31. August 1996: Blutiger Bruderkrieg zwischen KDP und PUK in Süd-Kurdistan

Als Birakujî (Deutsch: Brudermord) werden interne Kämpfe der kurdischen Freiheitsbewegungen bezeichnet, speziell die Kämpfe zwischen der KDP und der PUK in Mitte der 1990er Jahren. Im Laufe der Kämpfe wurden kurdische Organisationen aus dem Iran und der Türkei wie auch iranische, irakische und türkische Truppen in den Konflikt verwickelt. Der Höhepunkt der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der #KDP# und der PUK war der 31. August 1996 in Hewler, in der heutigen Hauptstand der Autonomen Region Kurdistan (KRG). Nachdem die PUK in Südkurdistan militärisch in die Überlegenheit geraten war, bat Masud Barzani, Vorsitzender der Demokratischen Partei Kurdistans, Saddam Hussein, dem Schlächter der Kurden, gegen seinen Rivalen Jalal Talabani, Vorsitzender der Patriotischen Union Kurdistan (#PUK# ) um Unterstützung.

Vermutlich aus Furcht vor militärischen Gegenreaktionen der USA hatte das Baath-Regime von Saddam Hussein seit 1991 keine größeren Militäroperationen mehr nördlich des 36. Breitengrades durchgeführt und sich trotz gelegentlicher Artillerieangriffe auf kurdische Stellungen, im wesentlichen auf die ökonomische Blockade der Kurdengebiete beschränkt. Saddam sah die Gelegenheit, Süd-Kurdistan (Nord-Irak) zurückzuerobern, und stimmte einer Unterstützung an die KDP zu. Am 31. August 1996 drungen die Republikanischen Garden der irakischen Baath-Regierung mit mehreren Panzerdivisionen in die Schutzzone vor und griffen auf Seiten der KDP die Kampfhandlungen an. Mit der Unterstützung von bis zu 40.000 irakischen Soldaten gelang es der KDP, die von der PUK gehaltene regionale Hauptstadt Hewler einzunehmen. Nach Einnahme der Stadt wurden 700 PUK-Kämpfer und Mitglieder des Irakischen Nationalkongresses außerhalb der Stadt exekutiert. Als Begründung für das militärische Zusammenwirken zwischen der KDP und dem irakischen Baath-Regime wurde von beiden Seiten darauf hingewiesen, dass die PUK Militärhilfe vom Iran erhalten habe und angeblich auch direkt von iranischen Kampfverbänden unterstützt worden sei. Der Bruderkrieg dauerte bis 1998 von den USA vermittelten Waffenstillstand an und endete ohne Sieg für beiden Seiten, aber Tausende von Kurden beza.
Ismail Zagros [1]

Participating in a television programme in Turkey, İsmail Hakkı Pekin, former Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff, called for the assassination of PUK leader Bafel Jalal Talabani.

İsmail Hakkı Pekin, former Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff, openly called for assassination in the programme ‘Gerçek Fikri Ne’ (What's the Real Idea) on Habertürk TV, moderated by Eren Eğilmez.

Pointing to the ‘security’ agreement concluded between Ankara and Baghdad on 15 August, Pekin said, “Turkey's agreement with Iraq is a very important agreement. We need to do the same on this side (Syria) as well. Bafel Talabani is said to be doing some things. You should deactivate him. In other words, you can assassinate him if necessary.”

Upon a warning from the studio, Pekin confessed about the assassination methods of the Turkish state, saying “You won’t do it, but have someone else do it.”[1]

Pê puka, guh belok.
[Kêvrîşk]
[1]

Title:
Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-Sharing Agreements Between the #KDP# and #PUK# of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998
Author: Brigitte E. Hugh
Place of publication: US
Publisher: Utah State University
Release date: 2020

In the mid-1990s the two Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—signed two power-sharing agreements, which had dramatically different results. The 1992 50-50 Agreement ended in conflict while the 1998 Washington Agreement ended in long-lasting peace.

I examine both the agreements and their surrounding context to identify what explains the success or failure of these two agreements in establishing long-lasting and cooperative peace. I find that the presence or absence of peace is due to both the language of the agreements and the context in which they were created. I demonstrate this through an examination of the two learning periods the Iraqi Kurds experienced, one through fighting from 1994-1997 and the second through a peacetime separation into two governorates from 1998-2006.

One of the most important conclusions is that the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process between the two Iraqi Kurdish parties prior to the 1998 Washington Agreement resulted in a more ambiguous agreement in 1998 which laid the ground work for greater cooperation over the next decade culminating in the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.[1]

On the occasion of the historic betrayal committed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (#KDP# ) on 31-08-1996, the Political Bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) issued the following statement: This treachery, like many other dishonesties in the party's history, is a stain on the nation's memory and will not be erased by hundreds of media speeches, false books, and misleading narratives of events.

The following is the politburo's statement, which reads:

Following an invitation from the KDP leadership, the Ba'ath dictatorship's Republican Guard forces occupied Erbil, Kurdistan's capital, 27 years ago. This occupation caused significant destruction and loss of life, causing long-term damage to national and patriotic sentiments that still reverberate in our collective memory.

The Kurdish people had only been revolting against the Ba'ath regime's oppression for five years, and the regime had seized a portion of the country's territory, but the KDP brought the Anfal and chemical attack armies back to Kurdistan and Erbil under the guise of disrupting the balance of forces in the civil war. As a result, hundreds of Peshmergas, #PUK# fighters, and Iraqi opposition forces were killed or injured, and hundreds more were kidnapped and disappeared. Since its inception, the weapons of this chauvinist army have degraded the Kurdistan people's elected parliament and tarnished our experience.

However, despite numerous media speeches, false books, and inaccurate accounts of the events, this treachery is a stain on the nation's memory, similar to many other dishonesties in the party's past. The PUK and other political parties in Kurdistan, motivated by their optimism for the future of our people and the legitimacy of the Kurdish issue, acknowledge that the political process in our country cannot be rooted in a single location and is susceptible to disruption. Therefore, they opted for a more favorable resolution based on peace and the restoration of cordial relations. They overcame difficulties caused by dishonesty and treachery while actively attempting to preserve the remnants of our nation's illustrious history. In doing so, they inaugurated a new era devoted to fostering peace and reviving the ongoing pursuit of democratic struggle. The fall of the regime's army and the August 31 tragedy during the liberation process, as well as the various achievements made by our people in terms of constitutional recognition of the Kurdistan Region and the implementation of a federal system, can be attributed to the PUK's patience and patriotic commitment to preserving the future of Kurdish identity and Kurdistan's sovereignty.

Unfortunately, the force responsible for the betrayal of August 31 continues to pursue the same terrible policy and serve the same narrow interests of the KDP, rather than learning from past errors. As it continues to accuse patriotic groups, especially the PUK, of baseless defamation while investing a great deal of resources, influence, and media fraud into this deception, it is clear that it has misunderstood the conscious restraint and patience of future servants of Kurdistan and encourages violence and dishonesty. Instead of focusing on the political process and the future of our people and trying to heal the wounds caused by the history of betrayal with proper Kurdish and national policy, it is constantly looking for ways to legitimize his betrayal.

Though it's painful to remember, we must not let our anger and resentment fester or lead us to seek vengeance; rather, we must work tirelessly to erase the memory of this and other tragedies from our nation's collective consciousness. We demand that all hope for authoritarianism be abandoned and that instead the chance be given to fix the government, create democracy, and bring real justice to Kurdistan. We will not forget the tragic events of August 1996 or other mistakes, but we are ready to fight for and make sacrifices for the right national policy.

All the brave and proud martyrs of our people, and in particular the proud martyrs of the resistance against the occupation of the Kurdistan capital on the day of August 31, 1996, are saluted on this day and in honor of all the martyrs and victims of our people. [1]

by Mehmet Alaca

The tensions between Turkey and the #PUK# are not new, though recent actions by both sides have exacerbated the situation despite shared economic interests.

Turkey has closed its airspace to planes taking off from and landing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) Sulaymaniyah governorate, citing the intensification of PKK activity in the city and airport as the reason behind the closure, which is expected to last until July 3. Two days after closing its airspace, a drone strike executed in the vicinity of Sulaymaniyah Airport targeted a convoy that included Mazloum Kobani Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and three U.S. military personnel. Although Turkey remained silent in the aftermath, all signs point to Ankara being behind the attack.

Both the decision to close the airspace and the attack are believed to be Turkey’s reaction to the recently increasing contacts between the Sulaymaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the U.S.-backed SDF, a significant portion of which are made up of the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the Democratic Union Party (#PYD# ). PUK leader Bafel Talabani's recent interactions with the SDF and comments about Kurds in Turkey—both understood in Ankara as signals that the PUK is growing closer to the PKK—have strained relations with Ankara. Therefore, the PUK is now under significant pressure from Ankara, with no short-term hope for normalization.

Relations have soured between the two parties since former PUK leader Jalal Talabani's death in 2017. When the PKK kidnapped two Turkish intelligence agents in Sulaymaniyah in August 2017, Turkey closed the PUK's Ankara office and expelled Bahruz Galali, a 17-year representative of the party in Turkey. Nor is flight suspension a new response; the KRI's 2017 independence referendum prompted Ankara to impose suspensions on flights from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Erbil flights began again in March 2018, but the embargo on Sulaymaniyah flights was extended until October 2019 due to Ankara’s claims that the PUK was supporting PKK activity in the KRI. Moreover, the flights were only resumed after then-President of Iraq and former PUK member Barham Salih intervened.

In October 2018, the Ankara-Sulaymaniyah route finally reopened after Qubad Talabani, the KRI’s deputy prime minister and Bafel's brother, closed the PKK's political office in Sulaymaniyah. Other signs of an attempted normalization appeared several years later. In March 2021, for example, Hakan Fidan, head of Turkish intelligence, reportedly hosted a PUK delegation in Ankara. Lahur Sheikh Jangi—co-chairman of the PUK who was removed from the party in 2020 due to a rivalry with his cousin Bafel—has also claimed that Turkey was involved in his removal from the party.

Yet Turkish action in the KRI has continued to be a major strain on relations. Conducting anti-PKK military operations in northern Iraq, Turkey seeks to increase pressure on the PKK and prevent it from launching attacks in Turkish territory. However, the approach adopted by the PUK, which is usually more tolerant towards the PKK than the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—the KRI’s largest party—has prompted friction with Ankara. For its part, the PUK has expressed outrage at the repeated drone operations and assassinations allegedly carried out by Turkey in Sulaymaniyah.

Intensified Contact with the PKK

During Turkey's operations in Iraq and Syria to create a safe zone in December 2022, Bafel met with SDF and PYD officials in northern Syria along with U.S. General Matthew McFarlane, commander of the Coalition Forces in Iraq and Syria. Bafel’s trip not only served to strengthen ties but also to isolate his rival and former PUK co-chair Lahur Jangi, who had frequent contact with the SDF and PYD and was seen as indispensable for Syrian Kurds.

The deepening of PUK-SDF relations became even more apparent at the end of March with a helicopter crash in Duhok. The crash killed at least nine SDF members, including a senior commander of the SDF’s anti-terrorism unit, who were on their way to Sulaymaniyah. The helicopter is said to have been bought by the PUK with the help of Washington during the Iraq war. In a message of condolence to the SDF after the crash, Bafel said “The PUK is proud of the glorious history that the CTG (PUK's Counter-Terrorism Group) struggled alongside Rojava’s CT units to protect Kurdistan.” This long history, along with an ideological alignment, shared tensions with the KDP, and a desire to be a figure in transnational Kurdish politics have all contributed to the PUK’s growing interest in this relationship. Likely concerned that this helicopter trip was a sign of deeper relations to come, Ankara’s decision to close its airspace—in addition to the alleged attack—are efforts to break the Rojava-Sulaymaniyah connection, at least temporarily.

Another example of stronger ties came in the form of a letter from Cemîl Bayik, a founding member of the PKK, to a meeting of political parties in Sulaymaniyah’s Dokan district in January. The letter addressed Bafel, saying that more national unity is needed in this process.” Although the PUK gives the impression of dealing with the SDF rather than the PKK—the former is an official ally of the U.S. coalition forces, whereas the latter is designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and the EU—Ankara perceives these actions as clear signs of the PUK looking to deepen relations with the PKK via Syria. Shortly after the drone attack, Fidan reportedly hosted the PUK's Qubad Talabani and the party’s delegation in Ankara, where Fidan expressed Turkey's displeasure with the PUK's relations with the SDF and the PKK.”

Bafel as a “Servant of Kurdish Politics”

Seeking to establish the PUK as an alternative to the dominance of the KDP in the KRI political sphere, Bafel is eager to be seen as influential in regional Kurdish geopolitics, hence the party’s closer ties with the SDF. During his visit to northern Syria, he emphasized the Kurdish question and described the PUK as a servant of Kurdish politics. He wants to be seen as a Kurdish leader involved in numerous regional processes and negotiations.

As such, Bafel frequently refers to making peace between Turkey and the PKK after their 40 years of war. He also released a video message for the Nowruz celebrations in Turkey’s Diyarbakir, a Kurdish-dominated city, in which he urged for unity among all Kurds and called for the release of jailed Kurdish leaders in neighboring countries.

Jalal Talabani, Bafel’s father, is remembered in Ankara as a leader who maintained constructive relations and played a mediating role for the Kurds in Turkey. It is clear that Bafel, who constantly refers to the role of his late father, desires the same influence for the PUK under his direction. After visiting northern Syria, Baful even met with the leader of the Turkey-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), Hasan Turan, as a gesture of good faith to Ankara. Nevertheless, Ankara largely considers Bafel’s statements on peace and jailed Kurds as interference rather than mediation.

No Reconciliation on the Horizon

Turkey believes that the balance of relations between the KDP and PUK can be a counterbalance to Baghdad, and as a result, Ankara does not wish for the situation in the KRI to deteriorate such that one party decisively wins out over another. Moreover, the complete exclusion of the PUK would only advantage Baghdad and Tehran, making the total dissolution of PUK-Ankara ties unlikely. In a call with KRI President Nechirvan Barzani in February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan allegedly advised Barzani to resolve the existing disputes with the PUK. He later shared the same message with both the KDP and PUK.

However, Ankara expects the PUK to completely distance itself from the PKK for any further normalization of relations to take place. They want PKK members in Sulaymaniyah to be handed over, and the PKK's activity in the city to be stopped. Furthermore, Ankara may also pressure the PUK to reconsider its increasingly close ties with Iran.

Of course, there are several obstacles. First and foremost, the PUK is likely hoping to use their rivalry with the KDP and tensions with Turkey to their advantage in KRI politics, an effort reinforced by the PUK’s closer relations with Baghdad. On the other hand, while Turkey has significant leverage over the KDP, specifically in the regards to the Habur Border Gate and oil exports, it should not expect such strong leeway with the PUK.

Instead, Turkey’s relationship with the PUK should be centered on the issue of natural gas, as a significant amount of gas that Ankara hopes to purchase from the KRI is located in PUK-controlled areas. Both sides have a shared economic interest in improving ties—especially after Turkey shut off the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the only outlet for the KRI’s oil—so if Ankara wishes to expand its influence over the PUK, it must first develop an economic relationship with the party over natural gas while respecting the party codes that make the PUK different from the KDP.

In addition, Turkey should keep in mind the potential necessity of PUK mediation if Ankara ever hopes to pursue future peace processes with the Kurds, particularly Syrian Kurds. Like many Kurdish political organizations, the PUK is driven by a sense of Kurdish nationalism that inevitably links them to groups like the SDF. Ankara must understand these dynamics and adapt its expectations and decisions accordingly. Acting without understanding the PUK’s position means a serious misreading of regional Kurdish politics.

Mehmet Alaca
Mehmet Alaca is an academic researcher focusing on Iraq, regional Kurdish politics, and Shia militias in the Middle East. He is currently an Ankara-based diplomatic correspondent and a non-resident fellow at Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). Alaca is a contributor to Fikra Forum.[1]

Nawzad Ali Ahmad

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on Sunday blamed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for failing to listen to their demands about Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activities in Sulaimani.
Speaking to the Turkish A Haber TV, Fidan asserted that Ankara is ready to take “further actions” should the PUK stick to its current policy on the PKK by not preventing the group from accessing infrastructure in Sulaimani province.
Fidan added that while Ankara understands that the PUK cannot fight the PKK, they expect the Sulaimani-based party to take several steps that would alleviate their concerns.
He claimed that Sulaimani authorities have assisted the PKK in the Kurdistan Region by providing them with national identification cards and access to hospitals and the wider infrastructure.
Before becoming the country’s foreign minister, Fidan was the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT). He said the PUK-PKK alleged ties had always been part of his agenda.
Turkey has repeatedly warned PUK leaders about the PKK’s activities, with Defense Minister Yasar Guler saying late last month that his country is “continuously warning” PUK leader Bafel Talabani about what he called “an increase in terrorist activities” in Sulaimani.
A flight ban on Sulaimani International Airport by Turkey has been in place since April 3.
While the PUK has denied support for the PKK, Talabani has previously said that groups Turkey considers “terrorists” are legal entities in the Kurdistan Region who have obtained a license to carry out political activities from Kurdish authorities or the Iraqi government.
Speaking at a regional forum in Erbil in October, Talabani said that his party’s problems with Turkey are “hard to resolve.”
Turkey in September killed three members of the PUK’s elite Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) in a drone strike on Sulaimani’s Arbat airport, alleging that members of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a force that Ankara alleges to be the Syrian front for the PKK, were present at the airport during the time of the attack.
Talabani referred to those killed in the attacks as “friends” who fought in the war against the Islamic State (ISIS), also claiming that he was under Turkey’s constant surveillance.
“We do not want to have problems with any country, but we will not conduct dialogue with pressure, threats, and drones. This is not how to engage in dialogue,” he said at the time.
Fidan visited Iraq and the Kurdistan Region late last year. He met with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani, from the PUK, discussing a wide range of topics including the Turkish flight ban on Sulaimani airport.[1]