Hawkar Muheddin Jalil
School of History, Politics & International Relations

The rising of Barzan led by Sheikh Ahmed was the last reaction of the Kurds against the integration of south Kurdistan with Iraq before the admission of Iraq as a member
of the League of Nations. The rising is considered by most previous researchers have been only a local rising against the Iraqi Government, as it did not spread to other Kurdish areas, but they do not discuss the main reasons for this. However, they are correct that the reaction of Ahmed was due to the attempt of the Iraqi government to control the area and eliminate his authority. Previous studies have mentioned that the existence of the Assyrians in the Kurdish areas of Mosul had affected the unrest in Barzan, as Ahmed was strongly against their residence, but they do not believe that this was a cause of his rising.782
The intention of the Iraqi government for the establishment of a police post at Barzan in June 1927 could be considered as the first step to controlling the area.
However, this was not easy, because Ahmed as a religious man had a great influence over the area, and his preparation to supply and arm his followers had increased his power.783 Jwaideh has pointed out that Ahmed did not accept the construction of a police building in the area because he attempted to continue his independent authority,similar to the Kurdish semi-feudal chiefs during the rule of Ottoman Empire in the first part of the 19th century.784 This is true, but his hostility towards the Arab government as a Kurdish nationalist was another cause for refusing the presence of the Iraqi 781 Report by the Air Officer Commanding Iraq Command‟, pp.27-29; Humphrys to Passfield, 29 May 1931, TNA, CO/730/163/6.
782 Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, p.222; Ali, Chand Lekolinawaiak Darbaray Bzafi Hawcharkhi Kurd, volume 2, p.235.
783 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, „Report on
the Present Situation in Barzan‟, 14 February 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184, p.3. 784 Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, p.222. 174
government not only in his area, but in south Kurdistan as well.785 He wished to establish an independent Kurdish state, and for this he contacted other Kurdish leaders,such as Simko and Mahmud, to obtain their support to expel the Iraqi troops from south Kurdistan.786 Ahmed believed that Britain was seeking to locate the Assyrians in the Kurdish homelands, by placing an Assyrian police force in the Barzan area.787 Jiawk mentions that Britain had secretly pledged to the Assyrians to create their state in south Kurdistan, similar to the Jewish state in Palestine, by their residence along the Brussels line from Diana to Zakho. He believed that to fulfil this scheme Britain tried to crush Barzan by arming the Assyrians and disarming the Kurds, which was unacceptable to Ahmed.788 For this reason, he attempted to remove them from south Kurdistan, and ordered the people not to deal with them, and he declared that he would punish those who tried selling food to them.789
Anti-Assyrian propaganda was not only published in the Kurdish areas of Mosul, but also spread to Arbil Liwa. This was an attempt by the Arab nationalists to create hostility between the Assyrians and the Kurds, and also conflict between the Kurds and Britain, who defended the rights of the Assyrians. They approached the Kurdish officers and civil officials, some of whom were members of the Pshtiwani Kurdan society,790 and told them that British policy was not in the interests of the Kurds, because they tried to settle the Assyrians, who were British spies. The Arab nationalists encouraged the Kurds to work with them by arguing that as the Kurds had not obtained their rights under the British mandate, they should unite their efforts for Britain to leave by 1932, and after this they would reach an agreement „to divide their country between them‟.791 The main aim of the Arab nationalists by publishing such propaganda (which was ordered from Baghdad) was to obtain an alliance between the 785 Research Department, Foreign Office to Edmonds, 1 March 1946, Edmonds Mss, Box 12, File 6, p.1.
786 „Report on the Present Situation in Barzan‟, p.3.
787 Ma‟ruf Jiawk, Masalat Barzan al-Mazlumat, [Arabic: The Issue of Barzan’s Oppressed] (Arbil: Dar Aras, 2001), p.107.
788 Ibid., pp.43-45.
789 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Hinaidi, 4 April 1929,
TNA, AIR/23/184.
790 There is no evidence of direct connection between Ahmed and the Arab nationalists, but Jiawk and other Kurdish officers who were anti-Assyrians had a relationship with Ahmed. Air Headquarters, Iraqi Command at Hinaidi to the Secretary of Air Ministry, „Summary of Recent Kurdish Activities‟, 12 March 1930, TNA, AIR/23/416, pp.2-3.
791 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Iraqi Command at
Hinaidi and et al., „Kurdish Nationalism‟, 6 February 1930, TNA, AIR/23/416, p.2. 175
Kurds and Arabs, because they believed that this would decrease the Kurdish feeling of separation from Iraq and would prevent their participation in a general rising.792
The growth of anti-Assyrian propaganda caused the Assyrians to fear that in the case of a rising against the Iraqi government, they would be attacked by Ahmed as well. To prevent this, Dobbs advised the Iraqi Prime Minister to take diplomatic steps to calm the situation in Barzan and decrease Ahmed‟s grievances by listening to him instead of taking the military action which the Iraqi government preferred.793 It can be seen that the Iraqi government wanted to decrease the influence of Ahmed and prevent the Kurdish tribes from assisting him. However, Dobbs was concerned about the safety of the Assyrians, especially as Iraqi forces did not exist in the area except a small Levy force, and he also believed that the Iraqi force was not prepared to attack Barzan at that
time. In the light of this consideration, Dobbs instructed Major W.C.F.A. Wilson, the Administrative Inspector at Mosul, to visit Bileh (a few miles from Barzan) and convince Ahmed to cease his activity against the Assyrians and the Iraqi government,and to assure him that there was no intention to make Barzan a place for the Assyrians.794 The result of Wilson‟s visit on 31 March 1928 was an agreement between them that Ahmed would be responsible for keeping law and order in the Barzan areas.Under the Qaimaqam of Zibar, Ahmed would be the agent of the Iraqi government for the administration of Barzan, which included Sherwan and Mzuri Balah (except the Bradost area), and the taxes would be collected by the Qaimaqam of Zibar through Ahmed.795 In their agreement, Wilson promised that the Iraqi government would not establish any Nahias in Shirwan and Muziri Bala, or build any further police posts in those areas.796

The agreement between Britain and Ahmed did not work for long, because it limited his influence. For example, in the Dolamari villages of Rowandoz Qadha,Ahmed had many religious followers, but he was not allowed to interfere with these villages, and without informing the authorities in Arbil the immigration of his followers from these villages to his region was not permitted. Another cause for the failure of the 792 „Summary of Recent Kurdish Activities‟, pp.
Ahmed had many religious followers, but he was not allowed to interfere with these villages, and without informing the authorities in Arbil the immigration of his followers from these villages to his region was not permitted. Another cause for the failure of the
792 „Summary of Recent Kurdish Activities‟, pp.5-6.
793 Intelligence Report Number 3, 1 February 1928, TNA, FO/371/13027, p.4.
794 Intelligence Report Number 5, 29 February 1928, TNA, FO/371/13027, p.2.
795 Intelligence Report Number 8, 11 April 1928, TNA, FO/371/13027, p.3.
796 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, „Barzan Intelligence‟, 4 April 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184, p.5.176
agreement was Ahmed‟s opposition to the enforcement of the census and arms laws.797 Ahmed believed that this was intended by the Iraqi government to decrease his power, and he emphasised that his followers should „carry arms without objection from Government‟.798 He also declared for the withdrawal of all troops at Bileh and the abandonment of the completion of the Sarai building there, which the Iraqi government insisted establishing to recover its prestige in Barzan.799 In addition, Ahmed was accused by the British and Iraqi governments of breaching their agreement that although he had promised to pay tax to the Iraqi government, he continued to collect it from his neighbourhood without paying it to the Iraqi government. However, in his defence Ahmed explained that this was because the crops had not been harvested because of the locusts and drought.800 It can be said that the agreement was not in the interests of Ahmed, as it obliged him to accept the authority of the Iraqi government over the Barzan area, and there was no promise for the removal of the Assyrians from Zibar Qadha.
Ahmed acted as an independent Kurdish leader and his power increased after he was joined by some Kurdish chiefs, especially those who had anti-Assyrian feelings.
For example, although Faris Agha of Zibar and Sheikh Ubaidullah of Surchi did not have a good relationship with Ahmed, they offered their assistance to him because they were also against the presence of the Assyrians in Zibar Qadha.801 Ahmed refused the instruction of the Iraqi government to hand over the northern Kurdish refugees who had escaped to south Kurdistan from Turkey, who numbered about 500 armed men.802 From 1930 onwards, three other Kurdish tribes (Shirwan, Mzuri and a part of Bradost tribe) joined Ahmed‟s forces and his strength was estimated as between 2,500 and 3,500 armed men.803 After this, in February 1930, Ahmed and the other Kurdish chiefs 797 Administrative Inspector of Mosul Liwa to Secretary to High Commissioner of Iraq, 2 April 1928 TNA, AIR/23/184, PP.5-6. 798 „Extract from S.S.O. Arbil‟s Report No.1A/10‟, 18 April 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184. 799 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, „Barzan Intelligence‟, 10 May 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184, p.2. 800 Intelligence Report Number 16, 1 August 1928, TNA, FO/371/13027, p.2.
801 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, „Barzan Intelligence‟, 14 April 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184.
802 „Extracts from Summary of Intelligence dated 25 February 1931‟, 21 March 1931, TNA, CO/730/161/1, p.1.
803 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, „Kurdish
Situation‟, 14 March 1930, TNA, AIR/23/416, p.2; Special Service Officer at Arbil to Air Staff 177
discussed the establishment of an independent Kurdish state after the withdrawal of Britain from Iraq, with Mosul as its capital, or at least to separate Mosul from Iraq.804 For that purpose, in November 1930 Sheikh Ahmed and some other Kurdish leaders aimed to separate the northern Kurdish districts of Mosul vilayet under a Kurdish chief,until the establishment of a Kurdish state.805
The Iraqi government feared the growth of Ahmed‟s power and believed that as the Turks were not comfortable about the existence of the Assyrians near their frontier,they were assisting him by supplying him with arms and encouraging him to rise against the Iraqi government. In September 1930, Nuri Pasha visited Angora and discussed this with the Turkish authorities, but he did not have any evidence to prove it.806 It can be seen that the main aim of the Iraqi government was to put pressure on the Turks not to support Ahmed in the case of their campaign against him. This was because the Turks in the same way as the Iraqi government were e not happy with the encouragement of Kurdish aspirations, and they accused Ahmed that whilst they were trying to supress the northern Kurds, he had made incursions into Turkish territory.807 The Turks emphasised that no opportunity should be given to Ahmed to continue his activity, and they asked the Iraqi government to take punitive action against him. They showed their readiness to arrest Ahmed if he escaped into their territories and to hand him over to the Iraqi authorities. The stance of the Turks encouraged Nuri to take action against Ahmed‟s authority, but he declared that they could not operate against him until the spring because of the weather conditions and the problems of the roads, which were not „accustomed to civilised [sic] government‟.808 Britain also agreed with the Iraqi government to end the threat from Ahmed, and they tried to use the rumours about the variations of his religion from Islam against him to stop the alliance between him and other tribes. Longrigg believed that he Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Iraqi Command, 26 September 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184; Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters at Baghdad, 18 February 1928, Ibid.
804 Special Service Officer at Mosul to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Iraqi Command at
Hinaidi and et al., 26 February 1930, TNA, AIR/23/416, pp.5-6.
805 According to their agreement, Sheikh Abulrahman Atrushi was responsible for Duhok and Amadia,
Ahmed for Aqra and Zakho, Sheikh Kak Amin for Rowandoz, and Sheikh Bahaaldin for Bamarni,
„Precis of Kurdish Situation‟, 14 June to 25 December 1930, TNA, AIR/23/232, pp.5-6.
806 Clerk to Henderson, 15 September 1930, TNA, FO/371/14521, p.1.
807 Helm to Henderson, 14 August 1930, TNA, FO/371/14580.
808 Al-Sa‟id to the Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the Government of Iraq in
Turkey, 20 September 1930, TNA, CO/730/157/7, pp.1-2.
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became Christian, because he allowed the eating of pork, which was opposed to the
faith of Muslims.809 According to British documents, the people believed that Ahmed
was their God and master, and they should only accept his orders. They stated that his
followers were obliged to wear a red turban as a sign of their allegiance to him; if they
did not, they would be punished.810 It can be said that much of this belonged to their
culture instead of to religion, and there was no further evidence to prove that this was a
sign of a new religion. This was because the turban was not only specific in the Barzan
area, but also many Arabs who were Muslims tease this. Wilson pointed out that the
main cause of the belief of people about his being God was because they were illiterate
and savage, and they even „turned their faces towards him in prayer rather than towards
Mecca‟. However, he stated that a man called Mula Juj was killed by Ahmed‟s brother
because he had declared that he was a prophet of Ahmed.811
Although Kurdish researchers have not proved that he did not change his
religion, the killing of Mula Juj could be considered as evidence that Ahmed or his
brother did not agree about publishing such propaganda. Moreover, except Wilson and
MacDowell, nobody else mentioned that Ahmed‟s followers prayed for him, and
MacDowell has not indicated any reference for this which might have come from
Wilson. In addition, it is true that some British documents described Ahmed as God,
but a source of information for Britain was Sheikh Rashid of Bradost, who was an
enemy of Ahmed as they both practised the Naqshbandi path and had conflicts over
attracting followers. Jiawk pointed out that Rashid was jealous about the increase of
Ahmed‟s followers, and he tried to encourage the Iraqi government to supress Ahmed
by informing them that he had changed his religion.812 However, Ismail Agha of
Rowandoz, who was the Qaimaqam of Rowandoz, rejected the rumours about the
conversion of Ahmed, although he was opposed to him, because he preferred Kurds to
unite with the Assyrians.813 However, MacDowell does not agree with them and
emphasised that his conversion was true, but „it is not together clear whether he had
809 Longrigg, Iraq, p.195.
810 „Extract from S.S.O., Arbil‟s Report No.1A/10‟, 31 July 1928, TNA, AIR/23/184; Special Service
Officer at Arbil to Air Staff Intelligence, Air Headquarters, Iraqi Command at Baghdad and et al., 28
July 1928, Ibid.
811 Wilson, „Northern Iraq and Its People‟, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 24, part 2 (1937),
pp.287-299.
812 Jiawk, Masalat Barzan al-Mazlumat, p.108.
813 Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan, p.204.
179
religious delusions or deliberately used novel ideas to reinforce his authority‟.814 This
encouraged Rashid to attack Ahmed in the summer of 1931 and he looted Barzan; in
reaction, Ahmed made a counter attack on the Bradost areas and defeated him.815
The Iraqi government used the fight between Ahmed and Rashid in its own
interests to occupy Barzan. In September 1931, it declared that unrest had spread from
Barzan to the Bradost areas, and order could only be restored by taking punitive action
against Ahmed. On 9 December, a column of two rifle companies and an Iraqi police
force surrounded Barzan, but they did not successfully occupy it and were obliged to
withdraw to Bilah.816 After this, the Iraqi government delayed its military operation
until 15 March 1932 because of the weather conditions in the winter, and also to obtain
the co-operation of the Royal Air Force.817 The second phase of their operation was the
implementation of a new plan to control Barzan by the establishment of administrative
control and police posts in Shirwan, and by the construction of roads with which they
hoped to control the mountain areas. However, as Ahmed was familiar with guerrilla
warfare, this plan failed as he attacked the police posts and cut off the supplies of the
Iraqi army, and by attacking the Shirwan tribe which had submitted to the Iraqi
government, he crushed the Iraqi scheme.818
The British and Iraqi governments also used the hostility between the Barzan
and Zibar tribes, and other tribes who were against Ahmed. They were organised in a
column and they had a great role in assisting the operation to occupy Barzan on 15
April 1932. However, Ahmed escaped from the Iraqi troops and survived the bombing,
and he continued his resistance against the operation after withdrawing to the hill
areas.819 The period from the occupation of Barzan until 25 May could be considered as
a ceasefire between them,820 because of the deal with Ahmed over an injured airman
who was captured after Ahmed‟s followers forced down his aeroplane on 3 April. Holt
814 MacDowell, Modern History of the Kurds, p.178.
815 Precis of a Report rendered by Air Vice-Marshal and et al., on Operations against Sheikh Ahmed of
Barzan in Northern Kurdistan from December 1931 to June 1932, TNA, WO/32/3409, p.2.
816 Dixon to Thomas, 18 April 1932, TNA, FO/371/16045.
817 The Times, 7 Apr 1932.
818 High Commissioner of Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 April 1932, TNA, FO/371/16045;
Rendel to War Office, „Operation Against Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan-1932‟, 5 November 1932, Ibid,
pp.1-5; . The Times, 12 Apr 1932.
819 Precis of a Report rendered by Air Vice-Marshal and et al., p.3; „Operation Against Sheikh Ahmed of
Baran-1932‟, p.2.
820 The Times, 25 May 1932.
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visited Ahmed in May to make peace with him, as he had shown his readiness to
negotiate and release the British airman.821 However, Ahmed was not permitted to
make any conditions, and only to abandon his activity by surrendering, which was
unacceptable to him.822 After that, Britain provided extra air operations to terminate his
rising, and asked the Turkish government to prevent the Kurds from using their
territory.823 This crushed Ahmed, as he lost most of the Barzan area and he was obliged
to surrender to the Turks instead of the Iraqi government. On 22 June, he and two
brothers with 100 of his followers crossed to Turkey, and after their disarming, they
were transferred to Adana to prevent any trouble in the frontier zone.824
The results of the attacks on Barzan‟s territory were the burning of some
villages by the Iraqi army and destruction of some Barzani houses because of the
bombing. Britain declared that the impoverishment of the people was because of the
improvident rule of Ahmed, as he tried to convert the religion of the villages, but due to
their opposition to him, they did not have enough time for cultivation. They also stated
that another cause of this was the seizure of grain and other foods by him during the
Iraqi campaign against him.825 However, Ismail Agha refused this and stated that the
people of the Barzan area were starving because their crops had been burnt by the
bombing of the villages.826 According to the War Office, the casualties of the operation
in Barzan were two British airmen killed and one missing, and two officers and airmen
wounded; 52 Iraqi officers and soldiers were killed, and 93 officers and other ranks
wounded, and 13 Iraqi police and constables were killed and 12 wounded, but the
Barzanian casualties were 65 killed and 125 wounded.827
It can be said that Ahmed of Barzan‟s rising, like most of the other Kurdish
risings, did not have support from other Kurdish leaders. The abandonment of anti
Assyrian feeling by Ahmed (which his enemies suggested was because of his
821 The Times mentioned that two airmen were captured who were released by Ahmed on 5 May, but the
British documents and Kurdish sources indicated one airman. The Times, 6 May 1932; The Times, 5
April 1932.
822 The Times, 10 May 1932.
823 Precis of a Report rendered by Air Vice-Marshal and et al., p.4.
824 „Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, on
Friday, June 24th, 1932‟, TNA, CAB/23/71/19; Jiawk, Masalat Barzan al-Mazlumat, p.114.
825 Maxse to the Duchess of Atholl, 14 November 1932, TNA, FO/371/16038.
826 Hamilton, Road through Kurdistan, p.281.
827 Precis of a Report rendered by Air Vice-Marshal and et al., p.6.
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conversion) caused the breakdown of the alliance between him and the others who were
against the Assyrians. In addition, although Ahmed and Mahmud had contacted each
other to unite their forces and start a general rising in the spring of 1930, this did not
happen. By dealing with them separately, Britain had a great role in preventing a
general rising, as the operation against Ahmed was only started after the surrender of
Mahmud to the government in May 1931. Another cause of their separation was the
lack of trust between them, because when Mahmud asked Ahmed to join an uprising
against the Iraqi government, the latter did not believe him that Britain would secretly
help the Kurdish movement by giving them ammunition and money. Ahmed asked the
High Commissioner of Iraq about this, and he was told that it was not true and that
Britain had decided to stop Mahmud‟s activities against the Iraqi Government.828 The
anti-Assyrian feeling of Ahmed was another cause for their disunion. The Kurds in
Sulaimania and Mahmud did not see the Assyrians as their enemy because the
Assyrians were not resident in Sulaimania.829 Moreover, the Kurds in Sulaimania were
closely in contact with the Assyrian officers in the Levies force, and discussed creating
an independent Kurdish state and with an autonomous entity for the Assyrians within
it.830 When Mahmud fought against the Iraqi government, he tried to obtain support not
only from Kurdish officers in the Iraqi army but also from Assyrian officers, and he
was successful as three of them joined him in October 1930.831=KTML_Div_End=

source:Hawkar Muheddin Jalil
School of History, Politics & International Relations
University of LeicesterThe British Administration of South Kurdistan and Local Responses,