Title: BETWEEN KURDISTAN AND DAMASCUS: KURDISH NATIONALISM AND ARAB STATE FORMATION IN SYRIA.
Author: ALEXANDER MCKEEVER
Place of publication: NEW YORK
Publisher: THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Release date: 2021

Since the fall of the Ottoman empire, Kurdish nationalism has developed as an ideology within a regional state system where Kurds lack national representation or recognition. This ideology has manifested itself into a fractured movement where the contemporary state borders that separate the Kurdish population at large have proven to be both a limiting and a creative factor. This thesis examines the history of Kurdish nationalism in Syria with a focus on both the local context as defined by Syria’s borders in addition to the broader region, for the politics of Kurds in Syria have clearly been shaped by interactions with the Syrian state as well as the regional Kurdish nationalist movement and interstate dynamics. In order to carry this out, this paper employs a methodological framework largely informed by the work of Hamit Bozarslan.

This theoretical underpinning conceptualizes Kurdish nationalist actors as existing within a broader ‘minority sphere’ where they interact with each other, various ‘state spheres,’ and the Kurdish population at large. While manifestations of Kurdish nationalism are informed by interactions with processes of state formation in their local contexts, nationalist actors are also shaped by ‘crossborder’ communication with the broader Kurdish minority sphere. The degree to which this crossborder dynamic is available to Kurdish nationalist actors largely depends on regional interstate relations; in periods of status quo borders are strong and penetration is difficult, whereas in periods of interstate conflict borders become porous and states will engage with adjacent Kurdish actors in an effort to undermine rivals.

Using this framework, this paper examines the secondary literature and primary sources relating to the history of the Kurdish movement within Syria, with a focus on three main events and their aftereffects: the 1962 al-Hasakah census, the entrance of the PKK into Syria from Turkey, and the 2004 al-Qamishli uprising. These endeavors further highlight the importance of interstate conflict in strengthening crossborder Kurdish nationalism, but additionally point to how the temporary opening of room for Kurdish nationalist actors to operate creates new dynamics within the local Kurdish minority sphere which the state struggles to address after a status quo reemerges.
[1]

The Damascus leadership on Sunday censured the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces’ (#SDF# ) “calls for federalism,” saying they contradict the landmark agreement inked by Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi in March.

The Abdi-Sharaa agreement “marked a positive step towards de-escalation” and “a comprehensive national solution,” read a statement from the Syrian Presidency, adding, “However the latest maneuvers and statements by the SDF leadership, which call for federalism and entrench a separate reality on the ground, openly contradict the substance of the agreement and threaten the unity of the country and the integrity of its territory.”

The presidency stressed that the agreement was “implemented away from any exclusionary projects,” and rejected “any attempts to impose a divisive reality or establish entities under the title of federalism and self-administration, without broad national consensus.”

The Abdi-Sharaa agreement, signed on March 10, urged integrating “all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria [Rojava] under the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the [Qamishli International] Airport, and oil and gas fields.”

The deal also affirmed that “the Kurdish community is indigenous to the Syrian state, which ensures its right to citizenship and all of its constitutional rights.”

The Syrian Presidency on Sunday expressed “deep concerns” over what it said were “practices” which signaled dangerous inclinations to [prompt] demographic change in some regions, threatening Syria’s social fabric and undermining prospects for a comprehensive national solution.” It warned against “disrupting the works of Syrian institutions in regions controlled by SDF.”

The Syrian leadership finally stressed that the SDF “cannot control the decision in northeast Syria [Rojava]” where “Arabs, Kurds, Christians and others coexist,” and urged the Kurdish-led force to “truly uphold” the Sharaa-Abdi agreement and “prioritize the higher national interest.”

Following a swift offensive in early December, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), then headed by Sharaa, spearheaded a coalition of opposition groups that toppled the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

Sharaa was in late January named interim president when he vowed to form an “inclusive transitional government that would reflect Syria's diversity.” He has, however, faced domestic and international criticism that he has marginalized minority communities, including the Kurds.

The Syrian presidency’s Sunday statement notably came a day after the first pan-Kurdish unity conference was held in Rojava on Saturday, gathering over 400 Kurds from Syria, the Kurdistan Region and Turkey.

In the conference’s closing declaration, Kurdish political groups in Syria agreed on a joint vision for a decentralized, democratic state that guarantees Kurdish rights and calls for a national dialogue to reshape the country's future.

“Based on historical responsibility and in response to the requirements of the current stage, a joint Kurdish political vision has been formulated that expresses a collective will and its project for a just solution to the Kurdish issue in Syria as a decentralized democratic state,” read the statement.

The vision safeguards Kurdish ethnic rights, upholds international human rights principles and treaties, and promotes women's rights and participation across political, social, and military spheres.

“It contributes to building a new Syria that accommodates all its people without exclusion or marginalization of any of its components, away from unilateral domination in thought and practice,” the statement read.

The conference’s final statement recommended its vision be adopted as a foundation for national dialogue among Kurdish political groups, the new administration in Damascus, and all Syrian forces. It said the goal is to create an inclusive Syria that respects the rights of all communities and strengthens the country’s role as a stabilizing force in the region.

At the conference, it was also agreed to form a joint Kurdish delegation to promote and implement this vision through dialogue with relevant parties.
For his part, SDF chief Abdi told conferees on Saturday that the goal of the conference is to strengthen Syria, not divide it.

“My message for all components of Syria and the Damascus government is that this conference is not, as some claim, to divide. Conversely, it is for the unity of Syria. We reiterate that we support the territorial integrity of Syria, and we state that the unity of Kurds is the unity of Syria, and the strengthening of Kurds means the strengthening of Syria,” he said.[1]

Syrian de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) on Sunday told Saudi media that the country’s defense ministry will also include Kurdish forces.
“The Syrian Ministry of Defense will include Kurdish forces in its ranks,” Al-Hadath cited him as saying, in an interview set to be aired later on Sunday.
It is not clear if Sharaa elaborated on the issue.
Sharaa also called Kurds an “integral part” of Syrian society but stressed that his administration will not allow the country to become a “launchpad” for Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) attacks.
“We are negotiating with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces ] to resolve the crisis in northeast Syria,” he said.
The Kurdish-led SDF, who control most of the northeast (Rojava), have expressed their readiness to be merged into Syria’s new security apparatus.
SDF chief Mazloum Abdi told Asharq Al-Awsat in a recent interview that they are willing to merge the SDF into the new Syrian army if both sides agree on a “suitable formula through negotiations.”
A coalition of rebel groups spearheaded by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8. They have announced the dissolution of their affiliated armed groups and formed a transitional government that is expected to expire in March.
The HTS has not clashed with the US-backed SDF, but the new officials in Damascus and Sharaa have declared that weapons should only be in the hands of the state and they will not tolerate the existence of any independent armed group.
Stefan Schneck, Germany’s envoy to Syria, told Rudaw on Thursday that Berlin is ready to help Syria’s new rulers establish a unified security force that includes the SDF.[1]

A delegation from northeast Syria (Rojava) met on Sunday with the committee appointed by Syria’s new leadership to finalize the landmark March agreement between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus. The accord aims to integrate Rojava’s civil and military institutions under the authority of the Syrian state.
In a statement on X, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) announced that the first session with the Damascus-appointed delegation - “tasked with finalizing the [March] agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces” - was held in “a positive and constructive atmosphere.”
The session is part of ongoing efforts to strengthen mutual understanding, including on “the formation of specialized subcommittees to follow up on the implementation of the March 10 agreement,” signed by Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi.
The agreement outlines the integration of “all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria [Rojava] under the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the [Qamishli International] Airport, and oil and gas fields.”
It further emphasized that “the Kurdish community is indigenous to the Syrian state,” affirming their full citizenship and constitutional rights. The agreement also called for a nationwide ceasefire and the return of displaced Syrians to their homes, under the protection of the Syrian state.
The DAANES statement noted that Sunday’s meeting explored “mechanisms to facilitate the return of displaced persons [including from Rojava] to their areas” and “addressing the obstacles hindering this return.”
The two sides further discussed ways to “resolve outstanding issues related to [student] exams and exam centers, in a way that ensures students’ rights and the integrity of the educational process.”
Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Kurdish authorities in Rojava have implemented their own curriculum - rejecting the Baathist-era education system and introducing Kurdish as a language of instruction for the first time.
The Rojava delegation also discussed “reactivating” the dossier of northern Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods to complete this file “in a manner that serves stability and civil peace.”
In early April, hundreds of fighters from the SDF, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), withdrew from these Kurdish-majority neighborhoods under a deal with Damascus. As per the agreement, SDF-affiliated internal security forces (Asayish) would be tasked with controlling security, while military units withdraw.
In a similar vein, member of the Damascus committee told the state-run Syrian news agency (SANA) on Sunday that the meeting with the Rojava delegation was “characterized by a spirit of responsibility and mutual concern for the national interest.”
Brigadier General Ziad al-Ayesh underlined the “consensus on several important dossiers, most notably the formation of specialized subcommittees” to follow up on the implementation of the Abdi-Sharaa agreement.
He echoed the points raised in the DAANES statement, highlighting consensus on the formation of subcommittees and on addressing challenges related to education and the return of displaced persons.
Both parties reaffirmed their “commitment to constructive dialogue and ongoing cooperation to support Syria’s unity and sovereignty and meet the aspirations of the Syrian people,” Ayesh said, adding that “another meeting will be held in the near future to continue discussions and follow up on implementation.”
The Sunday session comes as Kurds in Rojava, like other minorities in Syria, are concerned over the centralization of power and the reliance on Islamic jurisprudence in the transitional constitution adopted by Syria’s interim government.
Syria’s interim President Sharaa had pledged to form an “inclusive transitional government that reflects Syria’s diversity,” but has faced domestic and international criticism for allegedly marginalizing minority communities.
It also comes as Kurdish ruling and opposition parties in Rojava are also in talks to form a joint committee to officially present a list of Kurdish demands to Damascus, which include decentralization. This followed a historic intra-Kurdish conference in Qamishli last month.
Damascus condemned the conference, viewing it as a separatist move. However, SDF chief Abdi emphasized during the event that the aim of the conference was to strengthen Syria, not divide it.[1]

Dilkhwaz Mohammed
DAMASCUS - The anticipated meeting between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led #Syrian Democratic Forces# (SDF) will be held in Paris soon to finalize integration talks, a senior Syrian foreign ministry official confirmed to Rudaw. Describing ties with Washington as a “partnership,” the official highlighted regional stability as the main shared goal and Syria’s role as a bulwark against “the return of Iranian militias.”

In an exclusive interview with Rudaw, Qutaiba Idlbi, director of American affairs at Syria's foreign ministry, stated on Wednesday that the new Syrian leadership supports administrative decentralization but rejects the idea of “an army within an army and a state within a state.”

Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the SDF chief Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement on March 10 to integrate all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria (Rojava) - including the SDF - under the authority of the Syrian state.

Idlbi confirmed that a high-level meeting between the SDF and the Syrian government “will be held soon in Paris” to “complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement.”

The meeting - reportedly to include Abdi, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, and representatives from the United States and France - was previously delayed due to purely technical reasons, he said.

Referencing the Iran-aligned Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as negative models, Idlbi stressed the need for full integration of the SDF into the national army.

Syria is “better off utilizing the SDF's expertise by deploying its fighters and commanders across all army institutions, rather than keeping them as a separate division,” he added.

On the future of the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) administering Rojava, Idlbi stated the interim Syrian government aims for a “smooth” integration, keeping local institutions and personnel intact under the national umbrella.

What will change is “the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis,” but the institutions “with their people and methods of management, will remain,” he clarified.

On July 13, violent clashes broke out in the Druze-majority Suwayda province between Druze fighters and Bedouin tribes, initially sparked by mutual kidnappings and escalating with the involvement of state-affiliated forces. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), at least 1,300 people were killed.

Earlier, in March, violence also erupted in Syria’s Alawite-majority coastal regions after ousted president Bashar al-Assad's loyalists attacked Damascus-aligned security forces. SOHR reported around 1,700 deaths - mostly Alawite civilians - with many casualties linked to government or pro-government forces.

Idlbi blamed these incidents on Assad affiliates, acknowledging the “natural state of fear” among Kurdish communities as a result of the violence, but urged addressing them through a political resolution while cautioning against external involvement.

He also accused Israel of stoking the conflict in Suwayda and seeking to “create this internal clash between Syrians.”

On Syria’s broader relationship with Israel, Idlbi noted that despite a history of hostility - including over 700 attacks on Syrian military sites since the fall of Assad - the interim government is open to resolving issues through a political framework. He dismissed reports suggesting that Washington has issued specific demands for Damascus to normalize relations with Tel Aviv.

Idlbi characterized the relationship with the US as a “partnership” grounded in common interests, with regional stability as the primary shared objective. He emphasized Syria’s new role as the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region.

Below is the full transcript of the interview with Qutaiba Idlbi.

Rudaw: Mr Idlbi, thank you for joining us. Let me start by asking how we can evaluate the current relations between the Syrian government and the American administration? Can we describe them as being at its all time best?

Qutaiba Idlbi: Of course, thank you very much for having me today. The Syrian-American relationship today is still at its best. Since the liberation of Syria and the fall of the [Bashar] al-Assad regime, there has been a major change in Syrian foreign policy. The focus of this change has been to transition from the political blackmail that the Assad regime practiced for more than fifty years in its relations with world countries to building a relationship based primarily on partnerships. We do not look at our relations with countries today and think about what these relations will be like in a month or two. Instead, we try to build these relationships on solid foundations for decades to come. We look, think, and plan for what this relationship will be like in ten, twenty, or thirty years because this is what will truly establish strong partnerships that will positively reflect on Syria and the United States, on the Syrian people and the American people. Perhaps many American officials have asked me about this, and I tell them, we are trying to build a steel bridge between Damascus and Washington that connects the two countries and the two peoples. We are practically at the beginning of this building process, and it is in a state of continuous development. What will unfold will certainly be better than what it is today.

Can we describe them as good relations? The United States also has demands from the Syrian government, including asking Damascus to join the Abraham Accords. Is the Syrian government ready for that?

There are no demands from the American government to the Syrian government within the framework of this relationship. The partnership between Syria and the United States actually involves common matters that the two countries need to work on. Putting anything within the framework of demands is, in fact, perhaps closer to a media term. There are no demands. There are common interests that Syria and the United States are working on, foremost among them being regional stability. Today, after the withdrawal of Iranian militias, Syria is the main barrier that prevents the return of Iranian militias and [the Iran-aligned Lebanese] Hezbollah [Movement] to the region, and prevents the instability and sabotage that usually come with them. This is a fundamental matter and, of course, a priority for the United States in the region, and it is a priority for us as well. As the [Syrian] Foreign Minister [Asaad al-Shaibani] and the interim President [Ahmed al-Sharaa] have mentioned in several meetings, we want to be a bridge of connection in the region, and we do not want Syria to be a source of threat to anyone in the region. Of course, how we manage our relationship in the region depends on both parties, not just on Syria, whether it is in partnership relations or de-escalation relations. We are open to the entire world, and we are also open to the countries and powers of the region, because we believe that building any partnership requires two parties.

There were talks about meetings between Syrian government officials and Israeli officials under American sponsorship. Did these meetings take place?

Israel, of course, has been a key player in Syria since the liberation. From day one, as we saw, Israel has carried out more than 700 attacks on Syrian military sites, and we also saw many messages that could be described as hostile to the Syrian people in general and to the Syrian government in particular. Of course, the last thing Israel did was its aggressions and bombing of the defense ministry building in Damascus and the shelling of security forces at the interior ministry in Suwayda province two weeks ago. So, within this framework, there is a major problem with Israel today regarding its hostile actions and policies towards Syria. We fundamentally believe that there are always two paths to resolving any problem: either the path of war or the political path. We believe that the Syrian people have gone through at least 14 years of war, and I think we have had enough of the years of war and we should spare the Syrian people from more war and confrontations, and therefore we are certainly open to resolving all these problems through the political framework. Within this path, of course, there have been meetings in an attempt to de-escalate and stop the Israeli aggressions on the one hand so that there is stability in the region - because the loser from the instability in Syria is not only Syrians but the entire region - and on the other hand, so that they [Israelis] let Syrians solve their problems by themselves and do not interfere in Syria's internal problems.

Regarding the US Congress, last week, it did not vote to lift all sanctions - and here I specifically mean the Caesar Act - imposed on Syria. They laid out conditions and stages for lifting these sanctions. Did you see that coming?

What happened at the beginning of last week was not a full on vote. What happened was that a bill was submitted to the financial committee in the House of Representatives, the United States Congress, and this bill was passed. It is still a bill that has been passed by the committee, and it must be submitted to the armed forces committee in the House of Representatives, and then it is submitted to the full House, and then it must go to the Senate. So, there is no complete move by the Congress. There was a clear movement by the financial committee in the House of Representatives, and behind this movement, it is also clear that Israeli and pro-Israeli pressure groups were fully active in pushing this project over the past weeks. So, what we are seeing, in fact, through this resolution is a fundamental expression of the nature of the Israeli efforts in this matter in Washington and their push within this resolution. I believe that the American people have not yet spoken their word on this law, as I mentioned, because it is still in its early stages.

Did we expect it you ask? In fact, we did not expect the extent of the Israeli planning and efforts in this regard, especially as it was evident in what Israel did primarily in southern Syria and also in Washington through its instruments. But as I mentioned, this does not necessarily express the direction of the American people, and I think we should also wait for the final word on this matter, which is from President [Donald] Trump, who made it clear what the American policy towards Syria is during the investment conference in Riyadh. So, I think as long as President Trump has not come out and changed this policy, but on the contrary, we see a full confirmation from the American administration of the policy that President Trump set at the Riyadh conference, I think the path is clear, and I think the word of the American people is clear in this regard.

Is there a link between the US not lifting the sanctions and the events that took place in Suwayda?

The process of lifting the sanctions, in fact, we saw from President Trump a full lifting of all executive orders and all sanctions that were [previously] passed by executive and presidential decisions, and that happened last month. In fact, lifting the rest of the sanctions requires a legal and political process, and it naturally takes a lot of time. For example, lifting the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, which was done in 1979, requires at least six months from the time the president issues an indication to Congress that there is a change in policy towards Syria. So this naturally takes its time. The Caesar Act will also naturally take its time for deliberations and consultations within the Republican Party and also with the Democratic Party, so it will also naturally take some time. And these two laws are, in fact, the only obstacle today to the full lifting of sanctions. So, I think there is a natural path to lifting the sanctions. What happened in Suwayda, the unfortunate events, and what happened in connection to them - form the media misleading to the exploitation of these events for political purposes, especially by the Israeli side - I think it may have had an effect on slowing down the process of lifting the sanctions, but I do not think it will affect the path completely.

If we move to the internal Syrian affairs, specifically what happened in Suwayda and what happened before that in the coastal regions, was the Syrian government unable to deal with these two files? And is there a danger, or as they say, fears of those events being repeated in the Kurdish regions?

Regarding dealing with the files, let's start with what happened in the coastal regions, or let's start with the file of liberation in general. Of course, after the liberation, the state of stability that we saw was the result of the government's efforts primarily, but it was also the result of what can be called a collective commitment from all Syrians that this is the path that preserves all of Syria. This collective commitment is naturally critical because it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state, especially since the state is nascent, it does not depend on the ability of the government or the state to preserve it. Collective commitment means, in fact, that every person and every group must be committed to implementing this path so that the path remains on its correct course. The problem that happened on the coast, in fact, was that this path was breached. At least from the point of view of a large part of the Syrian people and a large part of society, when a group affiliated with the Assad regime set up ambushes and attacked security men and killed a large number of them, and this matter was framed as an attempted coup and a change of power, at least as these groups promoted it. This, in fact, was a signal to the entire society that there was a breach of this societal commitment and that there was an attempt to turn back the clock. It resulted in a large reaction that I do not think any government could have controlled. I think the Syrian government made great efforts, as we saw in the first days of these events, and it pushed a lot of forces and individuals who came to the coast to fight these remnants and they committed violations. It actually pushed many of these forces out of these areas, and there were even losses from the ministries of defense and interior and from these fighters as a result of pushing them out of those areas. And if we also look at the frameworks of any country after civil wars, about 90 percent of countries that emerge from civil wars return to a state of civil war immediately within months due to permanent breaches of this societal commitment. I think so far, if we compare the situation in Syria today with the situation in these cases, we are in a much better situation than the majority of cases of emerging from civil war, and this, as I mentioned, is not only due to the efforts of the government, but it is due to the cohesion and solidarity of the Syrian people today.

With regards to what happened in Suwayda, what happened was similar in nature to what happened on the coast. There is a group that emerged linked to the Assad regime, which has been in Suwayda since the liberation of Syria, and did not abide by any agreements. It is still continuing, whether through Captagon networks and drug trafficking or the theft networks that the regime established even in 2023 when Suwayda came out in demonstrations against the Assad regime. The networks that are currently in Suwayda are the same ones that Louay al-Ali and Ali Mamlouk and other intelligence chiefs established to tamper with Suwayda. These networks are still present today in Suwayda. The problem is that since the liberation and until now, these networks - similar to what happened in the coastal region - are trying, after the cloak of the Assad regime has fallen from them, to entrench themselves in a sectarian cloak, and they committed breaches, as we saw, as a result of clashes with the Bedouins that led to the bloody events we witnessed.

The question today, in fact, is: can the state with its current resources, with its current size, with its current age, really be a stopping barrier and stop any bloody events of this matter? In fact, this is what the Syrian government did; it tried to stop things before they deteriorated, and the messages were clear even to community leaders in Suwayda from day one that let's work together so that these events do not escalate and get out of control, and so that, God forbid, what happened in the events on the coast is not repeated, and so that the wrong signals are not sent to society. These messages were clear from day one, and there was great cooperation from community leaders in Suwayda with [the Druze spiritual leaders] Sheikh [Hammoud] al-Hinnawi and Sheikh [Youssef] al-Jarbou and many leaders of the [armed] factions in Suwayda, not only [Laith] al-Balous but even Sulaiman Abdel Baqi and others.

What happened, in fact, was that a party, especially affiliated with [Druze spiritual leader] Sheikh [Hikmat] al-Hajari, was not satisfied with the state of support that occurred in the province around the state's option to end this military situation, so it called on the Israeli side. Of course, in the first hours of the Israeli intervention, there were no Syrian army forces or defense ministry forces inside the city of Suwayda. In fact, the government withdrew the defense ministry forces and deployed security immediately to avoid any unnecessary confrontations or any violations; because in the event of the army entering civilian sites in any case, there is always a possibility of any indirect clash or any violation. So, the state or the government took the initiative, fundamentally, from day one to withdraw the army forces and deploy the internal security forces.

In fact, was that the forces and factions affiliated with Hajari, whether he agreed to that or not, called on the Israeli side, and we saw the Israeli side's attacks not only on the internal security forces in the city of Suwayda, but on the deployment of the internal security forces, in fact, around the province, which left Suwayda open and vulnerable to attacks from everyone, not only from the [spontaneous mobilization] ‘faza'at’ whether from Bedouin forces or tribes, but we even saw a real activity of [Islamic State] ISIS groups that flocked in from the [Syrian desert] Badiya. If you look at the map of Suwayda province, 70 percent of its borders are with the Badiya, and they are administrative borders, in fact, that are impossible to control without a large military and security presence. This military and security presence that was protecting the province was hit by the Israeli enemy, and thus it deprived the government of the ability to protect the province effectively, and I think this is what the Israeli side was seeking from day one; it did not seek to protect the Druze, it was actually seeking to create this state of internal clash between Syrians, and what happened, happened.

Of course, we move today to the situation of the Kurdish community, as you mentioned, is there a state of fear? I think there is a natural state of fear for sure. For a regular person who does not know or does not follow the details of these matters day by day will surely say: Look at what happened to the Alawites, look at what happened to the Druze, it is natural for me to be afraid. What I am saying in this situation is that this fear is natural, but the government was and still is, as I mentioned at the beginning, extending its hand to everyone, saying: let's solve our problems through political solutions, and do not involve external parties in any conflict. And this is the path that we are reiterating today to everyone: Let's sit at the negotiating table and work to reach a political solution. I understand the fears as you mentioned, but even I, as a Kurd, say: there is a unique Kurdish experience today in Syria. Kurds are not new to Syria, Kurds have been in Syria for hundreds of years, if not more than a thousand years, and they have an excellent experience. We in Syria today, ever since the establishment of the Syrian Republic, have had three heads of state, presidents and prime ministers, who were Kurds. The presence of Kurds in Syria is not new, and their experience within the [Syrian] society is not new, so let's learn from this experience and let's sit down and really prioritize the interests of the Kurdish people and the interests of the Kurdish communities instead of personal interests.

Delving deeper into the [Kurdish] dossier, there was a March 10 agreement between the Syrian presidency [represented by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa] and [Mazloum Abdi] the commander of the SDF. The agreement comprised eight items, and it was expected that there would be a meeting in Paris between the Syrian government and a delegation from the SDF with French and American presence. Why was this meeting postponed?

The Paris meeting was postponed for a purely technical reason; initially it was arranged at the last minute. In fact, the invitations for the meeting were sent only a few days before its date and it was prepared for somewhat unilaterally by the mediators in the midst of the events in Suwayda. So, the postponement, in fact, happened primarily because it overlapped with the events in Suwayda, and the focus of the Syrian government and the Syrian leadership was primarily on a ceasefire and de-escalating the crisis for fear that fighting would resume again, and on the other hand, there was not enough time, in fact, to prepare for the meeting. As was announced, the meeting will be held soon in Paris between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government to complete the negotiations on the implementation of the [Abdi-Sharaa] agreement.

Has a specific date been set for this meeting?

A specific date has been set preliminarily and will be announced soon.

Can we announce it now?

You will hear about it soon.

Regarding the Kurdish issue, the Kurds agreed among themselves and held a conference in Qamishli, and they had demands and called for decentralization. Does the Syrian government reject all forms of decentralization?

Certainly not. First of all, there are two things: first, in the meeting that took place in Qamishli, I think there was a gathering of many Kurdish parties and groups. Of course, there is always a question that is asked: do these Kurdish parties and groups represent the entire Kurdish community? I think this is a matter that the Kurds themselves must answer. As a Syrian Kurd, I do not, in fact, see in many of the existing Kurdish groups and parties any representation for me, and there are many like me, especially when you look at the communities of Kurds whom some Kurdish hardliners call ‘Arabized Kurds.’ If you look at the communities of Kurds in Hama, Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus, which represent the majority of Kurds in Syria, you do not find any representation for them in these parties, and you do not find any communication with them.

Regardless of this matter, after this meeting took place [in Qamishli], of course, there was a lot of talk about decentralization. The Syrian state's or the Syrian government's dealing today with governance, especially local governance, is based a lot on the principle of decentralization, especially administrative decentralization. So, I do not believe that there is, in fact, a discussion or points of disagreement about the issue of administrative decentralization. The problem of centralization in Syria was not a legal problem, but a political problem. The Assad regime did not want to apply any form of decentralization that is in fact mentioned in the Syrian law, and it wanted, of course, as a totalitarian dictatorial regime, to hold all the strings in its hand.

We say today: we are not the Assad regime, and we are not the Baath Arab Socialist Party, and we are not Arab nationalists, because when we start from the standpoint of the Syrian government, we do not start from an Arab nationalist standpoint, but we start from a Syrian national standpoint that brings all Syrians together. So the problems that the Assad regime created because of its political nature and because of its political perspective must also be solved through politics. We do not need to solve them by creating new legal frameworks that we do not need in the first place. For example, within Syrian law, Law 107 for local administration gives extensive authority for administrative decentralization.

In fact, today, as a Kurdish person, how do I see my representation within the Syrian state? And how do I see the representation of my culture within the Syrian state? If I can go or send my children to school and they can learn the Kurdish language alongside the Arabic language, I see that as a representation of me and my culture. If I can open a Kurdish cultural center, I also see that as a representation of me. If I am, for example, in a Kurdish village, and I see the use of the Kurdish language within this village, this also has representation for me. If I can go to an official institution to get my official papers and my Arabic is weak, but there is a person who speaks Kurdish and can help me issue these papers, like what most developed countries do, this is also a representation for me.

So, these are, in fact, the demands that matter to the normal Kurdish person in their place, not those who try, as you mentioned, to get personal, factional, or political gains at the expense of the cause of the ordinary Kurd. Within this context, the Syrian government says: this is originally our starting point in dealing with the Kurdish issue, and not only with the Kurdish issue, but with the issue of all Syrians; that they must see their representation and culture within their local communities, this is a very natural matter and should not even be a starting point for negotiation.

If we talk about the Syrian Democratic Forces, in many interviews, the leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces told us that they would be part of the defense system in Syria or the interior ministry, and they also talked about integrating approximately 100,000 fighters into the defense ministry, but they also have conditions, which is to join with their current formation into the defense ministry. What is the American opinion on this?

I think what matters first is the opinion of Syrians on this matter before the American opinion. But I tell you that the Syrian government and the American government agree on a fundamental matter, which is that there cannot be an army within an army and a state within a state. We have seen this experience before; we saw it in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and we saw it in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias, and we saw it in other places. An army within an army cannot create a sound, healthy, and stable state, and this will always reflect in more strife and instability for the entire state. What we are putting forward clearly is that there is room for everyone in the state in all its joints. And as is the existing experience today in the Syrian army, which started from an alliance of different factions that liberated Syria and then a number of factions joined it, this alliance of these factions that created this army and included other factions did not itself create a bloc within the army, even though it was the one which established this existing era today. So, just as we worked on this basis from the beginning, we also say that groups cannot be established within the army. So the challenge today is how can we benefit from the expertise that exists with the Syrian Democratic Forces, but at the same time create a sound situation on which armies are built. And I think this sound situation is built, in fact, through the full integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army. What does that mean? I'm sorry, let me finish my thought. What does that mean? Today, General Mazloum Abdi says that the Syrian Democratic Forces have a lot of expertise that they accumulated during the last era, and I agree with him on that. What we are saying today is: let's benefit from this expertise in all institutions of the Syrian army. Why do we want to limit this expertise to one division? For the state to benefit from this expertise, it must be fully deployed within the divisions according to specialties. So, on the one hand, the Syrian state can then fully benefit from the expertise that the Syrian Democratic Forces have built and from the expertise of the Kurdish fighters, and on the other hand, I avoid, God forbid, after a period of time, having an army within an army and a state within a state like other countries that used this model and we saw how they failed or entered a state of instability from which they will not be able to get out.

There is an experience on the ground in the Kurdistan Region, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are part of the Iraqi defense system, but they are not integrated into the Iraqi defense ministry, they are affiliated with a separate ministry in the Kurdistan Region. Can't we apply that model in Syria?

We are generally open to learning from the experiences of others, whether they succeeded or failed, and this is a very important matter. But in the end, the Syrian experience and the Syrian component have very different natures and characteristics from the natures of other experiences, whether in the nature of the Syrian components, or in their culture, or in their relationship with each other historically and during the recent period. Therefore, we start primarily from understanding the experiences of others and where they succeeded and where they failed, but we need to build on our experience as it is. As I mentioned, we as Syrians, especially during the past eight months, have had a somewhat successful experience, it has its flaws and needs some reform, but we have a successful experience in this regard. How, in fact, do we integrate the state of factionalism into a military institution? As I mentioned, it is not complete and not at its peak, it needs a lot of development and work, but we have an experience in the state of transitioning from the state of factionalism to the state of thinking on the country level, the national state, and thinking about the homeland. And with this, we want to protect Syria from returning to a state of division, fragmentation, and factionalism, but also, as I mentioned, to benefit from all the expertise that all Syrians have built, whether they were in civil society organizations and the state of expatriation or in the state of factionalism and military groups in northern and eastern Syria.

There is a self-administration in north and east Syria, [the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES)] . It has its security and service institutions. Does the Syrian government want to end the self-administration and maintain administrative decentralization with its conditions and with few authorities?

Administrative decentralization means, as I mentioned, that the parties manage themselves regarding their daily interests and people's lives, this is administrative decentralization. As for the continuation of the self-administration, we say that government or institutional work is linked to people first, and is not linked to models. A state cannot have several models for institutions; there must be one model for institutions, while the people who transfer their experience can be in these institutions. So, in fact, the state of integrating the self-administration means that we use the people who are in water management; they can remain to manage water in that area. The people who are in civil registry management and others can remain in the same framework under the umbrella of the Syrian state.

So, in fact, the state of transition is, in fact, a very smooth state, no one is talking about firing employees, this did not even happen in Damascus for it to happen in the areas of northern and eastern Syria. What will change, in fact, is only the framework that is used by the institutions on a daily basis, but the institutions with their people, their areas, and their way of management will remain the same. In the end, providing services to people, in general, and especially when we talk about administrative decentralization, remains the same, in fact, whether you wear a green or blue uniform, the service is the same one you provide to people.

So, what are the disagreements between the Kurds and the Syrian government?

As a Kurd, I do not believe there is a disagreement between the Kurds and the Syrian government. I think perhaps there is not a complete meeting of views yet between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian government. What is being talked about now and what we hope to achieve is how we can accelerate and set a practical plan to implement the March agreement that took place between General Mazloum Abdi and [interim] President Ahmed al-Sharaa. So today, I think for different circumstances and for the absence of mechanisms for building trust, there were no diligent efforts to try to implement the agreement completely. What we hope for today first is that there will be positive efforts to build trust regarding the implementation of the agreement, so that there is no room for misunderstanding, and so that there is no factor of instability whether in the areas of northeast Syria [Rojava] or elsewhere.
This is what we hope to achieve, and then there will be a practical and realistic plan with a clear timeline for implementing the agreement, so that we can turn any page of disagreements, and so that all of Syria, including north and east Syria, can move towards more investment, developing infrastructure, and creating job opportunities. And this is, in fact, what Syrians want in the end, whether they are Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, or other components.[1]

Dilbixwin Dara
Talks between the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) and the interim government in Damascus are progressing but have not yet reached the stage of formal negotiations, a senior Rojava official told Rudaw.

Elham Ahmad , foreign relations co-chair of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), told Rudaw’s Dilbixwin Dara in an interview from Qamishli, that discussions with Damascus remain in their early phases and that “one cannot call them outright negotiations.

“They are a form of dialogue” which “falls within the framework of how we can address the Syrian issue,” Ahmad said.

In recent months, the Rojava administration has been engaging in talks with Syria’s interim government over integration into federal institutions - including the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - based on a March 10 agreement between interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi.

Following his appointment as Syria’s interim president, Sharaa in late January pledged to form an “inclusive transitional government that would reflect Syria’s diversity.” However, he has faced criticism from both domestic and international observers for allegedly sidelining minority communities in the governance process.

Kurdish leaders have long advocated for a decentralized system within Syria. Ahmed argued in the interview aired on Sunday that centralized rule in Syria has long caused suffering, and decentralization would lighten the central government's burden by giving regions responsibility for services, culture, language, and internal security.

On the regional front, Ahmad confirmed that there are ongoing discussions with Turkey through an “open channel,” calling the engagement “positive and constructive.” She emphasized the need for dialogue to prevent further escalation and to explore peaceful solutions.

She also voiced strong support for the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), describing it as a historic opportunity “not only for Kurds but for the entire Middle East.”

The senior Rojava official further extended her appreciation to Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, citing his “genuinely positive role” during what she described as “sensitive and challenging times” for the people of northeast Syria.

Below is the full transcript of the interview with Elham Ahmad.

Rudaw: It is interesting that neither of us is from Qamishli. Although you are from Afrin and I am from Kobane, we are closer together. Thank you very much for accepting this interview. Ms. Elham, you are very active, very vibrant in your work. You have a massive responsibility you're shouldering, isn't it?

Elham Ahmad: It's a national responsibility, a revolution that has reached a level where we must now see results from it and fulfill our duty.

I want to start by asking about the negotiations and exchanges between you and the interim leadership in Damascus. What are they about? These meetings that are happening in Damascus - are they negotiations, dialogue? What is exactly happening in Damascus?

Yes, actually, what is happening in Damascus is at its beginning, but one cannot call them out right negotiations. They are a form of dialogue - meaning, they fall within the framework of how we can address the Syrian problem. When the [Bashar al-Assad] regime was in charge, that regime represented one side, it was clear, and that regime was the Baath regime. The other side facing that regime was the opposition. Much effort was exerted to truly save Syria from that crisis. Those engagements [with the toppled Assad regime] cannot be called negotiations either. They were also a form of dialogue about how we could exit the crisis, but those engagements did not work.

Now, the new administration in place, the interim administration [led by Ahmed al-Sharaa], wants to bring [the different] Syrian parties under its umbrella, understand all the diverse components and communities within [the Syrian] society, include them [in governance] and accordingly establish a new Syria together. Through these engagements, we wish to reach partnership in this country. We believe we are Syrian. We are Kurdish and Syrian, we are Arab and Syrian, we are Syriac and Syrian. Our common identity that brings us all together is being Syrian. Within this framework, we are asking how can we build a new Syria together?

For this, [I can say], the engagements [between Rojava and Damascus delegations] can be described as dialogue. Through this dialogue, we can find the path to resolution. Syria has yet to exit this fundamental crisis and has yet to save itself from this [thorny] situation. We ask: how can we save Syria from this crisis, bring it to a stable situation and an agreed-upon situation? At this stage, the talks [between the delegations] are taking place within that framework.

Is there someone supervising or monitoring these negotiations?

Indeed, there are mediators. [The latest meeting] marked the first time an American representative participated, a French representative also participated, and Britain was also involved indirectly. But the parties that sat down - including our representatives and the interim administration’s - we sat together following [agreement] on several main points that are required to reach a resolution, and held discussions about what measures can be agreed on following the March 10 agreement signed in Damascus [between Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces chief Mazloum Abdi], to implement the items of that agreement. How can we implement [that accord]? By adopting which approach? Our discussions centered on that.

Are you satisfied with the role of US Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack? What is his role in these negotiations? What does he do?

It was the first time that both of us - [DAANES and Damascus representatives] - saw Mr. Barrack in the meeting. It was the first time he participated in the meeting in person. In my opinion, as he mentioned in the meeting, to be able to play a positive and good role, knowing the parties is very important. I think there was hope that some decisions would come out of the meeting. We also said one or two decisions must come out of this meeting, but they didn't.

Why wasn't that possible?

Because of the [difference in the two sides’] understanding of integration. In the March 10 deal, we agreed on integration in the form of participation. However, each side interprets this term, integration, differently. Our definition of integration is that it must entail mutual recognition. That means that the Damascus government also recognizes us as we accept them. What kind of acceptance might you say? Now they represent an interim administration. They assumed rule and became the interim administration. However, elections were not held, the entirety of the Syrian people and society did not agree to [their assumption of power], but they came, ousted Assad and became the interim administration. For example, they declared an interim constitution which they drafted [on their own]. They also formed an interim government and now preparations are underway to announce a people’s assembly. These were all unilateral measures they implemented.

So they did not hold consultations with you when doing these things?

There were no consultations, neither with us nor with other Syrian components or parties. These steps are all taken unilaterally. There is one party that has declared itself as the interim administration, and we are in dialogue with this side to properly and truly implement the March 10 agreement.

Does the new leadership in Damascus want the SDF to join the Syrian army? How do you view this matter? Are you against the SDF becoming part of the Syrian army? Tom Barrack wants this from you, doesn't he? To join the Syrian army and for the SDF to cease to exist.

There is such a decision in the March 10 agreement. It says integration, meaning the SDF must also become part of the army. There is such a decision, there's an agreement.

Under its own name? [As the SDF?]

This matter is up for discussion. When discussions start, what form we will agree on will be taken as a basis. It is not like they can just come and say surrender your weapons or bring all these fighters you have, transfer them and goodbye, it's over for you. The issue isn't like that. The integration we are talking about is different. We say the interim government must recognize the will of the people here [in Rojava]. In terms of security, how do these people protect themselves? Or how do they want to reach a way with Damascus to bear the responsibility together? Damascus must see all the people as Syrians. What emerged in the meeting is, [we noted] that the people here are under an administration - today this administration is called DAANES, tomorrow it might be something else - but there is [an administration] with institutions serving this community and serving the people. [The integration the Damascus leadership has in mind] is that when this integration in institutions [takes place], the people in those institutions are not accepted as employees of state institutions by the interim administration in Damascus. They’re perception is that there are people here, they’ll come and replace them, they’ll take charge. That's it, the other side will have no role anymore.

And you don't accept this? You don't accept that the Syrian interim government comes and administers this region?

No, that's not it. Now there's the issue of integration, however, [prior to that], Kurds are still lacking an identity. They have not been officially accepted as a national component within Syrian society with a history. This issue is not outlined in the constitution and they do not have self-administration rights. For thirteen years, the people of northern and eastern Syria have been in a system where they've both protected themselves and managed themselves. They've presented massive sacrifices, martyrs. They have suffered greatly and have been displaced. As they say, We suffered under the [Baath] regime, the people here [in Rojava] have also suffered under that regime, made sacrifices, and fought against the Islamic state (ISIS), Daesh. This is why, in Syria's general national issues, no one can say, I've done more and I deserve to take charge of everything. The issue isn't like that. They are also tired, they have also made sacrifices, everyone has made sacrifices, so they must sit together and figure out how do we rebuild this country, how do we manage it? A common thinking must be created.

You have no intention of dividing Syria? I am asking this because many parties accuse you of wanting to divide Syria through maintaining the DAANES?

Division or fragmentation must have a reason [to call for it]. Why division? There must be reasons for that and those reasons become the basis for a society to think about separation and the main reasons [usually] come from the center. If the center truly recognizes the rights of this community, holds their hands, treats them as equals and respects their will, then why would they seek separation? For years, it has always been said about this community, about the Kurds, that they are dividing Syria. Today, the same is being said about [the Druze community in the southern province of] Suwayda. Mind you, under Assad's Baath regime, the people who sidelined themselves the most and did not participate in [the Syrian civil] war and did not kill anyone and remained peaceful were Syria’s Druze. But what are those people being exposed to today? They are facing extermination, accused of being “infidels who must be exterminated and of wanting to “divide Syria. Suwayda is a city - if it were to be divided from there one day, where would it go? If Syria is divided, where would it go?

So the people of Suwayda don't want to separate, do they?

No, our relations with the Druze are very good. Until now, we haven't heard from any of them saying, “We want to divide Syria.” There's no such thing. These are scenarios and propaganda made deliberately that they keep repeating. Yesterday, Hakan Fidan, Turkey's Foreign Minister, again said, We won't allow division. He says if Syria is divided, it means Turkey will be divided. Why are such statements made when a people want to live in peace and want to reach an agreement with the current government?

Look and see - the idea of Kurdish separation hasn't come from anyone's mouth until now, it's not in anyone's intention, but if, when rights are demanded and this is called separation, this means the intention of the person speaking this way is bad.

What kind of Syria do you want? Do you want a federal Syria? Do you want a Syria where you're autonomous? Do you want a decentralized Syria? What kind of Syria do you want?

We've always openly stated in our projects or goals: the centralized state has brought nothing but pain and suffering to this society for decades. We, the people living in northern and eastern Syria, along with other components, with the advancement of democracy, with the advancement of different systems that express democracy, this shows that a decentralized system that shares state powers, meaning the duties of the central state, with regions, fundamentally lightens its own burden.

So you insist on a decentralized system?

Yes, a decentralized system that lightens Damascus's central burden. Give responsibility to the regions. If problems arise tomorrow, say, We left it to you. Whatever there is, you solve your own problems. Education, health, internal security, and economy. All these must be decentralized, give duties to regions, cities, and provinces. For example, give it to them so they can manage themselves and the people there bear responsibility. If there's always a centralized system like before, someone says, “according to the decision I make, and it's imposed on everyone,” this deepens the crisis. The previous system caused the crisis. If they do the same, problems will deepen again.

You won't surrender your military forces, meaning the SDF, you won't hand over the DAANES, you won't hand over your institutions to Damascus, you won't give your borders to Damascus, you won't give the airports to Damascus. What will you give to Damascus? Have you and Damascus reached some common points between yourselves?

Yes, there are [mutual points]. The things we see as right. But when we say decentralized, it doesn't mean nothing is centralized. We know some things are centralized: country borders, for example, let's say border crossing, airports, passports, identification cards - these are all tied to the center in all federal countries. We are not saying everything must be decentralized. No, but the services aspect, cultural aspect, and language aspect - all these must be decentralized. For example, today there are many Kurds here, the Kurdish language can be primary here, but in another city, another place, it doesn't have to be Kurdish.

So you're saying the Kurdish language should be first in Western Kurdistan?

Yes, let it be first alongside Arabic, let the Kurdish language be first. There are Syriacs, let there be Syriac language, but the cultures here might not exist in Idlib. In Idlib, Arabic is enough, in coastal areas, Arabic is enough, but in Afrin, Kurdish is primary. When there are decentralized systems, they fundamentally make the situation much easier, eliminate internal problems, cause people to truly feel they have rights, have character and will, and participate in this state by their own will, meaning they're within this state, not always by force, like no, you must be Arab! But I'm not Arab. No, if I speak Arabic, I might not be able to express myself well.

Society should not be administered by force. Damascus and those states which have influence in Damascus must understand this. We have not said we won't surrender, but the issue of surrender is itself problematic. We want to have participation be the basis; voluntary participation, the SDF participates in the army. For example, which army exists in Damascus now? We can establish it together. Let's establish it together. Are we creating an internal security system? The same way our hearts are set on Qamishli, at the same time let them be on Hama and Homs and Latakia too, see their security like your own security. For that, the internal security system - we voluntarily participate in it, create it together, and create regional councils together. This isn't difficult. The idea that only I exist, I am the state, I am everything - this idea must change.

I mentioned the airport, Qamishli airport - its name is also written in Kurdish, Arabic, Syriac, and English. Previously, it was only Arabic and English. Will you manage the airport in the future?

We are not fixated on that. We know the airports issue is a sovereignty matter. meaning they're connected to the central government and managed by it. But here, which province it's in, there's a kind of guarantee or let's say a way of how this airport can best serve society? This needs discussion.

We talked about decentralization. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani has also spoken about it with Sharaa and with Tom Barrack. He said there must be a decentralized Syria. You made a visit to Erbil, and I saw you met with President Barzani. I wanted to know his role - how do you see his role?

His role is truly appreciated. It's a positive role, especially given the problems Rojava - or northeastern Syria - is facing today. His personal relationships with international leaders and his dialogue with the temporary administration in Damascus are significant. From what we've seen and through our direct contact, we can say his role has been genuinely positive and deserves thanks. We also hope his involvement grows even further - so that, in these sensitive and challenging times, we can support each other more and work more closely to help resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria.

Recently, I heard you say, We have direct contact with Turkey. Have you visited Turkey?

There are discussions, there's an open channel. There are direct discussions and dialogue, and there's a need for these dialogues, and we see them as important too. Especially when there was war between us, and hell was breaking loose. Very intense attacks were made, and great resistance was made. Now at the negotiation level, at least, instead of using weapons directly, there's talk. There's negotiation - what's the problem, how can this be solved, how do we understand each other? This exists.

There are ongoing discussions and an open channel [of communication]. We are engaged in direct talks and we believe these dialogues are important. Especially during times when war was raging between us - when attacks were severe and resistance was intense. It is better now to talk than to fight. Instead of exchanging fire, we talk: what's the problem, how do we solve it, how can we understand each other?

But I want a clear answer - did you go to Turkey? According to my information, you met with the deputy head of Turkish intelligence (MIT). Is this true?

Let's not overshare - there are negotiations, and we see them as positive and constructive. We are focused on removing the obstacles [hindering development] in the region, and our discussions are ongoing.

So, will these discussions continue?

Yes, we fundamentally want the dialogue to improve further. Rather than relying on threats, we must sit down, understand each other, and talk about what the actual issues are - what do they want? Their talks with Damascus are truly very deep. We know this. To some extent, sometimes it even feels like they speak more on Damascus's behalf than Damascus does itself. We understand this too. But today we are thinking about all of Syria, and they say they are too. Northeastern Syria is part of Syria, so relations must improve on that level.

Have you had any negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)?

We receive news and direct information, especially when he managed to come forward with a brave and significant initiative during a very sensitive time. In my opinion, this [peace] initiative isn't just for Kurds, it's for the entire Middle East. The peace process [between the PKK and the Turkish state] is like no other in history. At a time when everyone was saying, It's over, it's finished, and while resistance and defense were also very strong, he said: The era of armed conflict is over. The war has played its role, and now change is necessary. Presenting such an initiative, that message was very important to us.

Have your negotiations with Ocalan taken place directly? Has he called and spoken with you?

Maybe they have, maybe they haven't. What I can confirm is that there has been dialogue, and we do receive information. What is most important is that the initiative he proposed has had a major impact and brought very important results for western, northern, and eastern Syria. For solution projects across all four parts of [Greater] Kurdistan, his vision is fundamental.

Ocalan has called on the PKK to lay down arms. Has he asked you to do the same?

Laying down arms is not on our agenda - is it not at all an option. Syria’s situation is still dangerous. In full view of the world, people are still being killed and massacred. Asking the SDF to disarm under these conditions is like telling them to walk into death. It is very dangerous. However, within the broader discussions on Syria’s future - how Kurds, the DAANES and the SDF fit in rebuilding Syria - these questions will eventually be addressed.

Ocalan recently said he wants to meet with Kurdish leaders, including you. Are there plans for you to visit him? This is truly very important for Kurds.

I would truly like to meet him. If it happens, it would be very positive, but we haven’t received an official invitation yet. Personally, I see it as a necessity. If it happens, I believe it will have a very positive impact.

You saw Ocalan’s video message from Imrali prison. What was your reaction to it, how did it seem?

It was very different. His ideas, the spirit and morale he conveys - even at his age - with such determination and clarity on peace, democracy, and justice, are incredible. His proposals are inclusive, not just for Kurds, but for all communities whose rights have been denied. He speaks of a new democratic system that reorganizes states and re-establishes republics. It is visionary.

The Kurdish Unity Conference in Qamishli formed a delegation to visit Damascus, but it didn’t go. Was the delegation not ready, or did Damascus refuse to receive them?

The delegation is ready. The paper [of the topics on their agenda] is also ready. But Damascus has not yet prepared itself to receive them. Work is being done on that. We anticipate that in the future a time must be set for a meeting to take place. If Damascus also prepares itself, until now, there's no problem with the delegation.

Your visits to Damascus won’t block the Kurdish delegation’s visit? Some think you're going alone without them.

No, I don’t believe that. The current delegation that is holding talks with Damascus represents the general framework of the DAANES. The Kurdish delegation, on the other hand, is focused on Kurdish rights - constitutional recognition, the Kurds’ role in the new Syria. When we go to Damascus, we also discuss Kurdish rights, the general decentralized system and the SDF forces, meaning what Syria's administrative system will be. We have those discussions. We also discuss the role the SDF will have in the new Syria. It's about those.

Is there any fear that war may again reach the DAANES or are you hopeful that it won’t happen?

We truly hope not. Syria has suffered enough. Still, there are forces trying to stir conflict. There are parties that want to ignite a war by any means. For example, the “tribal mobilization - the call made to the tribes prompting them to go to Suwayda [to fight the Druze]. They went from this area too, that mentality. They gather themselves with an idea, with an idea and move. That is a very dangerous situation.
We can say that in our region this hasn't happened much, neither has a response to those calls and in this idea been recorded. It hasn't happened much. But there are those who went [to Suwayda] and returned as bodies. This danger truly exists.

Here I want to urge our brothers, especially our Arab brothers, to be careful about this matter. This region is stable; people look after their lives, even if things are difficult, they manage themselves by their own will. Why should they leave their areas and go to Suwayda to get themselves killed? Why disrupt the situation here? There are those capitalizing on this, within the interim administration, there are people pulling these strings. In neighboring countries, too, there are those who are pulling strings too. This will not end well so I stress that not falling into this trap is very important.

If there’s an attack on Rojava like what happened in Suwayda or with the Alawites - massacres [in the coastal regions] - who will protect you?

We’ve always protected ourselves - with support from the forces of [the US-led Global] Coalition to Defeat ISIS and most importantly, from our own people, we have Kurdish backing. We have strong societal support, international relations, and Kurdish relations as well. In such a scenario, I think general support within the Kurdish community, especially the Syrian people, is needed. I think that the spirit of Kurdish identity and responsibility exists.

So you see such an attack on Western Kurdistan as unlikely?

It should not happen, it must not happen.

Which country do you see as closest to you? In Europe and the West?

If I name them, it might not be very objective. Until now, for example, our relations with France are strong. Our talks are good, with some other countries, for example, Germany. We've also had good dialogue with Germany and other countries. In tough times, some of them reach out to us themselves, asking how they can help. That’s important.

If something urgent arises, do you have high-level contacts in those countries?

Yes, with many countries. For example, in the US, we have contacts at the White House and the Pentagon - at many different and high levels.

I want to ask about Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad). What do you see as their future?

Regarding Afrin, Sare Kani and Gire Spi, discussions are ongoing. We agreed to establish a committee. It was also included in the [Abdi-Sharaa] March 10 agreement. There was a special item regarding the return of displaced persons to their homes. We formed a committee for Afrin, but after that, Damascus did not follow through. A meeting was required to officially discuss the return of the displaced persons.

We’ve also said people from Deir ez-Zor who are now living in Afrin should return to their homes, and we guarantee nothing will happen to them. In return, our people in camps - living in dire conditions - must be allowed to return to Afrin, Serekaniye, and Gire Spi. We’re discussing this with both Ankara and Damascus. The Turkish side says “we handed it over” [to Damascus], but violations continue to take place and armed groups tied to Turkey are still there. The future of these areas must also be discussed so that people can return home.

When will we see you in Afrin?

I hope very soon. We're putting all our weight to resolve this situation as soon as possible.

So you believe Afrin’s people will return and the demographic changes won’t be permanent?

Yes, they will return. Afrin’s people will return. There's no alternative. True, the destruction is massive, but we believe our people will rebuild it again.

You've traveled across many parts of Kurdistan, especially Western Kurdistan. Which city did you love the most?

Afrin is beautiful - its people, its nature. All our cities are good, but Afrin is very special, both geographically and personally for me. I’ve also visited cities in South, North, and parts of Eastern Kurdistan. There are very nice cities.

Is there a city that holds a special place in your heart?

Of course, it's Afrin. One must love their own city - it holds history and memories for me. But truly, every place in Kurdistan is beautiful.

So you want to visit Afrin soon? Is it possible for you to go now?

It's difficult. The security situation is problematic, and there’s no official permission from the other side that would allow such a visit for now.

You've traveled a lot - to cities in Kurdistan, Europe, and America. But I asked earlier whether you've been to Turkey recently, and you didn’t give a clear answer.

I’ve been before.

But I'm asking about recently - in the past few days. Is there any danger to your life during these travels?

Yes, there is danger. But we also take security precautions to protect ourselves.

I was truly happy to interview you. Thank you for giving us time. It was very nice to do this interview here in Qamishli. I’ve always seen you on TV, but this is the first time meeting you face-to-face. Kurds praise you a lot and have even given you affectionate nicknames - some call you “our diplomat.” That kind of recognition also places a heavy burden of responsibility on your shoulders.

That’s absolutely true - it’s a very heavy responsibility that’s been placed on us.

Is your diplomatic team strong?

Yes, but it still needs to improve - and it’s getting stronger. As women, we say: whatever strength we have, we put it in service of our people. Whatever resources, whatever capacity we have, we dedicate it to serving our people. We see ourselves as servants of the people - that’s how we define our role. We understand that we’re living in historic times, and we carry a historic responsibility. We must see it through to the end. The accountability for this is heavy - we know this well. And because of that, we approach everything with a spirit of responsibility and a hope that we can rise to the level of our people's expectations.[1]

Title: From Idlib to Damascus – HTS’ Evolution Into the Syrian Caretaker Government
Publisher: Rojava Information Center (RIC)
Release date: 2025

On December 6th, 2024, in the middle of a blisteringly successful offensive, with the fall of Damascus and Assad’s government almost guaranteed, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham reintroduced himself to the world. Interviewed by CNN’s Jomana Karadsheh, he dropped his nom de guerre, ‘Mohammed al-Jawlani’. In its place, ‘Ahmed al-Sharaa’ entered the limelight. Seemingly in one day, al-Sharaa went from being considered a terrorist, to being courted by all world leaders. The collapse of Assad and the withdrawal of the Iranian and most of the Russian forces from Syria was met with ferment by Western media outlets. The discourse that developed around HTS and al-Sharaa’s evolution played a pivotal role in its international acceptance, despite its overtly jihadist past as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Sharaa’s recent history in the authoritarian HTS.

Assad’s collapse opened the way for a new chapter in Syria. Many Syrians finally saw prospects for peace and a better future. However, the post-Assad period has so far been marked by the self-appointed president al-Sharaa’s HTS-dominated Caretaker Government concentrating power and state control in its hands. Through four key steps – the establishment of an interim authority loaded with HTS figures, the ‘Victory Conference’, the ‘National Dialogue Conference’, and the publication of the transitional constitution – the so-called transitional stage has been kept under the control of Al-Sharaa and looks set to remain that way. This paves the way for a continuation of HTS’ authoritarian and repressive governance record from Idlib. At the same time, HTS and its Idlib allies have been implicated in crimes of a jihadist Islamist character – a phenomenon observed since its origins as an al-Qaeda offshoot in 2012 up to today.[1]

Syrian Kurds should join forces and head to Damascus to present their demands as one team, suggested a veteran Kurdish politician on Wednesday as the country navigates a transitional phase.
I suggest that they [Kurds] separate one issue from another. The general issues like power, reference, and power sharing in Rojava should be put aside. The most important thing now is the identification of Kurdish demands in Syria and what to agree on before presenting them to the new Syrian regime,” Omar Sheikhmous told Rudaw's Dilbixwin Dara.
“We know that there is a good opportunity, there is a willingness and they listen. They are also ready to include Kurds in the authority. Therefore, they should focus on points they can agree on. They should also focus on the demands of Kurds in Syria regarding their language, culture, autonomous administration... and federalism,” added the politician who is originally from northeast Syria (Rojava) but lives in Sweden.
Many Syrians and foreign powers are worried that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the force that spearheaded a recent military offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad, may impose strict Islamic rules and threaten minority groups such as Kurds, Druze, Christians, and Alawites.
The Druze have established militia groups in Suwayda province and elsewhere, refusing to allow the security forces to enter their region. They have also declined demands from Damascus to lay down their arms until the country drafts a new constitution.
Omar Sheikhmous (right) in an interview with Rudaw's Dilbixwin Dara (left) on January 7, 2025. Photo: Rudaw
Sheikhmous believes that the demands for federalism or other forms of decentralized power by the Druze and other minority groups provide an opportunity for the Kurds to achieve a similar status.
A top Syrian official told Rudaw on Sunday that they will not allow any federalism or decentralized rule calling it a “red line.”
“We will not allow any federalism or any decentralized rule, and legitimize any solution based on ethnic, racial, or religious dimensions. This is a red line for all Syrians, and we hope that all other components will rise to the responsibility and contribute to building their country,” Ahmed al-Dalati, a leader in Syria’s Military Operations Command and deputy commander-in-chief of HTS, said.
Sheikhmous highlighted that it is very important for Kurdish to be considered a second official language in the new Syrian constitution.
He also said that it is important that the new administration shares the economic resources equally among the regions - unlike the former regime.
There are ongoing efforts to resume intra-Kurdish talks between Kurdish ruling and opposition parties in Rojava. The talks began a decade ago but have been stalled for years due to disagreements.
The Kurdish National Council (ENKS/KNC), an umbrella group of Kurdish opposition parties in Rojava, has been in constant rivalry with the ruling People's Democratic Party (PYD) over maintaining influence in Rojava.
Mazloum Abdi, chief of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), held a meeting with the ENKS last month to pave the way for the resumption of ENKS-PYD meetings.
The latest talks are mediated by American and French diplomats.[1]

A senior official from the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) said on Thursday that they plan to preserve the enclave’s current status while engaging more actively in Syria’s political process, despite the new government’s rejection of federalism.
“Our current plan is to preserve what exists, and we will try to be more involved within Syria and participate in every process,” Elham Ahmad , co-chair of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s (DAANES) foreign relations said during a panel at the Sulaimani Forum when asked about their plan if Syria’s interim government opposes federalism.
The interim government’s officials and commanders have ruled out federalism.
The Kurdish official warned that centralized systems have historically led to structural crises in diverse societies like Syria.
“We see that strictly centralized systems do not solve problems but deepen them,” she said. “Syria must not return to [how it was] before 2011. It must be decentralized and give the rights of all Syrian components.”
Her remarks come weeks after a deal was reached between interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) chief Mazloum Abdi to integrate Rojava’s civil and military institutions into the Syrian state.
The SDF is the de facto army of Rojava.
Ahmed called the agreement a “historic point” which dispels accusations that the Kurdish administration seeks partition or separatism.
“We have always been accused of [wanting to cause] division and separation, so this agreement has put those accusations to rest,” she said. “We are now in the phase of forming dialogue committees to discuss the bond of the agreement, how to implement it, and its mechanism.”
Ahmed confirmed that “many understandings” had also been reached regarding the strategic Tishreen Dam and Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh in northern Aleppo which had long been under SDF control.
This follows a 14-point agreement signed in early April that includes a prisoner swap and outlines joint security oversight in Aleppo.
As part of the broader agreement, Damascus-aligned forces and the SDF on Sunday began jointly managing security of the neighborhoods.
The dam became the target of intensified attacks by Turkish-backed militia groups following the ouster of the former regime.
Rojava’s Ahmed reiterated that the Kurdish administration demands participation in drafting Syria’s new constitution.
“What is happening now is that Syria’s future is being specified by one side,” she said. “We see ourselves as important and serious partners in the process of rebuilding Syria.”
Sharaa signed a 53-article interim constitutional declaration in March, criticized by minority communities for reinforcing authoritarianism and religious exclusion. It preserves Syria’s name as the “Syrian Arab Republic,” makes Arabic the sole official language, and stipulates Islamic jurisprudence as a primary source of legislation. It also requires that the president be Muslim.
The declaration has drawn backlash from various groups, including Syria’s Druze community. Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, who in March called the government “extremist in every sense of the word.”
At the Sulaimani panel, Ahmed noted that many Syrians - including Druze, Alawites, Christians, and a significant secular segment of the Sunni Arab population - reject centralism. “Most in Syria demand decentralization,” she said.
Druze military and political forces in Suwayda have refused to disband and repeatedly called for decentralization. Bahaa al-Jamal, the Druze commander in Suwayda, told Rudaw in March that the declaration is “not accepted” and that the community “ought to have been included” in the process. He added that the Druze will only recognize Syria’s president “through fair elections.”
In March, Rojava’s ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the opposition Kurdish National Council (ENKS) agreed on a joint list of demands, including federalism.
“The unification of the Kurdish stance is the starting point,” said Hoshyar Zebari, a senior official from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), who voiced support for the demands.
The KDP, led by Masoud Barzani, has maintained ties with both ENKS and the SDF. In January, Barzani met publicly with Abdi in Erbil, followed by talks between Abdi and ENKS that led to a plan to send a united Kurdish delegation to Damascus.
Peter Galbraith, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and fellow panelist, highlighted Syria’s vast social and ideological divisions and argued that federalism offers the best path forward.
“How do you reconcile a part of Syria, northeast Syria, which has its own political system, strict gender equality... with one in Idlib, which is Islamist?” he asked. “Federalism in Syria is likely to keep Syria together.”
The Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose leaders rule Syria, was formed from factions previously affiliated with al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS). HTS leader Sharaa has attempted to rebrand, but international critics point to extremist ties. Some members of the newly formed cabinet in Damascus - such as Interior Minister Anas Khattab - were designated as terrorists by the US and the UN in the early years after the civil war in 2011.
Prior to ousting the former regime, the HTS had long controlled Idlib in northwestern Syria.
Galbraith stressed that around 40 percent of Syria’s population is not Sunni Arab, and even among Sunni Arabs, many are secular, echoing claims made earlier by Ahmed.
“The idea that one particular ideology coming out of Idlib led by somebody who used to be ISIS and used to be al-Qaeda could somehow control Syria, is something that is not in the interest of the people of Syria and frankly not in the interest of the rest of the world,” he said
Galbraith proposed elections based on proportional representation as a way to ensure diverse representation and inclusivity across Syria’s fractured landscape.
“We’re hoping to reach deeper understandings regarding the constitutional process, the political process, and the process of rebuilding Syria anew,” Ahmed said during the discussion.
[1]

The Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) announced on Sunday that it has reached an agreement with the interim government in Damascus to facilitate official education certification for students in areas under its control.
In a statement, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) said the agreement was made “to ensure the smooth running of the examination process, in the best interests of students and their educational future.”
The agreement includes a one-week postponement of preparatory school exams. It also involves the formation of joint committees to oversee the administration of exams in Rojava, the establishment of temporary joint registration centers, and the approval of registration transfers for students originally from outside the region.
Furthermore, six official exam centers will be designated across five regions, specifically in Hasakah, Qamishli, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and the town of Kobane (Sarrin).
Since 2011, Kurdish authorities in Rojava have developed their own curriculum in areas they control, rejecting the national one in place at the time, which they said promoted Baathist ideology. They also introduced Kurdish as a language of instruction for the first time.
Some 70,000 students studying in the Kurdish-administered areas have been awaiting examination periods, the Rojava-affiliated Hawar News Agency (ANHA) reported on Tuesday.
DAANES explained on Sunday that the agreement with Damascus followed meetings with the Syrian education ministry on Thursday and Friday, emphasizing that the coordination “stems from our shared responsibility to support education and protect the rights of students across Syria, based on cooperation and integration between educational institutions.”
Following a swift offensive, a coalition of opposition groups led by the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), then-headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, in early December ousted the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.
In late January, Sharaa was appointed Syria’s interim President and on March 10 he signed a landmark agreement with Mazloum Abdi, the chief of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to “integrate all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria [Rojava] under the administration of the Syrian state.”
The agreement further recognized the Kurdish community as “indigenous to the Syrian state, which ensures this community’s right to citizenship and all of its constitutional rights.”
Of note, the United States-backed SDF serves as the de facto army of Rojava.
Last week, a delegation from Rojava met with the committee appointed by Syria’s new leadership to finalize the implementation of the Abdi-Sharaa agreement.
DAANES then remarked that the meeting was held in “a positive and constructive atmosphere,” noting that discussions included “addressing outstanding issues relating to [student] exams and exam centers [in Rojava], in a way that ensures students’ rights and the integrity of the educational process.”
Prior to that, Syrian Education Minister Mohammed Turko - the only Kurd in the new cabinet - told Rudaw in April that efforts were underway to reconcile the education systems in Damascus and Rojava. He highlighted ongoing work to ensure certification equivalence and to allow students to sit for official exams in their home provinces, rather than traveling long distances to government-controlled areas, as was previously required.[1]