ournalist #Ferda Çetin# stated that Abdullah Öcalan’s call requires active participation, not just support.
Abdullah Öcalan's February 27 ‘Call for Peace and Democratic Society’ is progressing on two levels. One aspect continues as a process of negotiation and dialogue with the state. The other is a call for a democratic society. This call carries the hope that the people of Turkey and Kurdistan will contribute to the resolution of the issue, the establishment of democracy and the rule of law, and the strengthening of the political ground in the construction of a new Turkey.

In the ongoing debates and messages, it is emphasized that for this construction to take place, all segments of society should not only embrace this call but also assume duties and responsibilities and actively participate as subjects in the process. In the political report he sent to the 12th Congress of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), Öcalan points out that the mechanism to build this process will be democratic communes and assemblies.

In the second part of his interview with ANF, journalist Ferda Çetin talked about the construction of a democratic society, democratic communes, and the duties and responsibilities that fall upon society in this process.

We publish the second part of the in-depth interview below:

There is talk of mutual distrust on both sides regarding the process and dialogue debates. What is the cause of this distrust, and what needs to be done to overcome it?

This situation is referred to as “ontological insecurity” (a state of uncertainty or anxiety regarding an individual’s existence, identity, and basic security in the world). This does not exist among the Kurds. However, over the years, the Turkish state has gradually instilled such a state of mind or approach within Turkish society. A dominant and deeply influential logic has taken hold, which ties the existence of Turkey and the Turkish people to the non-existence, weakness, or powerlessness of the Kurds. Therefore, the recognition of Kurds' rights, their acquisition of status, and their self-governance are seen as dangers and threats by Turkey, its governments, and its entrenched state institutions.

For the Kurds, the attempted genocides, massacres, executions, assassinations, and the persistent effort throughout the history of the Republic to resolve the Kurdish question through violence, suppression, destruction, and denial have also created counter-distrust. Speaking with a state, or a government that represents it, which has engaged in such extensive atrocities and turned such evil into a routine and normal policy, has created distrust. The real issue, after identifying this truth, is how this distrust can be eliminated and overcome. Whether we call it negotiations or dialogue, if this process is carried out in a healthy and sincere manner, the distrust can be overcome. People have minds, intelligence, and consciousness.

When the truth is spoken and discussed openly, people will believe it and embrace transformation. But if things continue as they are today, it is an insult and disrespect to the people’s intellect and their vision of self-governance and coexistence. Societies should not be pushed into such desperation or deadlock. However, in this matter, the Kurdish and Turkish societies do not stand in the same position. The Kurdish people genuinely seek peace, brotherhood and democracy. This desire is not limited to Turkey; it extends to Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Kurds are already building their system on this foundation, envisioning a future of coexistence with the peoples and communities of these countries. They engage in open debate, develop its theory, and put it into practice.

What about the situation from the perspective of Turkish society?

In Turkey’s society, discourses and ideas such as “internal enemies, external enemies, threats from outside, the survival of the state, external forces threatening the state” are instilled from primary school all the way through university. This culture shapes people from coffeehouses to mosques, from madrasas to stadiums. In this context, instead of criticizing or condemning the society, it is necessary to criticize the political power, the universities, and the intellectuals who have allowed society to reach this state, as well as those profit-driven circles that seek war and benefit from war while remaining ineffective in confronting these circles. Asking “Why did society get to this point?” is not very meaningful.

In order to transform this social structure shaped by racism, monism and fear, what responsibilities fall on Turkey’s intellectuals, civil society, the state itself, and political parties?

For the achievement of democracy in Turkey, the laws and the constitution must change. This is not only for the Kurds; the current legal system and constitution do not allow room for democracy. Laws are just one dimension of the issue. However, laws do not change on their own, nor can they change solely through parliamentary arithmetic. Many politicians already state that even the current constitution is not being implemented. They say, “There is no need for a new constitution since you are not implementing the existing one. Implement the current one first, and then we can discuss a new one.” This is one aspect of the issue, but constantly expecting this change to come from the government is another problem. With so many political parties, civil society organizations, institutions, universities, and intellectuals continually demanding change from the state and government only exposes how ineffective and helpless society has become. Society should object to this. And society is not a mechanism governed by a single core or center. It is an organism made up of many components, many factors, and many dynamics.

Moreover, everyone says that this process is “very good,” both for Turkey's development and its relations with the Kurds. It is said that the congress decision of the PKK (to disband and disarm) was very courageous and highly beneficial for Turkey’s future and its democracy. However, unfortunately, everyone is currently in the position of an observer. Universities are watching, journalists are watching. Everyone is chasing the popular aspects of the matter: Who attended the meeting? What did Öcalan say? What did Tayyip Erdoğan say? A society in such a state is truly a pitiful one. Perhaps one of the things that needs to be corrected in this process is exactly this. Such a passive, submissive, expectant, and merely supportive stance is unacceptable. The attitude is: ‘It is good and favorable, but we will watch, and if it progresses, we will support it.’

You seem to be referring to the construction of a democratic society. What do we mean by the construction of democracy? What duties and responsibilities fall on the different segments of society in this regard?

This is the most important issue. It is addressed in Öcalan's statement, in the decisions of the PKK congress, and in the final reports. There are many aspects, but essentially there are two main points. The first concerns the duties and steps the state must take, which are directly related to the negotiation or dialogue process. These may proceed slowly and some may take time. This is the dimension related to the state, namely, to do its part for peace and democracy. However, the second, and in fact the stronger and more essential aspect, is the call for a democratic society. This is a call directed at the Kurds, Kurdish institutions, and Kurdish politics, as well as at Turkey’s society. The call for a democratic society means that for this process to advance, deepen, and for a new Turkey and true brotherhood to emerge, democracy must transform into a genuine democracy. We are not talking about a system limited to elections held once every four or five years.

All institutions, all components, and all segments of society should actively engage in this process with their own demands, agendas, and expectations, while also voicing their objections and criticisms. For instance, there are religious groups in Turkey, there are the Alevis, and women, all of whom play a critical role. For example, women should assert the issues they want addressed. Violence against women is rampant, and impunity continues alongside it. There are widespread cases of femicide. Likewise, Alevis need to express their demands and the type of constitution they envision. They may say, “Yes, the process has begun and is proceeding well, but as Alevis, we demand this kind of curriculum.” The same applies to other institutions. There are organizations such as the Chamber of Architects and Engineers, the Medical Association, and the Bar Associations. These institutions should become more active, more dynamic, and engage directly in the process. This type of engagement is also something the Kurds and the Kurdish side desire.

In the construction of democracy, what kind of mechanism will or should the “Democratic Communes” represent, as envisioned in the political perspective of Kurdish People's Leader Abdullah Öcalan? Without a doubt, these discussions will take shape through public meetings and platforms where people participate as active subjects, but what is your view in this regard?

This is also a very fundamental issue. Both Öcalan and the PKK have called for a democratic society. The call for a democratic society is a call for reconstruction. Reconstruction points to the insufficiency of the current situation. It signals that the existing social segments and the current style of politics are inadequate, hence there is the need for reconstruction. Perhaps we should even set aside the term “reconstruction” and simply speak of “construction.” At this point, there must be a departure from a political approach that merely consists of voting at certain intervals or supporting a party. We are speaking of a structure where all segments of society can organize themselves through communes and assemblies, where central management and decision-making processes are decentralized, and where localities hold decision-making power. The more decision-making processes shift from the center to the local level, the more we can speak of genuine democracy. When multiple centers, areas, villages, neighborhoods, and districts can make decisions concerning their own daily lives, political preferences, and modes of self-governance, this expresses their freedom.

Could you elaborate on this point?

Apart from nationwide or society-wide agendas, the extent to which a commune or assembly can create and renew its own agendas defines its level of freedom. This may involve a village, a specific social group, youth, a cultural group, or even a small settlement. We can expand these examples. Each group, each social segment, will determine its own agenda, revise and renew it, struggle for its realization, and fight to remove the legal and legislative barriers that stand in its way. This is what Öcalan aims to create and what he has been struggling for. In fact, this is what he has been explaining for over twenty years. He envisions a society composed not of people who are silent, voiceless, passive, and submissive, but of people who speak out, demand their rights, express their grievances, and actively pursue them. Every person, every group, every place, every region has its own demands and agendas. These may involve daily socio-economic problems, political preferences, or issues related to self-governance.

Isn’t there a fragmented picture here? Could this fragmented situation bring about new problems?

This is not an issue unique to our geography or to the Kurds. Multiplicity, differences, and the existence of the other do not obstruct the formation of higher and stronger unities. In fact, they strengthen them. The existence of different beliefs, ethnicities, and communes is not a barrier to pursuing higher common goals. For example, issues like ecology may represent a higher mechanism that transcends local units. It is a higher purpose, a shared objective. The protection of nature, animal rights, children's rights, and women's rights can all serve as further examples. The ability of these groups or so-called fragments to express their own positions, defend their rights, and pursue their realization is not hindered by their diversity. For instance, there is the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which Turkey has signed and implements. It addresses such matters. It highlights local initiatives, determining one’s own rights and laws, developing economic freedoms, achieving self-sufficient economies, electing one’s own governor and police chief, or at least having the right to pursue such options.

In other words, local or smaller units having self-governance, initiative, decision-making power, and the ability to debate is exactly where the beauty lies. A village community debates its own priorities: do they first need water, a road, or a football field? They discuss, make decisions, and then exert pressure on the central government or municipality, saying, “This is what we need, and we will realize it.” There is nothing more beautiful than this. The opposite is the current situation in Turkey, where ministries in Ankara allocate funds according to a predetermined share, and the village itself has no say in how that money is spent. The funds are used as the ministry sees fit, which may not address the village’s urgent needs.

In conventional organizational structures, communes or assemblies are usually affiliated with institutions, which could be a party or another mechanism. In the model you describe, could there be a structural gap? I mean in terms of a central organization or structure.

The strengthening of local units does not mean completely severing ties with the central authority or rejecting any central decisions or connections. That would not be correct either. Some strands of anarchism advocate such a position of total non-governance and complete decentralization, but that is not viable. There will always be joint undertakings, shared debates, and an axis that considers the broader society. However, this central or hierarchical connection must be extremely loose and flexible. It must not operate with rigid orders and instructions, where decisions are made from a single center and locals are merely tasked with implementing them. The relationship between the local and the center will still exist and must exist. Organization and coordination are always necessary everywhere.

However, these are still discussions at the conceptual level. What would you say about the importance of putting them into practice?

We are currently having an intellectual discussion. We say, “It would be good if it were like this, if it were done that way. This would be the ideal system.” But if this system is not woven together, if it is not developed, if no concrete steps are taken towards it, then it will remain purely theoretical. There are already many books in libraries on these topics. Universities discuss them far more extensively than we do. Social sciences departments and sociology departments engage in these debates. The real skill and beauty lie in putting these ideas into practice. It is about organizing, creating communes, forming assemblies, and coming together. If the process in Turkey is truly to be advanced, neither for the left-socialist circles in Turkey, nor for the democratic forces or for the Kurds, can any result be achieved by simply waiting. It is important, correct, and meaningful to pay attention to and be curious about the outcomes of the messages and meetings. However, if one does not carry out the necessary organizing, express demands, engage in the process, and establish institutions and bodies, these discussions will remain purely theoretical. Everyone is already discussing these matters. We must move beyond that stage.

There have been some criticisms and reactions from certain left-socialist circles in Turkey toward the political perspective of Kurdish People's Leader Abdullah Öcalan. How do you view these discussions?

There can, of course, be criticisms. In fact, the harshest criticisms have been made by Öcalan himself. He says, “We were unable to approach Marxism correctly.” He evaluates his perspective on socialism and real socialism, offering self-criticism rather than mere criticism. He openly states, “We made these mistakes. We viewed things this way.” While referring to Marx and Lenin as important sources, he also acknowledges, “There are gaps in certain areas. They failed to foresee certain developments. These aspects were not that clear in that period.” Thus, he critiques both external leftist-socialist theory and the mistakes and shortcomings that he himself and the PKK have identified or failed to address. Criticism is not harmful, and there is no discomfort in being criticized. However, criticism is different from slander, denigration, and trivialization. In Turkey, or in some Kurdish circles, there are groups who call themselves “nationalists” or who present themselves as more radical, and this situation exists to this extent. We cannot call it criticism.

The same could be said for certain leftist circles in Turkey. It is not correct to place them all in the same category and define them as “the left” or treat them all on the same level. But some of these criticisms serve only to condemn or nullify what the PKK or Öcalan have done. Rather than trying to understand, they pursue a policy of rendering meaningless and trivializing. A segment of the Kurds also does this. This was particularly evident during the post- international conspiracy period between 2002 and 2004, when liquidationist tendencies emerged within the organization itself. These groups claimed, “The PKK is dissolving, collapsing, and disappearing. We, too, were once revolutionaries, but history has proven us right. We recognized this much earlier, and the PKK and its leadership only realized it too late.” They took a hostile and insulting stance. These cannot even be considered criticisms. However, since these groups have no real weight or influence within society, there is no need to take them seriously.

Finally, do you think this new period also carries certain risks? In other words, could the new decisions of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, embodied in the PKK, lead to marginalization? Or could it weaken its socialized and popularized character that we have discussed so far?

There is absolutely no such risk. This applies to Kurdish society, the Kurdish Freedom Movement, and Kurdish legal politics, as well as the other parts of Kurdistan, including Rojhilat (Eastern Kurdistan), Başûr (Southern Kurdistan), and Rojava (Western Kurdistan). Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK have enabled the people to develop the ability to think, comprehend, debate, and become aware of their rights and laws. This was not something present from the very beginning. A society has been created that not only resists and struggles but is also fully conscious of its rights and laws. Such a society now exists. Neither Turkey can turn it back a hundred years, nor can the Ba'ath regime, or the system in Iran reverse this. A consciousness has been firmly established in society. This is why it is often said that “The PKK is not merely an armed organization.” It is a movement that has instilled a mindset, a consciousness of freedom and democracy, and has realized this in practice. The idea of a free society has already been actualized. However, its institutionalization, its continuity, and its organization have not yet reached the same level. This struggle will continue and will grow stronger. It cannot weaken or regress.

What is important for us now is to make use of time and realize this as soon as possible. Instead of going down an unknown path filled with constant tension and conflict, it is possible to live more freely, more equally, and more justly under better conditions, and this must be achieved quickly. Marginalization or dissolution is out of the question. This can only be prevented through organization. As long as society remains organized, these risks will not exist. An organization exists already. Öcalan and the PKK seek to further expand, strengthen, and institutionalize this organization. They also advise the state to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of this process. The message is: “If this happens, we can reach an agreement and become brothers and sisters.” This message is being conveyed to Turkey, to Iran, and to Syria. It says, “If we become equal partners and stakeholders, we can build a strong and just system together.” Society is fully aware of this.[1]