: Turk

and Commander-in-Chief, appointed a Cabinet and adopted the National Pact- a document which had been drawn up during the Congresses³¹ in Erzurum (July 23-August 6) and Sivas (September 4-11) and which became the fixed basis of Nationalist foreign policy. It consisted of six articles which laid down the principles for the maximum sacrifice which could be made in order to achieve a 'just and lasting peace'. It called for Turkey's complete independence within its new boundaries. Article I recognised that the destinies of the territories populated by an Arab majority should be determined by the free votes of the inhabitants, and declared that the territories inhabited by an 'Ottoman Muslim majority' were indivisible.³² The Pact affirmed the necessity of safeguarding the security of Istanbul and envisaged the opening of the Straits to the commerce of the world. It also confirmed the rights of the minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Allies and the other countries who had been defeated in the War. Finally, it repudiated every suggestion of foreign control in Turkey's political, judicial and financial affairs in order that Turkey's national and economic development should be rendered possible. The National Pact was to become the

Tarih Kurumu Yayinevi, 1973); Bernard Lewis., The Emergence of Modern Turkey. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); H. C. Armstrong., Grey Wolf. (London: A. Barker, 1937); Tevfik Biyiklioglu., Ataturk Anadolu'da 1919-1921. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1959); Kazim Karabekir., Istiklal Harbimiz. (Istanbul, 1960); Tayyip Gokbilgin., Milli Mucadele Baslarken. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1959); Ali Fuat Cebesoy., Milli Mucadele Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Vatan Nesriyat, 1953); Falih Rifki Atay., Cankaya. (Istanbul, 1969); Dagobert Mikusch., Mustafa Kemal. (London, 1931); Erik Jan Zürcher., The Unionist Factor: The Role of Union of Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement, 1905-1926. (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz., The Immortal Ataturk: A Psychobiography. (Chicago, 1984).

³¹. For the Congresses see: FO371/6469/E 5233/1/44, April 27, 1921, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; Serafettin Turan., Kurtulus Savasinda Kongreler. Cumhuriyet'in 50. Yildonumu Semineri. (Ankara, 1975); Ulug Igdemir., Sivas Kongresi Tutanaklari. (Ankara: Ataturk Dil Tarih Yuksek Kurumu, 1986); Mahmud Gologlu., Erzurum Kongresi. (Ankara: Tekin Yayinevi, 1968); Salahi, R. Sonyel., Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Nationalist Movement. (London: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 14-18; Salahi R. Sonyel., Turk Kurtulus Savasi ve Dis Politika. Mondros Birakismasindan Buyuk Millet Meclisi'nin Acilisina Kadar. (Ankara, 1973), pp. 93-107, 122-147; Evans, United States Policy, pp. 185-189; Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 25-26; Mehmet Gonlubol and Cem Sar., Ataturk ve Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi, 1919-1938. (Istanbul, 1963), pp. 6-8; Cebesoy, Milli Mucadele Hatiralari, pp. 156-170; Elaine D. Smith., Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement 1919-1923. (Washington, 1959), pp. 17-18, 19-20.

³². The Mosul Vilayet, with its largely Kurdish population fell ,within this definition.

fixed basis of Nationalist foreign policy and Turkish desiderata in the Lausanne Conference.³³

The Greek landing in Izmir on May 1919 gave the Nationalist Movement enormous impetus and enabled its leaders to canalise their activities and weld the movement into a formidable instrument. 'The Greek occupation of Smyrna has stimulated a Turkish patriotism probably more real than any which the war was able to evoke' commented Admiral John Michael de Robeck, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean in his letter to Curzon, 'and that patriotism has enabled Mustafa Kemal to raise a force which, if he decides to resist the peace terms, might cause the Allies considerable embarrassment.'³⁴ The events leading to their final victory over the Greeks started with the Amasya Declaration of June 18-22 1919, by which the Nationalists decided to establish a resistance movement and set up a government in Anatolia.³⁵ The Amasya Congress constituted a landmark in the Nationalist Movement by proclaiming, for the first time, the independence and indivisibility of the people of Anatolia. It led the way to the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses whereby the movement established itself more firmly and challenged the Istanbul government and the Allies.

³³ Eleanor Bisbee., The New Turks-Pioneers of the Republic 1920-1950. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p.53 Also see: FO371/6469/E5233/1/44; Roderic H. Davison., ' Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne' The Diplomats (ed. by Gordon, A Craig & Felix, Gilbert) ; Joseph C. Grew., Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945. (London: Hammond: Hammond and Co., 1953), p.477-478; Bernard Lewis., The Emergence of Modern Turkey. p. 246; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.350; Temperley, Peace Conference of Paris. (Vol. VI.), pp, 112, 605-606; Arnold J. Toynbee., Survey of International Affairs, 1925: The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement, (Vol. I, London, 1927), pp. 409-492; Kemal Zeki Gencosman., Ihtilal Meclisi. (Istanbul, 1980), pp. 51-52; For the text, see: FO371/7952/195312 E11690/10102/44; CON 11940/426; FO371/7947/E4988/4988/44, Turkey. Annual Report, 1921; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East, pp. 74-75; Tarik Zafer Tunaya., 'Osmanli Imparatorlugundan Turkiye Millet Meclisi Hukumetine Gecis' Devrim Hareketleri Icinde Ataturk ve Ataturkculuk. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981) pp. 181-207; Anderson, The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923. (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), p.173; Arnold Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood., Turkey. (London: E. Benn,1926), pp. 85-86; Medlicott, British Foreign Policy, p.50; Michael Foot., Armistice, 1918-1939. (London, 1940), pp. 74-75.

³⁴ Robeck Papers, November 18, 1919, Admiral de Robeck to Curzon [private letter].

³⁵ For the text of the Declaration see: Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 343-344.

The occupation of Istanbul, the capital, on March 16, 1920 by the Allies, in which mainly British forces were employed, caused outrage among the Nationalists. As Cumming aptly put it: 'The Greek aggression at Smyrna probably did more than any other factor to hasten the nationalist movement in Turkey, and the British action in occupying Constantinople may readily have added the finishing touches'.³⁶ Mustafa Kemal vigorously protested calling it the 'last blow' which was directed against the 'sovereignty and political freedom of the Ottoman nation' and which struck at 'sacred principles such as the sense of freedom, of nationality and of country' as well as the principles of 'modern society and human conscience'.³⁷

Soon after the occupation the Nationalists intensified their efforts to establish the Grand National Assembly, which refused to accept the 'foreign slavery' imposed upon it by the Allies and was determined to fight for full independence. The Assembly, which opened on April 23, 1920 in Ankara, consisted of the deputies of the Ottoman Parliament who had escaped arrest following the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies and of deputies elected from the non-occupied territories of Turkey. After the election of Mustafa Kemal as the President of the Grand National Assembly and the adoption of the National Pact, the Nationalists felt stronger politically. It was now time to change this political power into a military one. The unsuccessful attempts of Britain and its Allies to revise the treaty in January at Paris and in February at London ended all hopes of reaching a compromise by diplomatic means and brought the possibility of a military offensive by the Nationalists. The first and the second battle at Inonu, on January 10 and March 31, 1921, were followed by a decisive battle at Sakarya on August 23, 1921

³⁶ Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, p.125; Feroz Ahmad., The Making of Modern Turkey. (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 48; David Stevenson., The First World War and International Politics.(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 300; Smith, Turkey, pp. 28-29; Major-General Sir Charles Townshend., Great Britain and the Turks' Asia, 22 (December 1922), pp. 949-953.

³⁷ M. Kemal Ataturk., Speech. (Leipzig: Ucdal Pub. Co., 1929), p. 360.

by which the Nationalists were finally able to check the Greek advance and force them to withdraw to the line of the Afyon-Eskisehir railway.

However, prior to the Sakarya battle the Nationalists had come to the conclusion that before they deployed their forces on the Greek front they needed to seek alliances and cultivate good relations with different countries: France and Italy in the West, Russia and the Muslims in the East. The Ankara government was fully aware that in order to protect its limited national interests against possible encroachments and maintain its independence and sovereignty against the Greeks it needed support, and that support seemed likely to be forthcoming from the French and Italians. The French, obsessed by the fear of Muslim troubles in their North African colonies and resentful of the British control of the Straits and British hegemony throughout the Middle East, and the Italians, dissatisfied with their gains from the treaty, were both prepared to have the Sèvres treaty modified. They were also quick to realise that a strong power was emerging in Anatolia and that in the changed circumstances following the First World War, they would not have the means to impose an imperialist policy on Turkey.³⁸ Along with the help of military victory, the enhanced prestige of the Turkish armies and awareness of their counterparts, the Nationalist Foreign Minister Bekir Sami was able to secure a diplomatic success by coming to a preliminary agreement with the French and Italians securing an immediate cessation of hostilities in return for the French evacuation of Cilicia, full recognition of Italian interests in Adalia in return for an immediate evacuation of Italian troops, and an Italian promise of diplomatic support at the forthcoming conference. The agreement of March 11, 1921 between Bekir

³⁸ Stephen E. Evans., The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Ataturk 1919-1938. (London: The Eathen Press, 1982), p. 64; Evans, United States Policy, pp. 351-355.

The General Staff was also of the opinion that 'except on matters where British interests are vitally concerned, there can now be little chance of imposing any conditions upon Turkey, with whom the terms of the new Treaty, unlike those of other treaties with the enemy, will probably now have to be negotiated'. FO371/7952/E11359/10102/44 (2), October 1922, 'Memorandum by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey.'

Sami and Briand, the French Premier, was followed by another agreement with Count Carlo Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, on March 12, 1921.

Italy, far from being satisfied by the post-war settlement, accused Britain and France of having violated the pledges made to Italy in the Treaty of London of 1915 and the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement of 1917, on the basis of which she had fought the war on the side of the Allies. The Tripartite Agreement, in which Britain pledged to Italy the guarantee of certain economic rights in Southern Anatolia, was not enough to prevent an Italo-Turkish collaboration. Benito Mussolini seemed determined to a degree which might sacrifice Allied unity to get some kind of consolation prize for Italy's contribution to the Allied cause during the War. In return for Turkey's recognition of Italy's right of economic exploitation, the Italian government undertook to give effective support to the demands of Ankara with regard to the return to Turkey of Thrace and Izmir, and withdrew their troops earlier in June following their agreement with Ankara.³⁹

Turkey's attempts to create a friendly atmosphere in which it could confidently further its resistance movement were not only limited to its Western links. Probably the greatest asset of the Ankara government on foreign policy was the close accord which had been maintained with Russia.⁴⁰ Turkey's national independence war and the new Nationalist government was warmly welcomed by the Soviet Union, which regarded it as a victory for Turkey, as well as for themselves.⁴¹ As George V. Chicherin, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign

³⁹. Ataturk, Speech, pp. 498- 499; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 101-105; Gotthard Jaeschke., Turk Kurtulus Savasi Kronolojisi; Mondrostan Mudanya'ya Kadar. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), pp. 143-144; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur., Yeni Turkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti. (Istanbul: Milli Mecmua Basimevi, 1924), pp. 82-86; John Darwin., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of the War 1918-1922. (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp: 181-182.

⁴⁰. For speeches of M. Kemal and Aralov see: FO371/7862/E4222/5/44; FO371/7864/E5129/5/44; Bayur, Yeni Turkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti, pp. 67-69; Haluk F. Gursel., Tarih Boyunca Turk-Rus Iliskileri. (Istanbul: Ak Yayinlari, 1968), pp. 186-187.

⁴¹. X. J. Euding and H. H. Fisher., Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927. A Documentary Survey. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), No. 43.

Affairs, saw it, 'in the struggle against foreign invasion and the creation of a national government by Mustafa Kemal the Soviet Republic served as a political and moral beacon in the life-and-death of these people.'⁴² Ankara felt the urge for and the necessity of closer links with the Bolsheviks and on March 16, 1921 signed a treaty of friendship which confirmed the official cordiality existing between the two countries. Despite its suspicion of Russian motives Turkey could not afford to allow its political 'accord' with Russia to disintegrate in the face of expected British opposition. The guiding spirits of both sides attached the utmost value to continued co-operation and desired to avoid anything in the nature of a rupture. The relations between Ankara and Moscow were at the time in the nature of a *mariage de convenance*. The Russians realised that the unsettled state of affairs in the Near East was detrimental to Allied interests and was a source of anxiety to the Allies. It was in the interest of the Soviet government that hostilities in Anatolia should be prolonged. They were willing with this object to furnish arms, munitions, and money for, as frequently pronounced, 'the joint struggle against the Imperialism of the West'.⁴³ On the other hand, the Ankara government, deprived of the possibility of procuring a steady supply of materials from Europe, had necessarily to turn to Russia. So long as Turkey had need of Soviet money and military equipment, the Russian alliance was the key stone of Ankara's foreign policy. Ankara, however continued to pursue a policy of great caution towards Russia. It never abandoned its liberty of action, and in its dealings with Russia friction was never wholly absent. Despite the currents of suspicion and lack of confidence, the official attitude overall continued to be amicable up until the Lausanne Conference, when Turkey steered itself clear from the results of over-close collaboration with Russia. The fact remains that in her diplomatic dealings Turkey, with a degree of success, oscillated between Russia and the West.

⁴². Ibid. No. 43.

⁴³. FO371/7947/E4988/4988/44, Confidential 11940, Turkey Annual Report 1921.

The Nationalists also managed to keep on cordial terms with the Muslim world, which could give at least moral or sometimes diversionary support against the other two worlds with which they dealt. During the 1919 War of Liberation, the Grand National Assembly's appeal for support seemed to be successful in upholding the Caliphate against the Christian world and encouraged the Nationalists to extend their efforts in the direction of establishing formal alliances with the Muslim world. The treaty of March 1, 1921 with Afghanistan⁴⁴ was a clear manifestation of a desire to form an alliance 'against attacks by an Imperialistic power'. By this treaty the Turks recognised the independence of Afghanistan in return for Afghan recognition of the leadership of Turkey and each country undertook not to conclude any treaty or convention injurious to the interests of the other party. Though Mustafa Kemal never committed himself to any pan-Islamic cause, he realised that breaking ties with a potential ally could create difficulties at a critical juncture. He was well aware that the tremendous support he enjoyed from the Muslims of India during the liberation war had constituted a complementary if not a determining factor in his victory against the Great Powers. It was an element which he could not afford to ignore in his policy considerations.

The Ankara government, whose position was strengthened following its diplomatic and military achievements, was now ready to deliver a major blow to the Allied ranks by concluding a decisive agreement with the French government. On October 20, 1921 Franklin- Bouillon, French Senator and the former President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the Senate, and Yusuf Kemal, the Turkish

44. The relations of the Nationalists with Afghanistan were regulated by the Treaty of Alliance concluded between the representatives of the two countries at Moscow on March 1, 1921. The treaty was ratified by Ankara on July 21, 1921, but ratification by Afghanistan was delayed until October 1922. In the meantime, each country sent diplomatic representatives to the capital of the other and the friendship and solidarity of the two peoples were publicly proclaimed. But most important of all, in the treaty, the spiritual leadership of Turkey was recognised by a Muslim country which scored a real success for Ankara over the Istanbul government. FO371/7947/E4988/4988/44, Turkey. Annual Report, 1921; CON 11940/426; FO371/9176/E10937/10937/44, Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; CON 12315/729; Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 30-31.

Foreign Minister who replaced Bekir Sami, signed the Ankara accord,⁴⁵ also known as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. The accord was highly significant since it was the greatest Nationalist diplomatic victory to date. Not only did it signal the recognition of the *de facto* Ankara government by a Western Power, it was also the first open and public breach in the Allied front in the Near East. The breach was never repaired. Though the unity of the Allied Powers was repeatedly proclaimed and reaffirmed, it was never more than superficial, and constantly failed to stand the test when any strain was imposed on it.⁴⁶

Turkey's hitherto successful efforts to establish closer links with its war-time opponents failed, however, when it approached Britain in March 1922. Despite its constant assurances of a desire for an understanding with Britain, Turkey was unable to receive a positive response. Foreign Minister of the Ankara government, Yusuf Kemal, in a meeting with Curzon, explained that there was no incompatibility between the interests of Turkey and those of Britain and that Turkey asked no more than the fulfilment of the National Pact. Curzon, however, was not prepared to compromise and the negotiations proved inconclusive. Although Mustafa Kemal was convinced that there was little chance of coming to terms with Britain, he nevertheless decided to send yet another mission to London before he

45. N. Ulug., 'Milli Mucadele'de Turk-Fransiz Munasebetleri' Hayat Tarih Mecmuasi, 10 (1972), pp. 23-29; Sabahattin Selek., Anadolu Ihtilali, II (Istanbul, 1966), pp. 282-293; Yahya Akyuz., Turk Kurtulus Savasi ve Fransiz Kamuoyu, 1919-1922. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), pp. 278-285; Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, pp. 141-142.

46. The British were alarmed at the friendship between the Turks and the French. Different voices from different parts of the Empire were united against the possible consequences of this agreement and the rising tide of anti-French feeling was reflected in their remarks. From the British army headquarters in Istanbul, General Harington wrote to Wilson that he was 'worried and angry about France making a separate agreement with Turkey'. 'The French do not seem to be playing straight with us in their dealings with the Kemalists' commented Haldane, who at the time was General Officer Commanding in Chief in Mesopotamia. Wilson was even more critical of the agreement and accused Lloyd George of not having the 'slightest intention of doing anything except backing the Greeks and losing India and Egypt.' Jeffery, The Wilson Letters, Nos. 188, 200, 224.

The controversy between England and France over the Franklin-Bouillon agreement originated from the fact that with this agreement France established economic and political influence over the new nationalist government. As Cumming rightly pointed out, 'the French, pursuing their own aims and ambitions in the Near East, were perfectly aware of the British aspirations in the same area,' and yet seemed 'willing to face the implications of a complete break-down of the Entente'. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry, p. 149. In the years to follow the dissatisfaction came to a point where both sides expressed their feelings freely and the breach between the two became too wide to be bridged.

launched his counter-offensive on the Greek front. Led by Fethi Okyar, the Minister of the Interior, to London in August 1922 this mission was intended to continue from where Yusuf Kemal had left off. Mustafa Kemal expressed Fethi Okyar's objectives in the following lines:

'I have decided to launch soon the counter- offensive. But my purpose is to prove to my own country and to the world that we still want peace, if it can be obtained on the terms of the National Pact. We know that the British will refuse such terms, but world opinion must be openly informed about our case. This is the sense of your London mission. Another objective is to gain time and deceive the English and the Greeks into thinking that we are still trying to reach agreement with them.'⁴⁷

Several attempts by Fethi Okyar to see Curzon ended in failure although he was seen by various Foreign Office officials, namely Ronald Lindsay and William Tyrell. After a short while the Nationalists became convinced that the mission was far from achieving its objective, that is the cessation of hostilities and conclusion of peace. The Ankara government was left with no choice but to adopt a military solution, and the counter-offensive began on August 26, 1922. Having established its position and struck a blow against the Eastern policies of the Allies, the Ankara government was now able to concentrate its efforts in the pursuit of two objectives: To expel the Greeks from Anatolia and to obtain the principles of the National Pact.

Greek Defeat: The Turning Point

The Greek occupation of Izmir in 1919 altered the course of Middle Eastern history and completely reversed the post-war situation in the Near East. It brought about war between the Greeks and the Turks, ended all hope of Allied co-operation

⁴⁷ Osman Okyar., 'Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to London' Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations. Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs. (Beverly: Eothen, 1984), (ed. by W. Hale and Ali I. Bagis) p. 71.

in the Middle East, and contributed more than any other factor to the rise and the success of Mustafa Kemal and Turkish nationalism.⁴⁸

The military resistance of Turkey, enabling Britain to conduct its partition plan, produced the collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor in September 1922 and jeopardised the military position of the Allies in the Near East. The Turkish advance into Izmir and the neutral zone around the Straits led Britain to revise its policy. The Commander-in Chief in the Mediterranean was aware of the gravity of the situation. 'It is urgently necessary that negotiations be opened with Turkish (? forces) in Smyrna,' he wrote in a secret telegram sent to the Admiralty on September 8, 1922. 'But the Greek authorities are unwilling...This is the only chance in my opinion of preventing catastrophe in (? Smyrna).'⁴⁹

But not everyone agreed about the actions to be taken. 'Kemalism would receive an enormous accession of prestige in Islamic countries,' wrote Andrew Ryan, political adviser in the British Embassy in Istanbul, on February 1922 in a memorandum. Therefore no stone should be left unturned to discourage the Greeks from evacuating Asia Minor precipitately, an appeal being made to the interest of the Christians in Asia Minor and their own interests in Thrace; and every effort should be made to accelerate a general settlement of which the eventual evacuation of Asia Minor would form part'.⁵⁰

⁴⁸. Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p.195; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F112/223 ff. 14-16, November 3, 1922, Allenby to Curzon; Karl G. Laren., 'Great Britain and the Greco-Turkish War 1921-1922.' The Historian, 35 (1973), pp. 256-270; Abe Attrep., 'A State of Wretchedness and Impotence: A British View of Istanbul and Turkey, 1919' International Journal of Middle East Studies 9 (1978), pp 1-9. For more information on Turco-Greek relations see: M.E. Yapp., The Making of the Modern East, 1792-1923 (1987); Michael L. Smith., Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922. (London: Allen Lane, 1981); Sukru S. Gurel., Tarihsel Boyut Icinde Turk Yunan Iliskileri. (Ankara: Umit Yayincilik, 1993); Baskin Oran., Turk Yunan Iliskilerinde Bati Trakya Sorunu. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991);Tevfik Biyiklioglu., Trakya'da Milli Mücadele (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1955); Stefanos Yerasimos., 'Turk Yunan Iliskileri: Mitler ve Gercekler.' Turk Yunan Uvuzmazligi (comp S. Vaner, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1990); E. Goldstein., 'Great Britain and the Greater Greece, 1917-1920'. The Historical Journal, 32, no.2 (1989), pp. 339-56.

⁴⁹. WO106/1440 The Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean to the War Office, September 8, 1922.

⁵⁰. WO32/5658 No. 0145/1144, February 9 1922, Ryan to the War Office. Memorandum Respecting the Evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek Troops. FO371/7855/E1547/5/44.

Ryan's view however was not shared by the General Staff. 'The crisis appears to be approaching' pointed out Earl of Derby, the Secretary of State for War in a memorandum of July 28, 1922. 'It is the opinion of the General Staff that, standing alone, the British troops have an impossible task if attacked either by the Greeks or Turks; the task is not much lightened even if the French and Italians give their whole-hearted support with their available troops on the spot'.⁵¹ He added that an 'assurance' should be obtained from both the French and Italians that they would give to General Charles Harington their 'unqualified support' in any operations, whether against Greeks or Turks, that he might be compelled to undertake. Horace Rumbold, British High Commissioner in Istanbul, stated his opinion in a telegram to the War Office on September 14, 1922, in which he asserted that this was the best moment to put forward proposals for a conference since such a conference would at least give them 'breathing space'.⁵²

While the crisis was approaching Britain found itself more and more isolated in its policy towards the Turkish Question. Britain was aware that the French were not the most reliable partners. 'We cannot trust the French one inch in the present situation,' wrote Rumbold in a secret telegram to the War Office, expressing his concern.⁵³ Highly accurate Intelligence Reports supported Rumbold's suspicion. 'In French circles generally, considerable satisfaction is expressed in regard to the Greek defeat' stated a report dated September 13, 1922 'and there is a widespread conviction that this will lead to a collapse of British policy in the Near East, which, with the triumph of M. Poincaré in the matter of Reparations⁵⁴, will eventually lead to the fall of Lloyd George, and the general triumph of French policy throughout Europe'.⁵⁵ It was also stated in the report that

⁵¹. WO32/5659 No. 0145/1160, July 28, 1922, General Staff Report on the Situation in Anatolia.

⁵². WO106/1505 File No. 82, September 14, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.

⁵³. Ibid.

⁵⁴. See: Chapter III, p. 46.

⁵⁵. WO106/ 1505 No. 864, September 13, 1922, SIS Report, Eastern Summary.

Kemalist representatives in Rome had received a communication from Ankara to the effect that the Nationalist Government had received from Colonel Mougin an assurance that 'France was prepared to supply the Kemalist army with any war material which might be required, however long the campaign against the Greeks might last'.

Another Secret Intelligence Report⁵⁶ of September 12, 1922 confirmed the suspicion of British officials about the French position. According to the report, Ankara delegates were assured by Briand, the former French premier, that 'France would prevent Constantinople (Istanbul) from falling into the hands of the British, or of the Greeks' whom he characterised as the "vassals of the British". Briand also stated that, 'should the Greeks attempt to march on Constantinople he would place the French troops in Syria at the disposal of the Turks'. In this connection, when Turkish official Fethi Bey inquired of the Quai d'Orsay officials as to the extent to which the Ankara government could count on the promise of the former premier, he received an assurance that 'France would abide by her word, whether seconded by Italy or not, and that she had no intention of compromising the strong position which she held towards the Moslem world, or of falling into the error, which she had committed in 1882, of allowing the British to acquire Egypt and the Canal, which would be repeated if Great Britain obtained a mastery over Constantinople or the Straits, either directly or through the Greeks.'

As far as the Italian attitude was concerned the situation, once again, seemed to be in favour of the Turks. 'Whole sentiment is enthusiastically pro-Turkish', wrote Sir Ronald Graham in a secret telegram sent to the Foreign Office on September 12. There was 'complete unanimity in demanding that the Italian government should dissociate itself from British policy which is stigmatised as refusal to face facts... The press', he continued, 'makes it clear that public opinion

⁵⁶. WO106/1505 No. 862, September 12, 1922, SIS Report, Eastern Summary.

might favour a diplomatic middle course but would scarcely tolerate Italian participation in active measures against Turkey'.⁵⁷ Graham himself was openly critical about the Greeks, calling them 'useless as guardians of the Straits', and sought an alternative answer to the Russian threat by suggesting that 'the Turks could be trusted to execute mandate faithfully and to put up defence against Bolshevik or any other kind of Russia.'⁵⁸

It was clearly apparent that there was a diversity of views within British ruling circles as to the policy to be followed. The natural outcome of this diversity manifested itself in the interaction of the parties involved; relations between the war time allies, already strained by differences on Greek policy, continued to cool and came near to breaking point over the Chanak affair.

Chanak: Unwanted Crisis

When the final victory came with the recapture of Izmir, Mustafa Kemal's popularity with the army, and consequently the strength of his position in Ankara, was undeniably enhanced. Although the British Cabinet became concerned that any withdrawal in the face of Mustafa Kemal's troops would cause irreparable loss of prestige on the Allied side, this position was not supported by the French and Italians, so that no effective help was likely to be forthcoming from them.⁵⁹ All semblance of Allied unity disappeared on September 19th, when French troops, followed by the Italians, withdrew their detachments from Chanak and the Asiatic

⁵⁷. WO106/1505 Secret, September 12, 1922, Graham to the War Office.

⁵⁸. WO106/1505 Secret, September 10, 1922, Graham to the War Office.

⁵⁹. Mss. Eur F112/199, 200b, September 18, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon; Mss Eur F112/199 200b, September 17, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon; Mss Eur F112/199, 200b, , May 5, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon; FO371/9176/E 10937/10937/44; Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; CON 12315/729.

shore of the Bosphorus, thus leaving the British to face the Turks should they made the attempt to cross the demilitarised zones.⁶⁰

Of the Allied Powers, Britain was now isolated in its Turkish policy and it was about to suffer the consequences at Chanak.⁶¹ Owing to premature publicity and failure to consult their governments in advance, the Dominions were also unenthusiastic and even uncooperative. After an exceptionally stormy scene in Paris, serious accusations were exchanged between Raymond Poincaré, the French Prime Minister, and Curzon. 'I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a scene', wrote Curzon upon Poincaré's behaviour 'behaving like a demented school master screaming at a guilty school boy.'⁶² In a letter to Crewe he would describe him as a man 'whose mind and nature were so essentially small, or whose temper was under such imperfect control'.⁶³ For a few weeks Anglo-French relations reached a pitch of bitterness which resulted in the breakdown of their precarious unity. Nevertheless, the presence of a Greek army in Thrace, combined with British determination to mobilise the strength of the Empire, made possible the British stand at Chanak.

⁶⁰. CON12344/444, Lindley to Curzon, September 18, 1922; DBFP, XVIII, No. 34; FO371/E9507/27/44; Rumbold to Hardinge, September 20, 1922 CON12344/487; Rumbold to Hardinge, September 20, 1922, CON12344/486; Poincaré's letter CON12344/601; DBFP, XVIII, No. 36. FO371/E9587/27/44; DBFP, XVIII, No. 35; FO371/E9593/E9594/27/44; FO371/7887/E9207/27/44; WO32/5742 No. 0152/6411; Briton C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia 1918-1922. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), p.347.

⁶¹. For further information on Chanak see David Walder., The Chanak Affair. (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Busch., Mudros to Lausanne: p.347; Winston Churchill., The World Crisis: The Aftermath . (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929), pp. 395-396; Charles Harington., Tim Harington Looks Back. (London: J. Murray, 1940), pp. 100-112; Robert Blake., The Decline of Power 1915-1964. (London: Granada, 1986), pp. 98-99; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, pp. 239-241. Evans, United States Policy, pp. 385-387; Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East, pp. 232-237; Sir Charles Petrie., Diplomatic History 1713-1933. (London: Hollis and Carter, 1946), pp. 336-337; Charles L. Mowat., Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940. (London: Methuen, 1955), pp. 116-119; Robert R. James., Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900-1939. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 141-147; D. L. Shuttleworth., 'Turkey from Armistice to the Peace' Journal of the Central Asian Society, 11 (1924), pp. 51-67; Charles Harington., 'Mudania and Chanak, 1922' Quarterly Review, 275 (October 1940), pp. 277-290; J. G. Darwin., 'The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet.' History, 65 (1980), pp. 32-48.

⁶². CAB24/139 CP. 4213, Hardinge to the Foreign Office, September 22, 1922 No. 472; FO424/254; CON12344/563.

⁶³. Mss Eur F112/201a, Curzon Papers, February 20, 1922, Curzon to Crewe, (Private letter).

The Chanak Crisis could be assessed as a means of testing each other's determination. The correspondence reveals that neither the British nor the Turks were willing to convert open hostilities into a war. Throughout the crisis Britain's aims were to preserve as much as possible of the Treaty of Sèvres, to retain its freedom to use the Dardanelles and to maintain British prestige. For the British it was an operation carried out to save face. 'We do not wish the position to arise of British troops alone being in Chanak and forced to evacuate, either after being called upon to do so by some public declaration on part of Kemal' wrote the War Office in their secret telegram of September 11 to General Harington in Istanbul 'or after a military threat on his part'.⁶⁴ As early as the summer of 1922, General Charles Harington, the Commander-in Chief of British troops in Turkey, was already of the opinion that from the financial and military point of view it was not practical to be in occupation of Istanbul. In his letter of June 3 to General Cavan, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, while questioning the role and usefulness of the Allied forces of occupation, he set forth some very powerful arguments in support of his wish to withdraw, which was heartily supported by Cavan. 'As a purely military position', he concluded 'we are too weak to enforce our will, and we are too strong merely to show the flag'.⁶⁵

However, Prime Minister Lloyd George was inclined to think that any display of weakness to the matter would cause irreparable damage to British prestige. 'If we stated under no condition would you resist and Mustapha Kemal sees it, if you give that impression abroad, believe me, it is very bad', he declared on September 21. 'One chance of stopping the war', he added, 'is for Mustapha Kemal to know that we are not going to be turned out of the Straits. If he knows that he won't go there...If he believes that the nation is divided on the subject and that he is getting encouragement to go on, he will be very likely to pursue a warlike

⁶⁴. WO106/1505 Secret, September 11, 1922, War Office to General Harington.

⁶⁵. WO32/5738 File No. 0152/6106, June 13, 1922, Cavan to Curzon.

policy'.⁶⁶ Upon Lord Charles Hardinge's proposal for the mutual evacuation by the British and Turks of the neutral zone, the Prime Minister was adamant that if they were to retire from Chanak Britain would be in a 'very weak position' and would have made a 'concession which would render it very difficult for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to maintain the British position at the forthcoming conference'.⁶⁷

Since the Cabinet believed that Britain could achieve its aims only through the presence of force, it was willing to run the risk of war to do so despite the fact that it did not want war. Therefore it was not surprising to see the Cabinet decision on September 29 ordering General Harington that 'unless the Turks withdrew at once from the neutral zone around Chanak' all the forces at his disposal - naval, military, aerial - were to attack.⁶⁸ The belligerent and uncompromising instructions of the Cabinet originated from the fear expressed by the Duke of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for Colonies, that 'there could be no greater blow to British prestige than the hurried evacuation of Chanak in face of Turkish threats'⁶⁹. Moreover, it was precisely General Harington who requested authority to deliver such an ultimatum and the Cabinet came to believe that the Chanak would fall unless this were done. The Cabinet was convinced that the Turks were under severe pressure by the Russians to attack Chanak at once. 'There is absolute proof from usual secret sources that utmost pressure is being brought by Soviet representative at (?Angora) to induce M. Kemal to attack neutral zones,'⁷⁰ Rumbold informed the War Office in his telegram of September 28, 1922.

⁶⁶. CAB24/ 139 No. 4219 'Situation in the Near East'. Speech delivered by Lloyd George at the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.

⁶⁷. CAB23/39 No. 149 Secret, September 27, 1922, Minutes of Conference of Ministers.

⁶⁸. Martin Gilbert., Sir Horace Rumbold - Portrait of a Diplomat 1869-1941. (London: Heinemann, 1973), p.268.

⁶⁹. CAB23/ 39 No. 141, September 20, 1922.

⁷⁰. WO106/1440, September 28, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office; FO371/7895/E10147/27/44.

The Cabinet knew that they did not have much time to deliver the ultimatum which was believed to be the only option to prevent the Turks from advancing. Despite the fact that all indications (such as the disapproval of public opinion, the opposition of Indian Muslims, the question of Mosul, the lack of Allied unity) were against taking such a decision, it was insisted that the ultimatum should be delivered. In the General Staff's consideration Britain's position was a 'gigantic bluff'. It was ready to take the risk since the Cabinet realised that British forces could not prevent Turkish ones from rapidly seizing Istanbul, Britain's greatest diplomatic asset. Had Chanak fallen Britain would have lost men, prestige and the ability to use the Dardanelles. Britain's main interest at that time was the establishment and maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, and only to secure that object was she prepared to use force. 'If necessary Britain was prepared to fight', wrote Ferris, 'but its real aim was to show resolution so as to deter war and to force the Turkish nationalists to the negotiating table. This was the best possible policy and one which Bonar Law's government adopted'.⁷¹

As for Turkey, it was a display of her military strength and of determination which Ankara believed would put it in a stronger position in the coming peace negotiations at Mudania and eventually at Lausanne. Mustafa Kemal felt very strongly the necessity to secure the peace immediately in order to be able to proceed with his projects for internal reconstruction which he had long been planning. It was an urgent question for him since he was facing severe criticism from the Grand National Assembly for stopping the advance of the victorious army at Chanak.⁷² General Harington, with the calm confidence of a man who knew the

⁷¹ Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategic Policy*, p.119.

⁷² FO371/7910/E12311/27/44, November 8, 1922, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

* Mustafa Kemal's letter to the British Government stating that Turkey was not at war with it was sufficient evidence to show Turkey's conciliatory attitude. His later meeting with the French High Commissioner, General Pellé, in Izmir, where Mustafa Kemal emphasised that Turkey wanted no more than the National Pact and wished to avoid conflict with the Allies, was another indication of the desire for peace on the part of Turkey. This was also indicated in a secret telegram, communicated on October 1, 1922 to the War Office by Lord Hardinge in which Poincaré revealed to him that he had information from Franklin-Bouillon stating that the total halt of Turkish troops was "due solely to personal authority of

situation on the spot, was well aware of the fact that Mustafa Kemal did not want* to attack the British and believed that a conference with him would be advisable. The intentions of the Turks were understood to be conciliatory.⁷³ Mustafa Kemal had already moved to remove the misunderstandings on September 13th by his letter to the British government asserting that Turkey was not at war with Britain; he later told General Maurice Pellé in Izmir that he wanted no more than the National Pact and wished to avoid conflict with the Allies. In his message to General Harington on September 28, he declared that he had issued orders to the commander at the front for his troops at Chanak to enter again the localities they were occupying, but that they were to avoid provoking any incident. 'In the event of your allowing the withdrawal of the forces at present on the Asiatic side, following the example of the French and Italian troops,' Mustafa Kemal continued, 'I am ready to give orders forthwith to our forces which are on the shores of the Straits to retire slightly and to content themselves with the re-establishment of a civil and police administration'.⁷⁴

Mustafa Kemal's decision not to attack the neutral zone was not only limited to a desire for an immediate peace. The reluctance of the Soviets to be involved directly in the conflict on the side of the Turks also played a significant role. Shortly after the launching of the Turkish offensive Ankara had sent an urgent communication to Moscow on the subject of Russian intervention. However, it failed to invoke active Soviet assistance in the matter. The absence of definite promises of Russian military assistance was primarily due to a distrust of Turkish motives, with regard to the relations between Ankara and Paris, and with regard to pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic schemes detrimental to Russian interests. Secondly, it

M. Kemal, whose desire for peace was absolutely sincere." WO106/1506, October 1, 1922 Secret, Hardinge to the War Office.

Soon after the Mudania Convention Ismet Pasha's letter to General Harington once more reflected the general desire for peace. 'I sincerely and ardently hope', wrote Ismet Pasha concluding his letter, 'that the work we did together may be prelude leading to organisation of countries to an eternal peace.' WO106/1427 No. 1009, October 24, 1922, Harington to the War Office.

⁷³. Mss Eur F112/226a, ff. 52-53, March 14, 1922, Curzon Papers; Mss Eur F112/199, 200b, October 2, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon, Curzon Papers.

⁷⁴. WO106/1506 September 28, 1922, Mustafa Kemal to Harington.

was due to differences of opinion among Soviet leaders and fear that active Russian intervention would nullify the effects of Soviet endeavours to obtain recognition from the Western Powers by diplomatic means.⁷⁵ The question will remain open to speculation as to whether the outcome would have been different in the event of a favourable reply had been received.

In the meantime, Rumbold and Harington, with this assurance that no offensive was likely to be forthcoming from the Turks, held back the ultimatum and proceeded with their own negotiations with them and were assured that the Ankara government intended to reply to the Paris note of September 23⁷⁶ (inviting the Turks to a conference on the affairs of the Near East) within a few days. But to induce Mustafa Kemal to accept, a sop had to be provided: the three Allied governments declared that they were prepared to admit the restoration of Thrace, as far as the Maritza (Merik) river, and Adrianople (Edirne) to Turkey, provided that during the peace negotiations the Turks did not invade the neutral zones and on the understanding that, with a view to the maintenance of peace, certain zones in Turkish territory would be demilitarised in order effectively to assure the freedom of the Straits and the protection of the minorities. On October 1 the Turks agreed to meet the Allies at Mudania (Mudanya), a small port on the Sea of Marmara.⁷⁷

The object of the conference was to bring the Greco-Turkish hostilities to an end and to fix a line behind which the Greek army in Thrace was to retire. Negotiations had not proceeded very far before it became apparent that there were very fundamental disagreements between the two sides on the question of Thrace.

⁷⁵. FO371/7899/E10515/27/44, (secret) October 4, 1922, Memorandum 'Soviet Russia and the Near Eastern Crisis'; FO371/7893, September 22, 1922, Secret Intelligence Service Report.

⁷⁶. FO371/7893/E9955/27/44; CAB24/139/CP.4238; FO371/9176/E10937/10937/44, CON 12315/729 Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; Harington, Harington Looks Back, p.119; Lord Vansittart The Mist Procession. (London: Hutchinson, 1958), pp. 290-291.

⁷⁷. Martin Gilbert., Winston S. Churchill. (Vol. IV, Part 3) Documents April 1921-November 1922. (London, 1977), pp. 2074-2075; Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol., The Turkish Empire. From 1288 to 1914. (London: Dood, Mead, 1924), pp. 418-424; Omer Kurkcuoglu., Turk-Ingiliz Iliskileri 1919-1926. (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1978), pp. 230-249.

Turkey proceeded to demand that the whole of Eastern Thrace, including Karagatch (Karaagac), a suburb of Adrianople, should be handed over in full sovereignty to Turkey at once, without awaiting the decision of the Peace Conference, and should be evacuated by all the Allied commissions and contingents within thirty days. The Allied unity which was newly established by Curzon's second visit to Paris on October 6 undoubtedly served to defeat the Kemalists' demands for the immediate occupation of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace; however, Turkish sovereignty over Istanbul and the Straits, still in British hands, was recognised. Finally, after days of tension and threat of war, the crisis was over and on October 11, agreement was reached.

Later, in a despatch to the War Office General Harington expressed his 'appreciation' of the way in which Ismet Pasha (Ismet Inonu), the Turkish General, had carried out the negotiations. 'Though reserved at first,' he added, 'from the moment his suspicions were removed our relations became quite friendly'.⁷⁸ Thus the Mudania Conference, which opened on October 3, resulted in the Convention being signed on October 11, and coming into force at midnight on October 14. In addition to terminating the Turco-Greek war, the Mudania Convention laid down that the Greek troops should retire within a period of fifteen days behind the River Maritza, the right bank of which should be occupied by the Allied contingents so as to form a buffer until the final conclusion of peace. The Greeks were to be withdrawn from Eastern Thrace within a period of thirty days after the evacuation of the troops and their place was to be taken by the Turks. The Allies were to control the transfer of authority and ensure the maintenance of order. The conclusion of the Convention put an end to a situation full of dangerous possibilities and brought peace, if not the peace.

⁷⁸. WO32/5743 File No. 0152/6411, Harington to the War Office, October 20, 1923.

These days of late September and early October were crucial ones for the peace of Europe. Britain's position and intentions were based on the principle of Allied unity, appealing definitely for French support, since it was clear that no peaceful solution of the Eastern Question was possible unless England, France and Italy were in agreement. However, Curzon's visit to Paris to confer with Poincaré and Count Sforza proved of little success. Poincaré defended the French withdrawal from Chanak on the grounds that the French government had never been a party to French military action south of the Straits and that the French commander in Istanbul had acted "ultra vires". The position of the French government was that though the warning to Mustafa Kemal was serious, it was not an ultimatum, and that it was both 'a moral and physical impossibility for France to resist the Turks if they advanced, and that French public opinion would not admit of a shot being fired against Turks'.⁷⁹ However, despite the heated nature of the Franco-Italo-British conversations, some progress was made towards an accord and after discussions which lasted for several days and were at times acrimonious, Allied unity was patched up on the basis of a compromise. The Mudania conference, however, held in accordance with the Paris decision, found French and British policy still at cross purposes and the manifold problems involved were settled only with the greatest difficulty.⁸⁰

British opinion was inclined to think that the presence of Franklin-Bouillon was to blame for the difficulty of the negotiations. The agreement strengthened the Ankara government politically, for not only had that government recovered the Province of Cilicia, but most importantly it had made a treaty with one of the principal Allied Powers. 'Franklin Bouillon's personal influence and intervention with Mustapha Kemal,' stated Hardinge, British ambassador at Paris, in a private and secret telegram to the Foreign Office, 'have been prejudicial to British interests.

⁷⁹. WO106/1503 Secret, Hardinge to the War Office, September 20, 1922.

⁸⁰. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry*, p. 181.

In his anxiety to be set up as a peace maker he has probably offered Turks more than Great Britain and perhaps even France is prepared to give'.⁸¹ In the words of George Glasgow, political correspondent for *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 'British uneasiness arose from the fact that nothing was known as to the status or instructions of Franklin Bouillon'.⁸² That scene over Chanak had left its ineradicable memories, and the *Entente Cordiale* had become the *Rupture Cordial*.⁸³ It was thus in a state of mutual distrust and foreboding that France and Great Britain faced the opening of the long-deferred peace conference to settle their problems in the Near East.⁸⁴ In the face of so many political uncertainties, it seemed obvious that Turkey could not declare victory and Britain could admit defeat once it was decided that a state of war did not exist between Britain and Turkey.

In terms of international relations the Chanak Crisis had two significant outcomes: First, it revealed how delicate and flimsy Allied unity was, and, second, being a contributory cause to the fall of Lloyd George, it raised hopes for a long-lasting peace in the Middle East. The Chanak failure contributed to the fall of Lloyd George and led to the Mudania Convention of 11 October 1922, which in turn led to the Treaty of Lausanne.

The fall of Lloyd George and the break up of the coalition government were, in Medlicott's words, 'the direct results of anxieties engendered or symbolised by the Chanak Crisis'.⁸⁵ Four days after the Mudania Convention came into force, on October 19, Conservative MP's meeting at the Carlton Club decided to withdraw their support from Lloyd George's coalition. Bonar Law's letter to the

81. WO106/1506, September 25, 1922, Hardinge to the Foreign Office; Mss Eur F112/199. 200a, November 6, 1921, Hardinge to Curzon.

82. Mss. Eur. F112/199; 200b November 12, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon.

83. John Connell., *The Office: A study of British Foreign Policy and its Makers 1919-1951*. (London: Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 49; Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry*, pp. 141-161; For early war period, see: John Marlowe., *Perfidious Albion. The Origin of Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant*. (London: Elek, 1971).

84. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry*, p. 185.

85. Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 42.

Times on October 6 was a reflection of his and his colleagues' profound anxiety about the government's foreign policy, which they thought highly perilous. It was by implication a warning that Bonar Law was not prepared to support a policy of intervention abroad on issues which had no direct connection with British interests. In other words, although he was ready to support the government for defying the Turks single-handedly at Chanak, he viewed with great doubt the wisdom of the policy which had made such action necessary.⁸⁶ 'We cannot act as the policemen of the world,' he wrote in his letter 'the financial and social condition of this country makes that impossible'.⁸⁷

The Chanak crisis had confirmed them in their distrust of his policies and fear of his methods. Lord Curzon, his Foreign Secretary and his severest critic during the crisis, had already resigned over his 'irresponsible' speech delivered at Manchester, on October 14, during which the Prime Minister, to quote Ronaldshay was, 'in the highest spirit and the most bellicose mood'.⁸⁸ The eve of a peace conference in which a victorious and self assertive Turkish government had to be coaxed to a reasonable settlement and to which the French must also be a party was an ill-chosen moment to denounce the barbarous excesses of the Turks and the perfidy of the French government.⁸⁹ 'On the evening of a conference at which I should probably be charged with the task of making peace with a victorious Turkish army and an exultant Turkish nation,' wrote Curzon, 'he [Lloyd George] based his entire defence of the recent action of H.M.G. upon the desire to save Constantinople and Thrace from the bloody shambles of a Turkish massacre. He openly flouted the Turkish people. He once again flouted the French.'⁹⁰ Coming on top of many other

⁸⁶. Robert Blake., The Unknown Prime Minister - The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 . (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1955), p.448; Lord Beaverbrook., The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George. (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 200-226.

⁸⁷. FO800/240 Ryan Papers; A. J. P. Taylor., English History, 1914-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) p.192.

⁸⁸. Earl of Ronaldshay., The Life of Lord Curzon. Vol. III, (London: Ernest Benn, 1928), p.314.

⁸⁹. William Mc Elwee., Britain's Locust Years, 1918-1940. (London, 1962), p. 80.

⁹⁰. Leonard Mosley., Curzon, the End of an Epoch. (London: Longmans, Green 1960), p. 240.

unpopular acts both at home and abroad, the crisis was too much for the Conservative Party and, unable to maintain his majority without Conservative support, Lloyd George resigned that same day, October 19.

To sum up, British miscalculations in their estimate of the respective strength of the Turks proved to be the first in a series of similar errors of judgement. British policy towards Turkey for four years after the Mudros Armistice, in Dockrill's words, 'contributed to a string of failures'.⁹¹ The unsuccessful Smyrna (Izmir) landing, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, the ineffective mediation attempts between the Greeks and the Turks, and the crisis at Chanak were the main contributing elements to these failures. Anglo-Turkish relations between the Armistice of Mudros and the Armistice of Mudania were marked, to quote Evans, 'by mutual distrust of each other's ultimate intentions'.⁹² But with the replacement of Lloyd George by Bonar Law the outlook seemed more promising than ever. 'The minimum of interference at home and of disturbance abroad'⁹³ was Bonar Law's election manifesto. He promised to enter into a new period of 'peace and tranquillity'.

Well before the Lausanne Conference, it was clear that Lloyd George's successor, Bonar Law, intended to follow a different policy from that of his predecessor. By opposing Chanak he had shown his disapproval of Lloyd George's policy and all the indications showed that in the conduct of foreign affairs a policy of non-interference was to be followed. The election campaign was fought over Britain's over-stretched, over-burdened foreign commitments. With the fall of Lloyd George, philhellenism disappeared as an element in British policy, which was now much more Middle Eastern than European-centred. As Nicolson put it, Curzon

⁹¹ Dockrill and Goold, *Peace Without Promise*, p. 247.

⁹² Evans, *The Slow Rapprochement*, p. 63.

⁹³ Blake, *The Decline of Power*, p. 103.

was always 'a bad European'.⁹⁴ In contrast to Lloyd George, who had little knowledge of Asiatic problems, Bonar Law considered a drastic and decisive settlement with Turkey to be Britain's most urgent imperial necessity. Hence, the departure of Lloyd George meant that prospects of a new Anglo-Turkish friendship were considerably improved.

As for the Turkish Nationalists, by the Mudania Convention they had secured Eastern Thrace and forced the Allies to make important concessions and to treat with the Ankara government - a matter of vital importance to the Nationalists - as the real government of Turkey. The Convention also paved the way for a general peace conference at Lausanne at which questions of a most complex nature that concerned the primary interests of many nations would be negotiated. At the Mudania negotiations Turkey's object was to be in as strong a position as possible from the military point of view by the time the peace conference met. Its strategy was to drive a hard bargain on every question to be discussed and to drive the three allies into three different corners, so that it would seem that only their relative strength in European politics would be the final factor in the Near Eastern Question. However, the diversity of problems made it extremely hard for Turkey to balance its diplomacy between the conflicting desires of the hostile camps. The departure of the Greeks from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and the disappearance of the Istanbul government united the whole of Turkey under the authority of the Ankara government. All opposition was for the moment disarmed. Thus Turkey set out at the negotiating table at Lausanne to realise the National Pact through diplomatic negotiations to which the military action at Chanak had put a temporary stop.

⁹⁴ Harold Nicolson., Curzon. The Last Phase, 1919-1925. A Study on Post-War Diplomacy. (New York, 1974), p. 88.

III

PRELUDE TO THE CONFERENCE

Reluctant Opponents: Britain and Turkey on the Eve of the Conference

Britain Seeks 'Tranquillity'

In the aftermath of the war, the British policy of establishing exclusive control in the former Ottoman territories depended on whether 'Britain could continue to dominate the region militarily and if the strength of Russia could be crippled and that of Turkey shattered'.¹ None of these conditions proved possible. The economic effects of the Great War eroded the very foundation of British military strength, Soviet Russia became a major threat to British interests, and the Turkish nationalist revival in Anatolia resulted in the collapse of the entire Sèvres settlement. Trends like the rising nationalism in its colonies and unexpected developments like United States isolationism² contributed greatly to existing difficulties. After the failure of the peace conferences Britain's nightmares about Europe suddenly seemed to be nearing reality. The United States' withdrawal from European involvement, a power vacuum in Eastern Europe, the alienation of Germany and Russia and - for a very short period of time - the domination of Europe by France were the main contributing elements to this anxiety.³

¹ Ferris., The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p.102.

² David Dumbleby and David Reynolds., An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. (London: BBC Books, 1988), pp. 57-73.

³ Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p.103; Anthony Clayton., The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939. (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1986),.p.1; R.W. Seton-Watson., Britain and the

The period under consideration was one of the less stable in British political history. In less than two years Britain witnessed three general elections,⁴ and the Irish question dominated British politics.⁵ The post-war economic boom was short-lived, and in the 1920s the economic situation, presenting the constant threat of depression and mass unemployment, turned into a grave political constraint. This, to quote Beaverbrook, 'severe and disastrous industrial depression with widespread unemployment on a scale unprecedented'⁶ was only a part of the problem faced by Britain. In addition, the cost of continued global Great Power status provided constant difficulties for the different British governments.⁷ Britain became conscious that the Empire was overextended and it lacked the resources to defend it. Its armed services were 'too weak to support its foreign policy' yet 'too expensive to suit its financial one'.⁸ The co-ordination of the diplomatic, military and financial elements of British strength in order to support its aim as a great power proved to be a difficult task. As Hayes aptly put it, the British policy in the period

Dictators. A Survey of Post-War British Policy. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 82-84.

⁴. November 15, 1922, December 6, 1923 and October 29, 1924. See: Alfred F. Havighurst., Britain in Transition. The Twentieth Century. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 177-186.

⁵. Britain's refusal to contemplate the creation of an Irish Republic and its insistence upon answering the Irish Question in terms of partition or dominion status constituted an intrusion of the Irish Question into British affairs and it became the most immediate and urgent matter confronting the new government. For further information on the Question see: Paul Canning., British Policy Towards Ireland, 1921-1941. (Oxford, 1985), p. ix; David Harkness., "England's Irish Question" The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939. (London, 1975), pp. 39-63 (ed. by Gillian Peele and Chris Cook); Blake, The Decline of Power, pp. 82-97; Stephen Hartley., The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy 1914-1918. (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Kings College, London, 1987) ; D. F. Macdonald., The Age of Transition. Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 155-171; Anthony Wood., Great Britain 1900-1965. (London: 1978), pp. 209-215; Robert R. James., The British Revolution. British Politics 1880-1939. (London: Hamilton, 1978).

⁶. Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George. p. 13; For more information see: Keith Laybourn., Britain on the Breadline: A Social and Political History of Britain Between the Wars. (Gloucester, 1990), p. 7-40; Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, pp. 17-19; Gilbert, Britain Since 1918, pp. 21-25; Paul Kennedy., The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980. (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1981), pp. 226-230; David Thomson., England in the Twentieth Century 1914-1963. (London, 1964), pp. 57-60; Arthur Marwick., Britain in the Century of Total War 1900-1967. (London: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 142-166; Bernard Porter., Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1982: Delusions of Grandeur. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 82-83; Keith Robbins., The Eclipse of a Great Power, Modern Britain 1870-1975. (London: Longman, 1983), pp 137-144.

⁷. Jeffery, The British Army. p. 21.

⁸. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p. 53.

under consideration was 'pragmatic in concept if unrealistic in execution, being an attempt to match the commitments of 1919 to the facts of the post-war world'.⁹ Britain's failure to balance its aims and means made it extremely difficult to further its foreign policy; by 1920 its military capacity in the Near East had declined, while the power of the Nationalists had risen.

Since political survival depended on national economy measures, military spending was among the first expenditures to be cut, leaving Britain limited in her options. In other words, due to war-weariness and economic weakness domestic affairs took precedence over Imperial matters. The immediate and substantial scaling-down of Britain's global responsibilities was a priority for the Empire's rulers. In Bartlett's words 'strained resources as well as the gradual triumph of common sense ensured that the policy of war imperialism did not long outlive the war'.¹⁰ 'There was neither the money, nor the men, perhaps not even the will for Britain militarily to underwrite either Curzon's grandiose plans for a pax-Britannica in the Middle East*', wrote Jeffery realistically, 'or Lloyd George's misconceived confidence in the Greek ability to act as a counterpoise to a resurgent Turkey'.¹¹ The War Office was well aware of the difficulties of the country's military situation. As far as the Near Eastern problem was concerned Britain had two options: 'to make friends with Turks' or 'to use the big stick. We can't use the big stick, even if

⁹. Hayes, The Twentieth Century, p. 212.

¹⁰. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, p. 31.

* . In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution it became accepted that the new regime posed a greater threat to Britain's interests in the Middle East. Since the collapse of the Russian Empire caused the formation of new weak nationalist states in Caucasia which were heavily dependent on a British presence, Curzon thought that this area might be transferred into an enormous British sphere of influence protecting the vital arc of the Empire. To this grandiose scheme Curzon added his hope that Persia would be established as a loyal British client state. Thus Curzon believing that it was now vital to defend India against Russian expansion by implementing some measures of political control in the crucial area of the Caucasus, stressed the absolute necessity to create buffer states between Russia and the Imperial lifelines in the Middle East. Although the Foreign Office was sympathetic to his idea, the War Office represented by Wilson, strongly opposed it and this opposition surface frequently in his 1919-1920 correspondence. (See Jeffery, The Wilson Letters, Nos. 53, 84, 99, 101, 109, 115, 123). In the post-war period Curzon became, as Jeffery stated, 'something of a *bete noire* for the War Office, frequently demanding troops which, Wilson claimed, he could not spare to support expensive policies in the Middle East'. Jeffery, The Wilson Letters, p. 70.

¹¹. Jeffery, The British Army p.159 See also: Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategy, p. 32.

we wanted to do so, as we have not got the troops available, so we must try and make friends'.¹² All indications pointed in one direction: Reducing British commitments as quickly as possible in order to satisfy the domestic demand for economy, and in doing so 'running risks' or 'piling up commitments', was the last thing Britain needed.¹³

The Reparation issue¹⁴ - a practice of requiring compensation for war damage - was another concern for Britain which caused friction between Britain and France, and gained momentum with Germany's announcement in July 1922 that it could not meet its obligations which had been revised and scaled down at Cannes. In view of the breach with France, Bonar Law was 'most anxious that Curzon should not commit the government to an armed conflict with Turkey, in which Britain might be completely isolated'.¹⁵ This would also be a big blow to Law's policy of 'tranquillity'.

12. WO106/1501, May 27, 1922, 'Statement on the Situation in Turkey'.

13. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, p.32.

14. Marc Trachtenberg., Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923.(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); M. R. D. Foot., British Foreign Policy since 1898. (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1956), p. 87; E. H. Carr., International Relations since the Peace Treaties. (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 52-60; Frank Ashton-Gwatkin., 'Thoughts on the Foreign Office 1918-1939' Contemporary Review, 188 (1955), pp. 374-378; Rene Albrecht-Carrie., Twentieth Century Europe. (New Jersey, 1923), pp. 79-85; Frank P. Chambers, Christina P. Harris, Charles C. Bayley., This Age of Conflict. A Contemporary World History. (London, 1950), pp. 160-162; Arthur J. Grant., and Harold Temperley., Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. vol. II Europe in the Twentieth Century, 1905-1970. (by Agatha Ramm) (London: Longman, 1984), pp. 99-102; Ruth Henig., Versailles and After 1919-1933. (London, 1984), pp. 18-21; William M. Jordan., Great Britain, France and the German Problem 1918-1939. A Study of Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles Settlement. (London, 1943), pp. 102-130; Anne Orde., British Policy and European Reconstruction After the First World War. (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 148-160; J. Douglas Goold., 'Lord Hardinge as Ambassador to France and the Anglo-French Dilemma over Germany and the Near East 1920-1922' Historical Journal, 21 (1978), pp. 913-937; Bruce Kent., The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

The disagreement between France and Britain over the reparations was deepened when France, without the approval of Britain, entered the Ruhr on January 11, 1923. This action represented a severe blow to Allied unity. France deserted Britain at a critical juncture, when Britain desperately needed the support of its Ally; as a consequence, Britain found itself in a weak bargaining position at Lausanne.

15. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, p.487; Gathorne-Hardy., A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1939. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 37-59.

The inter-Allied debts, or more particularly the problem of the British debt to America, was another dimension of the economic difficulties that Britain had been experiencing. It was a further complication in Anglo-American relations and just as Reparations had destroyed Anglo-French collaboration this question was to bedevil relations with the United States.¹⁶ The United States was not interested in Reparations but was interested in repayment of the loans it had made to its Allies. While the United States took the view that there was no connection between the Allied debts and those of Germany, the Allies insisted that the two obligations were related and their ability to repay their American debts was dependent upon their collection of reparations from Germany. The tension which resulted from the Americans' claims for settlement of the war debts to them, irrespective of debt settlement to Britain by France, Italy or Russia, was compounded when it became clear that Britain and the United States were unlikely to reach an agreement in the short term. Bonar Law was convinced that the debt settlement without corresponding payment by Europe of its debts to Britain would produce grave consequences for the British economy. But despite his serious attempts to tackle the problem, the settlement of the issue was left to his successor Baldwin.

Among the reasons why Britain found peace with Turkey desirable was the Muslim factor. The British Empire included a vast population of Muslim inhabitants, which made itself felt as an important policy consideration. As early as 1919 Montagu, a stern opponent of Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy, strongly argued that the Indian Muslims were an important factor which Britain had to take into account. He was concerned that the government's policy could cause unrest among the Muslims of India, who were concerned for their 'brothers' in Turkey. It was well known that Turkey, during the War of Liberation, had enjoyed the

¹⁶ For more information on the Inter-Allied Debts, see: Orde, *British Policy*, pp. 77-96; Anthony Haigh., *Congress of Vienna to Common Market, British Foreign Policy 1815-1972*. (London, 1973), pp. 89-94.

admiration and support of the Indian Muslims, who believed that Turkey was successful in upholding the Caliphate against the Christian world. Throughout the Greco-Turkish crisis the Muslims of India followed events very closely and expressed their anxiety about British policy.¹⁷ The defeat of the Greeks seriously damaged British prestige, which had already been much diminished in Eastern countries in consequence of the harsh terms imposed on Muslim Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres and of British partiality for Greece since the Armistice. The Viceroy, in a secret telegram of September 1922 to the Secretary of State for India, expressed his fear of possible 'violent repercussions throughout the Islamic world' regarding the state of feeling in India due to the critical situation in the Near East and emphasised the necessity of establishing friendly relations with the Nationalist government. 'From India's standpoint', added the Viceroy, 'the essential thing is the restoration of the old cordial relations between Great Britain and Turkey'.¹⁸

The General Staff also considered that Britain had much to gain from a friendly Turkey, since the loyalty of her Muslim subjects was very much dependent on the way she treated Turkey. In a memorandum of 1922, General Townshend was to direct attentions to the 'Mohamedan menace to England' and suggest a moderate approach towards Mustafa Kemal, who, he wrote, had been 'refrained [sic] from attacking England by means of this great weapon of Islam'. He also stated that Mustafa Kemal was no longer inclined to follow the same line and was quite prepared to use this weapon if he failed to get peace.¹⁹ Thus it was probable that a peace with Turkey which would improve Britain's relations with it would go far in diminishing British anxieties as to the military situation in India and in the

¹⁷. IRO L/PS/11/211, April 5, 1922, Secretary of Bihar Jameatulama to the Registrar; IRO L/PS/11/211; IRO L/PS/11/211, March 1, 1922, Viceroy to Secretary of State for India

¹⁸. CAB24/138 CP 4186 (secret) September, 13, 1922, 'Near Eastern Crisis'; See also, CAB24/139 CP 4263, October 6, 1922, Peel (Viceroy) to the Foreign Office; FO371/7913/E12699/27/44; Curzon Papers, India Office Library, Mss Eur F112/228; For the King's view on the matter see: Mss Eur F112/227 f.40, September 13, 1922, and ff. 141-142, September 16, 1922; Mss Eur F112/226b, ff. 122-123, December 9, 1921.

¹⁹. FO371/7946/E9114/3288/44, July 27, 1922, Memorandum by General Townshend.

Near East generally. The Muslim factor played an important role and Britain could not afford to ignore it in its diplomatic dealings with the Ankara government.

Public opinion was another major consideration that the Conservative Government had to take into account in the formulation of its Near Eastern policy. Bonar Law himself, as a believer in peace, was convinced that British public opinion was opposed to a renewal of the war. He represented the great majority of the population who sincerely believed that what Britain needed was 'peace and tranquillity' as opposed to a renewal of hostilities. 'The nation wants peace so badly,' wrote Nevile Henderson, Acting High Commissioner in Istanbul, in a private letter to Rumbold, 'that neither it nor Bonar Law want to take even the slight risk of war which the preparation for war would entail'.²⁰ 'There was much opposition in the country and no enthusiasm for any ventures abroad in the House of Commons, Press or Army',²¹ wrote Lord Beaverbrook, echoing Henderson's view.

Apart from the widespread desire for peace, the public remained convinced that the cost and consequences of a war would be undesirable, even if the nation were victorious. As Bartlett emphasised in his analysis of twentieth-century British foreign policy, Britain, preoccupied by the rising expectations of large sections of the population, as well as by the grievances of the unemployed and poor, preferred not to encumber itself with an expensive foreign policy. 'Fears of serious unrest at home and of an electoral backlash if popular expectations were not fulfilled were a major influence on ministerial thinking in these years'.²² At a time when the discontent of public opinion was at its height, Britain, given her past experience and

20. FO800/253 Tu/23/5, Oliphant Papers, January 8, 1923, Henderson to Rumbold; Rumbold 30, ff. 193-197, Rumbold Papers, January 8, 1923, Henderson to Rumbold.

21. Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, p.162 see also: Martin Ceadel., Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945. The Defining of Faith. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 62-86; Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp. 240-243; DBFP, No. 329.

22. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, pp. 33-34.

her current circumstances, was not left with much choice but to follow the current tendency and endeavour to reduce the cause of friction.

Given the considerations stated above it was imperative for British interests in general that the Lausanne Conference should come to a successful end. Britain could hardly afford a major military adventure in the Middle East, in view both of domestic difficulties and the international situation. Therefore diplomacy became the only means of reaching a settlement as far as Britain was concerned. Curzon was obliged to find a peaceful solution to the Turkish question rather than risk a new war with incalculable consequences for Britain.

British Objectives Require a United Allied Front

The need for an Allied front at Lausanne had been recognised by Britain soon after the Turkish victories over the Greeks. Britain could not afford any serious disagreement between the principal Allies at the Conference. Believing that it was necessary to restore Allied unity to make the Turks accept Allied terms, Curzon suggested a preliminary meeting between Poincaré, Mussolini and himself in order to formulate a concerted policy.²³ Curzon was well aware of the fact that he had to be very careful in his French policy and steer a middle course, though with the utmost reluctance. The success of his policy depended very much on the support of the French. 'Our sole chance of success in the exceedingly difficult situation which confronts us in the Near East', he stated in September 1922, 'appears to lie in our keeping France in line, and in my being able to come to some sort of agreement with Mr Poincaré'.²⁴ He had already set out the essential points in a memorandum mainly based on the March and September proposals,²⁵ and he made it clear to

²³. For Curzon's argument see; FO. 839/4 No. 37; November 20, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office, FO. 424/255; CON 12330/195, October 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge.

²⁴. CAB24/138, CP 4194, September 17, 1922, Memorandum. 'Conference on Inter-Allied Debt Reparation'.

²⁵. FO371/9079/E5519/1/44, May 29, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 570; FO371/7892/E9735/27/44, September 22, 1922, 'British Secretary's note of a Conference between the

Poincaré that unless an agreement was reached and maintained on these points he would not be at the conference.²⁶ Having realised that Curzon would not come to the conference at all unless the French government agreed to show a common front on all the main issues, Poincaré at length accepted in principle the memorandum setting forth the points on which British government considered a prior agreement to be essential, and gave an assurance that complete accord would be preserved in resisting any impossible Turkish claims. When Curzon met Poincaré on November 18th, the French had already agreed to Britain's position on the demilitarisation of the Straits, the Syria-Iraq frontiers, Western Thrace, and the occupation of Constantinople until the treaty was ratified. In a general way the French also agreed on indemnity and other financial clauses, including the confirmation of pre-war concessions.

Hardinge informed the War Office that Poincaré contemplated the conference with 'the utmost apprehension'. In his view, it was absolutely essential for the British government to preserve a united front on all questions that might arise, owing to the demands and attitude of the Turks, which had become quite 'insupportable'.²⁷ Although Poincaré seemed willing to give his support officially, British political circles were sceptical about the credibility of such support outside the conference. In a private letter to Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, on November 20, Hardinge stated that although the French would give their support to the British in the conference, Poincaré would fight 'tooth and nail' with them outside the conference.²⁸ The British were convinced that the outcome of the Reparation Conference was very much linked to the support which the French would provide for Britain. Only after the discussions in Paris did the signs of

French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 am. Wednesday, September 20, 1922'; DBFP, XVIII, No. 41.

26. Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy*, pp. 189-190; also see Nicolson, *Curzon*, pp. 314-315.

27. WO106/1444, No. 1127, November 5, 1922, Hardinge to the War Office.

28. FO800/386, Rus/22/5, Private letter, November 20, 1922, Hardinge to Crowe.

strains that overshadowed the Anglo-French alliance disappear and soon after a communiqué was published confirming the agreement on all matters to be discussed in the Conference.

After his meeting with Mussolini at Terriet on November 19th and 20th²⁹ Curzon was convinced that Mussolini was strongly in favour of the Entente on the basis of equal rights, but his support clearly depended on what the Italians could get as a substitution for the Tripartite Agreement of 1920. Mussolini strongly felt that the Italians had been, 'put off with vague promises in the past' while her allies had acquired valuable territories which were a source of 'wealth and power' to them, and now the time had come to put these vague promises into action.³⁰ According to Curzon, Italy, having practically lost the Tripartite Agreement, and being unlikely to retain the greater part of the Dodecanese, had nothing to show to the world as the Eastern reward of her victory in the war. In his view, Mussolini knew 'next to nothing of the subjects' or was 'startlingly ignorant of external affairs'. Curzon's general impression was that the Italians would not 'give much trouble provided that they (could) get some advantage which they (could) parade to their countrymen.³¹ These advantages were to be the Dodecanese Islands and the economic concessions.

Britain also recognised that a solid front against Turkey required American co-operation. The United States' interest in economic matters and its determination to protect American interests through its 'Open Door' policy³² caused mixed

²⁹. On Terriet Curzon had sent a message to Poincaré stating that Mussolini wished to avoid Lausanne because he had been put out of the city by the police on his last visit. Nicolson., Curzon, p. 288-89; Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 487 .

³⁰. FO839/14, No. 36, FO371/7915/E13063/27/44, November 22, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO839/32 No. 312; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur 112/285, No. 13; DBFP, XVIII, No. 213.

³¹. FO839/4; FO424/255; FO371/7916/E13333/27/44, CON12330/671, November 27, 1922 'Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe'; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F112/285, No.13, November 21, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office.

³². Shortly after the conference commenced on November 25, Child, American Chief Delegate felt the need to clarify to the Conference 'Open Door' policy. 'The United States,' he pointed out, 'has no desire to take any action which might embarrass the Allied Powers in the proper effort to secure peace. It desires nothing which need conflict with the interests of other countries, if the principle of commercial opportunity for all nations is recognised at the outset. The United States has no intention of seeking for

feelings in British circles. 'A complete understanding with the United States on the Near East would strengthen our hands immensely in dealing with exaggerated pretensions from Angora as well as with French and Italian jealousies', wrote Alexander Waugh, British Consul-General in Istanbul, in a memorandum of 1922. 'But in order to succeed the negotiations must be frank, open and kept from commercial and financial intrigues'.³³ Rumbold however, was sceptical about securing American co-operation. Referring to Waugh's memorandum in a confidential letter to Oliphant he pointed out 'Americans will not readily - even for a time - adopt a self-denying ordinance, by which I mean, refrain from seeking commercial advantages until, at any rate, peace has been reached with Turkey'.³⁴ Britain tried to avoid provoking the United States needlessly, but not at the price of compromising British interests. After a final conversation with Poincaré and Mussolini which took place in Curzon's room on November 20, 1922,³⁵ Curzon, who tried very hard to remove the existing differences and find a common ground, was eventually successful in aligning the interests of Britain, France and Italy, at least at the start of the negotiations.

In order to secure vital British interests in the Turkish peace settlement there had to be a new *modus vivendi* among the Allies. Curzon was convinced that Britain could only use its advantageous position as long as Allied unity remained intact. Once he secured the united front he moved on to define the objects of the British stance at Lausanne in two categories.

itself or its nationals a position of special privilege but it desires to protect its rights and to assure the Open Door'. FRUS, (1923) II, No. 19; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 481-485.

³³. FO800/253 Tue/22/8, January 25, 1922, Rumbold to the Foreign Office, Oliphant Papers.

³⁴. Ibid.

³⁵. FO839/4, November 21, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office; DBFP, XVIII, No. 193, 204; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/5, November 20, 1922 (Allen Leeper's Diary); Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne*, pp. 362-363; Nicolson, *Curzon*, p.288 ; Alan Cassels., *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy*. (Princeton, 1970), pp. 21-23; C. J. Lowe., & F. Marzari., *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940*. (London, 1975), pp. 185-188.

" CATEGORY A. (ESSENTIAL)

1. Western Thrace. Adherence to the understanding arrived at the March discussions that the position in Western Thrace shall not be altered and that the Turkish demands for a plebiscite shall be refused.

2. Frontier of Western Thrace to be the frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of September 1915. (This agreement may be subject to possible creation of a neutral zone to provide railway access for Bulgaria to the Aegean.)

3. Freedom of the Straits. This principle is accepted by all the Allies (Note of September 23rd). The actual manner in which it is to be applied remains for discussion. The Allied Governments should maintain a firm accord as to the demilitarisation of certain zones on the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus, and as to the inspection of these areas under conditions to be determined.

4. Capitulations. Adherence to the March resolutions with certain modifications which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to suggest to their allies.

5. The Islands in the Aegean. To be ceded by Turkey to the allies to be disposed of in the manner agreed to by the latter.

6. Frontiers of Syria and Iraq. To be maintained except in so far as the Mandatory Powers may be disposed to consider or to propose local rectification.

7. Mandated Territories in Syria, Iraq and Palestine. No change to be admitted.

8. Allied Graves. The Allies to insist upon a transfer of the ownership of the soil to them.

9. Indemnities. A Turkish indemnity to be demanded as proposed in the March resolutions. The exact figure to be determined by agreement between the allies. The Turkish demand for an indemnity from Greece to be refused.

10. The Mudania Convention. To be strictly enforced and all Turkish violations of it to be firmly resisted.

11. Constantinople position. No withdrawal of Allied troops, until ratification of the New Treaty of Turkey (September note).

CATEGORY B (MOST DESIRABLE)

1. Protection of Minorities. As regards Minorities in Asia adherence so far as is still possible to resolutions of March, and as regards Minorities in Europe strict adherence to terms of September agreement.

2. Turkish Military Forces. General adherence to terms of March resolutions. If a relaxation of these is conceded, this should not apply to the Turkish army in Europe which should be strictly limited in numbers.

3. Financial Clauses. These should remain for discussion between the Allied experts.

4. Economic Clauses. Insistence upon recognition by Turkish Government of Allied pre-war concessions, and annulment of Turkish repudiation contracts since the Armistice. The methods to be discussed by the Allied experts. "36

Britain's aims were far from compatible with those of Turkey. On November 1, 1922 Curzon explained to the Cabinet that the Sèvres issues would be the first to be considered, followed by a wider discussion of the Straits.³⁷ Economic and financial clauses, along with the limitation of Turkish military sources and the protection of minorities, represented the 'most desirable' objectives. Among those objectives, Ottoman debts, the Capitulations and concessions were the issues in which the French seemed most interested, while the Italians concentrated mainly on the Dodecanese Islands, Capitulations and Cabotage. In short, Curzon, while trying to maintain Allied unity, aimed to restore British prestige in the East and in particular to ensure the freedom of the Straits, win Mosul for Iraq, which was under the British Mandate, and drive a wedge between Angora and Moscow.³⁸ In order to achieve these objectives, Britain, fearing an immediate direct threat and

³⁶. CAB23/32, November 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge, Appendix I; FO371/7913/E12653/27/44, November 14, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge; FO371/7913/E12653/27/44, November 14, 1922, Curzon to Graham; DBFP, XVIII, No. 192, 193.

³⁷. CAB23/32 Annex IV.

³⁸. Dockrill and Goold, Peace Without Promise, p.237; Nicolson, Curzon, p. 282.

involvement in the wars of others, followed a deterrence strategy so as 'to keep what it held'.³⁹

However, the General Staff had a different approach towards the Turkish question. Shortly before the Lausanne Conference started, a secret memorandum on the forthcoming conference revealed the General Staff's view on the recent developments in Turkey. It stated that due to the creation of a national spirit in Turkey the situation in the Near East had fundamentally changed since the Treaty of Sèvres, as shown in the recent successes of the Turkish army. These developments showed that Britain could no longer treat Turkey as a conquered nation to which it was possible to dictate any terms it wished. The General Staff expressed the opinion that a strong Turkey was not necessarily a danger to the British Empire. The memorandum stressed that the Turks could attack no vital points in the British Empire (neither Iraq nor Palestine could be considered as such): 'Therefore 'so long as our relations with them are friendly, it is to the advantage of Her Majesty's Government to strengthen them, in a military sense, rather than the reverse. Fate...had located them in one of the most coveted areas in the world and if we are to have peace in the Near East, they must be strong enough to defend it'.⁴⁰

Despite the different approaches of the General Staff and the Foreign Office to the Turkish problem, the British policy which had traditionally been 'inductive, intuitive and quite deliberately opportunist'⁴¹ remained the same in essence and had yet to face one of its major challenges in the case of the 'Turkish Settlement'. 'The Turks are not just in the same position that they were when the Treaty of Sèvres was drawn up,' wrote Joseph Grew, the American observer at the Conference, 'they are coming, not hat in hand, but with a victorious army behind

³⁹. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p.183; Earl Ronaldshay The Life of Lord Curzon. (London, 1928), III p. 225.

⁴⁰. WO33/1016, October 19, 1922, Memorandum by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey.

⁴¹. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, p. 43.

them. That makes a lot of difference.'⁴² The question was how long and to what extent Britain could keep its Allies in line without seeing them make separate agreements with Turkey. Thus at the outset of the Conference Curzon felt the necessity of providing compensation for the Allies, i.e. diplomatic support for France in the reparation question, economic gains for Italy in the former Ottoman territories, and acknowledgement of the United States' 'open door' policy which, in reality, meant American entry into the Middle East. Therefore it would not be wrong to say that the main strength of Britain on the eve of the Conference was clearly based on its diplomatic position vis-a-vis its Allies and the ability to maintain its position by fulfilling its promises. Most of the time Curzon was successful in maintaining 'the facade of Allied unity', which, if not genuine, was crucial to the success of the Conference.⁴³

Turkey Seeks Peace and Stability

Turkey had reversed the course of events by defeating the Greek forces backed by the Allies, especially Britain, and practically secured a stronger position by being victorious. Of the nations defeated in 1918, only Turkey had been able within a few years to achieve such a result. However, Turkey was about to come to the end of its resources and had its own difficulties. During the last ten years Turkey had been involved in four major wars: The Italian War of 1911-2, the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Great War of 1914-1918 and the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. Due to war-weariness, the economic resources of the country were stretched to the limit; prolonged mobilisation of the Army and military operations which had

⁴². Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 486.

⁴³. Nicolson, *Curzon*, pp. 290-293; FO371/7915/E13149/27/44, November 19, 1922, Meeting of the Allies at Terriet, DBFP, XVIII No. 206; FO839/32; FO371/7965/E13737/13003/44, November 29, 1922, Curzon to the Foreign Office.

begun in the spring of 1921 and continued until the Mudania Armistice proved costly. The need for economic reconstruction and development was paramount.⁴⁴

Moreover Turkey was held responsible for the debts of the decaying Ottoman Empire, which had been in a state of permanent insolvency, and had had to be supported by continual loans from European governments interested in Ottoman survival.⁴⁵ The Turkish aim at the Conference was to establish a long-term plan for the liquidation of the enormous debt in such a way that the economic life of the new state would not be crippled in the process. Therefore, the Lausanne Conference provided a good opportunity for a new start, a modern Turkey. For this purpose Turkey desperately needed the financial help of the Allies in general and the British in particular. Despite all its success, Turkey could hardly stand alone and the tendency towards Britain was stimulated by the belief that Britain was the country most capable of being useful to Turkey in an economic recovery. Within this context Turkey needed western capital and investment and desired amicable terms with the Allies. The Lausanne Conference would be a failure if it only served further to widen the breach between Turkey and the Western Powers. Turkey's need for economic recovery was to play a great role in the determination of Turkish policy at Lausanne.

For Turkey, the peace conference was purely and simply a continuation of the war of independence, which was now to be waged on the diplomatic front until

⁴⁴ The British, who were well aware of this, would exploit this Turkish weakness to the very end. During the negotiations Curzon did not hesitate to use the economic aid as a threat against Turkey and on several occasions emphasised the connection between the signature of the treaty - unequivocally on British terms - and financial aid. 'Ismet knows' he wrote in February 1923, once the treaty has been signed the help of England will be given.' (DBFP, XVIII, No. 380, February 9, 1923, Curzon to Henderson; FO371/7965/E13599/13003/44; FO371/9134/E1303/217/44) In the face of American offers to help to bring the Turks into line Curzon had no doubt what course had to be followed. 'The best assistance that US government can offer is to follow the sound line taken by Mr. Child more than once in my presence with the Turks, namely to tell them that unless and until they signed the treaty American sympathy is arrested and American aid will not be forthcoming.' (DBFP, XVIII, No. 379, February 9, 1923, Curzon to Geddes; FRUS, 1923, No. 327 pp. 951-953; FO839/17 Nos. 1057, 1058; Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F112/285.)

⁴⁵ Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 44; N. Bilal Simsir, British Documents on Ataturk (1919-1938) (Vols. I, II, III, IV, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1975).

the National Pact was fully recognised by the Allies. Turkish diplomacy rested, of course, on the military successes which allowed bargaining from a position of comparative strength. Making good use of fragile Allied solidarity and of antagonism between Russia and the West were the options waiting to be used. But above all what Turkey needed was stability and peace, as Mustafa Kemal later put it, 'at home and abroad'.⁴⁶ It did not need further territorial gains beyond the National Pact, but to recover from the disastrous consequences of many years of war. A great incentive to united resistance and endurance had disappeared when the Greeks were driven out of Izmir. Friendship with the Soviet Union had hitherto been a valuable asset in Turkish policy, but it now needed to be reconsidered in accordance with more pressing policy requirements.

Besides the economic difficulties, on the eve of the Lausanne Conference the political situation at Ankara was not altogether stable and the internal dissensions which had as far as possible been pushed into the background in view of the external threat had already begun to surface. Not every member of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), including some of the Ministers, was comfortable with the role played by Mustafa Kemal after the termination of active military operations. They were particularly uneasy about his involvement in the political questions and intimated to Mustafa Kemal that his military functions had come to an end and the political questions belonged exclusively to the Council of Ministers. Mustafa Kemal however, was not impressed by such arguments, as the Turkish victories over the Greeks had enhanced his popularity with the army and consequently strengthened his influence in the GNA. On his return to Ankara he successfully defended the attitude adopted by Turkey before and after the Chanak crisis despite the pressure

⁴⁶. Ataturk'un Tamim Telgraf ve Beyannameleri .Vol. IV. 1917-1938.(Ankara: Turk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitusu, 1964) p.560.

and criticisms from the GNA because of the halt to the advance of the victorious army without the full realisation of the National Pact.⁴⁷

The opposition, which expressed itself mainly in the form of the 'Second Group',⁴⁸ did not disappear and the divergence of opinions became especially visible when the question of the delegation to be sent to the Peace Conference was placed on the agenda. Rauf Orbay, the Prime Minister, Yusuf Kemal, the Foreign Minister, and Riza Nur, the Minister of Public Health, appeared to be the most likely choice for the delegation. In his memories Rauf Bey reveals that he was not enthusiastic about going to Lausanne since other countries were to be represented by their Foreign Ministers. Therefore, such a mission should naturally be given to Yusuf Kemal.⁴⁹ According to Mustafa Kemal 'Rauf Bey himself did not feel equal to his task' and a delegation led by him could not have any success on such a vital issue.⁵⁰

Mustafa Kemal's choice did not lie with the Prime Minister but with someone whom he could trust: Ismet Pasha, the victor of the Mudania Convention, who had proved to be a determined, patient and tough negotiator, although as a professional soldier throughout his life he had had no diplomatic experience.⁵¹ At

47. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt, 3 pp. 860-872; 920-930.

48. The opposition was run by various deputies in the Assembly and it came to be known as the 'Second Group'. It had its organ a paper called the 'Tan' which was started in Ankara under the editorship of Ali Sukru Bey, a former naval officer and a deputy for Trabzon. The 'Second Group' represented itself by its name not as a distinct party, but as a group forming a part of Mustafa Kemal's own Defence of Rights organisation. Its principal component parts were the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress and Monarchists of the type of Sukru Efendi (Hoca) who published in January 1923, a pamphlet openly denouncing the abolition of the Sultanate.

For further information see: Ismail Arar., Ataturk'un Izmit Basın Toplantısı. (16-17 Ocak 1923). (Istanbul, 1969), p.39-44; Erik Jan Zürcher., Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic. The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), p. 23; Ismet Inonu., Hatıralar. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 100; Nursen Mazici., Belgelerle Ataturk Doneminde Muhalefet, 1919-1926. (Istanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984), pp. 53-71; Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952. (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 537-539; Feridun Kandemir., Siyasi Darginliklar, II. (Istanbul, 1952), pp. 119; Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Nationalist Movement, pp. 82-84; CON12359/425

49. Rauf Orbay., "Rauf Bey'in Hatıraları", Yakın Tarihimiz, (Cilt, II, Istanbul, March 1962 - January 1963).

50. Kemal, Speech, pp. 570-571.

51. The head of the Turkish delegation, Ismet Pasha, had had a purely military career as a professional soldier. He himself was very much aware of the fact that he was an 'amateur diplomat' and the difficulties

Mustafa Kemal's request, Yusuf Kemal resigned and Ismet Pasha became Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 26 1922.⁵² After a long and heated debate on November 2, 1922, the Assembly confirmed the appointment of the Turkish delegation headed by Ismet Pasha, who, addressing the Assembly, stated that he would be guided by the National Pact at the Conference.⁵³ He was accompanied by Riza Nur, the Minister of Health, and Hasan Saka, the Minister of Finance. Rauf Bey was not included in the delegation. The elimination of Rauf Bey, some argued, was the first step to the tense relations between the government and the delegation at Lausanne. Not every member of the GNA regarded the selection of the delegation as the best choice. Riza Nur recalled in his memoirs the resentment he felt about severe opposition from the 'Second Group' to his constant appeal to them that Turkey would be in a much stronger position at the Conference if the delegation obtained the full support of the Grand National Assembly.⁵⁴ The question of the selection of the delegation clearly displayed the existence of opposition in the GNA against

he had experienced at Lausanne had very much to do with his lack of diplomatic experience. 'The diplomats who wanted to take advantage of my situation', stated Ismet Pasha in his memoirs, 'would put their proposals forward in a way that would suit the rules and methods of diplomacy. Whereas I, as an amateur diplomat with an army background, found myself suffering from the disease of expressing my opinion with short and dry statements in the face of these demands'. (Inonu, Hatıralar, p.87) Grew, the American observer at the Conference expressed his observations about Ismet Pasha in the following lines: 'He talks more in the manner of a military man than a diplomat and apparently thinks in the same channel'. (Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 502) Rumbold, despised him for not being 'a la hauteur of his task' and the Turkish delegation for not having 'a single really big experienced and capable man'. (FO839/22 No. 59) However, not everyone shared the same view. 'He is a master of detail,' wrote Harington who carried out the Mudania negotiations with Ismet Pasha. 'He examines every sentence most carefully, and from first to last never accepted anything without first seeing whether there was any catch in it', and he concluded with a warning, 'it wants very extreme patience to deal with a man like that... Ismet will be perfectly clear and logical, but he will adopt some sort of attitude to try and get the definite yes or no'. (Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F112/2266, ff. 254-255, October, 1992)

Ismet Pasha's inexperience in diplomacy reflected itself in his telegrams too. These telegrams are written in the style of military reports. In Simsir's words they were 'short, blunt and dry statements compared to the Ottoman diplomatic correspondence which was sophisticated, eloquent, and elegantly expressed. Simsir, Lozan Telgrafları I, 1922-1923. (Ankara, 1990), p. XVI.

52. Kemal, Speech, p.571; Jaeschke, Türk Kurtulus Savasi Kronolijisi. Cilt II, p. 4.

53. However, the British were cautious towards Ismet Pasha's election as head of the Turkish delegation. 'This is not reassuring', wrote Rumbold on October 28, 1922, 'It portends sabre rattling at Conference as Ismet's attitude at Mudania was most intractable'. FO371/7907/E11757/27/44; Inonu, Hatıralar, p.47; Gencosman, Ihtilal Meclisi, p.329; Gonlubol and Sar, Ataturk ve Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi, pp. 29-36; S. I. Aralov., Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Turkiye Hatıraları. (Istanbul: Burcak Yayınevi, 1967), pp. 184-185.

54. Nur, Riza., Hayat ve Hatıratım. (Cilt. III , Istanbul, 1968), p. 964.

Mustafa Kemal and his supporters and this opposition would be more frequently pronounced especially after the failure of the first phase of the Conference.

In the light of the difficulties mentioned above, an immediate peace was highly desirable; not only would it put an end to the existing economic difficulties but it also would ease the unstable internal political situation by pacifying the opposition. Moreover Mustafa Kemal was convinced that the old social, religious and political structure of Turkey needed drastic reform and his reform programme could only be materialised with the conclusion of a satisfactory peace which would disarm the opposition to political change.

The Turkish Objective: Nothing but the National Pact

The Lausanne Conference was unique among post-war conferences in that it was the only one in which the Allies met the defeated enemy on anything like equal terms,⁵⁵ and which reflected an acceptance of the negotiating position of those whom the Allies considered the defeated party. Turkey aimed at proving that it was not the defeated Ottoman Empire that had signed the Sèvres treaty, but was rather a new state which had fought for its independence and did not come to Lausanne as a supplicant. The Turkish delegates' aim at Lausanne was to add a diplomatic victory to the military victory which had been achieved in the field. Their stand-point was the Mudania Convention, signed by the Nationalists, whereas the Western Powers tended to rely on the Armistice of Mudros, which had been signed by the defeated Ottoman Empire. In order to strengthen its negotiating position Turkey was, first of all, to rely on its military position. At almost every opportunity, Ismet Pasha made it clear to the Conference that he was not the representative of the

⁵⁵. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 365; Richard T. B. Langhorne., 'The Treaty of Lausanne(1923) and the Recognition of Modern Turkey: The International Context'. Symposium on the Foreign Policy of Ataturk's Turkey (1923-83), Proceedings, (Istanbul, 1984), p. 117.

defeated Ottoman Empire but that of a victorious Turkey determined to negotiate peace on equal terms.

In addition to this, Turkey went to Lausanne to secure its prime objective: The National Pact, which came to represent the Nationalists' requirements and formed the basis of all negotiations with the Allied powers. The Nationalists proceeded to the Conference with a very definite programme: The complete scrapping of the Treaty of Sèvres, a plebiscite for Western Thrace, the restoration of Mosul, the freedom of the Straits, but provided that the independence of Turkey and the safety of Istanbul were ensured, no military restrictions, no minority provisions, other than those in the European treaties, no financial and economic control, no Capitulations but the full sovereignty and independence of Turkey; in short, the National Pact in its entirety. Instructions from the Cabinet were another delicate issue that the Turkish delegation had to bear in mind during the course of the discussions. They were as follows:

1. The Eastern Frontier. No Armenian Homeland to be admitted. Negotiations to be broken off if Allies insisted.
2. The Frontier of Iraq. Suleymaniye, Kerkuk and Mosul to be claimed and new instructions to be asked from Ankara concerning newly-emerged situations.
3. The Frontier of Syria. Efforts to be made to improve it along the following route: Re'si Ibn Hani-Harim-Muslimiye-Meskene-Firat-Derizor-Col-Musul.
4. The Islands [the Aegean]. Policy to be determined in the course of negotiations. Islands to be claimed on account of their proximity to the Dardanelles. Fresh instructions to be requested from Ankara should difficulties arise.
5. The Frontiers of Thrace. Efforts to be made to secure 1914 frontier.
6. The Frontiers of Western Thrace To be determined in conjunction with the National Pact (i.e. plebiscite).
7. The Straits and Gallipolli Peninsula. No foreign military force to be admitted. Ankara to be informed in advance if negotiations to be broken off.

8. The Capitulations. Under no circumstances the Capitulations to be accepted. Delegation have every authority to break up the negotiations should the need arises.

9. Minorities. To be solved by the mutual exchange of population.

10. Ottoman Public Debt. To be distributed among the successor states. Greece's debt to be renounced in return for its recognition of reparations. Failing that the question to be postponed for twenty years.

11. Army and Navy No limitation to be accepted.

12. Foreign Institutions. To be subject to Turkish Law.

13. The Succession States Article 1* of the National Pact to be applied.

14. The Rights of the Islamic Institutions and Foundations to be determined under the guidance of previous agreements. ⁵⁶

These instructions defined Turkey's national goals very clearly. On two of them, the Capitulations and the possible establishment of an Armenian state, Turkey was determined to the point of risking the possibility of war. If the need arose, Ismet Pasha had full authorisation to break off the negotiations without consulting Ankara since the Nationalists on many occasions publicly proclaimed that they would only make peace on the basis of the National Pact, which stood for the complete economic, financial, and juridical independence of Turkey within the territories inhabited by a majority of Turks.

The realisation of the National Pact, and nothing but the entire Pact, and the recognition by the Allies of the Government of Ankara as the sole representative of Turkey were the sole considerations by which the Nationalist government was

⁵⁶ Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I. p. XIV.

*. Article 1 runs as follows: 'The destiny of Ottoman territory under foreign occupation and peopled by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the Armistice on October 30, 1918 should be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race, and in aspirations, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, and devotion, and form an invisible whole.'

guided. To what extent the Turkish delegation managed to fulfil the principles laid down in the National Pact was yet to be seen.

Questions to be Settled before the Conference

The first issue was where the negotiations should take place. In order to obliterate the difficulties of communication between Ankara and the Turkish delegation, as the conference site the Grand National Assembly suggested Izmir, a town which was also the symbol of Turkish victory. The British considered the matter from a different angle: In a telegram to the War Office on October 11, 1922, Rumbold pointed out the popular belief that the Turks were not only victorious against the Greeks but also against the Allies. 'This impression', he wrote, 'will be strengthened if the Conference were held in a Turkish town'. He maintained that 'to consent to such a proposal would go far in admitting that a Greek defeat meant an Allied defeat'. Rumbold had another reason to object to Turkish soil; 'If precedent were followed,' he warned, 'a Turk might claim to be president and moreover the question of position of the Constantinople government will be raised in a more acute form.'⁵⁷ Curzon entirely agreed with the 'weighty reasons' stated by Rumbold and ruled out any idea of holding a peace conference on Turkish soil. Such proposal was 'wholly unacceptable' since it would hurt the feelings of Greek statesman Eleuthere Venizelos.⁵⁸ After lengthy discussions through telegraphic correspondence, with the assurance that the necessary steps would be taken to facilitate as much as possible communication between Lausanne and Ankara, the neutral site of Lausanne was accepted by the Turks.

The selection of Lausanne as a conference place however created considerable difficulties for the Turkish delegation regarding communications. As

⁵⁷. WO106/1426, No. 865, October 11, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.

⁵⁸. FO371/7903/E11024/27/44, October 13, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge; DBFP, XVIII, No. 123; FO424/255; CON12330/381; DBFP, XVIII No. 121, October 12, 1922, Curzon to Hardinge.

the negotiations progressed the Turkish side found it increasingly difficult to cope with the newly emerging situation; it realised the inadequacy of 25-30 pages of instructions and frequently had to ask the Nationalist government for new instructions. Hence the exchange of telegrams increased tremendously and reached a point where the telegrams sent from Ankara to Lausanne were greater in number than the ones issued from Lausanne to Ankara. These telegrams caused great tension between Ismet Pasha and the Prime Minister, Rauf Bey. In order to avoid the communication difficulties Rauf Bey suggested the Kostence (Constanta) line while Ismet Pasha favoured the Eastern line on the grounds that it was reliable, faster and that the telegrams were not corrupt as in the case of the Kostence line.⁵⁹ Due to delays and incomplete and corrupt telegrams, both sides bitterly complained about not getting replies in time; consequently, Ismet Pasha chose, on more than one occasion, to send direct telegrams to Mustafa Kemal in order to be able to get a quick reply which was crucial in terms of preparations for the next session. Ismet Pasha's direct communication with Mustafa Kemal, which left the Prime Minister Rauf Bey in isolation, had a great effect on the deterioration of Ismet Pasha's position vis-à-vis the Turkish Cabinet.⁶⁰

The selection of Lausanne also put the Turks in a disadvantageous position from the intelligence point of view. Numerous human intelligence reports gave very accurate account of the Turkish negotiating standpoint. But the most important role as far as the Conference was concerned was played by the signal intelligence. The intercepted Turkish telegrams contributed a great deal to the British assessment of the Turkish position during the negotiations. Winston Churchill, who was a great believer in the vast benefit of intelligence in international relations, stated that he attached 'more importance to them as a means of forming a true judgement of public

59. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, p. XV, No.270. January 4, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 287. January 6, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

60. Orbay, 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari' Yakin Tarihimiz, Cilt II, p. 53.

policy in these spheres than to any other sources of knowledge at the disposal of the State.' Curzon agreed. After emphasising the importance of the information gathered by clandestine means, and the assessment based upon it, which statesmen weigh when they make their decisions, Churchill concluded: 'The deciphered telegrams of foreign governments are without doubt the most valuable source of our secret information respecting their policy and actions.'⁶¹ In this respect the Lausanne Conference represents 'one of the most interesting case studies of the use and value of secret intelligence.'⁶²

Whitehall was extremely well-informed as to the position in other countries and in the course of negotiations there can be little doubt that London knew a great deal more about what was happening in Turkey than Turkey did of what was taking place on the Allied side. The effect of intelligence on Curzon's policy, by providing a novel and valuable source of information and making his work easier throughout the Lausanne Conference, was certainly the crucial if not the determining factor contributing to his 'skilful diplomacy'. Since the Eastern line, which was used by the Turks, was under British control these intercepted telegrams gave the British the opportunity to assess Turkey's negotiating position. The intercepted Turkish telegrams supplied to the Foreign Office were regularly studied by Curzon, who learned of the difficulties facing Ismet Pasha in Lausanne and the Nationalist government in Ankara. Therefore Curzon was well aware of the fact that Ismet Pasha was caught between the terms acceptable to the Conference and those desired by the Ankara government. He also knew exactly how far he could push matters, since he had first-hand information about at which point the Turkish

⁶¹. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.) Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945, (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987), p. 16. For further information see: C. M. Andrew., Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Community, (London: Heinemann, 1987); David Dilks., 'Appeasement and Intelligence' Retreat From Power. Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol. I, 1900-1939. (ed. by David Dilks), (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 139.

⁶². Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence' Intelligence and International Relations, p. 115.

delegation was instructed to break off negotiations. Not only did Curzon learn about Turkey's position but he also gained information from these telegrams about the other power's policies, which put him in a stronger position and enabled him to form counter-policies. It would be unrealistic to say that the possession of good intelligence by itself enabled him to form his policy but it certainly helped a great deal towards the decision making process. Given the information and data the British side had, it would not be an exaggeration to say that they had complete superiority over the Turkish side, which was very poorly prepared. The archival material shows that Britain had also elaborated counter arguments against the likely proposals of the Turkish side as part of its thorough preparation.

A substantial contribution was also made by British Intelligence during the second half of the Lausanne negotiations, so much so that Rumbold, who was the chief negotiator for Britain, would comment: 'The information we obtained at the psychological moments from secret sources was invaluable to us and put us in the position of a man who is playing Bridge and knows the cards in his adversary's hand'.⁶³ Moreover, during the first part of the Conference the British delegation had the 'distinct advantage of being able to read a large proportion of the Turkish delegation's private correspondence'.⁶⁴ The information which was obtained from the Secret Intelligence Service 'did not guarantee that the British negotiators would be successful in obtaining all their objectives, but it did mean that on certain occasions they could cut their losses and know when not to push the conference to a breach'.⁶⁵ Turkey lacked completely such advantages at the negotiations and was thus easily forced into making concessions which it could not avoid without breaking up the Conference. It could well be argued that if Ismet Pasha had had the inside knowledge as to how the United Allied Front which Curzon arranged in Paris

⁶³. FO800/253, Tu 23/54; Gilbert, Sir Horace Rumbold, p. 290; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne p. 382.

⁶⁴. Jeffery and Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence. Intelligence and International Relations, p.108.

⁶⁵. Jeffery and Sharp., 'Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence'. p.115.

was 'tentative' the course of the negotiations and the outcome of the Conference could have been different.

The second issue to be settled was the question of Turkish representation at the Conference. Since the appointment of Bekir Sami Bey as the first Foreign Minister of the Ankara Government in 1920, the diplomatic representation of Turkey had been a controversial issue not only between Istanbul and Ankara but also among the Allies. The Lausanne Conference was to end the confusion in a quite dramatic way. Controversy arose as to whether the Istanbul government could be represented separately, and over Ankara's intention of making its acceptance of an invitation contingent upon the exclusion of the Istanbul government. When the Allies invited both governments to the Conference, Ankara did not fail to act, and in a letter to the British, Italian and French governments, Ahmet Muhtar, the Minister of Defence, described the Istanbul government as a 'political group established at Constantinople with no legal, political right to call itself a government'.⁶⁶

In a special meeting of the GNA Ismet Pasha argued against the invitation of the Istanbul government on the grounds that such an invitation would upset the situation created by the Mudania Armistice Convention. The Istanbul government tried to reach an understanding with Ankara for joint action on the basis of recognition of the role Ankara had played but without formally abdicating its own position. In a telegram to Mustafa Kemal on October 17, Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha was of the opinion that 'victory that had been gained had done away with any conflict and dualism between Istanbul and Ankara, and that national unity had thereby been assured'. He suggested joint action at the Conference, a suggestion which he reiterated with his direct appeal to the Presidency of the Assembly on 29

⁶⁶ Kenneth Bourne & D. C. Watt., (eds.); British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA)- Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1920-1921, Vol. II, No. 71; For more on this matter see: FO371/7947/E 4988/4988/44 and CON 11940/426 Turkey. Annual Report, 1921.

October.⁶⁷ However, Ankara was determined to solve the problem once and for all.

On 1 November, three weeks before the Lausanne Conference convened, the Grand National Assembly adopted a resolution that the office of Sultan had ceased to exist, that under the fundamental law the Caliphate was vested in the house of Osman but that the Caliph must be elected by the Assembly, and that the Turkish State was the support on which the caliphate rested. It announced that the GNA was the sole sovereign body in Turkey, that the people recognised no other government, and that the Istanbul government had ceased to exist from 16 March 1920.⁶⁸ This action was to put an end to the duality which had existed in Turkey since the establishment of the GNA in 1920.

Not surprisingly, the actions of the Ankara government were heartily supported by the Soviets, with which the government was on the best of terms, though conflicting opinions were held in Anatolia as to how far a Bolshevik alliance could be maintained without swallowing Bolshevism itself, a thing repugnant to all but an insignificant minority. Nevertheless, the Nationalists as a whole had throughout acted on the principle that Bolshevik activity could not fail to bring grist to the Ankara mill. Chicherin sent a message on 3 November congratulating the Assembly on overthrowing a 'despotic, monarchical autocracy' which had acted against the interests of the people and had reduced the country to subjection to Western Powers.⁶⁹ The Allies proved to have no intention of opposing the change of authority in Turkey. The British government recognised the Ankara government as the only representative of the people of Turkey and claimed 'no right to intervene

⁶⁷. Kemal, Speech, p. 575 ; Orbay, 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari' Yakin Tarihimiz; WO106/1506 No. 35a, October 1, 1922, Rumbold to the War Office.

⁶⁸. For the text of this historic resolution see: FO371/9176/E10937/10937/44; CON 12315/729 Turkey. Annual Report, 1922; FO371/7910/E12311/27/44; FO371/7953/E11817/10102/44; Kemal, Speech, p. 577-578; Orbay, Rauf Orbay'in Anilari. Yakin Tarihimiz, (Cilt II, Istanbul March 1962 - January 1963); Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 58-60.

⁶⁹. WO106/1444 No. 1118, November 5, 1922, Peters (Moscow) to the War Office.

in the domestic affairs of Turkey not affecting any treaty rights'.⁷⁰ The question of representation was thus solved by the abolition of the Sultanate and the resignation of the Istanbul government. The abolition of the Caliphate, however, had to wait until after the Lausanne Conference.

Once the Istanbul government was out of the political arena, the third question came on to the agenda: The controversy surrounding the opening date of the Conference. There appeared to be substantial difficulties concerning the Lausanne Conference opening as agreed on November 13th. The Turks were anxious to get the Conference started as soon as possible since the government was under increasing pressure and criticism at home for halting the advance of the victorious army. Therefore an immediate peace was invaluable as far as internal difficulties were concerned. Curzon's wish to postpone the opening date of the Conference in the light of the impending election in Britain irritated the Turkish government. On 8 November, on the occasion of conveying Ankara's message of dissatisfaction to the British delegation in Istanbul, Ismet Pasha was reported to have complained that every day's delay made it harder for them because of internal affairs. 'Whether he meant the Bolshevik grip or the increase of feeling against the Nationalists', Rumbold continued, 'I could not discover'.⁷¹

In view of the information as to present attitude of the Grand National Assembly and the Turkish army, Rumbold was particularly worried that the adjournment of the Conference might seriously endanger the maintenance of the armistice. On 12 November he advised, together with the other Allied High Commissioners, that the conference meet as soon as possible and that a definite date be fixed immediately.⁷² Nonetheless, a delay was inevitable and Rumbold advised

⁷⁰. WO106/1444 No. 1112, November 4, 1922, Secret Foreign Office Despatch; DBFP, XVIII No. 159.

⁷¹. WO106/1444 No. 1153, November 8, 1922, General Harington to the War Office.

⁷². FO371/7912/E12581/27/44, November 11, 1922, Curzon to Graham; DBFP, XVIII No. 180.

Ismet Pasha to postpone his departure until a final decision as to the date of the opening of the Conference was reached.⁷³ Although Ismet Pasha in his memoirs underlined the fact that he had not been informed as to the adjournment, Rumbold's account indicates quite the opposite. Ismet Pasha, despite being informed of the adjournment on 8 November by Rumbold, proceeded to Lausanne on the grounds that the Ankara government had received no official notification of the adjournment of the Conference, and that he ought to be at Lausanne on the date originally indicated.⁷⁴ His action was, according to him, designed to pacify the opposition at home by indicating that peace was on the way rather than by 'placing the Allies in the wrong' as Rumbold contemplated.

The postponement of the Conference was considered undesirable not only for its possible political repercussions, but also because of military considerations. In a secret telegram sent to the Admiralty on October 12th, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean was also in favour of an immediate start of the Conference and expressed his concern about the delay. In support of his argument he wrote, "Apart from the expense of maintaining large naval and military forces in these waters it is certain that as the occupation of Thrace proceeds and the winter comes on, so the desire of the Nationalist Army to occupy Constantinople will increase... with the British force reduced by a Brigade in Thrace a threat to Constantinople would create a very awkward situation".⁷⁵

Whatever difficulties may have been involved prior to the negotiations, matters were much compromised by the postponement of the Conference. Not only did it antagonise Turkey, but it also irritated Britain's allies, rendering all collaboration once more impractical. Curzon initially failed to get the support he

⁷³. WO106/1444 No. 1136, November 6, 1922, War Office to Rumbold.

⁷⁴. FO371/7912/E12313/27/44, November 8, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII No. 168; Inonu, *Hatıralar*, p.50; Simsir, *Lozan Telgrafları I*, No.3. November 14, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁷⁵. WO106/1426 No. 491, October 12, 1922, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean to the Admiralty.

expected from Poincaré and Mussolini in the name of unity. Poincaré, having declined responsibility for the effect the news of the postponement might have upon the Ankara government and Turkish public opinion, was convinced that every day's delay increased the difficulties in the way of concluding peace and might well lead to a resumption of hostilities. In his note of November 7 to Hardinge, Poincaré expressed his concern in the following lines: '[The Turks] are coming to believe that they will only obtain by force of arms the advantages which they feel now to be within their grasp'.⁷⁶ Italy shared Curzon's view and considered the difficulties raised in his letter 'substantial'. They were ready to take joint action but felt 'bound by promise to be ready by November 13th,' and could 'at a pinch honour it.'⁷⁷ They nonetheless hoped that the Turks would ask for a postponement.

The Turks were, however, far from asking for a postponement as they were under severe political pressure at home. In order to prevent any embarrassment to the Allies, Poincaré stepped in by inviting Ismet Pasha to France for a week. This move alarmed Curzon, who feared that Turkey and France would come to an agreement between themselves. Curzon's fear was unfounded; Ismet Pasha explained in his memoirs that the sole reason for his welcoming of Poincaré's invitation was to find out if the Allies' desire for peace was genuine.⁷⁸ In the end, due to French intervention, the problems of postponement were overcome without further controversy. The 'undesirable consequences' implied in Ismet Pasha's communiqué urging an immediate start to negotiations did not follow.

⁷⁶. WO106/1444 No. 1170, November 7, 1922, Hardinge to the War Office; DBFP, XVIII No. 164-168.

⁷⁷. WO106/ 1444 No. 1126, November 5, 1922, Graham (Rome) to the War Office.

⁷⁸. Inonu, *Hatıralar*, p. 50-51; Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was not at all pleased at Ismet's Pasha's visit to Paris and with the fear of France and Turkey coming into a separate agreement, it instructed Lord Hardinge 'to point out to Poincaré importance of preserving Allied solidarity and avoiding appearance of separate action by France, and to request that Ismet Pasha should not be received by anyone in authority. FO371/7913/E12676/27/44.

After the settlement of these three questions examined above, the way was now open for the negotiations at Lausanne. Britain and Turkey, determined to conclude a peace, though for different reasons, sat at the conference table to discuss the terms of the peace. The outcome of the Conference no longer depended on the good-will of the two sides but on the success of the formulation of their strategies and of their tactical skills. The first phase of the Conference would provide an excellent platform where upon each side could effectively implement their strategies in order to secure a more favourable settlement.

IV

THE CONFERENCE: FIRST PHASE

(November 20, 1922 - February 4, 1923)

The Opening Manoeuvres

The Conference which gave birth to the Treaty and ultimately to the foundation of the Turkish Republic convened in Lausanne on Tuesday 20 November, 1922 with Turkey on one side and Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania on the other. The basis of the Conference was the necessity of concluding peace between Greece and Turkey and at the same time of ending the state of war which existed technically between Turkey and those Allies with which it had been at war since 1914. The United States and Russia also participated in the Conference insofar as it concerned their interests.¹ The delegation of the United States, which went to Lausanne to present the American position and to protect American interests in the Near East, was present at all discussions though it did not enter into any engagement or sign any documents.²

¹. Evans, United States Policy, pp. 376-417. Child, the United States delegate, explains the purposes of US participation in the Conference, see: Foreign Relations of the United States. FRUS, (1923), vol. II, No. 226; William O. Scroogs., 'American Interests at Lausanne' Foreign Affairs, 10 (1932), pp.688-690.

Russia was invited to the conference at the request of the Turks with a view to enlisting Russian support in the face of expected British opposition.

². FRUS, No. 7; Parliamentary Papers, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923; Cmd.1814, (1923) p.11; Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, Chapter IV.

The Department of State was to summarise the position of the United States as follows: 'While it is neither natural nor desirable that we should participate in the peace conference or become involved in the negotiations regarding policies or aims in which we have no share it is essential that the Department should be constantly in command of adequate information, keen for the protection of American interests,

Amongst the countries represented at Lausanne, the concept of "equality" was something to which Turkey attached the greatest importance and about which it was particularly sensitive. In almost every correspondence the phrase "on the basis of equality" occurred. In this way, Turkey was trying to get the message across that even the slightest desire on the part of the Allies to treat it less favourably than the other delegations was not acceptable. Ismet Pasha was very much concerned that the Turkish delegation should participate in the Conference 'on the same footing of equality' as the other powers and was not prepared to accept any arrangement contrary to this principle. Turkish sensitivity about equality had manifested itself even before the opening of the Conference when Ismet Pasha realised that Turkey had been placed at the same table with the small states, far away from the victors of the war. He protested against what he felt was an intentional slight and managed to secure a more favourable seating arrangement.³ This was not the last time the head of the Turkish delegation felt compelled to assert the equal standing.

The second incident occurred at the opening ceremony of the Conference. Having learned that Curzon would deliver an unscheduled speech following the Swiss President's address of welcome, Ismet Pasha decided to do the same. After Curzon's response of a complimentary character, Ismet Pasha, unexpectedly, advanced to the stage and addressed the delegates, emphasising the new position of Turkey as a free and independent state.⁴ Despite having been toned down

ready to throw the full weight of our influence to obtain assurances for the freedom of the Straits and the protection of minorities, candid as to our views and in a position at any suitable time to make the separate agreement which at some time must be made with the Turkish Government recognised by the Powers. No point of advantage should be forfeited, no just influence lost, no injurious commitments made. We should maintain the integrity of our position as an independent power which had not been concerned with the rivalries of other nations which we have so often made the Near East the theatre of war...' FRUS, 1923, II, p. 887-888 .

³.; Further evidence of Turkey's sensitivity about the issue of equality was to be seen at a later stage of the conference when M. Kemal sent a telegram to Ismet Pasha indicating his satisfaction about the seating arrangement at a dinner given by Garroni, in which Turkey was placed at the same table as Britain, France and Italy, apart from the small states.

⁴. For Ismet Pasha's speech see: Cmd.1814 (1923) p. 4; Sevket Sureyya Aydemir., İkinci Adam, Cilt I. (1884-1938) p.227; Aydemir., Tek Adam, p. 105; Seha L. Meray., Lozan Baris Konferansi: Tutanaklar, Belgeler (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1969), Takim I, Cilt I, p. VI; Roderic H. Davison., 'Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After' The Middle East Journal, 7 (Summer 1953), pp. 324-348.

beforehand at Poincaré's suggestion, Ismet Pasha's speech caused great dissatisfaction among the British delegation. According to Curzon Ismet Pasha's attitude was indicative of the spirit in which the Turkish delegation were approaching the Conference and foreshadowed 'trouble at every turn'.⁵ Nevertheless Ismet Pasha's intention, contrary to Curzon's conviction, had been to show to the Conference that he and Curzon stood on an equal footing even if it might not be the kind of speech expected at a ceremonial session. However, Ismet Pasha's determination to make his weight felt at the Conference remained limited to his unscheduled speech.

The third occurrence was even more serious. According to the rules a Swiss citizen was to preside over the Conference since it was held on Swiss territory. However, as the Swiss government had renounced the presidency, in the course of conversations in Paris it had been proposed that the presidency should be exercised in strict rotation by the Powers who had organised the Conference, namely, Britain France and Italy. When Ismet Pasha learned that the rotation of the presidency was limited to France, Italy and Britain he argued that this rotation 'should also include Turkey on the grounds that the latter had also, in the first instance, invited the powers to meet at Smyrna; the position of an inviting power could also apply to her'.⁶

While Ismet Pasha's protests fell on deaf ears, Curzon, using his skill and experience, had already successfully used the rotation for his own ends. He suddenly announced that it would fall to the 'senior' representatives of the powers that had organised the Conference to preside at the meetings following the opening ceremony. The criteria of that seniority were not to be questioned by other delegates. As regards the question of the presidency of the commissions, he once

⁵. FO839/5 No. 15; November 29, 1922, Curzon to Crowe. DBFP, XVIII, No. 209;

⁶. Cmd.1814, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. Turkey (1923) p. 8.

more established his authority and stated that the responsibility for the Conference rested on those Powers which had convoked it and that, therefore, it belonged to them to direct the debates of the commissions. Ismet Pasha's second attempt to get a Turkish delegate appointed as secretary-general of the Conference was successfully ruled out by Lord Curzon, who pointed out that the request was 'contrary to all precedents' and proposed Rene Massigli, the French delegate, leaving no chance for Ismet Pasha to object. It was a *fait accompli* that Ismet Pasha never expected.

In contrast to his adversary, Curzon was an experienced statesman. His masterly use of language is clearly detectable in his 'picturesque telegrams', as described by William Tyrell.⁷ 'He talks well,' wrote Joseph Grew, the second American delegate, in his memoirs, 'with a beautiful choice of words and expressions'.⁸ His great knowledge of the East, and his ability and skills as a negotiator unquestionably gave him a tremendous advantage over his counterpart, so much so, that at the outset of the Conference, on the grounds of his experience and authority, Curzon took charge of all important territorial and military commissions, despite strong protests from Ismet Pasha, and thus was able to control the time table of the Conference. 'They have sent me, a soldier,' Ismet Pasha remarked to an English journalist, 'to fight a Bismarck, one of your greatest statesmen'.⁹

After the opening speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation at the Casino de Montbenon, the meetings were held in the Hotel du Château d'Ouchy, where English, French and Italian were chosen as the official languages and commissions and sub-commissions were set up for the issues to be discussed. The first of the three main Committees would deal with territorial issues and be presided

7. FO800/243, (private letter), December 7, 1922, Tyrell to Crowe.

8. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p.491; Inonu, *Hatiralari*, p. 75.

9. Grace Mary Ellison., *An Englishwoman in Angora*, (London: Hutchinson, 1923), pp. 305, 308.

over by Lord Curzon himself, while the second and third Committees would examine the Capitulations and Minorities under the presidency of Marquis C. Garroni and economic and financial matters chaired by Pierre Eugène C. Barrère.

When Barrère requested that the three commissions should not sit simultaneously, so that all the delegates could take part in the debates, Lord Curzon quickly grasped the opportunity to propose that the Territorial Committee should be the first to sit and that the Conference should wait before embarking on the work of the other two commissions until the first had made some progress.¹⁰ By doing so he obtained the important advantage of being in charge of the organisation and the agenda of the Conference. He was able to conduct a policy of his own as to the organisation and agenda of the Conference since he was better qualified by knowledge and experience than any of the delegates in politics.

Once in the Conference he continued to control the negotiations, overriding Ismet Pasha's objections to the draft of procedure, drawn up by the Allies, 'with velvet words but steam roller methods'.¹¹ When he reported to the Foreign Office, Curzon was to describe objections of the Turks as of a 'very trivial character intended to establish their claim to complete equality or to satisfy their national pride'.¹² As Grew rightly observed Ismet Pasha represented 'a victorious nation but he was being regarded as a vanquished enemy; his delegation was being given no consideration whatever in the organisation of the conference'.¹³ Ismet Pasha, not being able to get any presidency of the three commissions or the secretariat of the Conference and failing to obtain that the Turks be allowed three instead of two delegates, lost the first round. It has been argued that Curzon's handling of the

¹⁰ Cmd.1814, p. 12.

¹¹ Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 491.

¹² . FO371/7965/E13003/13003/44, November 21, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 211.

¹³ Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p.492.

Conference was to be one of the 'classic examples of expert diplomacy'¹⁴ This was clearly the case regarding the opening stage of the Conference. At the outset of the Conference, Curzon, having obtained control of the procedure, secured a victory over Ismet Pasha and was now in a position to conduct the negotiations in line with his diplomatic strategy.

The Formulation of Strategies

Britain Rests on Allied Unity

Allied unity constituted a cardinal principle of Britain's Near Eastern policy. As this formed the basis of Curzon's strategic policy, the British diplomat made every attempt to preserve a united allied front; it was absolutely vital for Curzon to achieve this harmony in order to defend British interests. Although no such unity of view existed among the Allies in regard to questions which had to be settled in Lausanne, he managed to secure at least the facade of it. Disagreements, which in the earlier stages of the Conference had simmered beneath the surface, at a later period boiled up into active controversy from time to time. Such disagreements were due not only to personal, political and military rivalries but also to real differences of conviction as to the nature of peace treaty with Turkey. The events of the last months of 1922 had left behind them specific issues around which disagreement inevitably tended to crystallise. In view of a possible failure to reach a common peace at Lausanne, Curzon was critical of his colleagues. 'The enemies whom I have to contend with and defeat' he wrote to Lindsay on January 31st, 'are not at Angora, but at Paris and Rome'.¹⁵ The question of how far the so-called

¹⁴. Nicolson, Curzon, p. 282.

¹⁵. FO839/17; FO371/7969/E14471/13003/44, December 26, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/9062/E1240/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 293, 357; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers.

solidarity among the Allies would stand the test of Turkish insistence was to be answered as the negotiations progressed.

After having obtained control over procedure, Curzon was able to bring the questions (i.e. territorial questions) under discussion first in which Britain was primarily interested and over which the Allies could display a solid front, while the Turks were in a relatively weak position. The first sixteen meetings of the Conference were held under the name of the Territorial Committee - since the progress of the first Committee was to determine the work of the second and the third Committees - whereas Barrère's Committee met six times, and Garroni's only five. In other words, the Conference should wait before embarking on the work of the other two commissions until the first had made some progress. This meant that unless Curzon secured British interests in a satisfactory way - that is, an international regime of the Straits under British control, and retention of the rich oil regions of Mosul - the Conference would slow down and not be able to make progress on issues concerning other parties.

The most striking example of this strategy was to be seen over the Mosul question, which lay at the heart of the British claims. It was well known to the British that the question of Mosul would constitute one of the principal obstacles to the establishment of peace in the Near East. On November 6, two weeks prior to the Conference, Rumbold wrote to Curzon that the 'Question of Mosul will be test of Turkish attitude in immediate future... Unless I am much mistaken Kemalists will press strongly for its retrocession.'¹⁶ Curzon was particularly well aware of the fact that Mosul was going to be the crux of the Conference.¹⁷ But it was only when he

¹⁶ FO800/157, November 6, 1922, Rumbold to Curzon, Curzon Papers.

¹⁷ FO839/16 No. 229, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; F112/295, January 25, 1923, Curzon to Balfour, Curzon Papers.

The Turks have always regarded Mosul as an integral part of the district, a fraction of the mother country, so that this issue was for the Turks before and above everything 'territorial'. Furthermore the Turks had, from the outset, maintained that the occupation of Mosul by the British troops was illegal since on October 30, 1918, the day when the Armistice of Mudros was signed, Mosul was in Turkish hands. The town of Mosul was occupied by the British after that date and without fighting. Curzon's

realised that it had reached a deadlock that he established his strategy to slow down the Conference and make other issues difficult to settle. 'In view of undesirability of giving impression that Mosul is only or even main obstacle to conclusion of peace,' wrote Balfour to Curzon in January 1923, 'reference could be made to Turkish obstinacy on other questions and previous refusal of Turks to avail themselves of good offices of League.'¹⁸

That is precisely what Curzon had in mind in his dealings with the Turks. He followed his strategy by being an ardent supporter of the Allies' claims on matters which were of secondary importance to British interests and by making unreasonable proposals that were bound to be refused by the Turks. He knew perfectly well that when he telegraphed to Ankara the negotiations would stir the Grand National Assembly and stiffen the Turkish delegation's position. 'Curzon, by his methods starts a train of consequences,' commented A. Washburn Child, the American observer, in his memoirs, 'which forces the Turkish delegation to be more obstinate than ever'.¹⁹ Curzon, then, would remark upon the 'intransigent attitude' of the Turks and endeavour to gain the sympathy of world opinion.²⁰ On several occasions he played the same game, telling Ismet Pasha that unless Turkey came into line with the Allies' proposals, international public opinion would judge where the responsibility lay.²¹

Apart from securing absolute unity between the Allies, Curzon's main concern was to avoid any rupture over the questions primarily concerning Britain. He planned his strategy in such a way that the possible reason for breaking up the Conference was to be shifted to a controversy in which British interests were not

argument about that was that the news of the Armistice reached Mosul on November 1. In addition, the strategic importance of Vilayet and the rich oil reserves were the factors which contributed to the dispute.

¹⁸. FO371/9062 /E1090/1/44, January 27, 1923, Balfour to Curzon.

¹⁹. Child, *A Diplomat Looks at Europe*, p. 98

²⁰. FO839/36. No. 316, December 3, 1922, Curzon to Crowe.

²¹. FO371/7967/E14370/13003/44, December 2, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 286; FO839/17 No. 154.

solely or mainly affected. When it became apparent that deadlock was inevitable over the question of Mosul, he used the minority and humanitarian question as a 'bed upon which to fall' in case a rupture came on the subject. Towards the last stages of the first phase of the Conference, Curzon's strategy became known to his allies, who began to suspect that the bed upon which to fall was the Capitulations. 'Rumours go around that Curzon will break on Mosul but will make it appear that this rupture comes on capitulations,' remarked Child, referring to the atmosphere surrounding the Conference Hall. As the Conference progressed Child's judgement of Curzon's tactic would become more precise. 'I have no doubt,' he declared, 'that he is really fishing for a breach on capitulations in case he cannot dispose of the Mosul question'.²²

Ismet Pasha was not unaware of Curzon's tactic. In an interview given to *Le Matin* he maintained that from the moment the British delegation realised that the Turks would not give way on the question of Mosul, the discussion of the Capitulations became embittered.²³ The question of the Capitulations, which restricted the sovereignty exercised by a state, within the limits of its territory, over persons and property, was of vital importance to the Turkish delegation and as Ismet Pasha pointed out to Child in a private conversation of November 27, they would be 'a serious hindrance' to the negotiations.²⁴

From the outset of the Conference, even well before the negotiations were due, Curzon, equipped with the information provided by intelligence reports, was fully aware that the issue of the Capitulations was one of the two over which the Turkish delegation had the authority to break off the negotiations without consulting Ankara. He also knew that the position of the Allies with political, economic,

22. Child., *A Diplomat Looks at Europe*, p. 114.

23. FO371/7968/E14597/13003/44, December 30, 1923, Crewe to the Foreign Office; FO424/255 No. 862.

24. FRUS, (1923) II, No. 25; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 502.

financial and judicial interests in Turkey would be equally affected by the Capitulations. 'In view of general situation created by the renaissance of Turkey as a not negligible military power, and the practical impossibility for Great Britain to enforce upon her any demands not supported by the Allies in earnest,' wrote E. Graham Forbes Adam, First Secretary in the Foreign Office Eastern Department, in a memorandum of January 1923, 'our policy at the conference ought to be to restrict our demands to the barest minimum and leave the burden of fighting the Turkish pretensions as much as possible to France and Italy. For even France and Italy will have in their own interests to stand up for something, notably in the field of capitulations, finance and economics.'²⁵

By proposing that the demands concerning the Capitulations be thrown at the Turks, whose well-expected response would be a categorical refusal, not only would Curzon shift the controversy to another dimension by avoiding rupture and possible resumption of hostilities on the questions mainly interesting Britain, but he would also display a solid Allied front against the Turks and place Turkey in an awkward position by advertising as much as possible the Turks' 'obstinacy'. After an unsuccessful appeal to Ismet Pasha over the Capitulations, Curzon would refer to his usual method once more and blame Ismet Pasha for being intransigent. 'Impossible people,' he wrote to the Foreign Office, 'who seemed to combine the intelligence of an undeveloped child with the indurated obstinacy of the mule.'²⁶

The continued occupation of Istanbul, which Curzon held as a trump card in the negotiations, proved 'a useful lever to get the Turkish delegates to expedite the proceedings of the conference' in so far as the Allies were concerned. Contrary to the War Office wishing for an evacuation 'the sooner the better,' Curzon was adamant that it would be in the interest of Britain not to evacuate the city until the

²⁵ FO371/7907/E11785/27/44, January 23, Memorandum by Forbes Adam.

²⁶ FO839/17 No. 210; FO371/9059/E726/1/44, January 15, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 327; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 380.

signature was secured. 'I suppose Foreign Office realises that when evacuation has been completed the last means of exercising pressure upon Turks...will have gone'.²⁷ Rumbold would follow the same line as his predecessor in the second part of the Conference. He would make it clear to Ismet Pasha that it was not possible to discuss the question of evacuation until the treaty was either about to be, or had already been, signed.²⁸ Despite Ismet Pasha's constant appeals for an immediate evacuation, neither Curzon nor Rumbold was prepared to alter his position unless he secured a satisfactory settlement.

Curzon was to describe Britain's tactics as 'complicated in application but simple in meaning'. He would try first to bargain and obtain what he wanted, failing that, to leave his Allies 'to dabble in further negotiations' while he 'aggravated the situation or played the role of a peace maker' between them.²⁹ The British strategy at the Conference was feasible so long as the Allied front survived and its survival depended on how far the Turkish delegation could go to satisfy the Allied demands. In order to obtain maximum concessions from the Turkish delegation, Curzon had to press hard but without causing the break up of the negotiations.

Turkey Aims to Neutralise Britain

The Turkish strategy at Lausanne was based upon the arrangements by the GNA.³⁰ Turkey's standpoint could be summarised in three points: The Turkish Empire had ceased to exist; in consequence, the Treaty of Sèvres and all other treaties concluded by the Empire with any other state had become null and void; and

²⁷. FO371/9079/E5440/1/44, May 29, 1923, Minute; FO371/7973/E13120/27/44, November 23, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 218.

²⁸. FO371/9079/E5132/1/44, May 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

²⁹. Euding and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, No. 43

³⁰. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Cilt III, pp. 1304-1325; FO371/7964/E13341/13003/44, November 10, 1922, Secret Intelligence Report, No. 968.

the new Turkish State had never been at war with the Allies but only Greece, and the peace treaty, properly speaking, was only necessary so far as Greece was concerned. In regard to the Allies and other Powers, 'the Turkish delegates were to endeavour to start, as it were, with a clean slate, completely disregarding all anterior relations between Turkey and foreign powers, except as regards the various treaties and agreements concluded by the Grand National Assembly'. Moreover, the Turkish delegates were also 'to take every advantage of differences of opinion and rivalries' between the powers and 'conclude separate treaties with them,' the same phrase used by Ismet Pasha later in his memoirs. 'Further corroborative information from the informants' was also included in the report about the attitude of the Turkish delegation on the specific points in question.

The most important advantage Ismet Pasha enjoyed was the weakness of Allied unity. It was a unity of vague promises engineered by Curzon and accepted by others in return for British support on issues about which they were most concerned. At the outset of the Conference he established his strategy of destroying Curzon's unity of promises by offering reasonable concessions. The initial Turkish strategy was to enter into separate arrangements with the Allies and then to enter into struggle with Britain. Ismet Pasha was quite prepared to make concessions to the Allies with a view to securing their neutrality, if not their actual support. But as the negotiations progressed he was compelled to revise his strategy since he came to believe that even the whole of Turkey would not be enough to satisfy the Allies, who were far from supporting the Turkish case against Britain. He thus became convinced that in order to achieve a rapid peace it was essential to come to terms with the British first, for once an agreement had been reached with them it was highly unlikely that the Conference would break down on the issues concerning other Allies.³¹ 'Before the Conference started,' Ismet Pasha recalled in his

³¹. Inonu, Hatıralar, p.73-74.

memoirs, 'we were convinced that our relations with the French, which had already been ameliorated, would further improve, whereas the entire difficulty would come from the British side. At the outset of the Lausanne Conference the British government was constantly making every effort to secure unity among the Allies - a move which we had expected, but in practice British efforts proved to be far more successful than expected.'³²

Ankara's determination for peace with England was to be reiterated at every opportunity, and the necessity for reconciliation between England and Turkey was to be emphasised as an invaluable asset for the peace. When interviewed by the *Manchester Guardian* in November 1922, shortly before the opening of the Conference, General Refet Pasha (Refet Bele), a stalwart of the Nationalist movement who had recently been appointed governor of Eastern Thrace by the GNA, stated that Turkey needed the friendship of England and that England's interests did not clash with those of Turkey. Although they had differences of opinion over the question of Mosul, Western Thrace and the Capitulations, which were seen as a gross violation of Turkish sovereignty, Turkey's attitude on the Straits question was 'identical with England's.' Nevertheless, in spite of these comparatively peaceful declarations there were also signs of extreme nervousness as to the question of Mosul. 'Mosul is Turkish and we want it back,' continued Refet Pasha. 'Here is England's opportunity. She could win our friendship with one stroke if she gave Mosul to us without bargaining. And if she were to give us Mesopotamia as well she would win not only our friendship but that of all Islam.' Recalling the unpleasant consequences of the former British government's policy, Refet Pasha was cautious. 'We do not know what the new English government will be like, but with generosity, understanding and clear logical thinking it will win our

³². Ibid. p.84.

friendship and establish peace in the Near East. Treat us fairly, and we shall be your friends.³³

The Turks seemed to have made every effort to convince the British that their prime objective was to make peace with Britain. In December, shortly after the beginning of the Conference, Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Curzon's Private Secretary, wrote to Rumbold: 'My impression is that the Turks were waiting and hoping for one thing and one thing only, an absolute proof of the willingness of the British to be friends with them again. The issue in Turkish mind is Great Britain or Russia. I believe if they got that proof they would not hesitate to throw over the Russians.'³⁴ Henderson's telegram to Rumbold supported Vansittart's argument. 'A good deal of anti-English stuff is being censored out of the press,' he reported, 'though more than I like to see still remains. It is quite clear that the Turks regard England as the only factor to reckon with at the peace conference.'³⁵

The uncertainty of Britain's real future intentions, as well as the Turks' distrust of Curzon because of his connection with the former government, however, made the Turks hesitate. They regarded Curzon as unconvinced of the desirability of good Anglo-Turkish relations. The lack of any friendly gesture on the part of Britain might serve the continuation of close collaboration between Turkey and Russia. Curzon was very much concerned about the possible consequences of such a friendship. On the second day of the Conference, November 21st, to Curzon's question as to how long the Turco-Russian friendship would last, Ismet Pasha replied: 'Forever.'³⁶

³³. FO371/7908/E12062/27/44; For Rauf Bey's speech delivered at the Grand National Assembly on 15. 12. 1922, showing the earnest desire for peace, see: FO371/7918/E14124/27/44.

³⁴. FO800/157, December 12, 1922, Vansittart to Rumbold; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 130-136

³⁵. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 120-124, December 11, 1922, Henderson to Rumbold; ff. 130-136, December 12, 1922, Henderson to Rumbold.

³⁶. Sımsir, Lozan Telgrafları I, No. 14. November 21, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

Nevertheless, it did not take long for Ismet Pasha to change his view. During the Straits discussion, when Ismet Pasha realised that the only way to peace was through Britain, he altered his strategy and favoured the British thesis on the Straits question, despite the fact that Soviet proposals corresponded most closely to the Turkish point of view and that the Soviets supported Turkey on the Mosul question.

There were other considerations influencing the strategy change on the part of Turkey. Turkey needed peace, and in order to secure peace it first needed Britain's support, which depended on arriving at a compromise over the questions of Mosul and the Straits. Second, the main ground for anxiety for Turkey's future lay in its capacity to deal with economic questions in a reasonable fashion.

Mustafa Kemal had a realistic conception of the need for economic reconstruction and development, and his public speeches at the end of 1922 and early in 1923 gave evidence of his desire to satisfy this need, and a conviction that this could only be achieved by encouraging the influx of foreign capital; more precisely, by establishing good relations with the West. In that respect the *Manchester Guardian's* interview with Refet Pasha was a significant one, conveying Ankara's message. 'We shall need English, French and American capitalists and technical advisers and experts. We intend to invite them to help in building up our new state'. The essence of the message was couched in the following sentence: 'Turkey would do as Britain desired if latter accepted National Pact which comprised Turkey's minimum demands.'³⁷ In a private conversation with Henderson, Refet Pasha once again made it clear that the only thing Turkey needed from Britain was a sign: an 'expression of willingness to accept National Pact which was based on Wilsonian principles.' Although Turkey was 'honestly' and 'sincerely' desirous of peace it could not accept less than the National Pact. As Refet

³⁷. FO371/7917/E13726/27/44, *Manchester Guardian*, Interview with Refet Pasha.

Pasha pointed out in the same interview, 'If her representatives at Lausanne or her leaders at Angora attempted to do so they would be repudiated and overthrown.'³⁸ Turkish support for either the British or Russian proposal on the Straits question was to determine the course of the Conference, Curzon's success or failure, and the future of Turco-Russian relations.

Development and Proceedings

Progress without Breakthrough

After the first plenary session on November 21, 1922, the Conference, having organised and adopted rules of procedure, started its complicated task by discussing the frontiers of Thrace on November 22 under the presidency of Curzon's Territorial and Military Commission. According to the original programme of the Conference, the Mosul question was to be discussed first. However, Curzon, having skilfully used his position as chairman of the Territorial and Military Commission, re-organised the Conference agenda and started the negotiations with the discussion of the Thracian border. Also, on November 26, a day before the Mosul question was scheduled for discussion in the Territorial Commission, Curzon had a private conversation with Ismet Pasha and persuaded him to discuss the matter outside the Conference, with a view to reaching a private agreement. Curzon's tactic was to keep disputed points for private discussions and avoid public disagreement in the Conference so as to obtain a better deal and prevent any embarrassment before the international community.³⁹ This effort could be assessed as a success for Curzon, as one of the strongest Turkish theses was postponed. Moreover, from the very start he was able to maintain the facade of so-

³⁸ FO424/255 No. 735, December 6, 1922, Henderson to Crowe.

³⁹ FO371/7967/E14272/13003/44, December 20, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 284; FO839/22 No. 21; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/5, November 26, 1922, (Allen Leeper's Diary).

called Allied unity on a subject where grave differences of opinion existed. Curzon left the settlement of the Question suspended and put another issue on the agenda, the one with which he would be able to demonstrate the solidarity of the Allies and of the Balkan states, and the one where the Turkish thesis had weak points: Thrace.

The Question of Thrace was, in Busch's words, 'an opening skirmish' of little real importance to Britain's Asian policy, but it did emphasise the effectiveness of Curzon's strategy.⁴⁰ Not only did he succeed in uniting the Allies behind the British thesis, but he also secured the full support of the Balkan states, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Ismet Pasha's argument was that the frontier of Thrace⁴¹ claimed by Turkey - from the Black Sea to the Maritza river - was that defined by article 7 of the Treaty of Constantinople, dated April 29, 1913. Having ceded Western Thrace and the hinterland stretching from Adrianople to Demotika to the Bulgarians in the course of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Turkey did not have strong ground in the face of the Greek claim that they had taken Western Thrace from the Bulgarians and not from the Turks. The Allies, on the other hand, recommended a thirty-kilometre demilitarised zone from the Black Sea to the Maritza river, to which Ismet Pasha would consent only on the conditions that the Allies gave guarantees for its inviolability and that there would be no foreign supervision over the territory. Ismet Pasha also demanded a plebiscite for Western Thrace⁴² where a Turkish majority was incontestable; this alarmed the Balkan

⁴⁰ Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 366.

⁴¹ The Maritza river divided Thrace into two sections, namely Eastern Thrace and Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace, under the Treaty of Sèvres, was given to Greece, but with the Mudania Convention the Allies agreed that the province should be restored to Turkey. Western Thrace, by the conclusion of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), was ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Treaty of Bucharest; two years later, in 1915, an additional portion of Western Thrace, namely Karagatch and Demotika, had to be ceded to Bulgaria, under German pressure, as a price for its entry into the war. By the end of 1919, however, Bulgaria in line with the peace treaty signed at Neuilly, ceded Western Thrace to the Allied Powers. Almost a year later, on August 10, 1920, the Allies with the Thracian Treaty, transferred the province to Greece, though this treaty was never ratified. See: Cmd. 1814, pp. 40-61; Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, pp. 1009-1012; Inonu, Hatiralari, p.63-68; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 21. November 23, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁴² Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 25-28; DBFP, XVIII, No. 215; Inonu, Hatiralari, p. 63-64; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, pp. 494-495; Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 293-298.

states, which were convinced that once the plebiscite was carried out the frontiers of Turkey would stretch up to the west of Maritza river.

Ismet Pasha had not expected the exhibition of so firm an Allied front and of a determined 'Balkan Bloc' in the very first round. In a telegram of November 22 to Ankara, he reported that he had little hope of securing the plebiscite in Western Thrace or the frontiers of Eastern Thrace as laid down in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, but that he was optimistic about gaining Karagatch. He was convinced that he could follow a flexible policy since the Thracian question was not regarded as 'essential' at Ankara. Rauf Bey's telegram of November 26-27 informing Ismet Pasha of the approval of the Council of Ministers of the line taken by him was evidence of Turkey's flexible approach.⁴³ 'Whatever happens,' Ismet Pasha wrote in his telegram to Ankara, 'I will not let the negotiations break up for the sake of these points.'⁴⁴

What Ismet Pasha did not expect was the solid Allied front strengthened by the Balkan block. Curzon threatened Ismet Pasha by pointing out 'the unwisdom of coming into collision not merely with inviting Powers, who were united, but with the solid block of Balkan States.'⁴⁵ In his words, that meant 'much more than the mere fact of Allied unity; it meant a terrible risk for those who declined to recognise the value and importance of this unity. It meant that those who might challenge it, and in the long run fight against it, would be provoking a contest of a one-sided character in which they could not hope to succeed.'⁴⁶ To Ismet Pasha it underlined the fact that a more conciliatory approach was needed and that in order to be able to show a strong hand at the coming part of the negotiations for crucial issues, small

⁴³. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 34. November 26/27, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

⁴⁴. Ibid. No. 19. November 22, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁴⁵. DBFP, XVIII, No. 226, November 26, 1922, Curzon to Henderson; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.31, November 26, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁴⁶. Cmd. 1814, p. 92.

sacrifices could be made. The Thracian frontier, thus, was to be the first breach in the National Pact.

The fate of the Aegean Islands⁴⁷ was also to be discussed on the same day, November 25, at the sixth meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission held in the afternoon. Ismet Pasha's policy was to secure the recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the islands of Imbros and Tenedos on account of their proximity to the mouth of the Dardanelles, and the demilitarisation of the main group of islands lying between the above group and the Dodecanese, currently in the hands of the Greeks. These islands could serve as a basis of operations. The very object of the proposed measures was to make it impossible for Greece to prepare offensive operations against Turkey on these islands. It was therefore essential to demilitarise them. The abrogation of Greek sovereignty over the main group of islands and the institution of a form of autonomy were, as Curzon stated, 'a try-on'. Ismet Pasha also knew that his argument concerning the Dodecanese islands, which were ceded to Italy in 1912 by the Treaty of Ouchy, would not be a strong one and would probably be dismissed without difficulty by Curzon. But he would not take a chance as to the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos and Samothrace, which were of vital importance from the point of view of the security of Turkey. In reply to Curzon's argument about the ethnic character of these islands, Ismet Pasha lost no time in exposing the double standards of the Allies. He pointed out that 'in a matter so essential' the ethnic character could not 'outweigh geographical and political considerations of the highest importance'. He placed his finger upon the weak point of Curzon's argument by referring to the discussion of Thrace during which the superiority of geographical and political necessities over ethnic considerations had been asserted despite the overwhelming Turkish majority. Thus, Ismet Pasha

⁴⁷. During the Balkan Wars Greece had seized all the Aegean islands from Turkey, except Rhodes and the Dodecanese islands which were at the time under Italian occupation. By the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913, Greece was confirmed in possession of these islands with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos which were restored to Turkey, but with the Sèvres Treaty Greece also obtained Imbros and Tenedos.

managed successfully to have the official decision concerning the sovereignty of these islands deferred until discussion of the Straits question. He insisted that the question of these islands was closely bound up with that of the Straits and hoped to get the full support of the Russians in the course of the forthcoming negotiations.

On the other hand, Curzon, who had given no consideration to the Turkish delegation in the organisation of the Conference, was to suggest that the Economic Commission under the presidency of M. Barrère could begin its work on the afternoon of the 27th November, the day the frontiers of Syria and Iraq were to be discussed. Therefore the Territorial and Economic Commissions would work concurrently but not simultaneously, providing the opportunity for Curzon to control the agenda of the Conference. That would give him the opportunity to exert pressure upon Ismet Pasha in the event of an unsatisfactory settlement of the Straits. In the case of failure to reach a satisfactory result concerning British claims, he would have the means of exerting pressure upon Ismet Pasha by vigorously supporting the Allies' demands in economic matters which did not primarily concern Britain.

In the meantime Ismet Pasha carried on a series of private conversations outside the Conference. On November 27, a day before the Mosul question was scheduled for discussion in the Territorial Commission, he met Curzon in private and discussed the matter in detail. That was when he realised that the issue would cause great difficulty and possibly lead to the break-up of the Conference. In the face of Ismet Pasha's demand for the restoration of Mosul to Turkey on ethnic, political, economical, historical, geographical and military and strategic grounds, Curzon's reply was categorical: 'I cannot and will not'. However, he was sympathetic towards Ismet Pasha's inquiry about the possibility of Ankara's participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company, calling it 'not an unreasonable

request which was well worthy of examination'. Curzon believed that 'if Turks can be given a share in oil, their demand for Mosul will probably be dropped'.⁴⁸

On the same day Ismet Pasha met Barrère; he complained about the unfriendly and unexpected attitude of the French over the Question but was assured that what was displayed was the official approach and should be seen in that light. After being reassured by Barrère, Ismet Pasha had a private conversation with Grew, during which Ismet Pasha gave his assurance that Turkey would show that 'nothing in her laws and legal system could worry foreigners as to their full protection'; Ismet Pasha also committed himself to giving a reassuring statement in regard to the protection of America's religious, philanthropic, and educational institutions in Turkey. The Prime Minister's telegram to Ismet Pasha informing him about Turco-American co-operation on the above-mentioned matter was a good example of such intentions on the part of Ankara.⁴⁹ Ismet Pasha's subsequent effort on November 29 to win American support by suggesting a new treaty between the two countries did not produce the wished-for result and Child turned down the offer on the grounds that the United States would make no commitment at that stage of the Conference.⁵⁰ Thus Turkey took a further step in the interval and gave the oil concession, known as the Chester Concession,⁵¹ to the Americans with the hope of getting their backing on Mosul.

While the work of the Territorial Commission was on its way the Economic and Financial Commission under the presidency of M. Barrère began its

48. FO371/7964/E13286/13003/44, November 27, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/8003/E13523/132/65, December 1, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 228, 246; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.25. November 25, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.40. November 27, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 59. November 30, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; FO839/17; FO839/9, 22; FO371/7964/E13286/13003/44; CON123/670.

49. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 44. November 28, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 57. November 29, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 502.

50. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p.95; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 57. November 29, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

51. See: Chapter V, p. 156.

work on November 27th upon the suggestion of Curzon. To organise the work of the Commission, which would have to deal with delicate technical problems, it was suggested that the work should be distributed among a number of sub-commissions. The chief questions to be dealt with by the Commission would be the distribution of the debt⁵² of the former Ottoman Empire among the countries in whose favour parts of that Empire had been detached, and reparation for the damage caused by the Greeks. Considering the fact that Turkey's economic and financial development depended on its full and complete independence, on its being released from all restrictions which interfered with its full economic liberty, these questions were of capital importance.

It was evident that the solution of the problems would require very considerable work, which would prolong the negotiations and thus delay the conclusion of peace. After deciding the procedure of the Conference Barrère was about to postpone the continuation of the discussion to the following day when Curzon spoke and stated that since 'he would not be able to join in the discussions of the sub-commissions, he would very much like to hear in the full commission statements of the views held by the various parties, and particularly by the Turkish delegation'.⁵³ Curzon's suggestion that economic and financial matters ought to be discussed before the main commission had one objective: to control the course of the negotiations and prepare his strategy accordingly. When the 'intransigent' attitude of the Turks concerning the territorial questions was displayed, more precisely over Mosul and the Straits, he would be in a position to put pressure on Ismet Pasha. On November 28, at the second meeting of the Economic and Financial Commission, Ismet Pasha presented the arguments of Ankara respecting

⁵². The decaying Ottoman Empire had been in a state of permanent insolvency, and had to be supported by continual loans from the European governments interested in Ottoman survival. The Turkish aim in 1923 was to make a long term plan for the liquidation of the enormous debt in such a way that the economic life of the new state should not be crippled in the process. Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948. (Geneva, 1950), pp. 44-45.

⁵³. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 540.

the issues of the Ottoman Debt and of Reparations and, on December 1st, the question of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, including the return of prisoners of war and civil hostages. Curzon, having listened to the Turkish thesis on the matters concerned and taken notes where necessary for his counter-attack, needed one last card which he could play should the necessity arise: the Capitulations.

The first meeting of the Second Commission, namely the Commission on the Regime of Foreigners, to discuss the Capitulations took place on December 2 under the presidency of Marquis Garroni. After the opening speech read by Garroni in Italian, three sub-commissions were set up to deal with judicial capitulations, economic capitulations and nationalities and antiquities. Both sides were determined to carry their point and expected that they would encounter great difficulty in the discussion of the subject. Not surprisingly, the matter was discussed more or less continuously from December 1922 to July 1923.

While Ismet Pasha was under immense pressure from the rigid instructions from Ankara and a very strong national feeling at home, the Allies on the other hand were not about to relinquish easily the privileges they had held for many centuries. Garroni's statement, laying down the necessity of substituting for the existing Capitulations some other variety that would be consistent with Turkish independent sovereignty, while guaranteeing necessary protection for foreigners, received no support from the Turkish delegation. In view of the incompatibility of the Capitulations with a nation's independence and with its concern for its existence and sovereign rights, Turkey would not agree to negotiations with a view to the Capitulations being suppressed in form and in name, but still maintained in substance. The Ankara government maintained the stance that 'Turkey had the same rights as every nation that was sovereign, independent and master of its destinies'⁵⁴

⁵⁴. Ibid. p. 469.

and it regarded its system of justice as equal to that of the best governed countries. Any proposal to modify it in the interests of foreigners was consequently regarded by it as an effort to abridge its sovereign independence.⁵⁵

However, the question of the Capitulations was an issue in which each of the Allies had an interest and they were able to present a solid front in the face of the Turkish argument. In a telegram to Ankara on December 2, Ismet Pasha expressed his pessimistic view on the situation: 'We disagree on everything. We have grave differences between us'.⁵⁶ His pessimism was not unfounded. The subsequent negotiations would prove that this was only the beginning of a long battle. However, what Ismet Pasha did not know was that the fragile Allied unity was already crumbling. 'Behind the scenes Italians are giving great trouble putting forward outrageous demands for commercial or other concerns, as a price of their remaining in the conference,' wrote Curzon to the Foreign Office on December 1. He called the Italian attitude a 'shameless attempt at blackmail which seemed to be inseparable from Italian conception of policy'.⁵⁷

Although when the question of the Dodecanese Islands came up for discussion at the Conference Curzon succeeded in preventing it from being raised with the Turks, it did not seem enough to satisfy the Italians, who desired 'a friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Italy's position in the mandated territories' and believed that 'a formula which would give satisfaction to the desires of the Italian government' could be agreed upon.⁵⁸

⁵⁵. FO839/36 No. 789; *DBFP*, No. 298, December 28, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/9058/E100/1/44, December, 30, 1922, Secretary of State for Colonies to Dominions.

⁵⁶. Simsir, *Lozan Telgrafleri I*, No.67. December 2, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 68. December 2, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁵⁷. FO839/17 No. 242; FO371/7964/E13493/13003/44, December 1, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/7973/E13390/27/44, December 4, 1922, Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with Italian Ambassador; *DBFP*, XVIII, No. 244, 253; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 116-119.

⁵⁸. FO371/7916/E13390/27/44, December 4, 1922, 'Record by Sir Eyre Crowe of a conversation with Italian Ambassador', *DBFP*, XVIII, No. 253; FO839/32.

On December 4, Curzon, in order to keep Allied unity intact and drive a wedge between Turkey and Russia, chose to bring the Straits question on to the agenda of the Conference. Discussion of the Straits question would test the strength of the Turco-Russian alliance as well as the success of Curzon's diplomacy. Furthermore, the issue would mark a turning point in the future relations of Turkey and Russia.

The Straits settlement was by no means a purely Turkish affair and it had never been, considering the history of the question.⁵⁹ Ever since the eighteenth century the Straits as an international waterway had formed the tension point between Britain and Russia and were the subject of a rivalry which would last for many years to come.⁶⁰ During the Lausanne negotiations it was British and Russian interests which clashed, as always in the past, rather than Turkey's interests and Britain's. But this time the roles of Russia and of the Western Powers were reversed. While Britain was in favour of the freedom of the Straits, Russia was determined to close them. The attitude of the Turkish delegation was naturally swayed by a number of conflicting aims, though Turkey had proclaimed its view four years before in the National Pact.⁶¹

⁵⁹. Erik Lance Knudsen., Great Britain, Constantinople, and the Turkish Peace Treaty, 1919-1922. (New York, 1987); Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatinin Turkiye Hatiraları, pp. 191-213; Herbert A. Gibbons., 'The Freedom of the Straits' Asia, 22 (December 1922), p. 957, 1006.

⁶⁰. Up until 1915 British policy was directed to keeping the Russians out of the Mediterranean. This continual tendency throughout the 19th century to press for the closing rather than for the opening of the Straits was to change with the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907, by which an entirely new situation was created. Turkey, realising that it could no longer count upon Britain to protect it against Russia, drew closer to Germany. The position as regards Turkey was also fundamentally altered by the circumstances after the First World War and Britain was convinced that the geographical position of Turkey placed in its hands an immense opportunity for obstruction. So the doctrine of the Freedom of the Straits evolved and Britain became determined to ensure that never again should Turkey be able to block the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea. F112/282, ff. 31-34; CAB24/40 CON/4308 FO Memorandum; CON/12023 Memorandum on British Policy and Freedom of Straits; H. Charles Woods., 'The Straits-Before and After' The Fortnightly Review, 113 (June 1923), pp. 282-292.

⁶¹. The Turkish point of view represented by article IV of the National Pact was that 'The security of the city of Istanbul, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the Capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman government, must be protected from every danger. Provided that this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly between us and the other governments concerned with regard to the opening of the Straits to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid'. Inonu, Hatıralar. p.69; Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p.127; Nicolson, Curzon, p. 307; Grew, Turbulent Era, p .504; Kurkcuoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri, pp. 264-275.

On the opening discussions of the Straits question, Ismet Pasha made a statement in which he repeated the principles laid down in the National Pact. This did not satisfy Curzon who called it 'half a dozen sentences of purely general character affirming Turkish sovereignty in the abstract and indicating sympathy with commercial freedom of Straits but containing no proposals or arguments and formulating no plan'.⁶² In fact, this time Ismet Pasha used the same tactic as Curzon, deliberately declining to continue the discussion in order not to reveal the whole position of Turkey before the views of the other states were heard. In Child's words, 'he [Ismet Pasha] camps patiently outside, saying little, doing nothing, estimating comparative realities of force'.⁶³ He was convinced that Curzon would again, as he had done on numerous occasions, try to get the Turkish view first,⁶⁴ which would enable him to prepare his reply. But this time Ismet Pasha was determined not to give further precise details despite immense pressure from Curzon.

After hearing, to quote Child, 'cat-paw [sic] nations which had been primed to set forth in substance the British and French viewpoint'⁶⁵, Curzon invited Chicherin to state the Russian case. Although Russia was in favour of permanent freedom for commercial navigation and for peaceful maritime communications in the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles without any restriction, it opposed the British thesis by demanding that the Straits must be permanently closed both in peace time and in war time to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey. In Curzon's terms the Russian thesis had only one objective: 'To convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake with

62. FO371/7965/E13660/13003/44, December 5, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 255; A. L. Macfie., 'The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne, November, 1922-July 1923' Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1979), pp. 211-238.

63. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 99.

64. Inonu, Hatiralari, p. 69; Nicolson, Curzon, p. 308.

65. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 100.

Turkey as the faithful guardian at the gates'.⁶⁶ Naturally, Chicherin's statement was bound to cause tension in the conference room and it did. Curzon, without a moment's hesitation, rose and in solemn tones replied to the Russian delegation: 'It seems remarkable that this programme, which provides chiefly for the defence of Turkish interests, should be put forward by Russia. While listening to this proposal, I imagined that M. Chicherin must have mistaken his role and assumed the *kalpak* of Ismet Pasha'.⁶⁷

Turkish support for the Russian thesis was not permanent and proved to be for tactical purposes only. Ismet Pasha had no intention of allowing Chicherin to speak on behalf of the Turkish delegation, although the Russian proposal corresponded most closely with the Turkish point of view. His main concern was that the disappearance of the Turco-Soviet front at this stage of the negotiations might endanger the Turkish position vis-à-vis Britain before any matter was settled to Turkey's advantage. But he realised that the time had come to make a choice between the old friendship for which no basis any longer existed and a new potential friendship based on the peace presently under negotiation. When asked by Curzon 'whether he accepted the Russian case as the case of the Turkish government', his reply determined the basis of Turkey's relations with Britain and Russia in the future. He declared that he would be willing to consider any other proposals made by the Allied Powers 'in close connection with the sovereign rights and the absolute independence of Turkey'⁶⁸. This was a most significant indication in terms of showing on what side Turkey's preference would lay.

On the following day, December 6, at the second meeting of the Straits Commission, Child made what Curzon came to describe a 'well phrased and

⁶⁶. Cmd.1814, p. 141.

⁶⁷. Nicolson, Curzon, p. 310; Cmd.1814, p. 133; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.82. December 2, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁶⁸. Cmd.1814, XXVI, p. 135; Nicolson, Curzon, p. 311.

effective declaration of American views', particularly with regard to freedom of access, both for ships of war, to the Black Sea, viewing the Straits as an international highway and claiming the right of every state to protect its commerce.⁶⁹ The American statement was a significant one in terms of timing since it was thought that Turkey should face the United States' individual position as well as the joint position of the Allies before taking a definite stand. However, Ismet Pasha still declined to discuss the question before the Conference until he had seen the detailed proposals made by Curzon in the name of the Allies and he joined Chicherin in asking for a postponement of the discussions until December 8. Nevertheless, by the end of two sessions the Turkish position was almost certain and the Americans soon recognised the fact that the Russian pressure for the fortified Straits and the Black Sea to be closed to all war craft had been 'almost lost' on the Turks who were inclined to be conciliatory.

The key question is whether Ismet Pasha's unexpected change of attitude was, as generally claimed, the result of Curzon's successful policy or whether there were other considerations affecting the Turkish viewpoint. Undoubtedly, Curzon's statesmanship was a contributing factor, but at the heart of the matter lay Turkey's willingness to reach a compromise with Britain. First of all, the Turkish point of view, as laid out in the National Pact, was not altogether far from the British thesis. Second, Ismet Pasha was convinced that the Straits question formed one of the main obstacles on the way to peace. If Turkey were to get a satisfactory settlement it would have to come to an agreement with the Allies in general, and with Britain in particular.⁷⁰ Third, Ismet Pasha, having believed that the only way to Mosul was through Britain, renewed private conversations through Riza Nur, the second Turkish delegate. Not only did Riza Nur offer to support the British thesis on the

⁶⁹. Cmd.1814, XXVI, p. 145-146; FRUS, II, 1923 pp. 913-914; DBFP, XVIII, No. 260; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 506-508; Child, *A Diplomat Looks at Europe*, p. 101.

⁷⁰. Inonu, *Hatıralar*, p. 71-72.

question of the Straits but he also offered to sign a peace treaty on British terms if only Turkey got Mosul. It was indeed very difficult for Curzon to ignore such a peace proposal. He informed the Foreign Office in the following terms: 'Turkey would meet us on every point, conclude satisfactory treaty and even break with Soviet, if only we would give them vilayet of Mosul'.⁷¹ Whether the proposal had the desired effect on the British delegation will be examined in detail when the Mosul question is dealt with, later in the chapter.

The considerable change in the attitude of the Turkish delegation had very much to do with their suspicion of future Russian motives, even though Ismet Pasha knew that Russian support at Lausanne was a factor of extraordinary importance. He also knew that he could not rely on Russia's support in case of a likely war with Britain. When he discussed the question with Chicherin in Lausanne and asked him whether Russia would be ready to fight beside Turkey if he were to reject the Allies' proposal, Chicherin gave him an evasive answer and suggested that the proposal could be negotiated in Moscow.⁷² Furthermore, Ismet Pasha came to believe that acting together with Russia on the question under discussion would, in fact, isolate Turkey from the Western World which it was determined to join. Last, but not least, economic considerations, as discussed above, played an important role in Turkey's policy change. Owing to the economic position of Turkey it was absolutely necessary to make peace with the Allies.

Since the Straits discussion, relations between the Turkish and the Russian delegation had been very strained and an open rupture had been avoided with

⁷¹. Nur, Hayatim ve Hatiratim, Cilt III; FO424/255; CON12330 No. 737; CAB23/32 No. 80; FO371/7965/E13660/13003/44, December 5, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/7965/E13695/13003/44, December 5 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII. Nos. 255, 257; FO371/7965/E13695/13003/44; FO839/18; Mss Eur F112/ 285, 294, Curzon Papers.

⁷². Inonu, Hatiralar. p. 77.

difficulty.⁷³ Russian disappointment was expressed in Ankara on January 11, in a private meeting⁷⁴ between Rauf Bey and Aralof, and also in Lausanne, through Chicherin's attempt in Lausanne to discredit Ismet Pasha before the Muslim delegations of India and other countries. Chicherin stated that 'the Turks were not only selling the interests of Russia, but of all Oriental countries, and that they were merely playing into the hands of England and helping her',⁷⁵ and urged the 'oppressed Moslem nations' to take immediate steps to lodge a very strong protest to the Ankara government against the policy of the Turkish delegates in Lausanne.

The death of Mustafa Kemal's mother was to produce another opportunity for Chicherin who, on January 22, sent a private letter to Mustafa Kemal in which he offered his condolences and sought co-operation on the Straits question.⁷⁶ But the actual object of the letter was to secure Mustafa Kemal's support for the Russian thesis, the closure of the Straits to warships. These assertions and suggestions on the part of Chicherin, along with the contemplated entrance of Turkey into the League of Nations, resulted in a very definite wave of anti-Turkish feeling among the Muslim delegations in Lausanne and increased Ismet Pasha's difficulties.

When the Straits question was, in principle, settled in favour of Britain, the problem of the Minorities was placed upon the agenda of the Conference. As Turkey took a limited part in making the agenda and no part in planning the subjects to be discussed, the Turkish delegation was sometimes in the dark, even the night before, as to the subject to be discussed the next morning and consequently found itself unprepared. In other words, while the Allies had ample time to prepare their case, before the agenda was communicated to the Turkish delegation it often

73. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.107. December 10, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.120. December 11, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No. 128. December 13, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.129. December 13, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

74. Ibid. No. 326.

75. FO371/9058/E262/1/44, January 5, 1923, SIS Report, No. 1030.

76. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 424. January 24, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.

happened that the latter received the agenda only a few hours before the meeting and was compelled either to answer hurriedly or to reserve its reply.⁷⁷ This was precisely the case in the Minorities discussions. The Turkish delegation was informed by the British only after midnight about the discussions of the next day and Ismet Pasha was not woken up by the clerk due to the late hour. He, nevertheless, managed to save the situation by presenting a lengthy report previously prepared in Ankara.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Minorities question was to be originally dealt with by the Second Commission under the presidency of M. Garroni, who proposed referring the issue to a sub-committee of the Capitulations Commissions. Having called Garroni's proposal 'wholly inconsistent with importance and world wide interest of subject' Curzon protested against it vigorously in private; Garroni was forced to transfer the issue, in the course of proceedings, to the First Commission presided over by Curzon, without any consultation with the Turks. 'I knew in his hand it would never be properly argued or pushed,' wrote Curzon to Crowe on December 3, and added: 'I shall take it at an early date and will press it with all (? force) at my command'.⁷⁹

On December 12, Lord Curzon opened the discussion by explaining the past history and present position of the minorities which was challenged by Ismet Pasha in a long speech containing extracts from histories, encyclopaedias and official publications, French, English and American, in support of his theme. The Turkish thesis was simple: Turkey was willing to accept the provisions laid down by the international treaties signed after the First World War and the League of Nations resolutions concerning the Minorities. A National Home for Armenians was out of the question since it would involve the dismemberment of Turkey and

⁷⁷. Cmd. 1814, p. 277; Inonu, Hatıralar, p. 79; Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 108; Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, p. 1019.

⁷⁸. Inonu, Hatıralar, p. 79.

⁷⁹. FO371/7965/E13525/13003/44, December 3, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 250.

was inconsistent with independent sovereignty. The idea of an independent body or organisation to supervise minority protection in the future was also categorically rejected.

The discussions on the Minorities were the most heated that the Conference was to witness. The Turks and the British had different interests in the matter and each was determined to settle the issue to its advantage. Ismet Pasha's instructions were extremely rigid and he was given every authority to break up the Conference and return to Ankara if the Allies insisted on the National Armenian Home. 'There is no question upon which the Turkish delegates are more unyielding,' reported the Americans to Washington on January 7, 'The American delegation has received no evidence that Ismet or any other Turkish delegate privately is in sympathy with the proposal for an Armenian national home.'⁸⁰ Therefore Curzon's attempt to press on Ismet Pasha the question of agreeing to assign a tract of territory in Turkey for the purpose of creating a National Home for the Armenians was bound to fail. As Ismet Pasha knew well, any solution which gave way to the Allied proposals would be totally rejected by Ankara. Therefore, under no circumstances could Ismet Pasha be induced to accept an independent Armenian State within the boundaries of Turkey.

In a private conversation with a Swiss professor, who was an ardent supporter of Armenian claims, Ismet Pasha expressed his feelings on the matter. 'You propose to dismember my country.' said Ismet Pasha. 'We, after fighting for four years throughout the First World War in order to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey, struggled for another four years to keep it intact. Your organisation's efforts are nothing compared to the states we defeated and the difficulties we overcame'.⁸¹

⁸⁰. FRUS (1923) II, No. 184, p.948.

⁸¹. Inonu, Hatiralar, p. 82.

Turkey's resolution not to tolerate any compromise in regard to the Armenian Homeland was also indicated by Riza Nur's behaviour in the course of the discussions held by the sub-commission. On January 6, Riza Nur, despite Garroni's objection, left the meeting room refusing to listen to Armenian claims.⁸² Rumbold, who was present at the meeting, was greatly disturbed and described it 'a most insolent scene'.⁸³

Deadlock Looms

As the negotiations progressed, the situation seemed to be reaching a point where in spite of the desire for peace the negotiations threatened to come to a standstill owing to the opposing and irreconcilable demands of both sides, and chances of concluding a peace seemed rather slim. Pessimism began to increase. 'What they want is peace on a National Pact basis to which they imagine they have worn us down,' commented Ryan in a personal telegram of December 19 to Henderson, 'they might perhaps drop one or two outlying things in the Pact, and come to terms on the Strait question which the Pact is elastic but I do not from my general knowledge or from indications here see any real sign of their wavering on Mosul or the Capitulations. They are also very strict about Minorities.' He concluded that there was no sign as yet of the smallest departure from the 'watchwords of complete independence and non-interference'.⁸⁴

After a conversation of more than one and a half hours with Ismet Pasha, Curzon was worn out. 'He is impervious either to argument, warning or appeal, and can only go on repeating the same catchwords, indulging in the same futile quibbles, and making the same childish complaints', Curzon complained on

⁸². Nur, *Hayat ve Hatiratim*, pp.1062-1063; Inonu, *Hatiralar*, pp. 83-84; Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari I*, No. 296. January 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtlari. Cilt IV, pp. 7-8; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 198-202.

⁸³. FO800/253 Tu/23/4, January 8, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

⁸⁴. FO800/240 Ryan Papers, December 9, 1922, Ryan to Henderson.

December 26. 'One might just as well argue with the Pyramid of Cheops.'⁸⁵ Ismet Pasha's report to Ankara was no different from that of his adversaries. In his telegram of December 23, he expressed himself in pessimistic terms regarding the prospect of a settlement. As the Allies still held their position on the Straits, the Minorities and other questions, 'a sudden rupture of negotiations had to be expected. Turks had got their backs to the wall on all questions,' and they could not yield on questions vital to their independence. In a reply dated December 24, the Prime Minister assured Ismet Pasha that the Turkish army was prepared for all emergencies.⁸⁶

Curzon was well aware of Ismet Pasha's difficulties in regard to the rigidity of his instructions and he would try to exploit it to the very end. The Minorities question was not of prime interest to Britain but constituted a useful tool for Curzon who used it with skill to bring the Turks into line when their attitude on the Mosul question proved to be difficult. He had no intention of carrying the demand for a territorial home beyond using it as a trading point.⁸⁷ It was, to quote Ryan, 'a "put up" merely for window dressing'.⁸⁸ In his memoirs, Ismet Pasha recalls a private conversation with one of the British delegates to whom he

85. DBFP, XVIII, No. 293, December 26, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/7968/E14625/13003/44, FO839/17 No. 744; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers.

86. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 199. December 23, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No 202. December 24, 1922, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

Ismet Pasha's telegram and Ankara's reply were deciphered by the British intelligence Service and Henderson, the Assistant High Commissioner, immediately informed Curzon as to the contents of these telegrams of vital importance, thereby greatly strengthening Curzon's bargaining position. FO371/7967/E14386/13003/44; FO424/255 No. 825; FO371/7967/E14386/13003/44, December 25, 1922, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 291.

87. The Russians and the Americans were well aware of Curzon's tactics. The Russians were inclined to think that the interests of the Minorities, and particularly the Armenians, were being 'sacrificed'. The Soviet delegation's secret despatch to Moscow of January 12, stated that the French action in the Ruhr after the breakdown of the Paris conference had resulted in Lord Curzon's attitude towards the Turks becoming 'tolerant and yielding' and that the concessions made to the Turks, however, 'in no way affected Great Britain's economic and colonial interests, but were primarily at the expense of the minorities, particularly the Armenians.' FO371/9065 SIS Report, No. 1070.

The Americans also believed that Curzon used the question 'only for trading purposes' and they gradually became suspicious of Curzon's plan 'to have the American delegation become involved in pressing it' so that it might appear that the Americans were entering into territorial and political settlements. FRUS, II, No. 159.

88. FO800/240, Ryan to Henderson, January 15, 1923, Ryan Papers; For the view of the Foreign Office see: FO839/12 No. 315, Minutes by E. G. Forbes Adam.

expressed his profound disappointment about the British stand. When Ismet Pasha inquired as to whether Britain would break the Conference up over the Minorities question he was assured that Britain was out for peace and its protests should not be misinterpreted. 'Over the years we committed ourselves by making so many promises therefore it is natural that we should protest vigorously'⁸⁹ stated the British delegate stressing that Turkey's worries were unfounded. The Americans, who actually supported the Armenian claims, were also aware of Curzon's approach to the question of a National Home for Armenians. '...as I have known all along,' wrote Child in his memoirs, 'he plainly intends to abandon the idea.'⁹⁰

While the formal discussions at the Conference pointed to a deadlock the private negotiations gained momentum. Soon after the unprecedented proposal of Riza Nur, the private meetings took place on December 7, 8 and 10, where the Turks claimed the vilayet of Mosul again and the British stated that on such a basis no further negotiations were possible.⁹¹ Ismet Pasha's firm attitude, as well as Curzon's realisation that the Mosul problem would certainly be the most troublesome one, strained the relations between the two and made Curzon more combative than ever during the Minorities discussions. He went even further and told Ismet Pasha the Conference would be broken up unless the Turkish attitude was more conciliatory.⁹² At the same time, Curzon was certain that it would be impossible to induce Turkey to accept any form of servitude or supervision in regard to the Armenians, or any other Christian and Muslim minorities for that matter. Curzon was also aware that the Turks were deeply conscious about the

89. Inonu, Hatıralar. p. 85.

90. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe. p. 117.

91. Simsir, Lozan Telgrafları I, No. 85. December 6, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 97. December 7, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.103. December 8, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 118. December 11, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 257, 273.

92. FO371/7966/E14010/13003/44, December 13, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 275.

judgement of the world and he on several occasions threatened Ismet Pasha by saying that 'the whole world had its eyes fixed on the conference room'.⁹³

Another tactic used by Curzon was that of provocation. In order to make Ismet Pasha agree to join the League of Nations he attacked him by saying that 'Great Britain did not fear the League of Nations because her hands were clean,' to which the Pasha replied that 'there had never been any question of Turkey fearing the League of Nations either. The hands of the Turks now at work in their own country, which had been devastated and ruined by foreign invasion, were quite peculiarly clean. Those hands had never violated, invaded or devastated any foreign country, and could without fear sustain comparison with any other hands'.⁹⁴ It was a war of attrition between the two that made the atmosphere tense, and the discussions more contentious than ever. However, Ismet Pasha knew that he could not go back to Ankara without peace and Curzon relied on the fact that Ismet Pasha could not push the matter further without facing a rupture. A compromise needed to be reached.

The problem was to be settled in favour of the Turkish thesis in return for Ismet Pasha's declaration that Turkey would join the League of Nations once peace was achieved. It was a deal convenient for both sides. Turkey, having already decided to become part of Europe and convinced that it was only through Britain that peace could be reached, favoured the idea of joining the League of Nations. Therefore it was not, as suggested by Nicolson, Curzon's 'victory to widen the breach between Turkey and Russia', but purely reflected Turkey's pragmatic approach to the matter.

In the following days, the work of the Conference was carried out by continuous meetings of sub-commissions. Although these groups discussed the

⁹³. Cmd. 1814, p. 183, 276.

⁹⁴. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 219.

various questions before them, by the end of each session innumerable points were still left unsettled. It was in these sub-commissions that the detailed negotiations were worked out, failing which the issues were carried on in the private rooms of the various delegates rather than across the conference table. On December 18, following the discussions respecting the question of the Minorities, the sub-committee of the Territorial and Military Commission prepared a draft 'Straits Convention,' and submitted it to the Conference, where it received severe criticism from Russia. 'It threatens the vital interests of Russia, violates the most elementary requirements of Turkey as regards her safety and independence', stated Chicherin. However, he did not get the support of Ismet Pasha, who declared next day that Turkey would agree in principle with the Allied Powers on many of the points contained in the draft, on condition that some modifications should be introduced into it.

Curzon was critical of the French and Italian attitude at the private meetings he held with Ismet Pasha. 'Ismet repeats same provisions over and over again, refusing to budge an inch,' he wrote to Crowe, 'while I have to fight solitary battle, my colleagues overflowing with unctuous civility to the Turks and showing an inclination to bolt at every corner from the course...If I were at liberty to deal with Ismet alone, I should be more sanguine of definite result'.⁹⁵ After deep private conversations which, according to Curzon, would 'break down the patience of the Prophet Job', on December 20, Ismet Pasha delivered a speech, 'in a tone of moderation and conciliation' and accepted the Allies' draft, which would be adopted as a final text of the Straits Convention at the last session on February 1.

When the Straits Question was settled there was only one issue left about which Britain was concerned: The Mosul Question. Ismet Pasha was absolutely

⁹⁵. FO839/17; FO371/7967/E14370/13003/44, December 22, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 286.

convinced that Britain's support for Italy and France over economic issues had the aim of gaining Mosul for Britain.⁹⁶ Child and Grew, the American observers, shared this opinion. From December 20, the day on which Turkish acceptance of the Straits Convention was secured, to January 23, the day the Mosul discussions began, Curzon became engaged in a note-writing controversy with Ismet Pasha over the question, and he manipulated the discussions on the Capitulations and the Minorities issues depending on the nature of the Turkish reply. On December 28, at the second meeting of the Commission on the Regime of Foreigners, under the presidency of Marquis Garroni, in which the judicial regime was under discussion, Ismet Pasha refused the Allied proposal to institute a regime 'which would perpetuate, under a disguised name or form, an aggravation of the capitulatory regime.' As Turkey regarded its system of justice as equal to that of the best governed countries, any proposal to modify it in the interests of foreigners was consequently regarded as an effort to abridge its sovereign independence. Ismet Pasha declared 'Turkey is requested to furnish guarantees for Allied nationals; but these guarantees already exist in Turkish laws and institutions, just as they exist in those of other independent States. There is therefore no justification for preferential treatment of foreigners, which none of the Powers represented here could tolerate in its own case.'⁹⁷

Curzon listened to Ismet Pasha's speech with 'much disappointment and great regret' and stated that it was 'the most hard and uncompromising speech' that Ismet Pasha had delivered since the Conference began.⁹⁸ He was well aware of Ismet Pasha's rigid instructions over the Capitulations, and of Ismet Pasha having the authority to break off the negotiations without consulting Ankara. 'The latter (Ankara) in its stupid isolation is so intent on the subject that it would probably lose

⁹⁶. Inonu, *Hatıralar*. pp. 712-74.

⁹⁷. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, p. 490-491.

⁹⁸. Ibid, p.495; FO839/36 No. 789.

half its kingdom sooner than yield,' he wrote to the Foreign Office on December 28. Curzon also knew Ismet Pasha's 'most profound and sincere desire to attain a peace,' and therefore did not refrain from attacking Ismet Pasha at the next meeting, on January 6. '...Turks will be very reluctant to leave Lausanne without a general agreement,' he wrote on January 10 to Crowe in a secret telegram, 'and that their efforts will be increasingly directed not to rupture but to obtaining by relentless pressure applied to very last second of maximum that anxieties or fears of powers may be persuaded to concede.'⁹⁹ Because of the settlement of the Straits question in favour of Britain, the warlike attitude of Curzon which had been observed previously in the Capitulations issue was absent in the Minorities discussions held on January 9 and 10. The discussions took place in a conciliatory spirit and an agreement was virtually reached between the two parties. But this was not the only reason for the moderation of British policy.

When the conference of Allied Prime Ministers in London on December 9th proved unsuccessful and the second attempt by Bonar Law in Paris on January 2, 1923 ended in failure through French rejection of his plan even as a basis for discussion, Curzon realised the difficulties lying ahead. On January 4, 1923, Curzon's united front was severely shaken by the collapse of the Reparation Conference at Paris resulting in the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany's great mining and industrial centre, by French troops on January 11.¹⁰⁰ The atmosphere at Lausanne was inevitably influenced by the general European situation. Two

⁹⁹. FO371/9058/E462/1/44, January 10, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 318.

¹⁰⁰. Chambers, This Age of Conflict, pp. 164-166; Hayes, The Twentieth Century, pp. 223-224; For American reaction see: Melvyn P. Leffler., The Elusive Quest. America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 82-90; Orde, British Policy, pp. 237-245; William M. Jordan., Great Britain, France, and the German Problem 1919-1939: A Study of Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles Settlement. (London, 1943), pp. 68-84; J. Paul Selsam., The Attempts to Form an Anglo-French Alliance 1919-1924. (Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 59-69; David Williamson., 'Great Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924' British Journal of International Studies, 3 (1977), pp. 70-91; For Curzon's speech on April 20, 1920, in the House of Lords, on France's occupation of the Ruhr, see: Joel H. Wiener and J. H. Plumb (ed.), Great Britain : Foreign Policy and the Span of the Empire 1689-1971. (Vol. I. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), pp. 772-783; see also: HANSARD (Lords) 5. s., LIII, pp. 781-789.

conferences proceeding at the same time would inevitably affect one another and, as Hardinge rightly observed, the failure of the British to support the French on the Reparations question would have its repercussions at Lausanne.¹⁰¹ The French invasion, a procedure which Britain regarded as 'illegal' and 'highly undesirable', had a prejudicial effect on the Allied front and put Curzon under intense pressure.

After the failure of the Reparation Conference the French changed their attitude at the Lausanne Conference and pressed for immediate peace with the Turks. The new French plan rested upon the conception that a treaty was necessary at whatever cost. To the French, the British plan proceeded upon the assumption that peace was necessary to the Turks and that the Allies could not simply abandon the whole of their interests. As Rumbold put it, the French would support the British at Lausanne as long as the British supported the French in the reparation question.¹⁰² Britain failed to do so and the French were now at liberty to act according to their best interests. The significance of the occupation was the fact that it was intended as a showdown. Germany was to be taught a lesson and at the same time France was demonstrating to Britain that she could act alone if need be and that she was prepared to take independent action.¹⁰³

The failure of the reparation question in London had its repercussions at Lausanne. Curzon considered that he was faced by an 'Allied surrender'. In his telegram of January 15 to Lindsay he was critical of the French stand. 'French position now is,' he observed, 'that trouble in Ruhr necessitates an agreement here at whatever sacrifice, even of French interests, and I truly believe that there is not a point on which they will be prepared to stand'.¹⁰⁴ In order to avoid the French and Italians acting separately Curzon promised to them to support their case, i.e. over

101. Mss Eur F112/199, December 2, 1922, Hardinge to Curzon, Curzon Papers.

102. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 116-119.

103. Wolfers, Britain and France between the Two Wars. p. 58; .

104. FO839/17, January 16, 1923, Minute by Curzon; CON12359 No. 75; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers.

economic matters and the Capitulations, against the Turks, and simultaneously he brought the Mosul question to the conference table in order to enlist their support.

The meeting of the Financial Commission held on January 13 proved an excellent opportunity for Curzon to follow his strategy. The distribution of the Ottoman Public debt was one of the most important financial questions, one on which a wide divergence of view between the Turkish and Allied delegations existed. The Turkish thesis was that the total amount of the Ottoman Debt to be distributed among the successor states of the Ottoman Empire ought to be the total debt which existed on October 30, 1918. This was strongly challenged by Curzon, who insisted on the 1914 total. Ismet Pasha, in a telegram to Ankara of January 14, reported that Curzon had the intention of making things difficult for the Turks in order to induce them to accept the British terms respecting Mosul. At a dinner party given by the British delegation Ismet Pasha received the impression that the British would be willing to discuss the issue at mutual future discussions.¹⁰⁵ He was convinced that as long as the question remained unsettled Curzon would block the Conference and make it impossible for the others to work out their problems with the Turks. 'Peace,' he wrote to Ankara, 'hinged on finding a solution to the Mosul question'.¹⁰⁶

While there had been some progress on other issues, such as the Straits and Minorities, the Mosul negotiations failed to dissipate mutual suspicion or create confidence between the two sides. Britain was determined not to abandon its claims over Mosul, which was one of the fundamental British objectives. Despite Curzon's constant denial that Britain's Mosul policy was actuated by economic motives, it was a fact generally realised by both delegations and fully acknowledged by the

¹⁰⁵. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari I*, No. 345. January 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

¹⁰⁶. *Ibid.* Nos. 258, 346, 347.

world press that the question of oil constituted the primary concern.¹⁰⁷ His plan to accommodate the Turks through non-territorial concessions either by oil or financial means was overwhelmed by the substance of Riza Nur's proposal that Turkey was ready to sign a peace treaty on British terms in return for Mosul.

On December 6, Curzon informed the Cabinet about the Turkish proposal and suggested giving the Turks 'a narrow strip in the mountainous part of the Vilayet' which 'did not actually include the land where oil was likely to be found.'¹⁰⁸ His compromise was rejected by the Cabinet Committee on Iraq on December 8, on the grounds that it did not contain the elements of the real situation and that therefore 'the proposed compromise would not furnish acceptable solution of difficulty.'¹⁰⁹ Even if accepted by the Turks 'it would be merely a first step towards further expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the whole Mosul Vilayet with all the consequences which that would entail...,' that is to say, the subsequent collapse of Iraq. A series of memoranda were exchanged between Ismet Pasha and Curzon, stating the historical, political, economic, strategic, geographical, and racial grounds¹¹⁰ why each refused to give up the Vilayet.

Before the official discussions were due, Ismet Pasha attempted for the last time to win Mosul for Turkey by sending two private Turkish representatives to

¹⁰⁷. M. A. Fitzsimons., Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. (London, 1965), pp. 11-14; Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, pp. 239-241; Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East, pp. 258-265; Anton Mohr., The Oil War. (London, 1925), pp. 145-175, 195-206; G. Jones Gareth., 'The British Government and the Oil Companies.' Historical Journal, 20 (1977), pp. 647-672; Helmut Mejcher., 'Oil and British Policy Towards Mesopotamia 1914-1918' Middle Eastern Studies, 8 (1972), pp. 377-391; Peter J. Beck., 'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926' Middle Eastern Studies, 17 (April 1981), pp. 256-276.

¹⁰⁸. FO371/7785/E13599/13003/44, December 8, 1922, Colonial Office to the Foreign Office; CAB27/206/IRQ Ist Conclusion; Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, pp. 1031-1039; FO424/255 No. 750.

¹⁰⁹. FO371/7966/E13812/13003/44; FO424/255 No.750; FO371/7966/E13812/13003/44, December 8, 1922, Crowe to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 265.

¹¹⁰. CON12330/771; CON12330/788; Anonymous., 'The Near East' The Round Table, 49 (1922), pp. 1-29.

London to negotiate an agreement on oil with the British government or with private persons.¹¹¹ Rustem Bey, a Turkish economic expert with the former Minister of Commerce and Railways who was to arrange for a British syndicate to work oil in Mosul for the benefit of the Turks, conveyed the message to British officials that the 'sole point of disagreement which prevented signature of treaty at Lausanne was Mosul and that Ismet Pasha would confirm that if question of Mosul was settled in favour of Turkey, treaty would be agreed tomorrow'.¹¹²

Curzon was furious about Ismet Pasha's attempt to search for a settlement not in Lausanne but in London. 'Ismet Pasha is endeavouring without success to persuade, threaten or force me to surrender to Turkey the Mosul vilayet including of course the oil-bearing region,' he complained to Crowe on January 11 and continued: 'Recognising his failure here, he sends behind my back some wholly unscrupulous and untrustworthy agents to London to try and effect a deal either with His Majesty's Government or with private persons in London so that I may, by this perfidious manoeuvre, be confronted with an agreement or understanding of which I knew nothing, and which is in direct opposition to the policy which I am pursuing here'.¹¹³

Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha's attempts to settle the problem through a private exchange, rather than discussing their claims before the entire Conference, did not produce the desired outcome. The only result of this spirited correspondence was to reaffirm the positions of the two parties and to increase their determination to

¹¹¹. FO839/16, January 8, 1923, Crowe to Curzon; FO839/16, January 9, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; FO371/9059/E589/1/44; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.281. January 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 288. January 6, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 339. January 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Nur., Hayat ve Hatiratim, p. 1037; FO371/9059/E589/1/44, January 13, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 325 .

¹¹². FO839/16, January 8, 1923, Crowe to Curzon; Mss Eur F112/285, No. 121, Curzon Papers.

¹¹³. FO371/9059/E589/1/44, January 11, 1923, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 325; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.339. January 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; FO839/16 No. 963; F112/295 f.12.

hold on to the coveted territory.¹¹⁴ Curzon soon realised that the Turkish and British positions on Mosul were irreconcilable and that no progress was likely to be made. Therefore he carried the question from private negotiations to the conference table and opened the official discussions on January 23. Curzon's decision to discuss the question at the conference table rather than in private negotiations had two significant outcomes. It forced the French and Italians to side with him, as both needed British support for their cases, and committed the British government publicly to the policy of remaining in Iraq despite the opposition of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Press.¹¹⁵

After the issue was put on the agenda of the Conference, considerable debate developed over the fate of Mosul not only between Ismet Pasha and Curzon but also between Bonar Law and Curzon. The French invasion of the Ruhr not only jeopardised the British position in Mosul, it also caused tension in Curzon's relations with the Prime Minister. Bonar Law, wrestling with the French over Germany, was desperately anxious to get out of Iraq and repeatedly sent messages to Curzon urging caution. First the Cabinet issued expressions of disappointment at the slow progress of the Conference and declared that Curzon's services 'could not be spared indefinitely'.¹¹⁶ Then Curzon received a personal warning from the Prime Minister himself, on the day the official discussions were due, expressing the view that a crisis must not be allowed to arise so suddenly that there would not be time for the Cabinet to determine definitely what their policy was to be.¹¹⁷ In view of the breach with France, Bonar Law was determined that Britain should get out of Iraq and that it should avoid even the mere appearance of risking a war because of

¹¹⁴. For this correspondence see Cmd. 1814, pp. 363-393.

¹¹⁵. FO424/256 No. 90, 112; FO839/16; FO371/9060/E830/1/44, January 19, 1923 Curzon to the Foreign Office; CON12330, No.90; FO371/9060/E830/1/44, January 19, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 334; CAB27/206, I.R.Q. Conclusion 4.

¹¹⁶. FO371/9059/E590/1/44, (secret) January 15, 1923, Prime Minister to Curzon; CAB23/45.

¹¹⁷. FO371/9060/E926/1/44, January 24, 1923, Prime Minister to Curzon; FO839/17 No. 1186; FO371/9060/E955/1/44, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 341.

British oil interests. He believed that it would be in Britain's best interest to settle accounts with the Turks in anticipation of the collapse of the Reparation Conference in Paris. In the likely event of the breaking up of the Conference over the question of Mosul, 'it would be the most unfortunate thing which could happen in every way' he wrote, 'as half of our own people and the whole of the world would say that we have refused peace for the sake of oil'.¹¹⁸

When Curzon joined the Prime Minister in Paris just before the abortive conference of Allied Prime Ministers on January 2, 1923 began, Curzon wrote: 'I found Bonar in great panic, willing to give up anything and everything sooner than have a row, astonished at the responsibility I have assumed at Lausanne, prepared for me to back down everywhere. He has not the least grasp of Foreign Affairs, no instinct for Oriental diplomacy.'¹¹⁹ Curzon's feelings were shared by his colleague Rumbold, who believed that the Prime Minister's attitude towards the settlement was far from satisfactory. 'The latter (Bonar Law) has got cold feet about the Turks, which puts us at a great disadvantage' he wrote to Henderson on January 2, 'for in the last resort the Turks I am convinced will not shrink from the use of force, whilst the mere thought of hostilities is repugnant to Bonar Law's mind.'¹²⁰ The breach between Curzon and the Prime Minister now seemed complete. Curzon had a very short time to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion and he had to do it without breaking it over the Mosul question.

There was no doubt that the Anglo-French disagreement over the Reparation question as well as the discord between Curzon and the Prime Minister raised Ismet Pasha's hopes for a better deal at the Conference since Allied unity seemed to have been broken. Although the French government made it clear to the

¹¹⁸. Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/38; India Office Library; Curzon Papers, F112/282, ff. 6-10, December 5, 1922, Bonar Law to Curzon; ff.11-13, December 7, 1922 Bonar law to Curzon; Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/40.

¹¹⁹. Mosley, Curzon, p. 255.

¹²⁰. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 177-180.

Turkish delegation that if the matter were raised at the conference table they were bound to support the British case, Poincaré's note of January 30 to Curzon revealed the real intention of the French. 'French government' he wrote, 'while desirous of maintaining unity of the three Great Powers in concluding separate peace treaties with Turkey, cannot put aside every idea of separate negotiations should the Lausanne Conference fail.' He continued: 'They consider that the agreement of September 1914 that the Allied Governments should not conclude separate peace treaties with enemy powers no longer holds in the case of Turkey since the present situation is largely result of the Greco-Turkish war. They would, however, inform the Allied Governments of any action they took'.¹²¹

The resignation of Barrère, the first French delegate, the day before the official Mosul discussions were due, was another sign of the change of French policy. Barrère, who had supported the British position all along, was replaced as Chief French Plenipotentiary by Louis Maurice Bompard, who Curzon believed would display sympathy towards Turkish aspirations. 'He thinks we ought to remain here for another fortnight,' he complained to Lindsay, 'reopening every discussion, and gradually whittling away every point for which we have hitherto stood out in order to obtain signature of a treaty which would constitute an Allied humiliation'. Curzon was very much disappointed with the departure of Barrère who, had he believed, 'affected an illness which had no real foundation, declining to be a party to concessions which he thought disgraceful'.¹²² He, as well as Grew, did not rule out the possibility of intervention on the part of Poincaré. Curzon was critical of the Italian attitude: 'Italians wobble from one side to the other with an invariable preference for retreat, the British are in a constant minority, for

¹²¹ FO371/9064/E1472/1/44, (secret) February 3, 1923, Colonial Office No. 5649/23, Duke of Devonshire to the Dominions.

¹²² FO371/9061/E1009/1/44; January 24, 1923, Curzon to Cabinet; FO371/9060/E868/1/44; FO371/9060/E868/1/44, January 22, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; FO371/9061/E1009/1/44, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 338, 343; CON12359/100; FO839/17 No. 1180; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 540; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 January 22, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).

the two other allies and the Turks may be said to constitute a working alliance'.¹²³ In view of this situation, Curzon convened a meeting with Barrère and Garroni in order to bring matters to a head and persuaded them that the treaty must be presented before his departure. He further proposed that their departure must involve the retirement not of a single delegation but of all of them 'in order to avoid on the one hand the appearance of Allied disunion, and on the other the risk of a Turkish attempt to reopen discussions with the party or parties left behind.'¹²⁴

When the discussions were opened his views were, to quote Curzon, 'strongly and loyally' supported by Bompard and Garroni. Curzon's promise of active assistance for their economic and financial claims had produced fruitful results. He now had to work out a solution which would enable him to get out of the present impasse without causing a rupture over the Mosul question. The Colonial Office's proposal to refer the case to the League of Nations could not have come at a better time. Curzon, grabbing the opportunity, pressed for Ismet Pasha's acceptance of the League, and by referring to articles 4 and 17 of the Covenant¹²⁵ he pointed out that Turkey would not only become a member of the League, but also a member of the Council for the Mosul dispute. To this, Ismet Pasha responded with a line of argument in which he refused arbitration in any form and insisted that Mosul was a part of the Motherland, urged a plebiscite to determine the fate of the territory, and once again asked Curzon to recognise the restoration of Mosul to

¹²³. DBFP, XVIII, No. 343; CON12359 No. 100; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.431.January 25, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; FO839/17.

¹²⁴. FO839/17, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay.

¹²⁵. Article 4: 'Any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the League.'

Article 17: '...State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council'.

Turkey.¹²⁶ 'I might as well have appealed to the Sphinx of Egypt or apostrophised the mummy of Tuthankamen,'¹²⁷ Curzon complained.

Although Curzon was furious about the stand taken by Ismet Pasha, he was pleased with the way in which he had conducted the proceedings. 'I think Mosul difficulty has been so steered by proceedings today' he commented in his telegram of January 23, 'that public opinion will be unanimously be on our side in dispute, and that Turks can hardly now contrive to make it sole or even main cause of rupture'.¹²⁸ With the hoped-for backing of the world public opinion he maintained his position in favour of appealing to the Council of the League, which he did on January 25, announcing it to the Conference on January 31.

Break-up of Negotiations

On January 27, 1923, the official work of the Conference, which had been sitting about nine weeks, had come to an end, leaving the Thracian frontier, judicial capitulations, financial and economic matters, and the Mosul question still unsettled and the prospect of agreement quite remote. The fate of the entire peace settlement now depended on the outcome of the last minute negotiations held behind closed doors. The tension was high. Nobody was certain what kind of peace could be signed, if any. Curzon was openly pessimistic as to the outcome of the Conference and Grew was sceptical about the validity of Curzon's tactics and blamed Curzon for the deadlock which was reached at that stage of the Conference. He wrote in his memoirs:

'A really clever man would not, I think, have adopted the browbeating tactics which he has followed since the

¹²⁶. Cmd. 1814, p. 398; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.419. January 24, 1923 Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; DBFP, XVIII, No. 340; FO424/256 No.109; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers; Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 January 23, 1923, (Allen Leeper's Diary).

¹²⁷. FO 371/9060/E959/1/44, January 23, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay.

¹²⁸. FO371/9060/E932/1/44; FO371/9060/E959/1/44, January 23, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 340; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers.

very opening of the conference. I do not know much about the inherent nature of the Turk, but I believe that a really clever and adaptable man would have used other methods of approach, less derisive, more respectful.¹²⁹

Curzon's tactic, however, did produce a satisfactory result, contrary to what Grew had supposed. By making issues more problematical it actually hindered the concrete progress of the Conference, which was just what Curzon had desired. The time now had come when only informal talks outside the conference hall could influence the eventual result.

On January 27, the same day that official negotiations ended, Ismet Pasha was paid a visit by Bompard, who informed Ismet Pasha that the Conference had failed and that the Allies would present a draft treaty unofficially to the Turks on January 29, and formally on January 31 at the last joint meeting of the Conference. If the draft treaty were to be rejected by the Turks the Conference would be suspended, but in the event of the Turkish delegation returning to Ankara for consultation with their government, this step would be treated as adjournment and negotiations would resume in a month or two. 'In fact,' pointed out Ismet Pasha, 'it is a break down and to resume the talks is a matter of convenience'.¹³⁰

Ismet Pasha was now faced with a difficult choice: either to break off the negotiations and return to Ankara, or to seek peace at the price of Mosul. There was no unanimity amongst the Turkish delegation as to the right policy to be adopted and the British were aware of the situation. A secret intelligence report dated January 20 ran on the following lines: 'Ismet Pasha appears to be drawn in two directions. While on the one hand his personal inclinations are in the direction of pro-British policy, he feels obliged to carry out the policy dictated by Angora.'¹³¹ As the report correctly revealed, Ismet Pasha was in favour of a compromise on the Mosul

¹²⁹ Grew, *Turbulent Era* p. 526.

¹³⁰ Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari I*, No. 443. January 27, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

¹³¹ FO371/9060/E877/1/44, January 20, 1923, Secret Intelligence Service Report, No. 1048.

question - since he was convinced that French and American support would not be forthcoming¹³² - while Riza Nur categorically refused to yield and argued that the detachment of the Vilayet would create a Kurdish problem and that, more significantly, its oil resources were of vital importance for the development of Turkey. The third delegate, Hasan Bey, was undecided but he agreed with Riza Nur as to the importance of the Vilayet.¹³³

In reply to Ismet Pasha's telegram asking for instructions about the policy to be followed, Rauf Bey stated on January 27 that the matter would be discussed at the Grand National Assembly. The very next day he sent another telegram to Ismet Pasha in which he pointed out that the Grand National Assembly had decided that the Allies' draft treaty consisted of unacceptable clauses and that Ismet Pasha should return immediately to Ankara after issuing a press communiqué for public opinion in Europe and in the United States elucidating the reasons for his departure.¹³⁴ Mustafa Kemal, however, urged that a very careful judgement be made between the losses which could be incurred by accepting the treaty and the benefits of a possible military campaign. 'If the question were to find a specific method to fix the frontier of Mosul Vilayet and the Allies were really genuine in their other demands,' he wrote to Rauf Bey, 'I would advise modesty'.¹³⁵ Mustafa Kemal was clearly

132. Turkey, in view of the "Ankara accord" had appealed to France to support its proposal for a plebiscite for Mosul Turkey had expressed the wish to have a reply before January 27 but did not receive any assistance in the matter on the grounds that it was a matter to be settled between Turkey and Britain. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.59. November 30, 1922, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.97. December 7, 1922. Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 257. January 2, 1923 Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 438. January 23, 1923. Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 442. January 27, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

Ismet Pasha knew that he could not rely on American support either. On January 14, during Ismet Pasha's private conversation with Grew, Turkey's desire to discuss a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States was to be turned down. Grew rejected the proposal on the ground that Americans 'should not feel justified in commencing negotiations for a treaty until it was evident that peace was going to be concluded between the Turks and the Allies' but they should 'keep the matter in mind.' Ismet Pasha's conversation with Child on January 30 was equally fruitless. Child tried to convince Ismet Pasha to accept arbitration and refuse the idea of a plebiscite in Mosul and a separate agreement with Turkey. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 346. January 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 460. January 30, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, Turbulent Era, p. 535.

133. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 443. January 27, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

134. Ibid. No. 449; T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtlari, 1923. Cilt. III, p.1267.

135. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 450. January 28, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Rauf Bey; No. 471. February, 1, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

swayed by the Turkish delegation's joint telegram of January 31 stating that in order to conclude peace, it was both 'fundamental and imperative to find a common ground for agreement with the British over the Mosul question.'¹³⁶ The delegations' preference and the possible 'common ground' was to settle the question between Turkey and Britain within one year of the signature of the peace treaty.¹³⁷

In the meantime, the French and Italians were engaged in a series of private talks with the Turkish delegation to ensure Turkish acceptance of the draft treaty. Garroni's 'friendly advice' to Ismet Pasha on January 28 was that Ismet Pasha should not return to Ankara immediately, but should instead ask for eight or ten days to consider the Allied offer and prepare a counter-proposal. Thus the Italian delegation would stay at Lausanne, Curzon would leave his delegation behind, and the Conference would continue its work.¹³⁸ On the other hand, Poincaré in his private letter¹³⁹ to Mustafa Kemal - which was communicated to the latter by the French Consul, Izmir, on January 27 - urged him to use his influence with the Grand National Assembly to secure the peace. At the same time Colonel Mougin, the French High Commissioner in Istanbul, had a private meeting with Rauf Bey, who seemed anxious about the possible breakdown and asked for Poincaré's co-operation.¹⁴⁰ However, Poincaré's appeal to Mustafa Kemal met with a cool reception from Rauf Bey, who pointed out that the 'Grand National Assembly, even

¹³⁶. Ibid. No. 470.

¹³⁷. Cmd. 1814, XXVI, 1923, p.838; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No 449. January 28, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 453. January 28, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 470. January 31, 1923, Ismet Pasha, Riza Nur and Hasan Bey to Ankara; No. 473. February 1, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 483. February 2, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

¹³⁸. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 456. January 29, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; FO371/9062/E1214/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 356; CON12359/164.

¹³⁹. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.446. January 28, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları, 1923. Cilt. III, pp. 1239-1240.

¹⁴⁰. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.418. January 24, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; FO371/9061/E997/1/44, January 25, 1923, Henderson to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 344.

if it wished, had no power to accept judicial capitulations.' He also accused French of 'serving capitalist interests'.¹⁴¹

It was not only the French which had been engaged in negotiations with Ankara. The Russians, too, were trying to gain influence in the Grand National Assembly with a view to protecting their interests. According to a British Secret Intelligence Report of January 5, Chicherin had received a secret communication from Moscow in which he was given to understand that 'although the situation in Angora did not seem to be as satisfactory as might have been hoped, the Soviets had the support of certain influential deputies in Angora who gave them ample assurances that no treaty would ever be ratified by the National Assembly against the interests of Soviets'. The letter also advised Chicherin 'to keep on friendly terms with the Turks in Lausanne and to use the utmost diplomacy in dealing with them.'¹⁴²

As to the Americans, they were cautious about taking definite action and beginning their own talks with Ismet Pasha since it was not yet clear whether the Conference was terminated or suspended. However, the State Department was of the opinion that it might be 'desirable to have an exchange of notes with the Turks, in case they showed themselves "well disposed" towards American commercial and philanthropic enterprises in Turkey'. If possible the delegation was asked, 'without seeming to cast doubts on American rights' to get a "written declaration" of the Turks' friendly intentions.¹⁴³

On January 30, the day before the official presentation of the draft treaty, Ismet Pasha, in a private conversation with Bompard, declared 'his inability to accept the treaty' but also announced 'his unwillingness to return to Ankara without

¹⁴¹. FO371/9063/E1273/1/44, January 29, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; CON12359/174.

¹⁴². FO371/9058, January 5, 1922, SIS Report No. 1030.

¹⁴³. FRUS (1923) II, No. 90.

a treaty.' That was precisely what Curzon had expected to hear. On January 31, he wrote to the Foreign Office: 'Ismet's refusal to return to Angora is conclusive proof that he has powers to sign and that he does not mean to go without a treaty. We should indeed be ill-advised if we did not take advantage of this discovery.'¹⁴⁴ Intercepted telegrams also pointed to the fact that Ismet Pasha, to quote Curzon, 'not only has authority but means to sign...' and he concluded, 'It is to my mind clear that Turks do not mean fighting and must have a treaty.'¹⁴⁵

Henderson's telegram to the Foreign Office on January 30, based on information from 'a well informed source' was another significant element in reassuring Curzon about presenting the draft treaty at his convenience. 'After final secret session held yesterday morning,' reported Henderson, 'Grand National Assembly decided that war must at all costs be avoided...and that Ismet has been instructed to ask for adjournment rather than accept rupture of conference and to give undertaking, if necessary, to refrain from military action of any sort during adjournment'.¹⁴⁶

With these assurances Curzon was, now, prepared for a showdown if it had not been for the 'Havas Incident' which darkened his '*grand finale*'. The day before the official presentation of the draft treaty, the Havas agency issued Poincaré's statement - which he called an 'unauthorised communiqué' - to the effect that the French government did not regard the Treaty to be presented to the Turkish Delegation on the following day as a final document but merely 'a basis of future discussion.' Curzon was understandably furious at the 'astonishing communication' to Ankara without previous reference to the British government or the Allied delegations at Lausanne. He called it 'a breach of the most definite pledges and

¹⁴⁴. FO371/9064/E1453/1/44; FO839/17; CON12359/164; FO371/9062/E1214/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 356; Mss Eur F112/285, Curzon Papers.

¹⁴⁵. FO371/9063/E1301/1/44; FO371/9062/E1240/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 357; FO839/17.

¹⁴⁶. CON12359/160.

understandings' and a 'flagrant violation of an agreement arrived at between the principal Allied Plenipotentiaries' and urged his government to call the attention of the French government to its obligations.¹⁴⁷ But Bonar Law's reply was not what Curzon had hoped for. Anxious to prevent further deterioration in Anglo-French relations, Bonar Law sent a telegram to Curzon on February 2, in which he wrote: 'There is no proof of French government having sent any official message to Angora in sense complained of, and it seems better to avoid representations to which French can return an ostensibly complete answer.'¹⁴⁸ Despite the lack of support from home and the Allies, Curzon, unaware of the new challenge he was yet to face, adhered to his original plan of submitting the draft treaty.

On January 31, 1923, at Curzon's suggestion, matters were brought to a head. A draft of the treaty¹⁴⁹ and of all its subsidiary conventions was prepared, embodying all the points on which agreement had already been reached. The Turkish and Allied versions of the numerous points on which the deadlock seemed complete. Curzon commenced the joint meeting by a speech of some length introducing the treaty, explaining its general character and object, and indicating the immense concessions which had been made to the Turks in respect of subjects dealt with in his commission. At the end of the session at which all these instruments - except for the Straits Convention, which was reserved for the following day - were formally submitted for acceptance on take it or leave it terms, Curzon explained that

¹⁴⁷. FO371/9063/E1340/1/44; FO371/9063/E1342/1/44; FO839/47 No.1390; Nicolson, Curzon, p.342; FO371/9063/E1384/1/44, February 3, 1923, Crewe to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 368.

¹⁴⁸. FO371/9063/E1334/1/44; FO839/47 No.1390.

¹⁴⁹. In fact preparations for the draft treaty had long been in progress. Curzon's telegram to Henderson on December 18 was a clear indication that Curzon intended, no matter what, to submit the draft as an 'ultimatum' to the Turks. 'My present intention is to shape matters so that there will be no adjournment of Conference except for December 24th and 25th, and to endeavour to get Turks to sign by end of month preliminary treaty, draft of which is now in preparation.' FO/839/17 No. 570; FO371/7967/E14125/13003/44, December 16, 1923, Curzon to the Foreign Office.

He also informed the Foreign Office as early as December 16, that he was drawing up a preliminary treaty for presentation to the Turks. FO371/7967/E14125/13003/44, December 16, 1922, Curzon to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 279; FO839/17 No. 125.

For the Draft Terms of Peace presented to the Turkish delegation at Lausanne on January 31, see: DBFP, XVIII, App. III; CAB24/158 CP.67; Cmd.1814 (1923), pp. 683-837; IOR L/PS/10/854, P593/23.

the British delegation would leave the following Sunday night, February 4, if no agreement on the draft had been reached by that date. He made it clear, however, that he was prepared to return at any time should Ismet Pasha desire an adjournment of the Conference to consult his government before signature. Peace now depended on the reply from the Turkish delegation. Curzon's original intention had been to give Ismet Pasha a more definite ultimatum, but neither the French nor the Italians were prepared for so drastic a line.¹⁵⁰ Yet, while the treaty was being presented to the Turks, he was handed a note from Poincaré addressed to Robert Crewe the British Ambassador, to the effect that France considered itself free to sign a separate treaty with the Turks, as that agreement applied only to the Great War and not to the present situation in which peace was being negotiated with the government of the Grand National Assembly. He maintained that France would reserve all rights to negotiate and sign a separate treaty after the British left Lausanne if it were found impossible to sign one *en bloc*. Curzon was greatly disturbed and annoyed at the note announcing Poincaré's break away from Allied unity at this most critical moment. 'A deliberate and unpardonable attempt on the part of France to jettison treaty presented at Lausanne,' he commented in a telegram of February 2 to the Foreign Office. Having called the French action an 'act of treason,' he accused them of violating their solemn engagements, and of entering upon an independent course of action in the interests of France alone.¹⁵¹

In a letter of January 1, Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote that the fundamental issue had not really been changed, and that it remained at the present, as it had been from the first, a question of a settlement between Curzon and Ismet

¹⁵⁰ FO371/9062/E1214/1/44, January 31, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 356; CON12359 No. 169.

¹⁵¹ FO839/47, February 2, 1923, Curzon to the Foreign Office; CON12359/181; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 543-544.

Poincaré's initiative caused an explosion of anger in France and press attacks on the government's Eastern policy, but public opinion was engaged in the Ruhr incident to the exclusion of everything else. In the face of severe criticism from the French press and protest from the British government, Poincaré had to defend himself and declared that his sole object was to 'avoid renewal of war'. CON12359/121, 131, 151, 166, 176, 194, 207, 210.

Pasha. This letter came at the right time and gave Curzon the assurance he needed. 'If they (Turks) really want peace, as is clear from all the secret telegrams,' wrote Amery, 'it is peace with us they want, and their desire to get it will not be weakened by the overt declaration of the French that they do not care what the terms of peace are and that they are prepared to make a separate peace and leave us in the lurch.'¹⁵² In the face of French and Italian pressure there was not much Curzon could do but climb down and agree to further negotiations with the Turks. By doing so, he was guided by two principles: the situation was not as desperate as Amery pointed out and the Turkish reply was yet to come.

The draft treaty was, to quote Busch, a 'considerable retreat from the Treaty of Sèvres, but it was not the treaty which Ismet Pasha was prepared to take back to Angora.'¹⁵³ It had too many points which ran counter to Ankara's determination to achieve full judicial, financial and economic independence. To Ismet Pasha's dismay, it contained not only articles that had been agreed upon but also articles that had not been agreed upon in the committees, and some entirely new proposals which had neither been presented nor discussed. 'It is full of new and some evil matter,' stated Child, though his reaction was more due to the 'clauses on concessions and economic matters' which were 'inimical' to American interests, rather than to his sympathy for the Turks.¹⁵⁴ He was joined by Giulio Cesare Montagna in expressing dissatisfaction with the draft treaty and not blaming the Turks for their anger. When the Allies informed the British about their objections to certain clauses the reply was: 'Too late to do anything! Too late to write anything new now!'¹⁵⁵

¹⁵². Curzon Papers, F112/282 ff. 51-55, February 1, 1923, Amery to Curzon.

¹⁵³. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 382.

¹⁵⁴. FO371/9065/E1587/1/44, February 4, 1923, Child to Curzon; FRUS (1923) II, No. 227; Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p.119. For Child's letter to Curzon see: FO371/9065/E1587/1/44; FRUS (1923) II, No. 244.

¹⁵⁵. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 119.

A rupture and a renewal of hostilities was feared. Allied representatives in Istanbul and the Allied military and naval authorities there debated the respective merits of holding their ground or of a total or partial evacuation of the occupied areas. 'I hope that before Lausanne conference breaks up instructions may be given me as to military policy the Government wishes [to be] pursued here,' wrote General Harington, General Officer Commanding in Istanbul on January 28, 'if Turks refuse to sign treaty it would be quite wrong to suppose that British force will be able to remain as at present...We are in a thoroughly unsound military position here...', and he concluded, '...My considered military opinion, if we are going to have definite break or war with Turkey, is that our military force should be withdrawn from Constantinople and Ismid to Gallipoli peninsula. From there we could sweep Turks out of Europe if necessary which is what they fear most.'¹⁵⁶

But a military solution was not what Ankara had in mind. The Council of Ministers' decisive instructions to Lausanne were that the final action of the Turkish delegation was to depend on how much the Allies were prepared to meet the Turks on economic and judicial matters. In the event of substantial modification in favour of the Turkish thesis, the delegation was advised to stay on; if not, an immediate return was expected.¹⁵⁷ In the full note which Ismet Pasha sent to the three Allied delegations on the morning of February 4, nearly all the outstanding territorial and military questions - the frontiers, Thrace, the Islands and the Straits - were settled or offers made which enabled a solution to be reached before the British delegation departed. The Conference finally broke down at the historic session in Lord Curzon's room at the Beau Rivage late on the afternoon of February 4, mainly over

¹⁵⁶. CAB24/158 CP.55(23); WO106/1431; FO371/9121/E1147/35/44, January 28, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 348; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 495. February, 4, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; CON12359/150.

¹⁵⁷. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 476. February 2, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 491. February 3, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

the question of the judicial regime for foreigners, Greco-Turkish reparations and the economic clauses.

The period of the greatest strain at the Conference was from the 3rd to the 5th, the 4th being the decisive day. On the receipt of Ismet Pasha's note the Allies met in Curzon's room at 2.45 on February 4, when, after obtaining further information from Ismet Pasha regarding the economic clauses, they decided to meet him at 5.40 pm and to offer him certain additional concessions regarding Mosul and the economic clauses as a final inducement to securing his signature to the terms of peace. Curzon, knowing that this was his last chance of avoiding a rupture over Mosul, sought a compromise. While declining the article in the Treaty which referred the question of the Iraq frontier to the League of Nations, he made a declaration to be attached to the treaty to the effect that the British Government would consent not to pursue the application to the League for the space of a year, in order to allow discussions with the Turkish government in the interval.¹⁵⁸ Upon the judicial and economic questions with which the French and the Italians were mainly concerned, a firm policy was adopted. Curzon was confident that Ismet Pasha would refuse to meet the Allied proposals on these matters since the Foreign Office memoranda, secret intelligent reports and the private negotiations with various delegations along with the Turks, all pointed to the same conclusion. As it was impossible for Ismet Pasha to make peace on the terms proposed, a rupture was inevitable.

Shortly after the meeting started, Ismet Pasha left the room with his delegation to consider the Allied proposal. When he returned to the room after a brief retirement he accepted Curzon's proposal regarding Mosul but rejected the judicial and economic clauses. He pointed out that if Turkey were to accept the

¹⁵⁸ FO371/9064/E1509/1/44, February 5, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 370; Quincy Wright., 'The Mosul Dispute' *American Journal of International Law*, 20 (1926), pp. 453-464.

economic clauses of the treaty as now proposed by the Allies it would be placed in a position of economic servitude. 'Turkey,' he insisted, 'could not be deprived of its economic and judicial liberty'. Equally, he refused the judicial formula as an infringement of Turkish independence and sovereignty. Curzon, relieved at Ismet Pasha's reply, pressed his terms, along with Bompard and Garroni, leaving no room for Ismet Pasha to manoeuvre. He also refused to accept Riza Nur's statement that the Turkish delegation had done all they could and that if they gave further on the points under discussion the treaty would not be ratified. Bompard and Garroni, with the support of Curzon, bombarded Ismet Pasha with appeals and threats to such an extent that Ismet Pasha lost his temper and threatened: 'I shall return to Angora and tell my people that the Conference, under the presidency of Lord Curzon, desired war.'¹⁵⁹ Outraged by Ismet Pasha's remark, Curzon defended himself and tried one last emotional appeal. 'You have,' he said looking at his watch, 'only half an hour, Ismet Pasha, in which to save your country.'

Ismet Pasha was faced with a dilemma, as Aydemir has aptly put it: 'If he signed the treaty as it is he would find himself in a situation which would jeopardise what had been won by the National Struggle for Independence. If he did not sign it the peace negotiations which had been going on for months would be interrupted; whatever the outcome it would not be satisfactory'.¹⁶⁰ He took the decision not to sign the treaty without further consultation with Ankara though risking a rupture and losing a treaty that was desperately needed. At this point the Turkish delegation left the room and the meeting closed at 7.45. The Conference was dispersed.'During the nine months of struggle' Ismet Pasha wrote in his memoirs, 'the time when I felt most depressed was February 4, the day on which the conference suspended'.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹. Inonu, *Hatıralar*, pp. 92-93; Nicolson, *Curzon*, pp. 347-348.

¹⁶⁰. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 241.

¹⁶¹. Inonu, *Hatıralar*, p. 92; For more detailed account of the closing day, see: Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 February 4, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).

On his return to the hotel he was surrounded by journalists who were anxious to know what had happened. 'Nothing.' Pasha replied, 'We refused servitude'.¹⁶² Curzon's train left Lausanne half an hour later than scheduled so that he could hear Ismet Pasha's views on the session with Bompard. But the deadlock remained. Failing to secure Ismet Pasha's signature to the treaty Curzon sarcastically remarked: 'Perhaps the most characteristic sequel was that within the next hour Ismet Pasha twice telephoned to find out whether I had really gone. Like a true Turk he thought that he could still catch me before I turned the corner of the street in order to have a final transaction over the price of the carpet.'¹⁶³

Following Curzon's departure, Lausanne witnessed extremely intense diplomatic activity between the leadership of the French and the Italians, who were trying to find a common ground with a view to settling the remaining points with Ismet Pasha. Bompard's long conversation with Ismet Pasha on February 5, at which the latter had accepted a formula relating to the regime for foreigners in Turkey prepared the day before by Montagna and had agreed that economic clauses in the dispute should be discussed later, raised hopes once more about the signature of the treaty. However, both Garroni's abortive attempt to persuade Ismet Pasha to confirm in writing his statement to Bompard and to delay his departure, which was to take place via Bucharest¹⁶⁴ on February 7, and Child's interviews with Pasha produced no result. Both the assurance of Massigli, Secretary General of the Conference, that the Allies were prepared to sign the treaty provided that Ismet Pasha stated in writing his agreement with Bompard and Montagna and General

¹⁶². Ali Naci Karacan., Lozan. (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1971), p.293; Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, p. 248.

¹⁶³. CON12359/ No. 214, 220; FO371/9064/E1509/1/44, February 5, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; DBFP, XVIII, No. 370; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 383.

¹⁶⁴. On his way to Ankara Ismet Pasha stopped at Bucharest where he had a press interview through which he found an opportunity to express his views on the situation. He affirmed that there had been 'no rupture of negotiations'. There had been 'no official notification' of the fact. What had occurred at Lausanne was 'a suspension of the work of the Conference.' He could not state when the negotiations would be renewed, as the work did not depend on the Turks. FO371/9066/E1843/1/44, February 11, 1923, Dering (Bucharest) to the Foreign Office.

Pellé's appeal that there was no reason why the treaty should not be signed, failed to convince Ismet Pasha. He maintained that he would return to Ankara to obtain the assent of his government to draft the treaty subject to modifications elaborated by Montagna. The declaration regarding the judicial regime for foreigners in Turkey which was strengthened by amendments inserted by Montagna eliminating foreign interference from the judicial system was to become known as the 'Montagna Formula' and cause great controversy in the second phase of the negotiations.¹⁶⁵

Ismet Pasha added that the Turkish delegation had already made their reply to the Allies' proposal on February 4, and that it was now up to the Allies to inform the Turks in writing of the present Allied point of view.¹⁶⁶ Poincaré's proposal to Curzon, asking for the consent of the British government to a formula under which the Allies would express their willingness to continue the discussions with Ismet Pasha received a lukewarm reception from the British who were now satisfied that a rupture on account of Mosul had been avoided.¹⁶⁷ They called the proposal 'a complete surrender to the Turks on matters held to be vital by the unanimous opinion of the allies' and declared that the British were 'unable to agree

¹⁶⁵ The declaration in which Montagna's insertions can be seen in parentheses stated as follows: The Turkish government proposes to take immediately into its service, for such period as it may consider necessary and which will not be less than five years, European Legal counselors, who shall be selected by it (from a list drawn up by the Permanent Court of International Justice of the Hague) among the jurist citizens of countries not having participated in the war of 1914-18, and who will be (engaged as) Turkish functionaries.

These legal counselors will be attached to the Ministry of Justice where they will participate in the labors of the Commissions on legislative reforms and it will be their special duty to follow in the cities of Constantinople and Smyrna, the functioning of civil, commercial and penal Turkish jurisdiction and to receive all complaints which may arise either from the administration of civil, commercial or penal justice, or the execution of penalties or the applications of laws (as well as domiciliary visits, searches or arrests) with the duty to report to the Ministry of Justice with a view to assure the strict observance of Turkish legislation.

Cm. 1814, pp. 852-853; For the full text of the Declaration see: FRUS, 1923, II, pp. 995-996; DBFP, XVIII, No. 397, February 14, 1923, Graham to Curzon.

¹⁶⁶ FO371/9064/E1459/1/44, February 6, 1923, Bentinck to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 371; FRUS, 1923, II, No. 242; Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari I*, No. 508. February 6, 1923 Adnan Bey to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 510. February 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p.555.

¹⁶⁷ CAB23/45, Appendix to Cabinet, 6, (23).

to any formula which would imply that the conference would be resumed on the basis of further allied concessions.¹⁶⁸

In the light of these developments Ismet Pasha sent a telegram to Ankara in which he related his last meeting with Bompard, and informed them that the 'negotiations were not broken off' and that he was returning on February 7 to deliberate the outcome. Aware of the difficulties he would encounter in the Grand National Assembly for failing to conclude a peace, Pasha felt that he should send a telegram to Rauf Bey and ask for a government communiqué to be released stating that the Conference had not broken down and that the Turkish delegation's return to Ankara was a direct result of the 'suspension' of the Conference. On the same day, February 5, he once more communicated with Ankara and declared that he had settled all questions outstanding with the British delegation and urged that 'friendly relations should be entered into with them and a mild attitude adopted everywhere towards them.'¹⁶⁹ As stated in Ismet Pasha's telegram, the Turkish delegation left for Ankara on February 7.

A detailed account of the closing stages of the first phase of the Conference is not possible due to the unavailability of the official documents covering the last moves of each side.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, in the light of the data available it may well be concluded that in this war of attrition both Curzon and Ismet Pasha succeeded in realising their original plans. Curzon, despite criticism from home, almost secured the British desiderata such as the Straits, and to a certain extent Mosul, on which the

¹⁶⁸. FO371/9064/E1514/1/44, February 6, 1923 Record by Sir Eyre Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador; FO371/9067/E2304/1/44, February 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 373, 421; CAB23/45/623; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 509. February 6, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 510. February 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

¹⁶⁹. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No 503. February 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.503 bis. February 5, 1923 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all Representatives; No.504. February 6, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; FO371/9065/E1631/1/44, February 9, 1923, Minute; FO371/9065/E1689/1/44, February 12, 1923, (Minute) 'Near East Situation'.

¹⁷⁰. The number of documents which are not available in FO371 files is significantly higher towards the end of the conference. Equally, a collection of official telegrams exchanged between Ankara and Lausanne shed little light on details. Therefore notes and diaries of the various delegations prove a valuable source of information at this stage.

much feared rupture was successfully avoided¹⁷¹; in addition, Turco-Russian discord was confirmed, though not as a direct result of his policy. Ismet Pasha, on the other hand, succeeded in reaching an agreement with Britain as originally intended and now England, the largest opponent and obstacle for peace, was out of the picture so that he could concentrate on France and Italy to settle the remaining points without so much interference from Britain. Moreover, the Conference was not broken off but suspended, which was of vital importance for Ismet Pasha so far as his relations with Ankara went.

From the outset of the Conference, Ismet Pasha's policy was to reach a peace accord with the Allies in general, and with Britain in particular. If he could meet the Assembly with an assurance of British goodwill in the settlement of outstanding points he was convinced that he could get the GNA's approval. He counted on Britain's goodwill in respect to economic clauses in order to obtain the approval of the Grand National Assembly. Britain was appeased and Turkey was left face to face only with France and Italy who, unlike Britain, presented no threat of war.¹⁷² Although they were bitterly disappointed at their failure to secure Turkish acceptance of the points that interested them, the British, to Ismet Pasha's dismay, after all the points which especially interested them had been settled, showed themselves more uncompromising than the French and the Italians. While they expressed their willingness to reserve economic clauses in order to secure the signature of the treaty, Curzon maintained his position on the treaty being signed as

¹⁷¹. 'Question of Mosul will only appear in the form of a clause to the effect that section of the Turkish frontier is referred for decision to the League of Nations' pointed out Curzon with satisfaction and added, 'I think I shall have carried out my promise to the Prime Minister, that if we split, it will not be on that rock either primarily or alone.' FO839/17, January 24, 1923, Curzon to Lindsay; Mss Eur F112/285, January 1, 1923, Curzon to the Foreign Office, Curzon Papers; Anonymous., 'Lausanne Conference' The Round Table, 13 (1923), pp. 342-355.

'Lord Curzon handled the situation in a masterly way' commented Allen Leeper, Assistant Private Secretary to Curzon, in a private letter to his father, 'for he succeeded in settling or making the Turks agree to all the questions on which public opinion in France and Italy might have been weak and then at the end defended French and Italian interests most strongly and loyally, so that the Turks broke on this issue.' Leeper Papers, LEEP 3/14, February 7, 1923, (Private Letters).

¹⁷². FO371/9064/E1500/1/44, February 6, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; CON12359 No. 223; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 181-184 Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, p. 89.

a whole. The entire British delegation was instructed to leave Lausanne for London. Ismet Pasha did not agree to settle the question of Mosul to Curzon's convenience, and Curzon did not give the treaty to Ismet Pasha who, he knew, was desperately in need of peace. But Ismet Pasha's difficulties were by no means over, and the biggest test was yet to begin on his return to Ankara.

V

THE INTERVAL

(February 4, 1923 - April 23, 1923)

Turkey went to Lausanne determined to win its territorial integrity, its judicial and political freedom, and to secure financial and economic liberation. The suspension of the Conference from February 4 to April 23, 1923 put a temporary halt to that goal. Perhaps it was not wholly unfortunate for Turkey to experience such an interruption, since to ensure the execution of these principles, some adjustment was required to improve Ismet Pasha's negotiating position. However, these policy adjustments were not limited to Turkey itself; Britain too revised its position and took the necessary steps to ensure that its desired terms were fully materialised. Therefore it would not be wrong to say that the period which elapsed between the collapse of the first phase and the opening of the second phase of the Conference was a period during which each side endeavoured to secure a more favourable start for the second round of the negotiations.

Turkey

Turkey Stiffens its Stance: The Izmir Incident

The initial reaction to the suspension of the Conference was mixed. While Ismet Pasha was strongly criticised in the Grand National Assembly because of his compromise over the National Pact, the press took a moderate line. They put the blame on the French and the Italians and expressed satisfaction at what they

regarded an Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. The comparatively successful attempt of Ismet Pasha to settle the main political questions of interest in Britain was immediately reported in the Istanbul press, which was as loud in its expressions of satisfaction over Anglo-Turkish friendship as it was in its denunciation of the French and Italian schemes to enslave Turkey financially and economically. So far as the press was concerned, the roles of France and Britain had been reversed and the latter was now looked on as a mediator. For the first time, a distinctly anti-French feeling was almost generally displayed. 'According to news from Lausanne,' reported the semi-official *Vakit*, on February 6, in an unusually outspoken article,

'the roles have suddenly changed and it is France and Italy who have assumed a threatening and domineering attitude towards the Turks, notwithstanding the friendship which they have professed since the Armistice. In the dark days Britain was regarded as the mortal enemy of Turkey; today there is no question in dispute between the two countries, while with Greece there is nothing but the question of reparations...in the opinion of the world, the obstacle to peace is no longer London but Paris.'

Other newspapers like *Tevhid-i Efkar* and *Aksam*, provided further support to this tone; the latter called the attitude taken up by France 'treacherous'. But on the whole, the papers confined their comments to plaintive utterances concerning the economic slavery which was being forced on Turkey by the Allies.¹

Nevertheless, in spite of these comparatively peaceful declarations of the Istanbul press, there existed a party in the Assembly in Ankara which was prepared for more extreme measures; there were also signs of a certain nervousness in government circles. The Allies were anxious that military extremists would overpower moderates in the Grand National Assembly and make it difficult for the treaty to be signed. Their fear was not unfounded. The breakdown of the negotiations caused great disappointment in Ankara. The break up was regarded as

¹. FO371/9121/E1726/35/44, February 7, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office.

a definite rupture and the government took the decision that the Izmir port would be closed to all foreign warships of 1000 tons and over. Rauf Bey's telegram of February 6 to Paris, demanding that 'all foreign warships of more than a thousand tons must leave Izmir harbour before midnight,'² was to be explained not only by the prevailing tension in the Assembly but also by the determination of Ankara not to risk a resumption of hostilities. Ankara's decision was communicated on February 6 to the Allied High Commissioners in Istanbul where it met with a joint protest by the Allies.

The French, having been disappointed with the non-signature of the treaty and the Turkish attacks on the French in the Turkish press, were keen on a firm line of action at Izmir and adopted a rather belligerent attitude by refusing to withdraw and declaring that they would resist if attacked by the Turks. The tension gained momentum with the Turkish declaration that the port of Izmir was closed by a barrage of mines as from February 7 and that any foreign interference would be resisted.³ The British, however, did not retreat. Henderson warned the Turkish authorities of the despatch of British warships on the ground that the Allies maintained their position under the Armistice of Mudros and could not submit to restrictions of movements of their warships. Although the British wanted to avoid the risk of an incident, they were convinced that yielding to Turkish demands would merely encourage the Turks to go one step further and request the evacuation of Istanbul which was held as a trump card. In a telegram of February 7 to Istanbul, Curzon instructed that the Turkish summons could not be accepted, and that ships were not to withdraw and if attacked they were to defend themselves. The

². Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 506. February 6, 1923, Rauf Bey to Paris Representative; FO371/9107/E1508/16/44, February 6, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.372; FO800/157; FO371/9065/E1681/1/44.

³. CON12359/244; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, Nos. 514-515. February, 7, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 516. February 7, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative; No. 518. February, 8, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative; No. 519. February 8, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 521. February 10, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative.

evaluation of the situation by Admiral Brock, General Harington and Henderson was that the Izmir incident had created 'another point at which at any moment precipitate action of Turkish, possibly subordinate, authorities might lead to outbreak of hostilities' as all the indications pointed out to the fact that the extremist military party in Ankara was having the 'loudest say'.⁴

Britain did not want to withdraw in the face of the Turkish threat and perhaps wanted to know the real intention of Turkey. The day the British battleship *Curaçao* entered the port of Izmir Adnan Bey paid a visit to Henderson and gave him Rauf Bey's 'formal assurance that demand for withdrawal of warships had not been inspired by any hostile intention particularly against British.' He also added that whatever Turkish attitude had previously been towards Britain, Turkey was now sincerely anxious for British friendship and instructions were given to that effect.⁵ The Secret Intelligence Reports also confirmed Adnan Bey's message. Henderson became convinced that Rauf Bey had not sent written proposals since he was 'unwilling officially to adopt standpoint' which was the 'only one possible for him in the present temper at Angora.' He welcomed 'a certain measure of satisfaction' for Ankara from which he believed Britain would gain more than it would lose considering that it might strengthen Ismet Pasha's hand at Ankara when he returned with the treaty.⁶ It was through Rauf Bey's personal intervention that the crisis was avoided.

Ismet Pasha himself, worried that the peace for which he had worked for eleven weary weeks was about to be destroyed, appealed directly to Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey in his telegrams of February 10 from Bucharest, in which he urged that there was still a good chance of concluding peace and that the situation should

4. FO371/9065/E1639/1/44, February 9, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office.

5. CON12359/273, February 11, 1923, Henderson to Curzon.

6. FO371/9107./E1676/16/44, February 10, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.383; CON12359/266

not be allowed to get out of hand until his return to Ankara.⁷ On February 12 Adnan Bey, in a private meeting with Henderson, once again stressed that Ankara had taken the first step towards legitimising the situation by showing that it had no hostile intentions, and that therefore it was now for Britain to show some sign of goodwill by withdrawing its warships with a view to liquidating the difficulties. Henderson's telegrams of February 12 and 13 to the Foreign Office expressing his anxiety on political grounds that the ships should withdraw before the Economic Congress at Izmir opened and before Ismet Pasha left Istanbul seemed to have the desired effect on government circles.⁸ Thus Britain, having considered Rauf Bey's assurance and the possibility of a serious risk of irreparable incidents in the event of the extremists gaining the upper hand at Ankara, and doubtful of the efficiency of French and Italian support, modified its line of action. London decided by way of a friendly gesture to reduce its own naval forces at Izmir to their previous strength, and expressed readiness to discuss the whole question diplomatically if Ankara wished.⁹ Ankara continued to maintain in principle its right to regulate the access of Allied warships to the gulf of Izmir, but, for practical purposes, the matter lapsed into a *modus vivendi*, which remained in force until the Allied forces evacuated Turkish territory.

⁷ Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No. 522. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 523. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.

Ismet Pasha's telegram contributed, more than anything, to the tension in the relations between the Prime Minister and himself. In reply to Ismet Pasha's telegram Rauf Bey did not hide his discontent. He clearly justified the decision taken by the government and stressed that if there had been a mistake the responsibility did not lie with Ismet Pasha but with the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who held the office in the absence of Ismet Pasha. However, he assured him that the crisis would not be allowed to escalate until his return. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari. I, No.531. February 12, 1923, Rauf Bey to Adnan Bey.

⁸ FO371/9107/E1754/16/44, February 12, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; FO371/9107/E1784/16/44, February 13, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 390, 393; FO424/256 No.284; CON12359/293, 353.

⁹ FO371/9107/E2139/16/44, February 24, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No.413; CON12359/287, February 12, 1923, Curzon to Henderson.

The French government were annoyed at the decision taken by Britain to withdraw extra warships from Smyrna without previously consulting them. They showed their displeasure by expressing their regret that 'Britain had not given the French government the opportunity of associating themselves with the communication on the subject and that gave the impression that the Allies were not acting in solidarity as regards the question of ships at Smyrna.' CON12359/373.

Uncertainty Prevails as the Crisis Fades Away

While the crisis was escalating Curzon, anxious about the possible refusal of the treaty by the Grand National Assembly, tried to secure Ismet Pasha's signature to the treaty by exerting pressure on him through Duca, Romanias' Minister of Foreign Affairs. Duca's intention was to keep Ismet Pasha in Bucharest as long as possible and urge him to sign the treaty.¹⁰ Curzon himself twice communicated with Ismet Pasha, expressing his confidence in his securing the peace which at the present seemed closer than at any time. In addition to this 'friendly' message, which Ismet Pasha received while he was in Bucharest,¹¹ Curzon sent a second message to Istanbul on January 9, which was communicated to Ismet Pasha by Henderson, Acting High Commissioner, on January 17, the day he arrived at Istanbul. Curzon still hoped that the treaty could be signed as presented on January 31. He instructed Henderson as to the line to be adopted in order to get Ismet Pasha to sign the treaty before he arrived at Ankara where the final decision would be reached. The message was based on the assumption that the Turks had made 'a gross mistake' at Lausanne in not signing the treaty, but that there was still time 'to rectify that error' since the Allies were 'willing at any time to sign treaty in that form'.¹² But Henderson himself was of the opinion that Ismet Pasha would not sign it. 'After leaving without signing,' he wrote in a private letter to Vansittart on February 14, 'it will be difficult, if not impossible, knowing the foolish obstinate nature of the beast, to get him to sign exactly what he refused a week or so ago.'¹³ Thus Henderson communicated to Curzon, once more, inquiring whether Ismet Pasha might be told that while further discussion was otherwise out of the question,

10. FO371/9065/E1674/1/44, February 12, 1923, Dering (Bucharest) to the Foreign Office; CON/12359/270, 271.

11. Inonu, Hatiralar, p. 94.

12. FO371/9065/E1644/1/44; FO371/9065/E1644/1/44, February 9, 1923, Curzon to Henderson; FO371/9065/E1639/1/44, February 12, 1923, Curzon to Henderson; FO371/9066/E1929/1/44, February 17, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 380, 388, 402; FO424/256 No.257; CON12359/257; Inonu, Hatiralar, p. 95.

13. FO800/157, February 14, 1923, Henderson to Vansittart.

if the National Assembly accepted all the points of the treaty to which Ismet Pasha had already agreed, the British government would be prepared to resume negotiations 'on basis of remodelling economic clauses only.' Curzon replied in the negative to the proposal of Henderson on the grounds that economic clauses and in particular article 94 were of importance to British as well as to French and Italian interests, although it might be true that, as a whole, the economic clauses were more essential to France and Italy.¹⁴

Henderson's judgement proved accurate. Although Ismet Pasha stated that he had great admiration for and confidence in Curzon and that his opinion was the only one that counted for him, he had no intention of signing the treaty before consulting with the Assembly and Mustafa Kemal. However, as Ismet Pasha pointed out to General Harington, he himself was in favour of peace and anxious about any delay in concluding peace 'owing to danger and expense of keeping armies looking at each other,' especially as there were 'no real differences between Turkey and Britain.'¹⁵ Curzon too was concerned about the perilous military situation and General Harington was instructed 'to avoid every appearance of uneasiness or action which might give the hostile element at Angora encouragement.'¹⁶ He was also reminded that in case of active hostilities the British Government had no intention of holding on to Istanbul.

Ismet Pasha was convinced that before his return to Ankara a private meeting with Mustafa Kemal would be beneficial, as it might result in a common

¹⁴. FO371/9065/E1717/1/44, February 12, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; February 13, 1923, Curzon to Henderson.

Article 94 of the Lausanne treaty relating to the confirmation of concessions, agreement whether formally ratified or not, was of particular importance to the British. The article was to settle the controversial issue of the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. For more information see: DBFP, XVIII, Appendix III, pp. 1021-1022, Cmd. 1814, pp. 686-772; FRUS, (1923), Vol. II, pp. 1005-1009.

¹⁵. FO371/9067/E1952/1/44, February 17, 1923, Harington to the Foreign Office; FO371/9067/E2125/1/44, February 22, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9067/E2217/1/44, February 26, 1923, Crewe to the Foreign Office.

¹⁶. WO106/1432, February 23, 1923, War Office to Harington.

policy concerning relations inside and outside the Assembly.¹⁷ Mustafa Kemal was also inclined to think that a meeting with Ismet Pasha would be desirable, to find out whether there was still a chance for peace and to remove any differences of opinion between them before facing the Assembly. He had been touring Anatolia since the middle of January. The objects of his tour were both military and political: to improve the morale of the army, and to prepare the way for elections, which were likely to be held after the conclusion of the peace, if not sooner.¹⁸

The most significant event of his tour was the press conference in Izmit on January 16-17, which was given to prominent members of the Istanbul Press. This meeting was more than a mere press conference held with the columnists of the Istanbul newspapers, which had given their warm support to Mustafa Kemal during the turbulent years of the Independence War. It was in the form of an informal conversation in which Mustafa Kemal had the chance to assert his views on the present stand taken by the Ankara government as well as on the future form that the country was likely to take. He also obtained the view of the columnists on these matters.¹⁹ Before he met Ismet Pasha in Eskisehir he stopped at Izmir on February 15, where he inaugurated an economic congress with a long speech in which he emphasised, as he had done on previous occasions, Turkey's need of foreign capital, for which it would give guarantees. The Izmir Economic Congress, like the Izmit Press Conference, was an important event, indirectly related to the Lausanne

17. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari I*, No.522. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.523. February 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No.524. February 10, 1923, Adnan Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.535. February 13, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No.536. February 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Adnan Bey; Inonu, *Hatiralar*, p. 97.

18. Mustafa Kemal's tour of inspection caused curiosity in the British circles, if not suspicion. Henderson reported to Rumbold on January 16 in the following lines: 'The variety of its objects, as reported in the Press, seem to indicate that it is a kind of "ready for all eventualities" trip. Inspection of his army, opening of an all-Turkish Economical Congress at Smyrna on February 15th, and an explanation to the people of the aims of the Popular Party which Mustafa Kemal has announced that he is going to form. Altogether it is a curious mixture of war and peace, military preparedness and post-war party politics and economic recovery.' Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 30, ff. 217-222, January 16, 1923, Henderson to Rumbold; Ryan Papers FO800/240, January 23, 1923, Henderson to Ryan.

19. Arar, *Ataturk'un Izmit Basın Toplantisi*, pp. 7-71; Zucher, *Political Opposition*, pp. 23-25; Yakup K. Karaosmanoglu., *Politikada 45 Yil*. (Ankara: Bilgi Basimevi, 1968), pp. 13-17.

conference as it conveyed to the West the economic policy and the peace terms of the Ankara government. Rumbold interpreted the speech as 'rather defiant though not categorically adverse to peace.'²⁰ When Mustafa Kemal interrupted his tour to join Ismet Pasha at Eskisehir he was accompanied by Fevzi Bey, the leader of the military party which had been pressing for a drastic line as regards the Izmir harbour incident. The Eskisehir meeting proved to be a success for Ismet Pasha. Having secured the support of Mustafa Kemal, the President of the Grand National Assembly, and of Fevzi Pasha, representative of the hard-liners, on February 21 Ismet Pasha returned to his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs and was ready for his big challenge: facing the Assembly.

The Grand National Assembly Gives its Verdict

On the same day as he returned to his office, Ismet Pasha faced for the first time a hostile Assembly to which he gave his account of the Lausanne Conference and his reasons for finding himself unable to sign the peace treaty. However, he considered that, though the proposed treaty did not completely satisfy Turkish desires, it would, with some small concessions on both sides, result in as satisfactory a settlement as Turkey could obtain. 'War is a fine game', he stated, 'but they who play at it too often and too long are bound to tire in the long run, and to meet with disaster.'²¹ It was apparent that the Opposition was dissatisfied with Ismet Pasha's report and had been preparing to attack his policy of peace. Despite the growing opposition however, it was well recognised that Mustafa Kemal still held the majority in the Grand National Assembly.

²⁰ FO371/9067/E2030/1/44, February 19, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

²¹ T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt III, (6 Mart 1922- 27 Subat 1923), Ankara, 1985 pp. 1290-1301; FO371/9121 Secret Intelligence Report, February 12, 1923, Misc/26; FO371/9068/E2526/1/44 Secret Intelligence Report, March 7, 1923, No.1106, Appendix, A.1.; FO371/9068/E2331/1/44, March 1, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

Prior to the general discussion in the Grand National Assembly, the Council of Ministers with the participation of Mustafa Kemal and the members of the delegation at Lausanne held two important meetings to negotiate the policy to be adopted in the face of an expected attack. After discussions, Mustafa Kemal and the Council of Ministers, owing to the strength and fierceness of the Opposition, had to abandon Ismet Pasha's original plans and policy, which was to recommend the signing of the treaty excepting the financial and economic clauses which would be discussed within the next six months. Leaving aside the hard liners, the deputies' enthusiasm for the National Pact proved such that the government had to draft more comprehensive counter proposals. It took the line of deferring economic and financial questions until after the conclusion of peace, of accepting other clauses which were decided upon after discussion of the draft of the peace treaty, and of demanding further concessions regarding the other points not already settled.²² However, the government preferred to withhold its opinion and not to express it before the Assembly, which it believed was not in the frame of mind for a dispassionate examination.²³

When the Allied draft treaty was brought before the Grand National Assembly for general discussion on February 27, feelings were already running high. The government and the delegation came under severe attack from the deputies, who regarded the articles of the treaty as being in violation of the National

²². FO371/9067/E2217/1/44; FO371/9068 Secret Intelligence Report, March 7, 1923, No. 1106; FO371/9067/E2217/1/44.

²³. The delay on the part of the Council of Ministers in presenting their proposals to the Assembly originated from the fact that these proposals were now taking the form of a whole counter draft treaty. While the Allied draft treaty was being discussed by the Ministers, Britain was observing the developments with great cautiousness and anxiety. A state of tension prevailed in the Turkish press against Rumbold and Ryan as the obstacles to a settlement on which Turks and French were agreed and which even the British would agree to were it not for their machinations. In the interest of peace Ankara played down the importance of the publications calling them 'defects in censorship'. However the main concern was not so much personal confrontation but whether Ankara would agree to what Ismet Pasha agreed to at Lausanne, subject to further discussion of what was left in dispute on February 4, or whether they would seek to reopen all the questions that Curzon thought settled. FO371/9068/E2304/1/44, February 28, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9068/E2284/1/44, February 28, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9068/E2485/1/44, (letter), February 27, 1923, Ryan to Forbes Adam.

Pact.²⁴ Ismet Pasha's conduct at the Conference, particularly over the question of Mosul, was subject to severe criticism from the deputies, who feared that by accepting the proposal for direct negotiations and by referring the matter to the League of Nations Turkey was throwing away its claims over Mosul. Having witnessed the acrimonious criticism Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha came under, Mustafa Kemal thought that it was time to intervene on the side of the government. He was equally critical of the manner in which the Assembly had been conducting the discussions and particularly dismissive of criticisms regarding the territorial settlement. He stated that the National Pact had never had a map and 'the boundaries were to be determined according to high interests of the nation.' According to Mustafa Kemal, the Turks had to make a choice between war and the postponement of the Mosul question. He explained to the Assembly that the postponement of the question did not necessarily mean giving up the Mosul Vilayet but perhaps only deferring it until Turkey was in a stronger position.²⁵

But Mustafa Kemal's intervention on the side of the Government and his solution based on peace did not ease the dissatisfaction among the sceptics, who maintained that once Mosul was referred to the League of Nations it would be naive to expect its restoration to Turkey. As widely acknowledged by the Assembly, the League of Nations was, in reality, Britain itself and if Turkey could not recover the Vilayet now, when its army was at the zenith of its power, it would be very unlikely to do so in the next year or so. More significantly, the postponement of the question was regarded, by the Assembly as an attempt designed to separate Mosul from

²⁴ The same day in his despatches to the Foreign Office, Rumbold described the negotiations which had been going on at Ankara as 'a great struggle.' He stated that it was impossible to say what view the Grand National Assembly would take of the draft treaty, however he was 'fairly optimistic' about the outcome of the discussions. 'I can not think that the Turks will go to war and I suppose that they are weighing in the balance the advantage or disadvantage between agreeing to the few financial and economic concessions asked of them or losing the whole treaty and risking complete ruin by going to war.' He concluded with the hope that Mustafa Kemal who was a 'real statesman' still had 'enough authority to influence the National Assembly in the direction of moderation.' Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 11-12, ff. 13-14; Curzon Papers, F112/283; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, pp. 253-254.

²⁵ T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt III, pp. 1317-18, 1321.

Turkey and as the end of Turkish-Kurdish unity, which would lead to the creation of a Kurdish question in Turkey. An autonomous Kurdish state, which it was believed would be eventually pressed for by Britain, would create yet another source of conflict within the Islamic world.²⁶ At a closed sitting of the Grand National Assembly on March 2, Ismet Pasha, while repudiating the accusation that he was out for peace at any cost, emphasised that since the greater part of the National Pact had been attained, there was no need for the army to make further sacrifices and that the nation was tired and wanted peace.²⁷

Given the delicate situation at Istanbul, which was under Allied occupation, the Prime Minister, Rauf Bey, was anxious to obtain a quick decision from the Grand National Assembly. The government's efforts were also subject to strong criticism and the deputies blamed Rauf Bey for hampering a proper discussion of vital questions.²⁸ Towards the end of the discussions, which lasted almost two weeks through secret sittings, the tension seemed to be building up. On March 5, the tension reached a point where deputies were openly critical of the outcome of the Lausanne negotiations, calling it 'a sell out' and 'colony peace' and urging Ismet Pasha to return to his military post since it was proved 'impossible to secure Turkey's independence and integrity with this delegation'.²⁹ Finally, at a secret session on March 6, during the discussions on the question of Mosul, criticism of the government rose to a high pitch. Mustafa Kemal took part in this final debate and threw his weight behind the government:

'Our delegation had fully and completely fulfilled the duty entrusted to them. They have maintained the dignity of our nation and Assembly. If you are desirous of bringing the Peace question to a successful issue the Assembly must

²⁶. Ibid. Cilt III, p.1309; Cilt IV, pp. 93, 118, 163, 180.

²⁷. FO371/9069/E2569/1/44; FO371/9070/E2802/1/44, Secret Intelligence Report, March 15, 1923, No.1111, Appendix, A.1.

²⁸. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt III, p. 1314; Cilt IV, p. 68.

²⁹. T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt IV, p. 118, 126, 127, 159; Inonu, Hatıralar, p. 101.

also morally support the delegation to enable them to continue their work.³⁰

Mustafa Kemal's remarks led to the collapse of the opposition which had been so vociferous up to the eve of the final decision. According to a Secret Intelligence Report, the Grand National Assembly was also largely influenced in its decision by a 'rather dramatic pronouncement' of Ismet Pasha to the effect that 'the clamour of war was absurd and ruinous', in view of what had been obtained and of the state of the army. He was prepared to resign his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs and that of Commander of the Western Forces.³¹

It was clearly evident that there was a strong movement among the Ministers and that the government was averse to resorting to decisive action until all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement had been explored. After a lengthy debate, the opposition was defeated on the peace issue, perhaps not unwillingly, and the government obtained a vote which practically left them a free hand in the further conduct of the negotiations. The Assembly acted on the principle of the necessity for absolute unity at home if the victory abroad was to be won. In the face of external pressure, internal dissensions were as far as possible relegated to the background. But to a certain extent friction was unavoidable between a Grand National Assembly, increasingly jealous of its own prerogatives, and the government and Mustafa Kemal, who were firmly determined to introduce a peace policy based on the avoidance of excessive military expenditure, the pursuance of a rational economic policy and a policy through which the recovery of the country could be secured.

Nevertheless, so long as the main purpose of the government was not accomplished, the parties showed a singular capacity for sinking their political

³⁰. Kemal, Speech, p. 601-602; CON12359/479.

³¹. CON/12359/503; FO371/9071/E3057/1/44, March 21, 1923, Secret Intelligence Report, No.1115.

differences and put up a united front. The Grand National Assembly gave its decision that although the draft treaty drawn at Lausanne was unacceptable as contrary to the National Pact, the government was authorised by an important majority to continue negotiations in order to secure peace. The conditions of peace were as follows: The Mosul question, being of vital importance, must be settled within a provisional period; the financial, economic and administrative questions must be settled in accordance with the complete independence of the nation; and the occupied territories must be evacuated rapidly after the signing of peace.³² On March 6, the Turkish government released the following communiqué :

'Draft treaty presented by Entente Powers to our delegation as a result of Lausanne conference has been considered unacceptable as it contains stipulations damaging to our independence; If Entente Powers should insist on acceptance of this draft as it stands we are free from responsibility for results which will ensue; Authority was given to government by great majority for continuance of peace negotiations on basis of solution within limited period of very important and vital Mosul question, full and secure attainment of vital and independent rights of our nation and country in financial economic and administrative questions and speedy evacuation of our occupied territories immediately after peace.'³³

The decision of the Ankara government was received with great relief in British political circles which had feared that the extremist elements in Ankara might win the day in the Assembly. 'Moderate party...gained great victory at Angora in the teeth of strenuous opposition,' commented Rumbold, expressing his relief on the existing doubtful situation at Ankara. Only a few days before, on March 2, in a telegram to Curzon, he had been fairly pessimistic about the outcome. 'Political

³². T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları. Cilt IV, pp. 181-182; CON12359/404; İnönü, Hatıralar, p. 101.

³³. FO371/9068/E2508/1/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 427; Simsir, Lozan Telgrafları II, No.4. March 7, 1923, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representative. (official communiqué)

situation appears to be chaotic and decision of Assembly is impossible to forecast.³⁴

Rumbold appeared to be satisfied with the terms of the communiqué. In his view, the communiqué, 'though evidently designed to placate extremists', had left much discretion to the Turkish government, who were 'most anxious to avoid war'.³⁵ As he rightly observed, the outcome was largely due to Mustafa Kemal's personality and influence. Soon after the result was announced Rumbold wrote to Curzon: 'The personality of Mustafa Kemal has been so predominant that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that main line of cleavage in the Assembly is that between his supporters and his opponents. It is however impossible to draw this line too definitely as his personal prestige is still so great as to make it difficult even for opponents to criticise him openly.'³⁶

Ankara's Efforts to Strengthen its Position

The government's difficulties were, however, far from being over. Towards the end of the month the political situation became very tense due to the murder of the deputy for Trabzon, Ali Sukru Bey, who had become identified with the opposition party known as the 'Second Group'. The already simmering opposition boiled over as a result of Ali Sukru Bey's death. Mustafa Kemal and his party, The Defence of Rights Association, turned the situation to their account by taking advantage of the disarray created in the ranks of the opposition by this incident to destroy the opposition altogether. On March 29, 1923, an amendment to the *Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu* (High Treason Law) of April 19, 1920, making it illegal to oppose the government of the Grand National Assembly or to campaign

³⁴. CON12359/384; FO371/9069/E2627/1/44, March 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 433.

³⁵. FO371/9068/E2525/1/44; CON12359/405; FO371/9068/E2508/1/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 427.

³⁶. CON12359/425; FO371/9130/E2664/199/44, March 7, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

for a return of the Sultanate, was introduced into the Assembly. This was followed by a decision to dissolve the Assembly, hold new elections within a maximum period of two months and introduce changes in the Electoral Law. However, the present Assembly was to continue to exercise all its functions until the new Assembly was elected. This was a move with the object of paralysing the Assembly, without dissolving it, while peace negotiations continued, as it became gradually apparent that there was little chance of making progress with the existing Assembly.³⁷ Ismet Pasha justified this on the grounds that, although the Assembly had, on March 6, given the government a mandate to proceed with the peace negotiations, elections were necessary in order to elicit a new and up-to-date expression of the national will.³⁸

The Second Group disintegrated and on April 15, the High Treason Law was accepted by the Assembly. The way was now open for Ismet Pasha to resume the negotiations at Lausanne with a freer hand. This would also strengthen the hand of the Defence of Rights organisation in the forthcoming elections. Not only did these measures secure Ismet Pasha's position at home, but they also enabled him to pursue negotiations with the Powers without fear of criticism by his opponents, with the prospect of being able to submit the results to a new Assembly composed of his supporters. Mustafa Kemal's initiative, aimed at crushing the opposition which he thought was a great hindrance to peace, was welcomed by the British, who had been following the developments with a great deal of anxiety. 'If as at present seems probable, Mustafa Kemal succeeds in bringing together a new Assembly committed to his programme', wrote Rumbold, 'I think that the chance of peace will be affected favourably rather than otherwise.'³⁹ But the road to peace had already been cleared by the determination of Ismet Pasha, Rauf Bey and

³⁷. Inonu, Hatıralar, pp. 106-109.

³⁸. Ibid. p. 107.

³⁹. CON 12404/32, April 3, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

Mustafa Kemal, who took a realistic view of the situation and of the costs and risks of a resumption of hostilities, and who fought for peace without showing overt signs of disagreement. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Mustafa Kemal's intervention on the side of Ismet Pasha and the government greatly contributed to ending this confrontation, accelerated the elaboration of a new Turkish position and soon resulted in counter proposals to restart the Conference.

On March 8, Ismet Pasha addressed a note⁴⁰ of 115 pages to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Britain and Italy, enclosing a memorandum couched in moderate language in which the amendments and additions desired by Ankara were shown side by side with the Allied draft of January 31. The counter proposal showed that Ankara, in the main, accepted the political and the territorial agreements provisionally reached by Ismet Pasha in the early days of February - notably on the questions of Mosul, Kara Agatch, and the Thracian frontier convention - and it confirmed the Turkish acceptance of the Straits Convention as drafted before the suspension of the Conference. While the territorial claims such as Castellorizo and the island of Adah-Kale in the Danube were put forward as bargaining counters, the adoption of the 'Montagna formula'⁴¹ for the judicial declaration, the maintenance of the proposal to separate the economic clauses from the treaty, and some amendments of the financial clauses ran counter to the Allied draft of January 31.

40. FO371/9069/E2624/1/44, March 10, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 431; The text of the Turkish counter-proposals is printed in *Recueil* (I), Vol. IV, pp. 33-69 and in Seha L. Meray., *Lozan Baris Konferansi: Takim I, Cilt V*, pp. 69-70; Inonu, *Hatiralar*, p. 105-106; Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, No.6. March 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Britain and Italy. (Memorandum).

41. Ismet Pasha had committed himself in the Grand National Assembly to the Montagna formula but Britain's refusal to accept it shook his position at a critical moment and complicated his task in Ankara. He was greatly upset over the misunderstanding arisen in connection with the Montagna formula (see: Chapter III, footnote, 164). He had been misled into believing that all Allies had been willing to accept the formula and had in fact been told so by Montagna and Bompard who had specially declared that they were putting it forward in the name of the three Allies. Britain maintained that the Montagna formula had never been an official draft and that 'anything put forward by M. Montagna on the evening of February 4th could only have the character of a personal suggestion,' since Montagna had 'no authority' from the British government 'to propose or agree to any changes in Allied draft declaration of February 3'. Thus Britain's position with regard to the treaty was as it was at the end of final meeting in Curzon's room on February 4. The British government was in no way committed to what had passed subsequently between

The arrival of the Allied note and Ismet Pasha's reply to it coincided with another event at Ankara which needs to be briefly examined because of its bearing on the course of the peace negotiations. In addition to the measures stated above taken by the government to strengthen Ismet Pasha's position, a further step was taken. The Assembly approved on April 9, 1923, an agreement with Chester and Kennedy⁴², conferring a monopoly of railway construction over a wide area, including Mosul, to an American syndicate. The United States, never having gone to war with Turkey and not sharing in the Allied administration of Istanbul, was viewed more favourably by Turkey than were the rival British and French companies. More importantly, Ankara pushed the Chester scheme through the Assembly with the deliberate object of securing American support over Mosul, as well as American aid for the reconstruction of the country. The concession gave the Americans far-reaching rights in the development of Anatolia which conflicted with French and British interests.⁴³ The British, who had inside information about the

Bompard and Montagna and the Turkish delegation and therefore would retain full liberty of action on the subject.

42. In his memoirs, Joseph Grew gave a brief summary of the origin of the Chester concession as follows: The inception of the Chester project dated from the years 1908-1909, when Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester began negotiations with Turkey for oil concessions for Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia. Although the Grand Vizier approved the project, the Turkish Parliament never officially granted the concession. The original American company which was to have taken over the concession became defunct, but a group of engineers and capitalists holding stock in the company held the project together informally. In 1920 interest revived among the group, and Admiral Chester and his partners sought the aid of the Department of State in an effort to "obtain a confirmation of his old project." At this time the American company met with the conflicting claims of other companies, particularly those of the French company.' Grew, Turbulent Era; Evans, United States Policy, pp. 344-348; Edward M. Earle., Turkey, The Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism.(London: The Macmillan Comp., 1923), pp. 339-350; Yahya Sezai Tezel., 'Birinci Buyuk Millet Meclisi Anti-Emperyalist miydi? Chester Ayricaligi' Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi, 25, No.4, (Aralik, 1970), pp.314-316; Lawrence Martin., 'The Chester Concession' Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 112 (1924), pp. 186-188; Anonymous., 'The Lausanne Treaty' The Atlantic Monthly, 134 (November 1924), pp. 693-700; Clair Price., 'The Chester Concession' The Fortnightly Review, 113 (June 1923), pp. 901-908.

FO371/9149/E2104/2104/44; FO371/9150/E4354/2104/44, April 30, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; FO371/9150/E4388/2104/44, April 30, 1923, Parliamentary Question on Chester Concession; FO371/9150/E4447/2104/44, May 3, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office; FO371/9149/E2234/2104/44, February 26, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office; FO371/9149/E2662/2104/44, March 6, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/7969/E13898/13898/44; FO371/9124/E1577/199/44, February 3 1923, Secret Intelligence Report, No.1068; CON12404/64.

43. FO371/9149/E3384/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3843/2104/44, April 10, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9136/E8906/343/4; Howard, The Partition of Turkey, p.301; Taner Timur., Turk Devrimi ve Sonrasi. (Ankara: Dogan Yayinlari, 1971), p.51.

Assembly's proceedings, were hopeful that the concession would not be approved by the Grand National Assembly. Therefore it was not surprising that Rumbold expressed his astonishment at the result. 'It is remarkable' he pointed out, 'even in Turkey that a government already committed to a general Election should have had the audacity, and a moribund Assembly the levity, to rush through a measure which, if effect is ever given, will tie up the economic future of the country for 100 years.'⁴⁴ But the statement of Dr. Ibrahim Fuat Bey (member of the GNA), given on his arrival in New York on April 7, to the effect that the 'concession had been favourably reported both by financial and public utility committees and would now go before the Grand National Assembly as a government not a private measure' was a clear indication that the concession would go through.⁴⁵

Although as early as September 1922, the Minister of Public Works at Ankara had entered into negotiations with the Ottoman American Development Company for the renewal of the Chester concession, Ankara held back the concession while it considered the different options in conjunction with the Mosul negotiations at the Lausanne Conference, where the prime object of the Turkish delegation was to reach an agreement with Britain on the matter. The basis of Ankara's policy was that the oil concession was available in exchange for recognition of its sovereignty in the Mosul Vilayet. When it became clear that under no circumstances would Britain give up Mosul,⁴⁶ the government was left with no choice but to approve the American concession. When Curzon refused to consider any proposal made by the Turks, and when the French failed to give the Turks their support in the Mosul dispute, and adopted an intransigent attitude towards the Capitulations in violation of the Ankara accord, Ismet Pasha informed Ankara on

⁴⁴. FO371/9150/E3843/2104/44, April 10, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

⁴⁵. FO371/9149/E3650/2104/44, April 9, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office.

⁴⁶. FO 839/50 Tel Nos. 267, 181, 287, 410, 1247; HANSARD, Vol. 163 (1923), p. 1345; FRUS, Vol.II (1923), pp. 1200-1201 Memo by State Department.

January 25 that it would be more appropriate to grant the concession to the Americans.⁴⁷

The Chester concession had repercussions on the peace negotiations simply because it clashed with certain concessions - first among them, that for the construction of the Samsun-Sivas railway- granted to the French Régie Générale in 1914.⁴⁸ The French were very much concerned about financial and economic matters, owing to their immense economic interests in Turkey. It would not be easy for Ismet Pasha to face the French at the conference table, especially after the grant to the Americans of the Chester concession, of which the French had claimed to be the rightful owners. By giving railway and other concessions of a comprehensive character to Chester, Turkey directly threatened the interests of three Allies and particularly antagonised the French.

The indignation of the French government over the granting of the Chester concession was exceptional. They vigorously protested against Ankara's conduct. Furthermore, the net result of Ankara's policy was to be clearly seen in the stiffening attitude of the French in the second half of the negotiations. They attended the second phase in a very different mood from that in which they had originally come to Lausanne in November. The concession also gave rise to considerable press discussion. The French press deplored the weak policy of their government resulting in the 'Turks openly defying France as in the case of Chester concession which was promised and practically granted to French.'⁴⁹ The concession was a

47. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari I, No.250. January 1, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.270. January 4, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 281. January 5, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.289. January 6, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No.426. January 25, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.438. January 26, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

48. The French and the Ottoman government had in that year reached a general agreement which worked out, among its arrangements, facilities for the raising of a loan, and which included an agreement with a French group by which the group were to secure the concessions just referred to. Although these arrangements were regarded as definitive, they never took effect as a whole since the Ottoman Parliament had not given formal ratification. It was rendered null and void soon after the First World War broke out.

49. FO371/9100/E1428/6/44, February 2, 1923, SIS Report, No. 1068; FO371/9149/E3743/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3940/2104/44, April 17, 1923, Parliamentary Question, April 18, 1923, Foreign Office

turning point in Turco-French relations and from that moment the French completely reversed their policy towards Turkey and like Britain, played the role of the uncompromising Ally.

Not only did the concession jeopardise French economic interests but it also conflicted with British interests. It purported to give the Chester group the right to construct railways and to exploit minerals and oil in parts of Mosul which were claimed by Britain.⁵⁰ The arrangement was bound to cause alarm in the British government since it disregarded the rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company,⁵¹ rights which had not formed the subject of a concession in form, but which were held by the British government to be established by a binding promise given by the Sublime Porte. On April 13, Curzon informed Rumbold of the British stand over the granting of the concession to the Americans in the following telegram:

'His Majesty's Government have heard of the alleged grant by the Turkish government of a concession to an American company to construct railways in Asia Minor and that it is said to include the development of the Mosul oil-fields as well as the construction of railways in Irak.

to Rumbold; CON12404/47, 56, 57; FO371/9074/E3718/1/44, April 11, 1923, Phipps to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 468; FO371/9149/E3692/2104/44.

⁵⁰. FO371/9149/E3693/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3775/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office; FO371/9150/E3807/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office.

⁵¹. The Turkish Petroleum Company was formed in 1912 as a result of an agreement between the Deutsche Bank and the National Bank of Turkey for the purpose of acquiring all claims to the oil deposits in Mosul and Baghdad, as well as of prospecting for oil in the other parts of the Empire. [The National Bank of Turkey was founded in 1909 by the initiative of the British government and with British capital]. The British government constantly claimed that the note addressed on June 28 1914, by Sait Halim Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, to Sir L. Mallet, British ambassador at Istanbul, secured for the Turkish Petroleum Company a definite right to the concession of all petroleum springs in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad and that it similarly bound the Turkish government. Although the German and the British governments pressed for the concession it was never granted and with the outbreak of the First World War the issue was dropped to be taken up after the war. The Lausanne Conference, however, constituted a good platform to settle both the future of the oil fields in Mosul and the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession.

For more detailed information see: Benjamin Shwadran., Middle East Oil and the Great Powers, (London: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1956), pp. 193-197; Helmut Mejcher., Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. (London, 1976), pp. 1-13; Marian Kent., Oil and Empire: British Diplomacy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920. (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 33-113; S. Housley Longrigg., Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 27-32; Fiona Venn., Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 32-34; M. Edward Earle., 'The Turkish Petroleum Company: A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy', Political Science Quarterly, 39 (1924), pp. 265-271.

Whatever may be the truth in this statement, it is not customary for the authorities of one State to grant concessions in territory administered by another, nor could such grant have the slightest validity.⁵²

Curzon also vigorously supported the French claims over the concessions, as he was well aware that if the French concession was considered null and void so was the Turkish Petroleum Company. At the same time he was apprehensive about the American intentions. 'It is inconceivable' he protested to the State Department on April 23, 'that the United States government should countenance any action which would tend to prevent one ally, after a victorious war, from providing in the treaty that the enemy state should make this just measure of reparation to the citizens of the said Ally.'⁵³ A certain amount of mistrust and lack of cordiality which existed between Britain and the United States at the first phase of the Conference was intensified by the Chester concession and reached a point where Curzon suggested to the French government that it should not send any communication to the United States notifying the resumption of the Conference and leave the initiative entirely to Washington.⁵⁴ However, Rumbold intervened and pointed out that the Turks had already communicated their counter proposals to the United States and that if this was the continuation of the discussions at Lausanne, the Americans might claim with some reason that they should be invited; he argued that there was nothing to lose by inviting the Americans, who otherwise would work against Allied

⁵². CON 12404/66.

⁵³. FO371/9074/E3852/1/44, April 23, 1923, Curzon to Geddes.

⁵⁴. The representation of the United States in the second half of the conference proved to be a controversial issue which required a great deal of discussion and persuasion in British political circles. Curzon was categorically against the presence of any American observers in the second part of the negotiations; his efforts to bar American participation in the development of the Near East could be explained by the ongoing struggle between Britain and United States for commercial supremacy in the Near East. The injection of an American influence into the section of the world which lay between Istanbul and India was recognised as detrimental to the policies of British imperialism. However, the Cabinet felt 'some concern at the possibility of no invitation being sent, both on general grounds and more particularly in view of recent reports that the Chester concession had been recognised by the Ankara government'. This tendency was echoed in Rumbold's telegrams to Curzon expressing the view that as the Grand National Assembly had passed the Chester scheme, the Turks could consider any omission to invite Americans as a direct encouragement to make further economic or political arrangements with them.

interests.⁵⁵ The Foreign Office sympathised with his view that the United States representatives might do more harm outside the Conference, especially if they knew an invitation had been deliberately withheld from them.

Curzon eventually calmed down and the invitation was sent to the American delegation but he was still dissatisfied. He communicated to Rumbold on April 26: 'Negotiations means settling terms with the Turks and it is not reasonable that the United States, who have not been at war and are not concluding peace with Turkey and will neither be bound nor have any responsibility for the treaty, should actually claim the right to negotiate its terms.'⁵⁶ The Foreign Secretary, who had been following the issue with increasing unease, sent another telegram on May 27 in which he insisted that the State Department should be made to understand clearly that the British government 'could not consider as valid any agreement whereby British rights in Mesopotamia are infringed'.⁵⁷ The United States, as Curzon suspected, would seek for more active participation at the second half of the Conference by protesting against the principle contained in the Allied draft protocol on concessions, by which protocol incomplete pre-war concessions - the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Régie Générale - were confirmed and validated. Grew's conversation with Rumbold was a clear indication that he would abandon 'passive observance for active intervention' which, from the perspective of the Foreign Office, meant that America was 'coming into the open over the Chester concession by backing the Turks over the economic clauses.'⁵⁸

However, the State Department still maintained its cautious attitude, avoided any 'involvement' in the territorial questions in the area and resisted being

⁵⁵. CON12404/39, 45, 132; FO371/9074/E3774/1/44, April 12, 1923, Phipps to Crowe; DBFP, XVIII, No.473; FO371/9074/E3969/1/44, April 4, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; FO371/9074/E3726/1/44, FO Minute, April 11, 1923; CAB23/45.

⁵⁶. FO371/9075/E4147/1/44, April 26, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO839/50.

⁵⁷. CON12404/137.

⁵⁸. FO371/9075/E4147/1/44; FO371/9075/E4278/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.485; CON12404/139; FRUS (1923) Vol. ii pp. 988-991; Ryan Papers, FO800/240.

drawn into issues of a 'purely political or territorial nature'.⁵⁹ Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Istanbul, made several attempts to secure the Department's support for the Chester concession but was turned down by the US government, which accused Ankara of failing to make any serious attempt to obtain assurances before granting the concession, of seeking to further its own political purposes and of endeavouring to obtain American economic assistance.⁶⁰ When American diplomatic support failed to materialise and the company was unable to fulfil the necessary conditions, the Ankara government felt it necessary to cancel the concession. On December 18, 1923, five months after the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, Fevzi Bey, the Minister for Public Works, informed the Company that the Turkish government had annulled the Chester concession.⁶¹ The concession proved a disappointment for Ankara, which failed to get the support it expected from the Americans over the question of Mosul, but more significantly it marked the American entry into the Middle East. As Admiral Chester aptly put it, 'the spheres of influence' had thrown every kind of obstacle in his way since he had been endeavouring to secure concessions in Turkey; for a score of years the United States government had been trying to get into Asia by the back door, because these spheres of influence had barred the front door.⁶² But now the front door was no longer closed. Britain realised that the Americans were in the game too and it had no choice but to come to an arrangement with the Americans on their terms.⁶³

⁵⁹. FO371/9150/E3777/2104/44; FO371/9150/E3807/2104/44, April 13, 1923, Geddes to the Foreign Office; *FRUS*, 1923, II, pp. 1200-1207.

⁶⁰. *FRUS*, 1923, II, pp. 1248- 1249.

⁶¹. *Ibid.* pp. 1248-1249.

⁶². FO371/9150/E4206/2104/44, April 24, 1923, *Morning Post* .

⁶³. Following the First World War , after having secured the control of Baghdad and Mosul Vilayets Britain was in a position to negotiate with its ally France the exploitation of the Mesopotamian oil resources at San Remo in April 1920. This provoked outraged in the United States calling it the violation of the Open Door policy. United States felt very strongly that because of a material contribution to the Allied victory it was also entitled to the fruits of victory. The State Department stated that if the Company's claim was to be asserted, the question ought to be settled by arbitration. The Lausanne Conference was to witness the finesse of American diplomacy in settling the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. The British feared that if the Americans were not met in the matter they were quite likely to take independent steps with the Turks at Lausanne and it was decided that the settlement of American participation was essential. See. Chapter VI.

Britain

While Ismet Pasha was exhausted by the opposition at the Grand National Assembly and distracted by social and financial chaos in the country, Curzon received a more welcoming reception on his return to London.⁶⁴ However, various indications of dissatisfaction were expressed in the Press about his handling of the Conference. The press, particularly the *Daily Mail*, was, to Curzon's dismay, openly critical of his performance at the Conference. 'Failure of Lord Curzon. The British negotiators are returning under the cloud of a humiliating blunder' was the huge headline spread across the front page. Although he had come without a treaty having been signed, his labours were acknowledged by the Cabinet. However, he met some criticism in Parliament, though nothing to compare with what his adversary had to encounter. In a speech in Parliament, Aubrey Herbert, M.P., gave his account of the failure of the Conference. After stressing the effects of the friendly attitude of the French towards Turkey, he criticised Curzon's attitude. 'With all his brilliant qualities, Lord Curzon did not carry good will to Lausanne and when he spoke to the Turks...with whom he was negotiating, [he spoke] as he speaks to us very often. We are his countrymen and we put up with it, though we do not like it.'⁶⁵ On the other hand some M.P.'s were critical about the Allies rather than Curzon. To Ryland Atkins the 'continuous and progressive concessions to the Turks' made possible 'day after day and week after week the slow surrender of many things that have been held priceless by Europe for the last 300 years.' This was what he called 'the disappointment of, and humiliation to Western civilisation.'⁶⁶ Despite certain criticism in the Press and in Parliament, Curzon succeeded in securing the backing of the Cabinet.

⁶⁴. Leeper Papers, LEEP 1/6 February 5, 1923 (Allen Leeper's Diary).

⁶⁵. HANSARD, (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons) 1923, Vol. 160 p. 202.

⁶⁶. Ibid. p.204.

Soon after he returned to his post at the Foreign Office Curzon was engaged in domestic politics besides his duties as Foreign Secretary. The immediate issue was the uncertainty over Bonar Law's Premiership. Bonar Law had never taken a very close interest in the Premiership. In fact, he was a rather 'reluctant' Prime Minister. His ill-health was now to provide him with a good excuse for retiring from his official duties and a good opportunity for Curzon to realise his lifelong dream of obtaining the office. It was perhaps the most appropriate time for him to turn his achievement at Lausanne into a trump card in the contest for the leadership of the Conservative Party. After all, Bonar Law was 'only an interim Premier keeping the seat warm until the more rightful occupant, himself, was called upon to occupy it.'⁶⁷ The time to fulfil his ambition came when on May 21, he received a letter from the Prime Minister announcing that he had placed his resignation in the King's hand. On the next day, however, he was shocked to learn that the King had appointed Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister. 'A man of no experience' Curzon commented, 'and of the utmost insignificance.'⁶⁸ After the initial shock, however, he managed to brush aside the feelings of humiliation and defeat and addressed a letter to Baldwin in which he thanked him for his invitation to continue in the Office although he had every desire to retire. He nevertheless stayed on as his retirement at the time 'might be thought to involve distrust' in the new government.⁶⁹ The question of whether Curzon's chances at gaining the Premiership would have been increased had he returned to London with a treaty can only remain speculation.

In the meantime, Curzon had two important foreign policy issues with which to tackle. On the one hand, he dealt with the Reparation question by mediating between Germany and France, particularly by pressing the latter agree to

⁶⁷. Mosley, *Curzon*, p. 254.

⁶⁸. Nicolson, *Curzon*, p. 355.

⁶⁹. *Ibid.* p. 356; James, *The British Revolution*, pp. 451-454.

easier armistice conditions. By doing so he tried to minimise the detrimental effects of the Reparation question on Anglo-French relations in particular, and the European situation in general. On the other hand, he was preoccupied with the Near Eastern Settlement since the incomplete Lausanne Conference posed a threat to the peace and stability Britain needed in the Near East. However, the outlook was not as bad as it appeared; as the situation in the Ruhr dominated all other questions in France, Curzon was left in complete control of the Eastern situation. The developments concerning the Mosul question, however, were posing an increasing threat to British interests and unless something drastic was done immediately Britain might well lose control of the territory.

Britain Bolsters its Position

As will be remembered, at the end of the first phase of the Conference Ismet Pasha and Curzon had agreed to settle the Mosul question through direct negotiations and failing that, to refer the matter to the League of Nations. However, the Iraq Committee's Report on Mosul, which came out soon after the Conference was suspended, determined future British policy in Iraq; the Cabinet, following the lead of the Committee, decided to stay in Mosul. The argument was that if the British troops left Mosul 'Britain would have fought the Asiatic war in vain. Turkey would have been the victor, not in Europe alone, but in Asia also and her triumph would not be a mere status quo ante'.⁷⁰ Therefore it was time for Britain to show its determination regarding Mosul, or, more accurately, oil. Turkey, by granting to the Americans the Chester concession, showed Britain that it would not easily let Mosul go. This was a direct threat to British economic interests in the region and it provoked angry reaction on the part of the British. Britain disregarded the Lausanne agreement requiring the postponement of the reference of the Mosul question to the

⁷⁰. CAB27/206/IRQ41.

League of Nations and in the meantime maintenance of the *status quo*, and gave permission for the military operation in Southern Kurdistan, in the Mosul Vilayet.⁷¹

The military operation was aimed at pacifying the Kurds in the Vilayet with a view to preventing the formation of a 'pro-Kurdish block', to neutralising Turkish activities in the region, and finally to expelling the Turks from the Vilayet in order to extend the British rule up to the Sèvres frontier of the Mosul Vilayet.⁷² The result was achieved a day before the second phase of the Conference opened at Lausanne.

By this military operation Britain was underlining the fact that any decision involving territories under her mandate must be referred to her rather than to the Ankara government which now had no control over the territories that it claimed belonged to it. Turkey had the right to give the concession in the Vilayet as the rightful owner of the territories whereas Britain had the military might to prove that was not necessarily the case. Ankara's protests against the British government for violating the *status-quo* for which provision was made under Article 3 (2) of the Lausanne Treaty had no conclusive effect on the British government, which regarded Mosul as remaining under its effective control and as being under its *de facto* administration. The British government played down the importance of the operation, calling it 'a local administrative measure necessitated by a menace to public security' and in no way directed against any Turkish interests.⁷³

The British military operation could well have led to a war between Britain and Turkey but Ankara, whose need for peace was far greater than that of Britain, chose, though most reluctantly, to accept the *fait accompli* and remained silent in

⁷¹. FO371/9149/E1985/1985/44, February 19, 1923, Foreign Office to the Colonial Office.

⁷². FO371/9009/E5237/1190/65, May 22, 1923, Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, Irak Intelligence Report; FO371/9004/E3620/1019/65, 'Situation in Kurdistan', April 9, 1923, Colonial Office to the Foreign Office; CO730/45/36913; Colonial Office Intelligence Report, 1923 No. 9/338.

⁷³. CON12878/41; FO371/9009/E9847/1190/65, Irak Intelligence Report, September 6, 1923; FO371/10097/E723/292/65; FO371/10097/E291/291/65; FO371/10113/E8024/5711/65; Colonial Office Intelligence Report, 1923, No. 25, 914.

the face of British efforts to restore its influence and prestige in the area. Ankara's decision could be explained not only by the need for peace but also by the fear that in the event of hostilities Turkey would find itself isolated and in danger of intervention and by the fear of jeopardising British 'neutrality' if not actual support, on which Turkey rested its strategy for the second half of the Conference. In addition to this there was the realisation that there was no longer any justification for military expenditure on the scale necessitated by the National Struggle; the avoidance of excessive military expenditure and the pursuance of a rational economic policy would be more beneficial for Turkey which, in the future, would be in great need of stability and prosperity.

Britain Prepares for the Second Phase

The first phase of the Lausanne Conference had failed to deliver the long-overdue peace treaty, but, in the course of the official and private negotiations had settled a number of outstanding questions and finally produced a draft on which further discussions were possible. In view of the urgency on every ground of effecting the Lausanne settlement, Curzon lost no time in taking up the issue. In the interest of rapid and effective negotiations, he at once took up the ideas contained in the Ankara communique and invited the Allied powers to meet in London to consider Ismet Pasha's note. He communicated to Crewe in Paris and Graham in Rome, in the following terms: 'In view of the length and importance of the Turkish counter proposals and in order to preserve that complete Allied unity, which the three allied governments agree to be essential, His Majesty's Government find it very desirable that there should be an early meeting of French, Italian and British experts to discuss the Turkish note'. The object of the meeting, he explained, 'would be to arrive at an understanding (a) as to the answer to be made to the

Turkish note and (b) the line to be followed in regard to further negotiations with Turkey, and the place of meeting.⁷⁴

Upon Curzon's request that the first meeting of the Allied experts should take place in London on March 21, a brief conference with Bompard and Garroni present was held at the Foreign Office, from the 21st to the 28th of March, where an accord was quickly reached between the Allies on the attitude which they would attempt to maintain in the second phase of the Conference. For Curzon, who was now feeling rather content about what he had obtained in the first half of the negotiations, the meeting 'was not a conference but merely friendly discussions between the experts of the Allied governments'. He saw it as a formality rather than as a crucial meeting that would determine the fate of the second half of the Conference as far as British interests were concerned. He did not take much interest in the details as most of the time, due to his office engagements, he was absent from the discussions. However, he was determined to stand firm on the principles upon which British policy was based.

The first issue was the detachment of the economic clauses from the main treaty, as had been requested in the Turkish note. He managed, with no difficulty, to persuade Bompard and Garroni that the detachment of the economic clauses from the treaty would be a difficult task since 'many of the economic clauses were of great importance for all Allied nationals, not only French and Italian, but British also' and if they were detached from the treaty altogether and postponed for settlement for a later date, the result would be a further long delay. He suggested that the best method for the procedure of the conference was to constitute three

⁷⁴. FO371/9069/E2682/1/44, March 12, 1923, Curzon to Crewe; FO371/9069/E2777/1/44, March 15, 1923, Curzon to Phipps; FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 21, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, Nos.435, 442, 451; Simsir, Lozan Telgrafleri II, No.10. March 22, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

committees⁷⁵, as informal as possible, which would deal with financial, economic and general questions. Knowing all too well the atmosphere in the Grand National Assembly and Ismet Pasha's delicate position in it, Curzon was anxious not to take any risk which would endanger the British achievement in the first part of the Conference. He suggested that it would not be 'worthwhile' in the Allies' reply to go into details; it would be 'quite sufficient to draw it up on general lines in friendly terms and to express readiness to resume negotiations'. However, this should be done on the understanding that the economic clauses could not be detached from the treaty and that the Allies were in no way committed to any amendments which had been added after the departure of the British delegation.

Having badly suffered from the lack of unity among the Allies at the first Conference, Curzon attached the utmost importance to the matter and stressed the importance of constituting a really solid Allied front so that there should be no doubt on the general lines of policy. Thus, when the Allies arrived at Lausanne, they would be 'in a position to lay down the guiding principles to be followed on all questions, and the Turks must not have any pretext for thinking that each power was ready to make separate concessions.'⁷⁶

The further question which required to be settled, and one of 'capital importance' for Curzon, was that of the meeting place for the second round of negotiations.⁷⁷ As early as February, he knew from a 'secret source' that Arlotta,

⁷⁵. FO371/9072/E3279/1/44, March 26, 1923, Report of Inter-Allied Committee (General Questions) regarding Turkish Peace Negotiations; FO371/9072/E3280/1/44, March 27, 1923, Report of the Turkish Economic Sub-Committee; FO371/9072/E3282/1/44, March 26, 1923, Report of the Financial Committee on the Turkish Counter-Proposals; DBFP, XVIII, No.455, 456, 457; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.10. March 22, 1922, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁶. FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office at March 21, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, No.451.

⁷⁷. FO371/9069/E2630/1/44, March 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9071/E2891/1/44; FO371/9071/E2902/1/44; FO371/9071/E30001/1/44; FO371/9071/E3136/1/44, March 19, 1923, FO Minute by Forbes Adam; FO371/9072/E3162/1/44, March 21, 1923, Minutes of Allied Meeting held in the Foreign Office; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 412, 424, 433, 458; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.7. March 7, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No.14. March 24, 1923 Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No.22, March 28, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

the Italian Secretary, had been informed by Serif Bey, who was left in charge of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, that it would be more advantageous for Turkey to resume discussions at Istanbul, since their return to Lausanne 'would imply moral obligations to accept Allied demands'. However, Curzon and Rumbold, who was to succeed Curzon in the second half of the Conference, held entirely different views from the Turks and were both inclined to favour Lausanne.

Curzon defended the choice of Lausanne on several grounds. In a telegram to Rumbold he argued that the atmosphere at Istanbul would not be favourable for the Allies, who would be 'surrounded by a crowd of fanatical Turks who knew nothing of what had been done at Lausanne, and would be violently prejudiced', that the 'danger of agitation, possibly against the Allied themselves' should not be ruled out, and that the safety of Venizelos in Istanbul was threatened. He concluded that at Lausanne it would be easy to give the Turks the impression that the Conference was merely a continuation of the original Conference.

Rumbold argued that if Istanbul were to be chosen the Turks would regard it as a triumph over the Allies. The Turks would assume that the Conference would take place in a Turkish building, and this would imply that the principal Turkish delegate would preside. Furthermore even if the Allies agreed to meet at Istanbul but insisted on an Allied presidency the Conference should be held in some outlying place since Ismet Pasha would 'feel it beneath his dignity as Minister for Foreign Affairs to sit under chairmanship of High Commissioner anywhere on Turkish soil'. Rumbold concluded: 'We have every interest in inducing Ismet whom we know to be committed to peace policy to come to the conference'.⁷⁸

⁷⁸. CON12359/479, 508; DBFP, XVIII, No.458; FO371/9071/E3006/1/44; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 23-25, ff. 33-34, ff. 35-47.

While Curzon's preference for Lausanne was accepted by Garroni,⁷⁹ Bompard declared that he favoured Istanbul because he deemed its atmosphere more favourable to the Allies. The Foreign Office immediately consulted Rumbold, who accused Bompard of protecting himself since he had been 'violently attacked' by the Turks and it would suit him to leave the French High Commissioner in charge of the situation, whereas if the negotiations took place at Lausanne he could not 'escape without appearing to run away'. Rumbold's following point seems more realistic: 'In adopting his view French government may be animated by desire to please Turks by deferring to their expressed preference for Constantinople and by hope that if French lose ground in one Turkish centre, Monsieur Steeg (Director-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank) will be able to retrieve it at Angora by private negotiations regarding French economic and financial interests.'⁸⁰ Whatever the real motive was, in the face of a firm stand by Curzon, Bompard accepted his proposal and did not pursue the matter further.

When the date of the meeting was discussed Curzon suggested that it would be best not to specify any particular day but merely to request that it take place as soon as possible. Thus, he declared, the Allies would 'throw the responsibility for any dilatoriness upon the Turks themselves'. As Curzon knew well, there were signs of dissatisfaction in the Turkish Press about the delay and Ankara was anxious to resume negotiations at the earliest possible date. Rumbold

⁷⁹. To the Italians 'there was no alternative but to make peace on best terms possible.' Although Mussolini had no strong views as to meeting place for further negotiations or procedure generally, he would take a firm stand on the question of Castellorizzo and adopt an 'intransigent' attitude. DBFP, XVIII, No. 443; FO371/9070/E2802/1/44, March 14, 1923, Meeting of Allied Representatives; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.22. March 28, 1923, Paris Representative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The cession of the Island of Castellorizo to Italy was agreed on at the first Conference of London and the question was not discussed at San Remo but the Treaty of Sèvres confirmed the island to Italy on account of the danger to Adalia if the island remained Turkish. In the final inter-Allied meeting of March 27, the Italians insisted that Italy's prestige would suffer if they abandoned it although Castellorizo was of little value to them. Curzon was of the opinion that the Allies could not go to war on a point of so little importance. However, he agreed to support the Italian claim after he was persuaded by Garroni that there was hardly any chance of war breaking out over the question of the island's future, as it was of no importance to the Turks, who only feared that the island might come under Greek sovereignty.

⁸⁰. DBFP, XVIII, No. 458, Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 27, 1923.

informed Curzon on March 24 that Adnan Bey had paid him a call in the course of which he had inquired about the Allied meeting in London and expressed his concern about the delay, the army being on tenter-hooks and there being disquieting reports of Greek military activity.⁸¹ All indications pointed in one direction: the sooner the negotiations started, the better it would be for all parties concerned.

Soon after the final inter-Allied meeting, which was held at the Foreign Office on March 27, where the work of the three committees as well as the above mentioned questions were discussed, a note was sent to Ankara to the effect that the Allies were not bound by anything which had taken place after the close of the final meeting in Curzon's room at Lausanne on February 4. They declined to separate the economic clauses from the rest of the treaty but declared that they were prepared to discuss what was the best method of reaching agreement on them, whether by examination and possible amendments of clauses in Allied draft or whether by shortening the whole section and leaving many details for later negotiation. Furthermore they stated that they would not accept the draft declaration, the Montagna formula, but were prepared to discuss Ismet Pasha's draft of the judicial declaration of February 3, to see if it could not be made acceptable.⁸²

Ismet Pasha replied to the Allied note of March 27 on April 7, accepting the proposal to resume negotiations at Lausanne, and naming April 23 as the date. However, he refused any reopening of the discussion on the "Montagna Formula" which, he emphasised, had been confirmed immediately following its proposal on February 4:

**"Turkish government cannot conceal its surprise that
inviting powers by promising to exert themselves to
reconcile Turkish counter draft declaration regarding**

⁸¹ FO371/9072/E3166/1/44, March 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 454, 458.

⁸² DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 405, 421, 425; 460; 465; FO371/9067/E2217/1/44; FO371/9071/E3000/1/44, March 14, 1923, FO Memorandum by Forbes Adam; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.23. March 28-April 1, 1923. (Allied Note to Ismet Pasha).

administration of justice in Turkey with allied draft, should have displayed tendency to reopen discussion of an important question which it was entitled to consider already settled in agreement with allied powers concerned.'

He stressed that Turkish counter proposals were not 'properly speaking a Turkish draft' but, on the contrary the 'result of utmost joint efforts of delegates acting on behalf of allied and of Turkish delegations to harmonise respectively drafts of both contracting parties; all the more as this arrangement known as "Montagna Formula" was several times confirmed in the course of both oral and written suggestions of allied powers subsequent to February 4th.'⁸³ The Allies refrained from answering any of the points in Ismet Pasha's note, confining themselves to a message stating that they would resume negotiations on the named day. The "Montagna Formula" threatened trouble.

With the aim of avoiding trouble, Curzon, perhaps unwisely refrained from stating a precise opinion about it.⁸⁴ As he knew well that Ismet Pasha had committed himself to the 'Montagna Formula' before the Grand National Assembly, any move to undermine this assurance at that stage would create a stir at Ankara and ruin the chance of reaching a peaceful solution. Political despatches and secret intelligence reports from Istanbul clearly pointed to the precarious position of Ismet Pasha and to the growing opposition to the government. In his despatch of March 30, Rumbold was fairly pessimistic about the internal political situation in Turkey: 'Atmosphere of Grand National Assembly is unhealthy. Army is said to be

⁸³. FO371/9074/E3585/1/44, April 8, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 466; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.30. April 7, 1923, Ismet Pasha to the Foreign Ministries of the Allied Government; IOR L/PS/10/854, March 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha's and Turkish counter draft of the treaty.

⁸⁴. As early as February 27, Rumbold had written to Curzon pointing out that the last minute negotiations among the Turks, French and Italians would cause disagreement between Allies and the Turks in the future. After the negotiations broke down he returned to his post in Istanbul where he wrote a letter to Curzon conveying his opinion as to possible difficulties resulting from the "Montagna formula". 'I am afraid that the 11th hour negotiations of our Allies with the Turks at Lausanne after we left may create some difficulties for us, and I am extremely sorry that all the delegations did not leave at the same time, thus leaving the position with the Turks as it was at 7.45 in your room on February 4. I suppose that it is only human that Montagna should have wished to conclude his labours by some sensational success such as the settlement of the judicial regime question, I am inclined to fear that in his eagerness he presented his formula on behalf of the Allies, which he had no right to do.' Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 8-10; F112/283 Curzon Papers

For the Allies note see: Meray, Lozan Baris Konferansi. Takim I, Cilt V, pp. 66-68.

discontented with policy of Angora and Russians are reported to be working against peace on basis of Lausanne proposals.⁸⁵ In the light of this information, the Allies' reply to Ismet Pasha's note was formulated in such a way as to minimise the risk of any premature controversy. Nevertheless, it was a miscalculated step and it inevitably led to a bitter controversy in the second half of the negotiations.

Britain, having once more secured 'Allied unity' and bolstered its position in Mosul, seemed to be putting an effective brake on Turkey's aspirations. By gaining control of the entire Mosul Vilayet it improved its position and constituted a considerable challenge to Turkey's territorial control in the region. The adoption of an active military policy in Mosul Vilayet, which was quite inconsistent with the spirit of the proposed article, relating to the maintenance of the status quo in the Lausanne Treaty, resulted in Turkey losing its grip in the Vilayet. By this move, Britain gained a more favourable position for negotiating the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession.

Turkey, on the other hand, tried to balance this move by stabilising its position through internal adjustments as well as potential external support. Ismet Pasha entered the renewed Conference at Lausanne in the confident expectation of obtaining all the demands that he put forward in his counter-proposal. With the full backing of Mustafa Kemal, he was freed from the pressure being exerted upon him by the Opposition, and his negotiating position was strengthened. He could now look to the future more confidently with elections on the way and a new Assembly possibly more amenable to his policy. Moreover, the expected American support constituted another source of strength for Ismet Pasha, especially since Turkish practical acceptance of the Straits Convention at the beginning of February had marked a very definite stage in the cooling of Turco-Russian relations. Ismet Pasha was fully prepared to confront three months of strenuous negotiations with the

⁸⁵. FO371/9073/E3351/1/44, March 30, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

Allies when he left Ankara for Lausanne on April 10. On the eve of the second round of the negotiations, neither side had clear predominance over the other. However, as Britain's needs had been satisfied to a great degree in the first phase of the Conference and it was now expected to play the role of the mediator, the possibility of obtaining more satisfactory terms for Turkey seemed even closer.

VI

THE SECOND PHASE

(April 23, 1923 - July 24, 1923)

Opening of the Conference

The Anglo-Turkish rapprochement of the first phase had settled all the questions in which Britain was mainly interested and this settlement prepared the ground on which Turkey could conclude peace with the Allies generally. The disadvantages of a possible rupture were far greater than the possible gains from the negotiations, as neither side desired or could afford to become involved in a military confrontation with unpredictable consequences. Britain and Turkey would act, though for different reasons, to bring the conference to a successful conclusion.

The British delegation was in a unique position to play the dual role of leader of the Allied front and of mediator between its allies and Turkey on matters which did not primarily concern its interests. The Turkish delegation thought they could rely on British neutrality (if not actual support) on certain questions, especially in financial and judicial matters. It was against this background that the second phase of the Conference opened, and it became soon apparent that almost all the questions on the agenda were inter-related in one way or another.

On April 23, Sir Horace Rumbold, who replaced Curzon as the chief delegate for Britain, took the chair 'in virtue of seniority in rank' and persuaded the three Allied representatives that the work of the Conference should be divided in

accordance with the London programme.¹ It was decided to set up three committees, Rumbold taking the presidency of the First Committee which was to deal with the outstanding territorial clauses and the judicial regime for foreigners. General Maurice Pellé took the Second Committee dealing with financial and sanitary matters, while Montagna took the Third Committee, which was responsible for economic questions. Shortly afterwards, 'in order to meet the susceptibilities of Ismet Pasha', who appeared to be 'somewhat disconcerted' at the absence of the Turkish plenipotentiaries at the Allied session, Rumbold invited him and Riza Nur to a private meeting to give information about the procedure and the division of work. It was also made clear to Ismet Pasha that there was no question of reopening discussion of articles already agreed to during the first Conference.² After almost an hour of talk with Ismet Pasha a full meeting of all the delegates followed at which Rumbold presided and made a welcoming speech. Ismet Pasha's speech, in contrast to his opening speech in the first Conference, was moderate and described by Rumbold as 'appropriate'.³

The Conference opened with a long discussion in the First Committee with regard to the Thalweg of the Maritza river, during which Ismet Pasha insisted that it should be the frontier between Turkey and Greece. Two days later, the Italians claimed the island Castellorizo (Meis)⁴ and it soon became apparent that unless the two questions of the Maritza frontier and Castellorizo island were settled, other territorial clauses of the treaty could not be finalised. Rumbold believed that Ismet

¹ Ryan Papers, FO800/240; FO371/9075/E4146/1/44, April 23, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office; Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, No. 54.

² The Mosul Question was an exception to this. Despite the agreement which had been reached between Ismet Pasha and Curzon during the first phase of the conference which fixed the time limit for settling the Question within 12 months through direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, Rumbold was instructed by Curzon at the beginning of the second phase 'to reduce a year's delay before reference to the League of Nations to six months'. In line with his instructions Rumbold proposed to Ismet Pasha a six month period and subsequently they agreed on the period of nine months. FO371/9149/E4062/1985/44; FO371/9005/E5503/1019/65; FO371/9005/E5438/1019/65; FO371/9005/E5628/1019/65, May 18, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Ankara; *Lozan II*, No. 295.

³ FO371/9148/E4224/1767/44; FO371/9075/E4147/1/44; FO371/9075/E4146/1/44, April 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; *DBFP*, XVIII, No.477.

⁴ FO371/9075/E4147/1/44, April 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; *DBFP*, XVIII, No. 478.

Pasha, however great his desire for peace, was unlikely to give way on both these questions, as he had to have 'something to show on credit side' on his return to Ankara. According to Rumbold, what was needed was a bargain and it should take the shape of 'agreeing to the Turkish proposal that Thalweg of Maritza should be the frontier in return for the Turks giving up Castellorizo'.⁵ There was no easy solution for the territorial questions and they soon became linked to other questions.

A day before the Italians placed their claim for Castellorizo on the conference table they had decided to raise, though not directly, the question of Allied reparation during the discussions of the Third Committee⁶ Confused by the incident, Ismet Pasha immediately arranged a meeting with Rumbold in which he complained that this question had already been settled and the Turks had Britain's word for it. Indeed, the Foreign Office was of the opinion that it could not be 'honourably re-open' on the grounds that it would be both 'futile and dangerous' to do so⁷. While Rumbold was trying to explain to his French and Italian colleagues why the British government could not allow the question to be raised again, he learned that General Pellé too had definite instructions to the contrary from his government. Under the circumstances Rumbold could not but give Ismet Pasha an evasive reply, which could only add to Ismet's growing suspicion of Allied intentions.

In his search for support Ismet Pasha also visited Grew, the American observer, and told him that he had come to Lausanne again 'on the basis of complete suppression of demands for reparations' and if the Allies persisted in these demands he would be left with no choice but go back to Ankara.⁸ Ismet Pasha

5. FO371/9075/E4218/1/44, April 26, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 480; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 90-91, April 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9075/E4235/1/44.

6. FO371/9075/E4215/1/44, April 25, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9075/E4251/1/44, April 26, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 479, 481.

7. FO371/9076/E4488/1/44, Foreign Office Memorandum, May, 17, 1923; DBFP, XVIII, No. 482.

8. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 562-563; FO371/9075/E4446/1/44, May 2, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.491; CON12404/172.

believed that the early commencement of negotiations for a Turco-American treaty not only would strengthen the economic relations between the two countries but also could hasten a settlement with the Allies. Nevertheless, the Americans seem to have been more interested in the Capitulations than in a treaty with Turkey and their support for reparation very much depended on a compromise which would provide for some satisfactory arrangement to replace the Capitulations even if it were only a transitory regime.⁹ Grew was prepared to support Ismet Pasha to a certain extent but did not give him the assurance he sought on the abrogation of Capitulations.

It was rather unfortunate for Ismet Pasha to return empty-handed from his visits, for neither the British nor the Americans were willing to support the Turks on the question of reparations. According to Rumbold, Ismet Pasha was 'very uneasy at being faced with the alternative of either returning without a treaty, or of having to give way on certain questions. In private his attitude is one of appeal; rather than of intransigence, and would seem to reflect the more unfavourable situation in Turkey herself at the present moment and her extreme need for peace.'¹⁰

On April 27, the meeting of the Third Committee was about to witness a serious crisis when Montagna (who was determined to preserve everything in order to secure Castellorizo) started the meeting by disregarding Article 79¹¹ altogether and proposed the discussion of the next article, a move which could well have led to the reopening of the entire reparation question. When the French intervened on the

⁹. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p.563-564; FO371/9075/E4428/1/44, May 1, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 489; FRUS (1923) Vol. II, pp. 956-957. 970, 987, 989.

¹⁰. FO371/9075/E4251/1/44, April 26, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 481.

¹¹. Article 79 of the Economic Clauses of the Draft Treaty of Peace stated: "If the property, rights and interests of Allied nationals (excluding Greek nationals) which were in territory under Ottoman sovereignty on the 1st August, 1914, no longer exist or have suffered damages resulting from acts of war, measures of requisition, measures of sequestration, transfer or confiscation or any harmful act or decision, the owner shall have the right to compensation which the Allied Powers will grant him out of the sums allocated for his object by Article 57 (Financial Clauses) and in accordance with procedure fixed by them." Cmd. 1814, (1923) p. 724; Karacan, *Lozan*, pp. 364-369.

side of Montagna, Rumbold asked for the suspension of the meeting and declared that his government was 'not prepared to reopen reparation question with Turks, and that in no case would article 79 be necessary'.¹² Rumbold's initiative proved successful and on resumption of the sitting Montagna announced that the Allies were prepared to drop Article 79. The incident was a clear manifestation of disagreement among the Allies on the question, but not a satisfactory result for Ismet Pasha who still insisted that the reparation question had been settled at the previous Conference and that this should now be officially recognised. His call was left unanswered. The reparation question continued to loom throughout the conference. Although Pellé joined Rumbold in recognising the grave effects of reviving the demand for reparation, Poincaré, the French Premier, was determined to raise the question for internal purposes, to show something concrete to the simmering opposition, even if it meant falling out with Britain. In order to avoid further disagreement among the Allied ranks it was decided to proceed with the next item on the agenda: The Montagna formula.

The Montagna formula, which was drafted as a compromise solution regarding the judicial capitulations in the closing stages of the first phase, was to prove one of the most controversial issues in the second phase of the Conference. Britain had already refused to recognise Montagna's initiative on the grounds that the formula had been presented to Ismet Pasha after the departure of the British delegation and did not refer to the issue properly in the Allied note of March 27. Rumbold's statement that the 'Montagna formula had never been an official draft' and that 'it had been produced at the last moment in the hope of rendering possible the immediate signature of a peace treaty on February 4,' gave rise to a long

¹². FO371/9075/E4235/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 482.

discussion in an atmosphere of considerable tension¹³ which in the end produced the new Allied proposal drafted as an alternative to the Montagna formula.

Although the Allies, together with the United States, displayed absolute unity on the subject, none of their arguments was successful in moving Ismet Pasha from his position.¹⁴ As the Montagna formula had been presented to him in the name of all the Allies he was now convinced that they were going back on their word. According to Ismet Pasha, the problem was directly related to Turkey's vital interests and the new proposal failed to give the required guarantee that Turkey would be treated equally with other states. He also accused the Allies of seeking to substitute a new form of capitulations for the old. ¹⁵

In a private meeting with Rumbold, Ismet Pasha did not hesitate to express his disappointment with British policy. All the questions in which Britain was mainly interested had already been settled in its favour and this settlement had constituted a basis on which Turkey could obtain the signature of the treaty without much difficulty. This basis was now disturbed by the insistence of the British delegation on bringing up again the Montagna formula about which Turkish opinion was very sensitive, and which Ismet Pasha had declared in the Grand National Assembly had been settled.¹⁶

Ismet Pasha was greatly disturbed by this setback. However, on May 8, he arranged a private interview with Rumbold in which he brought up the issue again stating that it had already been resolved. Two days prior to this meeting he had been firmly instructed by the Prime Minister to break the negotiations and go back to

¹³. FO371/9076/E4541/1/44, May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.496; CON12404/185, 192 Inonu, Hatiralar, pp. 134-137.

¹⁴. Inonu, Hatiralar, pp. 133-138.

¹⁵. It was related to the range of powers to be conferred by Turkey on legal counsellors whom it was prepared to engage. May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 496.

¹⁶. FO371/9076/E4543/1/44, May 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 498.

Ankara if the Allies were insistent that the formula did not constitute a legal draft.¹⁷ Rumbold was convinced that Ismet Pasha had committed himself in the Grand National Assembly to the Montagna formula and that nothing could induce him to accept anything else. The British delegate nevertheless urged him to instruct his legal experts to examine the legal draft. The same day Rumbold telegraphed to Henderson: 'The rock of the "judicial safeguards of foreigners" looms ahead, Ismet... is evidently committed to the Montagna formula, which is a rotten formula but which we may have to accept after all.' He also appealed to Henderson not to 'breathe a word of this.'¹⁸

The Montagna formula created difficulties not only for Ismet Pasha and Rumbold but also for Montagna, the producer of the formula. He was now discredited, and his power to make the Turks drop their demands for Castellorizo was weakened. He did not get much encouragement from Rumbold, who maintained that the time was not ripe for the intervention of the plenipotentiaries as there were still many other articles to be discussed before the Allies decided on their course of action.¹⁹ Based on information obtained also from 'secret sources', Rumbold warned the Foreign Secretary that if they insisted on going beyond the Montagna formula, Ismet Pasha was instructed to break off the negotiations and leave the Conference. 'It is therefore,' he concluded, 'for our Governments to decide whether they are prepared for a rupture on this question.'²⁰

Rumbold throughout the Conference was well aware of Ismet Pasha's impatience to obtain peace as soon as possible. Henderson's 'correct diagnosis' of the present state of Turkey provided ample information for Rumbold. 'Desperate keenness of Ismet to get peace' he wrote on May 5, 'is, to my mind, the best

17. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, May 6, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

18. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 111-113; FO371/9079/E5425/1/44.

19. FO371/9076/E4554/1/44, May 5, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 501.

20. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 114-118.

guarantee of our success.'²¹ As the negotiations progressed it became increasingly apparent to Rumbold that Ismet Pasha's priority was to ensure the speedy conclusion of peace. 'My impression of Ismet's attitude, which is corroborated by what Pellé has gathered,' he wrote to the Foreign Office, 'is that Ismet is determined to get peace as he feels that he can not return to Angora empty-handed for the second time.'²²

It should be stated that the British perception of Ankara's keenness for an immediate peace depended very much on the intercepted telegrams between Lausanne and Ankara, and the intelligence reports rather than impressions driven from private negotiations. Moreover Ismet Pasha's own assurances constituted a valuable source in this process. Yet there seems to have been some scepticism on the part of the British about whether the Turkish delegation was deliberately prolonging negotiations. It was asserted that the failure of the Turkish delegation to sign the treaty was mainly related to the internal political situation in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal's political position in Ankara had prompted him to postpone peace, as he considered that peace would result in internal disruption. In the face of external difficulties some unity was maintained and the opposition could to a great extent, be controlled; but once the question of peace was settled, the passions of the opposition group would be set free and the position of Mustafa Kemal and his party would be seriously jeopardised. Therefore the Turks wished to delay peace until the consolidation of the Kemalist position or the disruption of the opposition.²³ The logical implication of this theory was that in the second phase of the Conference the Turks would slow down the negotiations as they intended to have the treaty ratified by the new Assembly. If the treaty had been signed earlier the Turks would have

21. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 99- 101; 111- 113; 124-127; CON12404/320

22. FO371/9075/E4148/1/44, April 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

23. FO371/9130/E2141/199/44, February 21, 1923, Bennet to Forbes Adam and SIS Report February 21, 1923, No. 1089; FO371/9121/E1625/35/44, February 9, 1923, SIS Report; FO800/157 Curzon Papers.

had to rush the elections so as to get a quorum capable of ratifying early in July. They did not, however, wish to provoke war, but they intended to postpone the conclusion of peace until they could control the internal political situation.²⁴

These assertions, although they have some valid points, fail to reflect the whole picture. It would be too simplistic to conclude that the opposition played the most crucial part in the decision making process at Ankara. It was true that the opposition was achieving a greater degree of unity and that its activities were making Mustafa Kemal's position increasingly difficult. It should also be remembered that it was the same opposition which severely criticised the government for failing to come to a satisfactory agreement with the Powers and which demanded the resignation of the Council of Ministers. It would have been rather unwise to lose time and wait for the opposition to grow by prolonging the negotiations rather than work for speedy progress and decrease the element of risk. Further, the financial difficulties of the country necessitated an immediate peace settlement. At the beginning of the Conference it was ascertained that, although the War Department had been granted extraordinary credits, the revenues of the Ankara government were not sufficient to balance the normal budget of expenditure and that it was not possible to meet the credits granted to the War Department by subsidies from Russia and credits from France for the supply of war material and contributions from other Muslim countries, particularly from India. Therefore immediate peace, as opposed to adventurous policies, was a priority. Lastly, the morale of the army was another consideration affecting Ankara's policy. The government was not able to rely on the whole support of the army in the event of a decision in favour of military operations. There was a growing demand among the troops for demobilisation on the grounds that the enemy had been driven from the country and that there was no reason why men who had been a long time under

²⁴. Oliphant Papers, FO800/253 Tu/23/25; Ryan Papers, FO800/240; FO371/9130/E2141/199/44 Secret Political Report, No.1089.

arms should not be permitted to return to their homes. There was thus little enthusiasm among the army for war, but it could be used as a last resort.²⁵ In the light of these arguments it seems incomplete to suggest that the policy of Ankara was motivated by the opposition and based on the postponement of the peace settlement. Rumbold, however, seemed to ignore these factors and concentrated on Ismet Pasha's position with regard to Ankara. 'Ismet Pasha is worried over the whole business,' he remarked, 'he is so bound down by his instructions from Angora that he dare not waver.'²⁶

Greek Reparation vs Allied Reparation

As the negotiations progressed it became clear that peace depended on the solution of five main questions: Greek reparation, the interest on the pre-war Ottoman public debt, the concessions, the judicial declarations, and the early evacuation of the territories under Allied occupation. Of these questions, the outcome of the Greek reparation question was to play a decisive role in the success or the failure of the conference.

The Greek reparation question had been a serious threat to peace, since both the Turks and the Greeks were equally determined in their demands. Venizelos had been under pressure at home for a military solution rather than to pay anything to the Turks and, exasperated by the delay, he had decided to bring the question to the conference table. His message to Ismet Pasha was clear: it was materially impossible for Greece to pay anything in the shape of an indemnity and unless this question was speedily settled the Greek army would become restive.²⁷ In his

²⁵. In the event of a breakdown of the Conference, the Turkish General Staff had prepared a secret plan for a military offensive. For more information see: Ihsan Ilgar., 'Turk Genel Kurmayi'nin Gizli Harekat Plani' Belgelerle Turk Tarihi Dergisi, Sayi 36, pp. 33-44.

²⁶. FO371/9076/E4541/1/44, April 27, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.496; FRUS (1923) Vol. ii pp. 1001-1002; Inonu, Hatiralar, p.135.

²⁷. Inonu, Hatiralar, p. 129; Simsir, Lozan Telgrafleri II, No. 249. May 17, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Orbay.

reply, Ismet Pasha displayed a firm attitude stating that Turkey would not tolerate any military threat on the part of Greece and would not hesitate to take military action if necessary.²⁸

The Allies were alarmed at the prospect of a new Greco-Turkish war. Their representatives and military authorities at Istanbul were preparing contingency plans in case the Greeks crossed the Maritza line and they found themselves obliged to maintain a precarious neutrality in the centre of a potential field of Greco-Turkish operations. The British were particularly concerned about a Greek advance on Istanbul with its possible ramifications²⁹ and they decided to act immediately. On 14 May Rumbold had a meeting with Ismet Pasha during which Rumbold was finally able to convince Ismet of the Greeks' inability to pay anything at all. According to Rumbold, the Turks could not 'get blood out of stone.'³⁰

Ismet Pasha was open to suggestions on the subject, but Greece had to make a 'gesture of good will'. It was now left to Rumbold to get the Greeks to do so. On May 18 he was informed, in response to his earlier suggestion, that the Greek government were ready to give up Karagatch but only as a last resort. Thereupon Rumbold and Venizelos worked out a detailed plan: Venizelos was first to inform Pellé, without consulting the Greek government, that he was prepared to cede Karagatch and a small triangle between the Maritza and Arda rivers to the Turks as a condition for the immediate settlement of the reparations question, and General Pellé was to present the proposal to the Turks as coming from himself. In the event of Ismet Pasha accepting the proposal, Venizelos would then inform Pellé

²⁸. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, No. 238. May 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Orbay.

²⁹. DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 517, 518, 520.

³⁰. FO371/9102/E4949/6/44, May 15, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9102/E5069/6/44, May 18, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 516, 524.

that he would telegraph the Greek government for authority to confirm it.³¹ The plan seems to have worked and Ismet Pasha telegraphed the proposal to Ankara. ³²

Ismet Pasha however, had a different solution in his mind. The Greek reparation question provided an indispensable opportunity for Ismet Pasha to bring the Allied reparation question to the centre of discussions at the Conference. He argued that both the Greek and the Allied reparation questions were connected, even though the Allies claimed otherwise. As he was now considering dropping his claims on Greece he wanted to know whether the Allies in return had abandoned their demand for reparation from Turkey. His question was to remain unanswered.

The Allied Reparation question became linked with the question of Greek Reparation in a way that may be described as a vicious circle; The question of Greek reparation could not be settled until Ismet Pasha was assured that the Allies would not demand any reparations from Turkey, yet there seemed to be no unity among the Allies as to the policy towards Turkey. The breach between Britain and its Allies was widening since the latter were reluctant to agree with Rumbold's inclination to drop the demand for reparations from Turkey, thus giving rise to a situation which was, as Rumbold put it, 'increasingly awkward and unfortunate.'³³ Moreover, everything pointed to their inability to come to settlement by compromise. Rumbold was bitterly critical of his colleagues' attitude. 'The French and Italians are hanging us up over one or two articles and their obstinacy in not consenting definitely to drop the demand for reparations from Turkey has already created a difficult situation and threatens to bring the work of the Conference to a stand-still.'³⁴

31. FO371/9148/E5296/1767/44, May 23, 1923, Secretary of States for Colonies to Dominions; FO371/9103/E5094/6/44, May 18, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 527.

32. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 256, May 19, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 271, May 22, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 273, May 22, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

33. FO371/9103/E5097/6/44, May 20, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 535.

34. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold, 31, ff. 133-134; ff. 141-144.

In view of the situation the British were anxious to get the reparation question out of the way and were trying to induce the French and Italian governments to drop their demands.³⁵ Rumbold, who was following the developments step by step, believed that a further delay in the settlement of the reparation question would produce undesirable consequences and decided that the time had come for forceful action. On May 21, in a meeting with Bompard and Garroni, he urged the immediate settlement of the Allied reparation question; he made it clear that if they revived their claims he should be bound to remain silent, thus giving Ismet Pasha a clear indication that the Allied front had been broken. 'Everyone agreed that there is now no chance of obtaining reparation from Turks', wrote Rumbold to Curzon on May 22, 'and only question is whether my French colleague and Italian colleagues shall put forward without my support a demand which they will ultimately have to drop again.'³⁶ Rumbold's threat proved effective and resulted in the French and Italian delegates asking their governments for fresh instructions.

On May 24 events took a dramatic turn when the Greeks announced that they would leave Lausanne two days later unless the Greek reparation question was settled. Rumbold had to warn Venizelos against 'criminal folly of any adventurous policy'. The solution, however, did not lie with Venizelos, who was contemplating the cession of Karagatch³⁷ to the Turks in return for the withdrawal of Turkish demand for reparation. Rumbold believed that Ismet Pasha would accept the Karagatch proposal once the Allies definitely decided to drop their reparation claims. However, he was worried about both the possibility of a separate Turco-Greco agreement on the basis of the Karagatch proposal *before* the settlement of the

³⁵ FO371/9104/E5382/6/44, May 23, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO371/9103/E5363/6/44, May 25, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII. Nos. 554, 557.

³⁶ FO371/9078/E5196/1/44, May 22, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 537.

³⁷ During the first phase of the conference Ismet Pasha had accepted in the face of the strong action taken by Curzon the surrender of Karagatch to Greece. See: Chapter III.

Allied reparation question between the Turks and the Allies, and about the delay over the Allied reparation question which might precipitate the renewal of hostilities between Turkey and Greece. Therefore, while he put pressure on Montagna by threatening him that he would not take up the question of Castellorizo until the settlement of the Allied reparation question, he appealed to Curzon to take 'strong and immediate action' in Paris and Rome.³⁸ 'My colleagues and I,' he wrote to Curzon on May 25, 'are straining every nerve to prevent situation from developing from one of grave anxiety into one of real danger'.³⁹

On the same day, Curzon urged the Italian and the French governments to drop their claims for reparation against Turkey on the grounds that the settlement of the Turkish claim for reparation against Greece, and the contingent issue of peace and war, might be dependent on the earliest possible settlement of this question. He also sent an urgent telegram to Rumbold in which, after reviewing the situation, he underlined that if the breakdown of the Conference was inevitable, it might be of 'advantage' that it should come on the grounds of the Montagna Formula, as on this issue they could count on American support and the general approval of public opinion.

Ismet Pasha was under strong pressure both from the Allies and his own government concerning reparations. In the meantime, the Greeks were insisting on the immediate settlement of the Greek reparation question; otherwise, they declared, they would leave the conference. Rauf Bey's telegram of May 23 clearly stated that the Turkish claim for reparation could not be renounced in return for Karagatch and that if the Allies upheld the Greeks' inability to pay they should equally admit the Turks' inability to do so. Rauf Bey maintained that rather than hold up peace on account of the Greeks, Ismet Pasha should conclude peace between Turkey and the

³⁸. FO371/9074/E5323/1/44, May 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 545.

³⁹. FO371/9104/E5382/6/44, May 25, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No. 554; CON12404/327.

Allies, and later with Greece.⁴⁰ In his reply to Ankara, Ismet Pasha urged the acceptance of the Karagatch proposal and expressed his conviction that peace could not be achieved within the instructions laid down by the government.⁴¹ Thereupon, in a meeting under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, the Council of Ministers arrived at the decision that if any sacrifice was to be made on the Greek reparation question, the questions of public debt interest, the early evacuation of the occupied areas, the judicial regime and the compensation of Allied companies should be brought forward with that of Greek reparations and only in the event of the settlement of these questions in favour of Turkey being guaranteed could a sacrifice be made in regard to reparations.⁴²

Riza Nur recalls these critical days in his memoirs and states that after having received Ankara's definite instructions not to give way on the questions of reparations, he and Ismet Pasha assessed the situation. Under the assumption that the Greek threat to leave the conference was serious, they sent a second telegram to Ankara asking for authorisation to renounce Greek reparations. Riza Nur claims that they received no instructions for three days and when Ismet Pasha wished to return to Ankara to get things straightened out, he strongly advised Ismet not to do so. In consultation with each other they decided, despite the government's instructions, to accept the Karagatch proposal.⁴³ It was a step which gave rise to considerable criticism at home.⁴⁴

40. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 278, May 23, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

41. *ibid.* No. 295, May 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

42. *ibid.* No. 301. May 25, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

43. Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, pp. 1200-1203; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 296. May 24, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal; No.305, May 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 310, May 26, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

44. Ismet Pasha's telegram to Ankara, to communicate that he had accepted the offer, caused great dissatisfaction in the government and made the already strained relations between Rauf Bey and himself worse. His second telegram, justifying his decision by arguing that it was a necessary concession which would enable success in other areas, did not have the desired effect in Ankara. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal intervened on Ismet Pasha's behalf, and the issue was resolved according to the wishes of the latter. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 312, May 27, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 313. May 27, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.314. May 27, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha.

The acceptance of the Karagatch proposal by the Turkish delegation was a critical move to which the Allies could not fail to respond. On May 25, to Rumbold's relief, the expected French answer was received and Pellé informed Rumbold that Poincaré had definitely agreed to renounce the French claim for reparation from Turkey.⁴⁵ On May 26, at a private meeting between Venizelos, Ismet Pasha and the Allies, Ismet Pasha agreed to the Karagatch proposal but asked for definite assurances as to the rapid settlement of the question of Allied reparations. He succeeded in obtaining the Allies' 'promise' on the subject since the instructions of the Italian government had not been received at that point. Two days later he was informed by Montagna that the Italian government too had sent instructions to drop demands for reparations.⁴⁶ Thus, the question of Greek reparations and that of Allied reparations were settled simultaneously. The peaceful solution of this perilous situation was due to the qualities of the two principal opponents, to the skill with which Venizelos played his cards against his own government, the Allies, and the Turks, to Ismet Pasha's sincere desire for peace, and to the courage with which he stretched the not too elastic instructions of his own government. Ismet Pasha acted on the same principle as he had in the first part of the Conference. He tried first to eliminate the most dangerous opponent, the menace of the Greek army, which could be used as a weapon against Turkey. Once the reparation dispute was settled, even if a rupture occurred, the Greeks would have no ground for military action, nor would the Allies have the means of using this military action as a threat against Turkey. His strategy, however, failed to obtain the support of the Council of Ministers at Ankara who were irritated by his exceeding their instructions.

⁴⁵. CON12404/322.

⁴⁶. FO371/9079/E5426/1/44, May 27, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

Decisive Steps towards Peace: Debt and Concession Questions

The settlement of the Greek reparation question was a sacrifice on the part of Turkey and was obtained only after Ismet Pasha 'considerably exceeded his instructions' and placed himself in a difficult position vis-à-vis Ankara.⁴⁷ Ismet Pasha felt that his accommodating attitude required some sort of Allied move to settle the remaining issues in favour of Turkey. On May 27, a day after the settlement of the Greek reparation question, in a meeting with Rumbold, Ismet Pasha pushed the question of the early evacuation of Istanbul into the forefront. The same day, Rumbold warned Curzon against what he believed to be 'the danger of mad intransigence at Angora overriding Ismet's strong desire for peace' and advised him to show generosity towards the Turks on the question of early evacuation. Rumbold argued that by early evacuation Britain would gain economically as well as politically since the delay meant continuing expenditure and the risk of incidents in the occupied area. Furthermore, early evacuation might produce a favourable effect on the course of the negotiations and on Britain's future relations with the Turks. Nevertheless, Curzon was of the opinion that the evacuation would constitute so important a concession that 'it ought not to be lightly granted', as it furnished the Allies with a 'most powerful lever'. 'We ought not therefore' he told Rumbold on June 13, 'to proceed with discussion of this question until we are satisfied that an acceptable peace is on eve of being concluded, and that presupposes a settlement of the important questions still outstanding especially the debt, commercial concessions and Mosul.'⁴⁸

⁴⁷. FO371/9079/E5581/1/44, May 29, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9080/E5671/1/44, May, 31, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 571. 576; CON12404/375. Henderson's report of May 30, based on the intercepted telegram sent to Ismet Pasha by Mustafa Kemal, clearly illuminated Ismet Pasha's position.

⁴⁸. FO371/9082/E6101/1/44, June 13, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No.606; FO800/240 Ryan Papers; CON12404/484.

In principle Ismet Pasha agreed with Curzon on the questions to be urgently solved, but with one exception. From the Turkish point of view, beside the evacuation of Istanbul, judicial capitulations took priority over other issues.⁴⁹ On May 29, after long and wearisome discussions, Ismet Pasha declared that it would be useless to take up any of the three remaining questions until that of judicial declaration was settled.⁵⁰ He delivered practically an ultimatum, that of settling one of the questions before proceeding to the consideration of another. Ismet Pasha could not afford to make another concession since his position regarding Ankara was delicate. The difficulty in reaching an agreement over the judicial capitulations shifted attention to the debt problem. However it was soon discovered that the Ottoman debt question proved even more inconclusive,

By the beginning of June, the prospect of peace seemed distant. Rumbold, who played the role of a mediator, described his situation as one of 'trying to square the circle.'⁵¹ 'Both French and Turks are quite intransigent on the subject, and I have exhausted my energy and ingenuity in trying to effect a compromise between the two.' In his view, the French seemed 'almost ready to push the matter to the point of presenting an ultimatum to the Turks', and that would mean a rupture.⁵² Rumbold's formula to overcome the deadlock was based on the solution of two other questions: Judicial capitulations and the evacuation of Istanbul. He was convinced that the combination of these two would consolidate Ismet Pasha's position vis-à-vis Ankara and that he would have 'greater courage to meet Allies half way over question of debt and concessions.'⁵³ Indeed, Ismet Pasha was open to recommendations and finally sent to Ankara for the consideration of the Council

49. CON12404/369; FO371/9081/E5884/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to the Foreign Office.

50. Simsir, Lozan Telgrafleri II, No. 326, May 29, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

51. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 197-199, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Crowe.

52. Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 194-196, June 19, 1923, Rumbold to Henderson.

53. FO371/9080/E5836/1/44; FO371/9080/E5676/1/44, June 1, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.578.

of Ministers three possible solutions: Payment in francs; No mention in the treaty either of conditions of payment or of confirmation of the Muharrem Decree⁵⁴; Confirmation of the Muharrem Decree and old loan contracts with a reservation respecting settlements with bondholders and, after peace, discussion of conditions of payment.⁵⁵ Ankara found the first solution preferable, the second acceptable, but the third one Ismet Pasha was instructed 'definitely to reject'. Ankara's rejection originated from the fear that if payment in francs was not admitted the Muharrem Decree would place the largest part of state revenue under foreign control.⁵⁶ On June 2, Ismet Pasha clearly explained to Rumbold that Ankara would under no circumstances agree to pay in sterling, giving Rumbold the impression that he would carry the matter to the point of rupture.⁵⁷

⁵⁴. This was a bilateral agreement concluded between the Ottoman Empire and its creditors for the resumption of service on the foreign debt and received the sanction of Royal *irade* on December 20, 1881. The contract became known as the Decree of Muharrem (from the Turkish month in which it was signed) and consisted of twenty one articles of which Blaisdell examined them in three general groups; 'those which refer to the reduction, conversion and consolidation of the internal and external debt, but excluding the Russian indemnity; those which deal with the service of the consolidated debt and the revenues ceded to the administering body; and those which are concerned with the erection of an executive body known as "The Council of Administration," the organisation to function under its direction, and the relations between the Government and the Council.' Donald C. Blaisdell., European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 88-89.

⁵⁵. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.329, May 30, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁵⁶. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 334. May 31, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 347. June 1, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 348. June 2, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 358. June 3, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha.

⁵⁷. Ismet Pasha's firm stand was due to the persistent attitude of the government. His relations with Rauf Bey were already strained over the status of Ferit Bey, Turkey's Paris representative. Towards the end of the first phase of the conference, Ferit Bey's initiative of engaging in private negotiations with the French without consulting the Prime Minister caused deep concern in the government and in particular to Rauf Bey, who immediately asked for Ferit Bey's resignation from his post and return to Ankara. Ismet Pasha's telegram defending Ferit Bey and criticising the Prime Minister's decision caused friction between the Prime Minister and himself through an intense private correspondence over a long period of time and finally resulted in Ferit Bey's leaving office. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which Ismet Pasha handled the conference became increasingly apparent to Rauf Bey, especially in the second part of the conference. A deep conflict between Ismet Pasha, who was accused of disregarding instructions, and the government was clearly noticeable. Despite definite instructions from his government about the payment of debts in French francs, Ismet Pasha seemed to hesitate and was almost willing to give in to the Allies suggestion of payment of debts in gold or sterling. In the face of the unyielding attitude of the government, he refused the Allies' proposals.

There were several reasons behind Ankara's determination. It needed money for reconstruction and for maintenance of the military situation and it could have no better grounds from the point of view of internal politics than to be able to say that it had broken off the Conference rather than leaving the country's revenues in the hands of foreigners. It would also facilitate the government's purpose in the election campaign.

Rumbold believed that if the Allies met Ismet Pasha on the question of the evacuation of Istanbul this would not only ease the tension and strengthen Ismet Pasha's hand vis-a-vis his government but also facilitate the Allied task in resolution of the other outstanding questions, particularly that of the Ottoman debt.⁵⁸ Rumbold's views were shared by Pellé, who also considered that it would be a better policy to strengthen Ismet Pasha's position with his own government by informing him of the acceptance of the judicial declaration in question rather than to defer its acceptance for bargaining purposes in connection with other outstanding questions. The French proposal was that the evacuation of the occupied territories should begin immediately after ratification of the treaty by the GNA and that it should end after the treaty came into force subject to its ratification by Britain, Italy and Japan and the demobilisation of the Turkish army to proceed *pari passu* with evacuation.⁵⁹ From Rumbold's point of view spinning out evacuation until three Powers other than Turkey had ratified the treaty was both 'dangerous and impractical'.⁶⁰ Curzon and General Harington agreed, the latter stating that the Allied Generals were unanimous in the opinion that once evacuation began it should be carried out completely. 'It would be exceedingly dangerous and unsound to leave small detachments exposed to incidents and insults with Turks in their present uppish mood, which will be accentuated when we are actually going' wrote General Harington to the War Office on June 6. 'In my opinion, evacuation should be

⁵⁸. FO371/9080/E5726/1/44, June 2, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 581.

⁵⁹. Poincaré's position, however, was understandable. He was afraid to weaken his insecure internal position by backing down on the coupons. So long as external pressure was there he was supported. His administration survived because the Chamber felt that it must support his policy in the Ruhr and he shrank from giving way on the coupons question for fear of antagonising the numerous French bondholders. Considerable effort was expended by the British in getting the French government to drop this condition and it was not until July 7 that the Allies were in a position to take up these three outstanding questions with the Turks.

⁶⁰. FO371/9080/E5806/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 585; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 168-173.

started on ratification by Angora and the time limit should be fixed by Lausanne, say 6 weeks, by which it will be completed.⁶¹

On June 4, the Conference focused on the question of concessions. The Allied strategy was that they would make the announcement of their assent to the judicial declarations at the outset of the meeting with a view to preparing the necessary ground for the favourable outcome of the concession question. Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha was determined not to give way on the question until he had made further progress over the debt and the evacuation of Istanbul. But Pellé too was insistent that the Allies should decline to discuss the evacuation of Istanbul until Ismet Pasha had settled the questions of debt and concessions. Ismet Pasha's endeavours to gain the sympathy of the Romanian, Serbian and American delegates on the issue ended in failure, leaving him alone to face French obstructiveness. After some strenuous sittings, agreement in principle was reached on the night of June 8-9, but when details of the evacuation and the concessions questions came to be examined by experts in the sub-committees, fresh difficulties arose. Ismet Pasha's attitude stiffened on June 10 at a private meeting during which the question of debt was discussed. He had received confirmation from Mustafa Kemal that the Turkish government would under no circumstances pay interest on debt in gold. If franc payment could not be obtained, the declaration confirmed by the Muharrem Decree could not be accepted, since Ankara regarded the Muharrem Decree as contrary to national sovereignty.⁶²

Ismet Pasha declared that Turkey had recognised its debt but was unable to pay in full. If the Allied governments would agree to payment in francs Turkey would agree to recognise its engagements as legally valid but it would not confirm

⁶¹ FO371/9081/E5965/1/44, June 6, 1923, Harington to the Foreign Office; FO371/9080/E5806/1/44, June 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 585.

⁶² CON12404/334; FO371/9082/E6030/1/44, June 9, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 595; Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, No. 348. June 2, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; No. 358. June 3, 1923, Mustafa Kemal to Ismet Pasha; Inonu, *Hatiralari*, pp.143-144.

its engagements by a proposed declaration in return for a vague promise that bondholders would examine its financial situation and discuss modalities of payment after peace. Alternatively, Turkey would agree to make no declaration and to leave both sides of the matter to be discussed with bondholders.⁶³ After a lengthy discussion it became clear that there was no possibility of reaching an agreement and breakdown seemed inevitable. Rauf Bey's press declaration showed serious signs of dissatisfaction. 'Turkey has reached limit of her sacrifices,' stated the Prime Minister, 'and can on no account accept peace which does not give her complete independence. If there be a rupture, it will have been brought about by those who have presented proposals calculated to entail economic and financial slavery of Turks.'⁶⁴

On June 11, Rumbold asked for definite instructions as to whether the British government was prepared to face rupture on this question. A long and wearisome discussion on June 12 only worsened the already complicated problem and everybody was convinced that until the debt question was settled further progress would be blocked.⁶⁵ As for the concessions, no immediate settlement seemed possible either. Ismet Pasha's instructions were that the matter was to be dealt with at Ankara, that there were other matters such as debt and evacuation still outstanding, and that the moment had not arrived for the settlement of the concessions questions.⁶⁶ The Debt question held the key to progress.

⁶³. FO371/9082/E6030/1/44, June 9, 1923 Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6033/1/44, June 10, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6059/1/44, June 11, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6103/1/44, June 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9082/E6217/1/44, June 14, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 595, 597, 598, 602, 615; CON12404/463.

⁶⁴. CON12404/478, June 12, 1923, Henderson to Curzon; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 421. June 11, 1923, Rauf Bey to Paris Representative; No. 426. June 12, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

⁶⁵. FO371/9082/E6217/1/44, June 14, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6252/1/44. June 15, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

⁶⁶. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 360. June 3, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.372. June 5, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No.388. June 7, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; No. 432. June 12, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

By mid-June, the situation reached a point where, in spite of the desire for peace on both sides, negotiations threatened to come to a standstill. The Allies knew that the Turkish delegates had lost credit with their government since the settlement of the Greco-Turkish reparation question and were no longer in a position to persuade their government to accept the solution of any question on its merit. The British and Italian delegates were convinced that in the event of a rupture over the debt question Ankara would not be deterred from resuming hostilities. However, Pellé still maintained that if the Allies showed a firm front the Turks would give way over the debt and concession questions and not dare to go to war again. Rumbold eventually disclosed that his government would be reluctant to see the Conference break down on the question of debt and by a skilful manoeuvre he put Pellé in a difficult position by asking him whether, if the positions were reversed, the French Parliament would be willing to see France engaged in hostilities on account of British bondholders.⁶⁷ Pellé, though he refrained from answering Rumbold, still held a view diametrically opposed to that of his British colleague and dissension between them seemed complete. The British effort to get Pellé to go to Paris to try and get things straightened out also failed when Poincaré turned down the proposal. 'We are all in a state of great depression here' wrote Rumbold in a private letter to Henderson on June 19, 'The conference had reached a complete dead-lock over the Debt question.'⁶⁸

The situation in the conference was undoubtedly one of complete deadlock pending agreement between the French and British governments regarding the further course to be pursued, since the Italians seemed to be amenable to falling in with any plan not involving rupture. Britain wished to avoid at all costs a rupture

⁶⁷. FO371/9083/E6252/1/44, June 16, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6356/1/44, June 18, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9083/E6406/1/44, June 20, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.617, 621, 624; ; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 194-196; CON 12404/499.

⁶⁸. FO800/240 Ryan Papers pp. 1106-1109; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 443. June 14, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; No. 465. June 19, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; No. 475. June 21, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

and a possible resumption of hostilities on questions which were mainly French interests, and deemed that the only course to be followed was to bring the French into line. According to Curzon as this matter was predominantly a French interest, Britain was prepared to be largely guided by the French view and to support it. But, he emphasised, that as 'relatively unimportant British interests' were involved, Britain was 'reluctant' to see peace negotiations finally break down on that particular point.⁶⁹ 'I know it is humiliating to give way to the Turks,' commented Rumbold in his telegraph to Crowe of June 19, 'but if we are not going to use force, we must take the best bargain we can. If we threaten to use force without intending to carry out our threat, the Turks might very well call our bluff and then our position would be considerably worse than before.'⁷⁰ For Rumbold the Allies no longer had any basis for negotiations.

The British, who were not unsympathetic to the Turkish view over the debt question, turned their attention to the concession question. Therefore, before plunging into the debt problem, which did not directly concern Britain, Curzon asked Rumbold 'to bring Ismet into the open on the Concession question'. The degree of Britain's satisfaction over the concession question would determine the degree of pressure to be exercised upon the French to bring them into line as well as Turkey's chances of settling the debt question to its satisfaction. Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha maintained that the concessions question was one to be settled in Ankara through negotiations between the Turkish government and individual concessionaires.⁷¹ At present his government took the view that the question was

⁶⁹ FO371/9082/E6101/1/44, June 13, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; DBFP, XVIII, No. 606; FO371/9081/E5884/1/44.

⁷⁰ Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 197- 199.

⁷¹ Inonu, *Hatıralar*, pp.141-142; Simsir, *Lozan Telgrafları II*, No. 434. June 13, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister; No. 440. June 14, 1923, Prime Minister to Ismet Pasha.

During the second part of the Lausanne Conference the British companies and the Turkish government were involved in negotiations at Ankara. The British position was that unless the Foreign Office was assured by the British companies themselves that they had obtained satisfaction at Ankara, it would not drop the treaty provisions as required by the Turks.

not within the competence of the Conference. Ankara believed that negotiations with the concessionary companies would succeed if the companies themselves entertained no hopes of intervention from the Allies on their behalf at Lausanne. Ismet Pasha also pressed for the immediate settlement of the coupons question since his instructions allowed him to discuss the concessions only after the coupons question was settled in favour of Turkey and the evacuation of Istanbul was promised.⁷²

On June 23⁷³, at a meeting of the Third Committee, Ismet Pasha underlined the fact that once the debt and the evacuation questions were solved Ankara would then consider the question of concessions and send him instructions. Riza Nur confirmed that at present the Turks were not empowered to negotiate the concessions, but that the modification of their view could later be put on the agenda.⁷⁴ Rumbold responded that a discussion of the conditions of evacuation could not be embarked upon until all other important questions had been resolved.⁷⁵ There seemed to be no way out of this vicious circle unless one of the parties relented. Ismet Pasha felt that, under the rigid instructions of Ankara, he had no option - apart from breaking off negotiations - but to convince Rumbold to settle the debt question first. He therefore met Rumbold in private on June 26, and gave him a positive undertaking that if the solution to the debt question was found

⁷². FO371/9084/E6547/1/44, June 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.475, June 21, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

The coupons question created another bone of contention between Ismet Pasha and Rauf Bey. The limit of the government's tolerance was reached when Ismet Pasha did not follow the clearly stated instructions that nothing should be discussed before the dispute over coupons was solved, and the government rebuked him accordingly. He responded with a telegram to Ankara, saying that 'the attitude of the government was like that of the Palace in the conduct of the Turco-Russian War, 1877-1878', and challenged Rauf Bey and the deputy Finance Minister, Hasan Fehmi Bey, to come to Lausanne and secure the peace treaty themselves. Orbay, 'Rauf Orbay'in Hatiralari'; Ataturk, Nutuk, p. 785; Karaosmanoglu, Politikada 45 Yil, p. 40; Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, pp. 1239-1240; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No.506. June 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 506. June 25, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey; No. 510. June 26, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.)

⁷³. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 486, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

⁷⁴. Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, June 24, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

⁷⁵. FO371/9084/E6547/1/44, June 23, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 632; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 490. June 23, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Prime Minister.

immediately he was ready to settle the question of concessions in a manner satisfactory to the Allies.⁷⁶

Rumbold was not entirely convinced and was reluctant to risk the claims of the companies as he believed that if the Turkish concessionaire companies were excluded from the treaty and not 'fairly treated' in the arrangements made with them at Ankara, he would be left with no choice but to accept the decision. But, as Curzon rightly observed, everything depended on the French decision on the coupons question. Rumbold was uneasy about the whole affair: 'The Turks do not mean to pay them [coupons] in anything but francs and we know that quite well.... It seems to me a matter of getting the French into line on a programme of action.'⁷⁷ An ultimatum, which the French believed should be delivered, was not regarded as a favourable option by the Foreign Office, which believed it might lead to a rupture. The disadvantages of a possible rupture were far greater than Britain's gains from the debt and concession questions. If a breakdown occurred they would have to be prepared for a prolonged period of uncertainty and for possible hostilities and they would also have to make their occupation of Istanbul more effective than it was at present. This was bound to result in Britain having to ask the French and Italians to share the burden of occupation more equally. Although the French could hardly refuse this, the Italians were reluctant to contribute more than they were at present. The whole problem, therefore, would inevitably lead to another division in the so-called Allied unity.

Curzon's telegram to Rumbold on July 21 clearly illustrated the apprehension of the Foreign Office regarding the ultimatum. He argued that there was no certainty that the Turks would yield to an ultimatum and that public opinion would not tolerate an inflexible policy. He also pointed out that the points over

⁷⁶. CON12404/548.

⁷⁷. FO371/9082/E6448/1/44; FO371/9084/E6731/1/44, June 28, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.640.

which Britain could break up the Conference were, though important, not 'absolutely vital', and a prolongation and possible extension of a military occupation would be 'very unpopular' and might even be 'dangerous'.⁷⁸ Ryan and Henderson too were of the opinion that the ultimatum meant rupture. 'If the ultimatum is too stiff and the French would want it pretty stiff,' commented Ryan in a private letter to Henderson on July 26, 'the Turks, in their folly, will break away rather than yield.'⁷⁹ In his letter of June 27 to Rumbold Henderson was pessimistic:

'The Turks would rather face a rupture, even with the ultimate possibility of war, than agree to pay the Debt coupons in gold. Therefore, in my opinion,... an ultimatum would mean a rupture, unless possibly the Allies said that they were going to and meant to use force.'⁸⁰

By the beginning of July the Conference had made no significant progress and still met the same difficulties as in June except that the Allies were now ready to give Ismet Pasha satisfaction on the question of early evacuation. They refused, however, to make this concession formally or to discuss it in detail until Turkey gave satisfaction on the other two points. In the concessions question, considerable British and French interests were at stake. Direct negotiations with the Ankara government were believed to be on the verge of a breakdown and, as a result of this, the Allies insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of a special protocol laying

78. FO800/253, Tu/23/48; FRUS (1923), Vol. II, p. 1028.

79. FO800/240, July 26, 1923, Ryan to Henderson (Private letter), Ryan Papers.

80. FO800/253 Tu/23/46; Tu/23/50; Oliphant Papers; FO800/240 Ryan Papers; Rumbold Papers, Rumbold 31, ff. 192-193, 216-219.

However Henderson and General Harington's reports on Turkey confirmed the fact that the 'growing internal disunion, increasing administrative disorganisation' and 'waning influence of Mustafa Kemal' could well provide a unique opportunity for the Allies to impose their terms. If the ultimatum was to be delivered, there could be no better time than the present since all the indications pointed that the Turks were hardly in a position to resume open hostilities and were incapable of active resistance to force. Therefore it was for the Allies to decide whether they could afford to face this risk in the belief that the Turks would yield to the Allies' last word. General Harington and Henderson believed that Ankara would be reluctant to run 'the risk of losing what they had hitherto gained and be exposed to the grave danger of ruining personal position as a result of internal troubles.' FO839/52 No.184-185, June 25, 1923, Henderson to the Foreign Office.

down the principles on which the future settlement of these concessionary questions was to be achieved.

The questions of the Decree of Muharrem and the currency in which the interest on the pre-war debts was to be paid were of interest mainly to the French though there was an important holding of unified bonds in London. On the one hand, the French plenipotentiaries were bound by a principle to which the French government attached great importance, namely the refusal to diminish in any way by a treaty stipulation the full rights of individual French bondholders; on the other hand, the Turkish delegates, with a budget which hardly balanced and inflexible instructions from Ankara, were determined not to commit themselves to anything which might risk the ratification of the treaty by Ankara and endanger Turkey's future economic and financial prospects. The continued state of stalemate posed a considerable danger to the successful conclusion of the Conference although none of the parties felt they were likely to gain by a fresh outbreak of hostilities. In the struggle that ensued, the British position was, by the nature of the case, that of mediator.

Ankara was getting impatient about the inconclusive negotiations at Lausanne. On July 2 Ismet Pasha addressed a note to the Allies in which he criticised the slow progress and urged the Conference to proceed without any delay with the discussion of essential questions, more particularly the question of coupons, which he believed constituted the principal obstacle to the conclusion of peace.⁸¹ Rumbold was furious with Ismet Pasha's note, which he called 'a tissue of misrepresentations seriousness of which is aggravated by its premature publication.' In his protest of July 3, he was equally critical of the Turkish attitude, declaring that it was 'intolerable' to be accused of dilatoriness on the grounds that

⁸¹. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari II*, No.539. July 2, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey.

the Allies had not accepted the Turkish view of how the questions should be settled.⁸² Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha's note of July 3, led to the clearance of minor points if not of the principal questions.

The main feature of the conference at the beginning of July was the isolation of the French due to their attitude regarding the debt question. On July 3, a visit of Romanian and Serbian delegates to Rumbold was a reflection of the general atmosphere in the Conference. The delegates were uneasy about the present state of the Conference and about reports of an intention to present the Turks with a *mise-en demeure* which would lead to the failure of the conference. Although they did not wish to criticise any action which the Allies would take to defend the financial and economic interests of their subjects, they considered a rupture of the Conference for the sake of the bondholders difficult to justify. The Serbian delegate, who had spoken with Ismet Pasha on the previous day, reported Ismet Pasha's view that any prolongation of the occupation would mean war and that the Turks would never sign peace unless they were assured beforehand that their territory was to be evacuated. 'Allowing for a certain amount of bluff on Ismet's part,' commented Rumbold in his telegram to Curzon, 'I have little doubt that Turks would view prolongation of occupation in manner stated by Ismet.' He saw grave danger in the French attitude⁸³ on the debt question and he believed that the French action would in effect amount to creation of 'another Ruhr question at Constantinople'.⁸⁴

On July 4, in a telegram to Curzon, Rumbold was bitterly critical of the French position. 'French are...seeking to involve us in policy which means rupture

82. FO371/9085/E6978/1/44, July 5, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.655.

83. The French proposal regarding the debt question was to confront the Turks with two alternatives: Either the acceptance of the draft of February 4, maintaining the decree of Muharrem which should be embodied the Paris formula, or the abandonment of the declaration of the bondholders, subject to reservation of the right to protect the interests of the bondholders in so far as they were Allied subjects. However, they demanded that the evacuation should take place only six weeks after the Turkish ratification if in the meantime an agreement had been reached with the bondholders.

84. FO371/9085/E6937/1/44, July 3, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; FO371/9085/E6956/1/44, July 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.651, 653.

of Conference but they refuse to face the consequences of such rupture.' He enumerated the consequences as an indefinite postponement of peace, the probable necessity of tightening the Allied hold on Istanbul and the possible resumption by the Turks of hostilities in one or more of three directions such as Istanbul and Chanak, Syria or Iraq. He then argued the first of these consequences was enough to add a serious danger to the already existing state of unrest in the Balkans and the Near East and that the second necessitated a 'large measure of responsibility for administration of Istanbul and some measure of responsibility for Eastern Thrace' unless the Allies asked Greece to take over. Considering the Turco-Greek rapprochement this alternative seemed rather unlikely. The third meant war, the ultimate extension of which nobody wished to happen. Moreover, there was the problem of justifying the rupture of the Conference to British public opinion ⁸⁵

At this moment Curzon had to intervene by communicating to the French government that their proposal still contained elements which the governments of Britain and Italy believed would meet with refusal from the Turkish government and that it was likely to produce a breach, since the French confronted the Turks with a choice between 'integral acceptance of the French formula or a postponement of evacuation.' Curzon urged the French government to reconsider their decision by reminding them of the serious warning of the Romanian and Serbian delegations, and of the statement by Ismet Pasha that Turkey would not pay interest in gold, that a rupture would mean a renewal of hostilities and that they would not sign peace without an assurance of evacuation. He also stressed the inconsistency of French policy by pointing out that while Poincaré had stated that the last thing he desired was to despatch reinforcements to Istanbul, he insisted on a solution which was likely to lead to a rupture. He finally asked the French government to reconsider 'the possibility of omission of any declaration on the subject of the debt from the

⁸⁵.DBFP, XVIII, No.653. July 4, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon.

treaty, full reservation of the bondholders' rights in a letter to Ismet Pasha but no corresponding postponement of evacuation.⁸⁶

It should also be noted that there was another consideration behind Curzon's strong appeal to Poincaré: The Turco-Greek peace threat. In the later stages of June, the unforeseen Greco-Turkish rapprochement embarrassed the Allies, who were faced from time to time with a threat from both sides to conclude a separate Greco-Turkish peace if the negotiations, in which the Allies were mainly concerned, were not expedited. When Venizelos visited Rumbold on June 28, he criticised the Allies for failing to come to an agreement, saying that a fortnight had elapsed since the Greeks had received the note from Allied delegates foreshadowing the end of peace negotiations and that they could not contemplate with equanimity a prolongation of the present state of things.⁸⁷ When Venizelos met Rumbold on July 5, the Greek representative declared that unless something could be settled before Sunday, July 8, he could no longer refrain from making separate terms with Turkey. To the relief of all involved, the French reply of July 6, which was immediately communicated by Crewe to London and Lausanne, was 'generally satisfactory,' thus opening the way to discussions of the three remaining questions, namely debt, concessions and evacuation.

The private meeting of July 7, between the Allied and Turkish delegates which lasted nearly six hours produced no result but only more friction. Nevertheless it prepared the basis for the discussions of July 10, during which tension rose to the highest pitch. Private discussions on the next day, July 11, proved also to be inconclusive. Rumbold's formula providing for the maintenance of the maximum number of allied warships in Turkish waters inside the Straits between the end of the evacuation and the enforcement of the Straits convention,

⁸⁶. FO371/9085/E6937/1/44, July 5, 1923, Curzon to Crewe; DBFP, XVIII, No. 656.

⁸⁷. FO371/9105/E6790/6/44, June 30, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 643.

subject to unlimited right of passage during the same period, was rejected by Ismet Pasha who maintained that he could accept no evacuation proposal which did not include the complete withdrawal of allied warships from Turkish waters, and that the Turks had always understood evacuation in this sense. When he asked instructions from Curzon as to whether in the last resort London would agree to leave no ships stationed in those waters provided he could secure unlimited right of passage, the reply, to his relief, was in the affirmative. Curzon, having consulted with the Admiralty, sent a telegram to Rumbold authorising him to proceed with his formula but stressing that the withdrawal should only be made in the last resort and as part of an absolutely final settlement covering concessions and any other points that Ismet Pasha could raise afresh.⁸⁸ Relieved by Curzon's reply but disappointed with Ismet's refusal, Rumbold communicated to Curzon on July 12: 'Things are going more slowly than I expected. At present it is difficult to see whether Turks are moving back, playing for time in hope that Anglo-French relations may deteriorate owing to Ruhr question, or merely testing allied position in order to see what they can screw out of us before finally coming to terms.'⁸⁹

Following months of discussion there was still no prospect of completing the treaty and it seemed almost certain that there would have to be a last-minute compromise since neither side wanted to risk a war at the expense of the issues still needed to be settled.

Final Bargaining: The TPC Concession

At the beginning of July, while there was little or no progress regarding the other issues before the Conference, the question of concessions came to the

⁸⁸. FO371/9087/E7217/1/44, July 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 669; FO424/258; CON12560/65, 76.

⁸⁹. CON12560/77; FO371/9086/E7191/1/44, July 12, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.668.

forefront, and the full weight of American diplomacy started to be felt. On July 8, the Americans were alarmed at the news that the meeting between the Turkish and Allied experts had produced a discussion in favour of a new formula which was to delete the second article⁹⁰ of the draft protocol on concessions and replace it with the following provisions:

"1. The 'juridical' validity of the French concession made in 1914 to be confirmed by Turkey and compensation to be given to be determined if necessary by arbitration. 2. The Vickers-Armstrong Company to be compensated by Turkey for work which it had actually undertaken. 3. The Alleged Turkish Petroleum Company concession to be confirmed by Turkey. "

The Allies' new formula for the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC)⁹¹ would have meant that the rights acquired by the TPC should be valid and maintained. The proposal, which had been objected to by both the Turks and the Americans in the first part of the Conference, thus came up again, and the Turks appeared to be relinquishing their former position. The US. State Department renewed its objections to any formula proposing to validate the TPC's controversial concession on the grounds that unless the British gave up their position in 'Mesopotamia' the Turkish territories would not include 'some of the important rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company.' Since the American government regarded the TPC's concession 'as monopolistic in its application to Mesopotamian oil fields,' the Department argued, the British government was not 'entitled to a monopoly of the fruits of a victory to which American arms have contributed, and to secure now monopolistic privileges for the Turkish Petroleum Company to the exclusion of American enterprise.' The State Department was concerned that if the Allied formula was incorporated in the treaty it would mean a great diplomatic victory for the British. 'Such victory should not be won by our

⁹⁰. The Article 93-94 of the Draft Treaty dealing with the concessions was transferred to a special protocol in the second part of the conference.

⁹¹. See Chapter V, pp.159-162.

own surrender,' the Department instructed Grew, 'and any reservation we make should be contrived as effectively as possible.'⁹²

At Lausanne, Grew believed that Rumbold and Ismet Pasha might have entered into a private arrangement by which the latter would agree to satisfy the TPC's claims 'as a return for British support on the issue regarding Ottoman Debt coupons.' After receiving the view of the State Department on the matter, Grew was determined to fight alongside Ismet Pasha and do everything in his power to strengthen his resistance to these 'entirely inequitable provisions'. He assured Ismet Pasha that if he stood firm he would win since the Allies' position was 'unsound' and they could not justify themselves before world opinion.⁹³ Nevertheless, Ankara would have to follow a cautious policy which would ensure American support and not antagonise the British. They could neither support the TPC's concession, since the GNA had granted the Chester concession in April, nor oppose it in strong terms since they still needed British support at Lausanne. The formula was elaborated to the effect that Ankara was prepared to allow the question of the TPC's concession to be referred to a neutral arbitrator, thus relieving itself from responsibility for any possible infraction of the Chester concession. However, Ismet Pasha was to 'stand fast' on the principle that the GNA had the right to grant concessions to whom they pleased.⁹⁴

American pressure began to increase. On July 12 Grew visited Rumbold to stress the importance which his government attached to the matter and declared that the United States would not be able to acquiesce in the validation of an agreement which had not at the time fulfilled all legal requirements; he concluded that if Rumbold maintained his position he would be reluctantly compelled to make a

⁹². FRUS, 1923, II, pp.1029-39; Grew, pp .582-584.

⁹³. Grew, Turbulent Era, pp.585-589; Simsir, Lozan Telgrafleri II, No. 618. July 13, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha.

⁹⁴. FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.680.

protest in the committee.⁹⁵ On July 14, Rumbold asked for further instructions from Curzon about the British position, that is, about the ultimate limit of concessions he could make. In return he was not given any precise instructions concerning the TPC and the matter was left to his discretion. The instructions regarding the evacuation were the same. When he asked whether, in view of the risk of a break in negotiations, the recognition of unlimited right of passage by Turkey was essential for Britain, the Foreign Office replied by transmitting intelligence information disclosing Ismet Pasha's instructions from Ankara with the hope that Rumbold, on the basis of this information, would find it unnecessary to make the concession.⁹⁶

Ismet Pasha agreed to the meeting proposed by the Allies⁹⁷ for July 17 and which was the final meeting of the Conference. Rumbold knew that he did not have much time left to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. After the preparation and rejection of some dozen formulas, the French consented to leave the question of the decree of Muharrem and the interest of the debt outside the treaty, while expressing in the committee a strong reservation as to the Allied view of the matter and the possible subsequent Allied action. Ismet Pasha eventually accepted a protocol regarding concessions which met some, if not all, of the Allied conditions, while Britain made a final concession by agreeing to omit from the treaty Turkish confirmation of the rights of the TPC. In view of Ismet Pasha's determined opposition, strengthened by the intervention of Grew on Ismet Pasha's side, it proved impossible for Britain to obtain a satisfactory formula with regard to the TPC. Considering the controversial nature of the question and the possibility of a breakdown of the negotiations with the risk of further points being reopened on a

⁹⁵. FO371/9087/E7258/1/44, July 13, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, No.672; CON12560/78; FO424/258.

⁹⁶. FO 371/9087/E7308/1/44, July 14, 1923 Rumbold to Curzon, DBFP, XVIII, No. 674.

⁹⁷. On July 15, the Allies sent a note to Ismet Pasha in which they recapitulated the position of the discussions and expressed their readiness to examine the outstanding points. On the next day Ismet Pasha agreed to meet them and the meeting took place on July 17.

question on which Britain could have received little or no support from its Allies, Rumbold's decision seemed justifiable. However, he was badly shaken when he received Curzon's telegram of July 18, which criticised the stand taken by him. 'I am most uneasy at learning' wrote Curzon, 'that you jettisoned case of Turkish Petroleum Company whose claims I repeatedly emphasised in discussion when at Lausanne regarding Mosul.' After referring to the intercepted telegrams between Ankara and Ismet Pasha which disclosed Ismet Pasha's intention to avoid a complete rupture in negotiations, Curzon continued:

'It appears to me that mere unilateral reservation, however strongly couched by you, cannot but prejudice materially our position in forthcoming negotiations about Mosul, and will also weaken most seriously Company's claims to rights under 1914 concession.'

He concluded by advising that Rumbold should insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum Company into the protocol.⁹⁸

Although Curzon's telegram caused Rumbold 'deep concern' it did not alter his conviction that the course which he had taken was the only one open to him if rupture was to be avoided. He explained the considerations and circumstances that governed his decision to accept the omission of any mention of the Company's concession in the treaty and defended his action on the grounds that Ismet Pasha had definite instructions from Ankara to break rather than yield, in which case the Allies and world opinion would accuse Britain of 'destroying certainty of peace for the sake of British oil interests.' After having referred to Curzon's own statement in the first phase of the Conference that oil considerations had nothing to do with the British attitude regarding Mosul, he added his conviction that rupture, which would commit Britain to an 'open and unpleasant dispute' with the United States, was most undesirable. He maintained that he had left the 'question of Turkish Petroleum

⁹⁸. FO371/9087/E7398/1/44, July 18, 1923, Curzon to Rumbold; FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, Nos. 679, 680; CON12560/110; FO424/258.

Company intact as between Turkish and British governments' and his action had 'in no way enhanced the validity of the Chester concession.' He was, however, very much disturbed by the whole affair. 'I deeply regret that after three months' arduous negotiations in the course of which you have more than once been good enough to express appreciation of my proceedings,' he remarked, 'I should have failed to obtain your approval on the last remaining question which stood in the way of peace.'⁹⁹ Curzon's telegram of July 20 settled the problem. 'I accept your explanation and agree that matter must be left as it stands.'¹⁰⁰

In comparison to Rumbold's difficulty in justifying the settlement to London, Ismet Pasha was in a relatively comfortable position. In early August, before he returned to Ankara, Rauf Bey left the capital for Sivas, his home town. This was, in fact, the retirement of Rauf Bey from the political arena.¹⁰¹ His departure from Ankara and relinquishment of office were the first public indications of dissension between him and Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha. The acuteness of the quarrel almost certainly dated from the first phase of the Conference, during the last stage of which relations between Ismet Pasha and Ankara had suffered a severe strain. The tension was caused by the different and conflicting political views held by Ismet Pasha and the Prime Minister Rauf Bey and by Ismet Pasha's disregard of the latter's instructions and finally manifested itself in the form of protest by the government by not authorising Ismet Pasha to sign the treaty. In other words, permission to sign the treaty did not come from the government, but from Mustafa Kemal, despite Ismet Pasha's two telegrams asking for authorisation.

⁹⁹. FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 680; FO424/258; CON12560/113.

¹⁰⁰. FO371/9088/E7527/1/44, July 19, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No. 680; CON12560/118.

¹⁰¹. Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim, p. 1247; Aydemir, Tek Adam, pp. 132-134; Aydemir, İkinci Adam, p. 266; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 711. August 2, 1923, Rauf Bey to Ismet Pasha; CON12560/174; FO424/258.

In a telegram to Ankara on July 18, Ismet Pasha was critical of the government's attitude; he declared that although it had been three days since he had reported to the government the mode of settlement, he still had received no reply. 'In the event of government insisting on rejection of conditions accepted by us we cannot do more,' he declared, and warned the government that the 'only course open to me would be to address a communication to High Commissioners in Constantinople informing them that we divest ourselves of authority to sign treaty,' and concluded 'I am not waiting to be thanked by Government but history will record our labours.'¹⁰²

Finally the evacuation protocol, after presenting some difficulties, notably in the matter of the right of Allied warships to remain in and pass freely through the Straits pending enforcement of the Straits Convention, was agreed upon on the same day as the Concessions Protocol. It was agreed that the evacuation was to be completed within six weeks of the ratification, that is by October 4, and that under article 3 of the treaty, and by the provisions of the Evacuation Protocol, the period of nine months during which Turkey and Britain would endeavour to settle by amicable negotiation the frontier between Iraq and Turkey would run from that date.

Ratification of the Treaty

Ismet Pasha returned to Ankara on August 13; his task was now to see the treaty of Lausanne through the Grand National Assembly. There was no reason to anticipate dangerous opposition, as the elections had created a new Assembly which was amenable to the government, with Mustafa Kemal as President. The opening sitting took place on August 11 but it was not until August 21 that the discussion of the treaty of Lausanne in the Assembly commenced. The public debate which began

¹⁰². FO371/8995/E7665/91/65, July 21, 1923, G. H. Q. Istanbul to the War Office; Simsir, Lozan Telgraflari II, No. 643. July 18, 1923, Ismet Pasha to Mustafa Kemal.

on August 21 lasted three days and a certain amount of criticism was observed by the deputies who devoted themselves principally to the question of the southern frontier. After the recommendation of the treaty by the Foreign Affairs Commission, the debate was continued on the 22nd when the other points of the treaty were raised, though in a moderate tone, and it was adjourned until the 23rd, when Ismet Pasha delivered a lengthy speech in which he defended the treaty.¹⁰³ Mustafa Kemal, when acknowledging his election as President on August 13, recommended the treaty highly and on August 23 it was accepted by a large majority. The great inducement to Turkey to ratify the treaty without delay was the provision in the evacuation protocol that territories occupied by the Allies should be evacuated within six weeks of their High Commissioners in Istanbul being notified that the Grand National Assembly had ratified the treaty. At the beginning of October 1923, Ankara found itself for the first time in unrestricted control of all the territories left to Turkey by the peace treaty.

The ratification of the treaty by Britain came much later. When Ismet Pasha pressed for an early ratification of the treaty by Britain, Henderson's reply was enough to raise suspicions about Britain's intentions. Ismet Pasha was told that the question of ratification could not be raised in Parliament before the middle of November and that even if submitted to Parliament at once, the formalities in connection with it would take some time.¹⁰⁴ It would be naive to say that it was sheer coincidence that the ratification of the treaty by Britain and the settlement of the Mosul question occurred at the same time. Britain was the last country to ratify the treaty and the explanation lay in the fact that it was ratified on the very same day that the Mosul question was referred by Britain to the League of Nations August 6, 1923.

¹⁰³. FO424/258; CON12560/213.

¹⁰⁴. FO800/253 Tu/23/69, Oliphant Papers, September 3, 1923, Henderson to Oliphant.

To sum up, the second phase of the Conference, which lasted more than three months after long delays and various crises, ended with the signature of the treaty on July 24. At the outset, the Conference was threatened with rupture owing to the Greeks' refusal to accept the Turkish demand for the payment of reparation, one of the main questions which had been left outstanding at the end of the first phase of the Conference. Greek troops threatened to cross the Maritza and reopen hostilities, but the matter was finally settled by the rational diplomacy of Venizelos and Ismet Pasha. The latter waived Turkey's claims against the concession of Karagatch by Greece to Turkey and the return of Turkish ships seized by Greece since the Armistice.

The last six weeks of the Conference were spent in endeavouring to settle the three outstanding questions: the currency in which the interest on Turkey's pre-war debt was to be paid, the terms on which Turkey was to satisfy the Allied holders of pre-war concessions in Turkey, and the provisions for the evacuation by the Allied troops from Turkish territory. The evacuation was not in itself a difficulty but it was held as a trump card by the Allies, who refused to discuss the question until the other two disputed points were on the way to settlement. The other financial and economic questions concerned mainly France, although there was substantial British interest in the matter of concessions. During the first phase of the Conference the French were prepared, under the inspiration of Franklin-Bouillon's policy, to come to terms with Ankara, sometimes contrary to their previous arrangements with their Allies. But they entered the second part of the Conference feeling resentful about the outcome of the Chester concession and the concentration of Turkish troops on the Syrian frontier. A complete change in their attitude was now obvious. After failing to obtain the expected French support on the question of Mosul, the Turks went to Lausanne for the second time determined to have a serious diplomatic battle with the French. Therefore it would not be wrong to say

that the real diplomatic battle was fought on the Franco-Turkish front and the conclusion of peace very much depended on Britain persuading France to drop those demands which Turkey would never accept. Largely through British mediation, the French were forced to accept the settlement of the pre-war debt question. This left the question of the currency outside the treaty and postponed it to future discussion between Ankara and the bondholders, while the concession question was settled as a result of a united front displayed by the Americans and the Turks.

Towards the end of the Conference the American representative Grew, with the aim of maintaining the 'open door' policy, intensified his efforts to make the Turks harden their attitude, and eventually, despite British opposition, this led to the omission from the treaty of any mention of the TPC's concession. However, one should also remember that once Ismet Pasha manoeuvred the TPC's concession into the position of being the only question between peace and war there was not much the British could do but accept the defeat. As Rumbold aptly put it: 'The Allied delegations on resuming negotiations found themselves in the position of a man entering a fight with one arm strapped to his side; for there was no longer anything they were prepared to fight about and Turkey knew it.'¹⁰⁵ It could also be argued that the British delegation was guided by the consideration that the area on which the company's concessionary rights fell would almost certainly not be included within the new frontiers of Turkey. Therefore it was not truly a defeat but a temporary withdrawal. The psychological victory belonged to the Turks.

¹⁰⁵. FO371/9089/E7722/1/44; FO371/9088/E7527/1/44; FO371/9088/E7660/1/44, July 24, 1923, Rumbold to Curzon; DBFP, XVIII, No.683.

VII

CONCLUSION

The Lausanne Conference which met in November 1922 to conclude a definite peace between Turkey and the Allies was the final phase in the long-standing Eastern question. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War the break up of the Empire seemed inevitable; the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 dealt the final deadly blow to the 'Sick Man of Europe'. Meanwhile, while Britain and its war-time Allies were busy with the dividing up the Ottoman Empire, among themselves a nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged in Anatolia; it set up a *de facto* government with an Assembly sitting at Ankara, rejected the peace terms imposed upon Turkey and adopted the National Pact, which gradually became the Turkish desiderata for any acceptable peace. Nevertheless, it was not until after their final victory against the Greeks that the Turks were able to force the Allies to negotiate on the basis of the principles contained in the National Pact.

The success of the Turkish forces provoked intense diplomatic activity. The Allies realised that they were no longer in a position to dictate the terms of peace despite their strong desire to attain what had been envisaged in the Sèvres Treaty. Britain took the lead in the formulation of a common policy, built up Allied unity and established itself at the outset of the Lausanne Conference in such a position that it was able not only to speak in the name of the Allies but also to control the proceedings of the Conference.

The Lausanne Conference provided the necessary ground for reconciliation between Turkey and Britain for the first time since the outbreak of the First World War. Conflicting nationalist interests were accommodated through mutual

compensations and concessions. The impulse which drew Turkey towards Britain appears to have stemmed from three major considerations. First, Turkey urgently needed peace and stability and Britain was regarded as the only power which could provide this; a settlement with Britain became therefore a foregone conclusion. Second, having suffered many years from the destructive effects of a capitulatory regime, Turkey was particularly sensitive about issues involving its sovereign rights and independence; it would not accept any solution even remotely suggestive of any kind of foreign interference in the conduct of its internal affairs. Britain was mainly interested in territorial and political questions which did not pose a direct threat to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey. Mosul presented a special case and it was agreed to postpone consideration of it. Although the postponement of the Mosul question was considered unsatisfactory by the Turks, it was overridden by the Turkish desire for an immediate peace and possible Anglo-Turkish friendship. Third, Turkey needed economic and financial assistance for the reconstruction of its economy, devastated after many years of war. Financial difficulties played an important role and prompted the Turks to conclude peace as early as possible in order to seek assistance from abroad. In this context, Britain was regarded as a potential creditor which could provide assistance to meet the country's pressing needs.

As for Britain, the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was fundamental since a war with Turkey would be detrimental to Britain's interests. First, war weariness, strained resources and economic weakness made it extremely difficult for Britain to commit itself to a cause which was most likely to fail. Moreover, in the likely event of a war, Britain was convinced that no help would be coming from its Allies. The lack of unity among the Allies meant that Britain would have to fight alone should war prove unavoidable. Furthermore, war would mean the end of the Conservative Government, which had committed itself to the cause of peace. As far as Curzon

was concerned, it would put a stop to his chances of gaining the premiership: Success at Lausanne would increase his chance of becoming the next Prime Minister, a dream which had become his life's ambition and which he could not afford to see unfulfilled. Second, as Britain secured most of its territorial and strategical claims, it was relatively satisfied. Given the circumstances in which Britain had to negotiate, the least unsatisfactory terms possible were obtained. As far as Mosul was concerned, it could be argued that Britain might well have been guided by the consideration that it was not wise to resume hostilities with Turkey on a question which, given British influence in the League of Nations, was most likely to have a result in favour of Britain. Last, Britain concluded that a friendly Turkey would provide a buffer zone against Russian encroachment and better serve British interests in the Middle East. In other words, Britain, by securing Turkish co-operation, endeavoured to gain effective control over any developments which would jeopardise its long term interests in the region.

Once everybody agreed on the principle of peace it was left to the tactical skills of the respective delegations and their strategies to determine what kind of peace was to be concluded. Britain's strategy was based on Allied unity, which it tried to keep intact in order to secure its own interests. Britain fought the Turks with utmost effort in the first phase of the Conference until it obtained its objectives. It also blocked the Conference in such a way that no progress was made until the issues concerning itself were settled. It prevented both the Conference from progressing and the Turks from making separate agreements with the other Allied member countries. Britain did this by supporting the Allies' claims against the Turks and reassuring them that British support was behind them. By the end of the first phase of the Conference British claims were by and large conceded by the Turks and in the second phase the British played a mediatory role pressing for the immediate settlement to protect what they had already gained.

Turkey's initial strategy was to isolate Britain and enter into separate engagements with the other members of the Allied union. Turkey believed that by satisfying the Allies' demands it would be able to enlist their support for Turkish demands vis-à-vis Britain. Nevertheless, Ismet Pasha was soon convinced that it was neither possible to satisfy the Allies' demands nor to secure their support against the British. He decided to change his tactics and set on a new course, that is, to come to terms with the British first. Having settled all the substantial questions between Turkey and Britain at the end of the first phase and removed the British obstacle to peace, Ismet Pasha strengthened his hand during the interval and prepared for a fierce fight against the French and the Italians in the second phase. He was convinced that once Britain was satisfied, Turkey would be in a better position to deal with the rest of the Allies freely and effectively. It was this consideration which dominated Turkish strategy throughout the Conference and led the Turks to adopt a more conciliatory attitude on the questions which directly concerned the two parties.

The further the Lausanne Conference of 1923 recedes into history, the more clearly we see how great a turning point it was in Turkish history. The success of the Nationalist Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal demonstrated that the vanquished Empire could be transformed into an independent state able to reverse the Treaty of Sèvres, to negotiate with the victorious Allies on its own terms, and to replace the Treaty of Sèvres with the very different Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty that was signed on July 24, 1923 confirmed the international recognition of a new independent Turkish state and incorporated Turkey into the family of Western nations as an equal partner. The Allies were forced to recognise this independent, and sovereign nation state.

The Conference was the first step on the way to a fundamental shift in Turkish politics internally as well as externally towards the West, which defined

Turkey's new role in the world. The treaty sealed the fate of the former Ottoman territories, putting an end to Turkish influence in the territories under the provisions of the National Pact. It closed the chapter of the long war years and introduced security and stability into Turkey's foreign relations.

The Turks to a great extent achieved their major goals, and that was due to the fact that their aims were legitimate, obtainable and realistic. What had been achieved by military means was confirmed by diplomatic success at Lausanne. The National Pact almost materialised; apart from Mosul, the Thrace and Southern borders were as described in the National Pact. There were no war reparations and no creation of an Armenian state. The Capitulations were abolished, leaving the Italians and the French unable to win the favourable economic and financial provisions for which they had hoped. Although Turkey did not have ultimate control over the Straits, many clauses threatening her ultimate independence and sovereignty were removed. The mandated population exchange of Greeks and Turks was carried out; the Ottoman Public Debt was divided among the successor states. Only Mosul question was left unsolved; it was referred to the League of Nations for further deliberations.

As for Britain, the Lausanne Treaty was a significant turning point in the process of establishing British influence in the former Ottoman territories. If the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne are compared, it would not be wrong to conclude that the British suffered a political defeat but lost hardly anything of importance. On the whole they were able to protect their interests and retain control over much of the Middle East. In other words, the Turkish success at Lausanne did not defeat the underlying aims of British diplomacy. Britain's two main objectives were achieved: the Straits were internationalised; the Mosul settlement was successfully kept out of the Conference and referred to the League of Nations, where the Vilayet was subsequently given to Iraq.

The Lausanne Conference also represented a landmark in the history of the Middle East. It changed the map of the region by creating a new international system in its midst. As the Ottoman Empire came to an end Turkey and Britain opened a new chapter in their relations and set to adjust themselves to their new roles in world affairs.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Brief Biographies of Leading Figures

Adam, Eric Graham Forbes: Born October 1888. Clerk in Foreign Office, 1913. Third Secretary in Diplomatic Service while employed at Peace Conference in Paris 1918-1919. Promoted to First Secretary in the Foreign Office, June 1, 1922.

Adivar, Adnan: 1882-1955. Graduated from Medical School. Member of last Ottoman Parliament Minister of Health and Social Services in GNA. Minister of Interior for a short period of time. Shortly after the Lausanne Conference, due to a falling out with Ataturk, left Turkey to reside in Europe 1926-1939.

Baldwin, Stanley: 1867-1947. Became MP in 1908. President of the Board of Trade, 1921-1922. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1922-1923. Succeeded Bonar Law as Premier, office which he filled three times, 1922-1924, 1924-1929, 1935-1937. He resigned from politics in 1937.

Bekir Sami Bey (Kunduh): 1855-1933. Studied at the Galatasaray lycée and at Political Science Faculty in Paris. Worked first for Foreign Ministry in several different embassies, then as governor of Van, Trabzon, Bursa, Beirut and Aleppo. Elected to last Ottoman parliament in 1920. Joined Nationalists after closure of Parliament. Commissar of Foreign Affairs (1920-1921). Resigned 1921.

Cebesoy, Ali Fuat: 1882-1968. Graduated from Military Academy. Involved in Nationalist Movement. Member of GNA and Commander of the Western Front. 1920 Ambassador to Soviet Union. Held numerous ministerial positions as well as that of President of GNA. Involved in the founding of Progressive Republican Party.

Churchill, Winston: 1874-1969. Elected Conservative member of Parliament 1900-1906. Liberal member 1906-1912. Served as under Secretary of State for Colonies 1905-1908, President Board of Trade, 1908-1910. Home Secretary 1910-1911. First Lord of the Admiralty 1911-1915. Minister of Munitions 1917-1919, Secretary of State for War and Air 1919-1921, Secretary of State for Colonies 1921-1922. Member of Parliament 1945-. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924-1929.

Crewe-Milnes, Robert Offley Ashburton (Marquees Crewe): Born 1858. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1883-84. Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1908. Lord Privy Seal, October 20, 1908. Secretary of State for India, November 7, 1910. Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris, December 31, 1922.

Crowe, Sir Eyre: Born July 1864. Appointed clerk 1 June 1900. Promoted to senior clerk, February 10, 1906. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 11, 1912. Given diplomatic rank of Minister Plenipotentiary at Peace Conference in Paris, January 11, 1919. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 27, 1920.

Curzon of Kedleston: Born January 11, 1859. MP Lancashire 1886-1898. Assistant Private Secretary to 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, Prime Minister. Under-Secretary of State for India 1891-1892. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from June 30 1895 to October 14, 1898. Governor General of India, December 3, 1898-1904, resigned 1905. Lord Privy Seal, May 27, 1915. During the absence of Mr. Balfour acted as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Peace Conference at Paris, January 1919 and was appointed to that office October 29, 1919.

Graham Sir Ronald William: Born July 1870. Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 1, 1916 during absence of Lord Hardinge at Peace Congress at Paris. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, November 25, 1921.

Hardinge of Penshurst (Charles Hardinge): Born 1858. Appointed to Istanbul, February 2, 1881. 3rd Secretary, 1882. Transferred to Istanbul 1888. Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1903. Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906. Governor-General of India 1910-1916.

Superintending Ambassador at Peace Congress Delegation at Paris, 1918-19. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris, November 27, 1920. Retired January 1, 1923.

Henderson, Nevile Meyrick : Born 1882. 3rd Secretary, 1907. Second Secretary, November 1911 and 1st Secretary, November 1918. Transferred to Istanbul, October 14, 1920. Acting Counsellor, December 1916, 1921 and Counsellor of Embassy at Istanbul, May 1, 1922. Acted as Charg'e d'Affaires, July 1-30 1922, November 1922-February 19, 1923, April 20, 1923.

Inonu, Ismet: 1884-1973. Graduated from the military academy in 1906. Served as Chief of Staff under Mustafa Kemal on Eastern front in 1916. Worked for Nationalists underground while serving at War Office in 1919-20. Appointed Commander of Western Front in 1921. Led Turkish delegation at peace negotiations in Lausanne. First Prime Minister of Republic. (1923-24). Prime Minister again, 1925-37. Succeeded Mustafa Kemal as President of Republic 1938-1950.

Law, Bonar: 1858-1923. Became a member of Parliament 1900. Succeeded Balfour as Unionist leader 1911. Colonial Secretary 1915-1916, member of the War Cabinet, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1916-1918. Lord Privy Seal 1919, Leader of House of Commons 1916. Prime Minister 1922-1923.

Leeper, Alexander Wigram Allen: Born 1887. Department of Information and Foreign Office, 1915-1918. Attached to British Delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris 1918-1920. Second Secretary, March 19, 1920. Served on British Delegation at Lausanne Conference, 1922. Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 1920-1924.

Lindsay, Ronald Charles: Born 1877. Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, 1908-1909. First Secretary, December 1, 1911. First Secretary and Acting Assistant Counsellor at Washington, May 7, 1919. Counsellor at Washington, September 1919. Paris Charg'e d'Affaires 1920. Principal Assistant Secretary, January 1, 1921.

Lloyd-George, David: 1863-1945. Liberal statesmen and Prime Minister 1916-1922. President of the Board of Trade 1905-1908, and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1905-1915. Minister of Munitions 1915, Secretary for War 1916. Superseded

Asquith as coalition Prime Minister. Continued as head of coalition government after World War I. Reigned as Prime Minister in October 1922 following the withdrawal of the Conservatives from the coalition.

Okyar, Ali Fethi: 1880-1943. Graduated from Military Academy in 1903. Military Attaché to Paris 1908. Member Ottoman Parliament 1912, Minister of Interior 1917. Representative in GNA, later President of GNA. Prime Minister 1924-25. Ambassador to France 1925.

Oliphant, Lancelot: Born 1881. Clerk in Foreign Office, 1903. Acting 3rd Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, September 5, 1905 and employed at Constantinople (Istanbul) until August 1906. Employed in Tehran 1909-1911. Promoted to Assistant Clerk, September 30, 1916. Acting Assistant Secretary, December 19, 1920.

Orbay, Rauf (Bey): 1881-1964. Naval Officer, national hero as commander of crusier *Hamidiye* in 1913. Member of Ottoman delegation at Brest-Litovsk peace talks. Leader of delegation which negotiated Armistice of Mudros. Head of Nationalist group in last Ottoman parliament (1920). Deported to Malta in 1920. After his return in 1922, Commissar and Prime Minister of Nationalist government. Ambassador in London, 1942-44.

Osborne, Francis D'archy Godolphin: Born 1884. Appointed to Rome 1909. 3rd Secretary, 1910. Transferred to Washington, 1913. Second Secretary, November 27, 1918. 1st Secretary, November 15, 1919. Foreign Office, January 1, 1920.

Nur, Riza: 1879-1942. Graduated from Military Medical Academy 1903. Member of Committee of Union and Progress before joining Liberal opposition. Arrested in 1910, exiled 1913-1919. Set in last Ottoman Parliament, fled to Ankara 1920. Minister of Education 1920, Minister of Health 1921-1923. Second Turkish delegate at Lausanne Conference. Member of GNA 1923- 1927. Opposition to Government led to his exile until 1938.

de Robeck, John Michael : Second in command to Admiral Carden at Dardanelles, 1915. Succeeded Admiral Carden, 1915. Commanded Second Battle Squadron, Grand Fleet, 1916. Vice-Admiral, 1917. Commander-in-Chief,

Mediterranean, and High Commissioner, Istanbul, 1919. Admiral, 1920. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, 1922-24. Admiral of the Fleet, 1925.

Rumbold, Horace George: Born 1869. 3rd Secretary, 1893, 2nd Secretary, 1896 and 1st Secretary 1904. Foreign Office, 1914-1916. Ambassador at Istanbul with title of British High Commander, November 1, 1920. Second British Plenipotentiary at Lausanne Conference, November 22-February 1923, and Chief British Delegate at resumed Conference April to July 1923. Signed treaty on behalf of the British Empire.

Ryan Andrew: Dragoman in the British Embassy in Istanbul between 1899-1914. After the Armistice of Mudros, in November 1918, appointed Chief Dragoman and political adviser in British Embassy in Istanbul. During Lausanne Conference adviser to the British Delegation on Turkish internal affairs.

Saka, Hasan Husnu: 1886-1960. Graduated from the civil service academy in 1908. Elected to the last Ottoman Parliament in 1920. After April 1920, member Grand National Assembly. Member of Lausanne Conference delegation. Minister of Economic Affairs (1923), Minister of Trade (1924), Minister of Finance (1925). Foreign Minister in September 1944. Represented Turkey at San Francisco Conference in 1945.

Tengirsenk, Yusuf Kemal: 1878-1968. Graduated from the Paris Law School in 1913. Member of GNA 1920-23 representing Kastamonu and Sinop while at the same time filling the office of acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. Signatory of international agreements between Turkey and Soviet Union and Turkey and France. Ambassador to Great Britain in 1924. Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Justice between 1930-1933.

Tevfik Pasha (Grand Vizier): 1836-1936. Graduated from Military School. Pursued career in foreign affairs. Served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Grand Vizier numerous times. Last Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.

Townshend, Charles Vere Ferrers: 1861-1924. British soldier. Joined the Indian Army and held Chitral Fort for 46 days (1895). As major-general in 1915, in conjunction with naval forces up the Tigris he took Amara. Defeated at Ctesiphon, he

fell back upon Kut, where he held out for a month before surrendering. M.P. from 1920.

Tyrrell, William George: Born August 17, 1866. Clerk in Foreign Office, April 26, 1889. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July, 25, 1896. Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey 1907-1915. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 1, 1918. Minister Plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference.

APPENDIX B

Maps




Fig. I. 30 OCTOBER 1918.
BOUNDARIES OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE MUDROS ARMISTICE.

Source: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. Harp Tarihi Dairesi Resmi Yayınları.
Türk İstiklâl Harbi I. Mondros Mütarekesi ve Tatbikatı.
Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1962.




Fig. II. 10 AUGUST 1920
BOUNDARIES OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE TREATY OF SEVRÉS.

Source: T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı.
Türk İstiklal Harbi. Batı Cephesi (4 Eylül 1919 - 9 Kasım 1920.)
Cilt II. Kısım II. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1991. Kroki 27.



Fig. III. 24 JULY 1923.
BOUNDARIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY FOLLOWING THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE.

Source: Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi,
Cilt 6, İstanbul: Temmuz 1970, Sayı 34, P 9.

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