Scott Douglas Jacobsen: First of all, could you please tell our readers where were you born, and when did you leave your country?
Azad Nanakeli: I was born in the city of Erbil (Hawler) in Kurdistan. I was Seventeen years old when I left my city and went to Baghdad to study then I left the country entirely and went abroad to Europe.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Is it possible to share some of your memories about growing up in a country which was dominated by war, dictatorship, and lack of security?
Azad Nanakeli:Since I was a child, my only dream was to see my society living in peace and for Kurdistan to become independent. However, dreams are something; real politics is something else. People of Kurdistan spent their entire lives in war.
They lived under vicious dictators in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. This is in addition to the fact that the United Nations never supported Kurdistan and its people. Let’s also not forget that our political leadership is also guilty of not caring enough about the new generations of Kurds.
I remember when I was a child sleeping on the roof top of our house, looking at the stars and trying to count them. When suddenly, all we could see are bullets fired in the sky in a fight between Peshmarga fighters and the regimes thugs.
The bullets would mix with the light of the stars in our vision. It became such a norm. That if one night there were no fight then we would be surprised. While I was studying in Baghdad in 1975, this was also the year when the Kurdish rebellion movement was defeated.
The Iraqi government began a new wave of violent attacks against the Kurdish rebels. Life became very difficult for us. I was not a member or supporter of the official Ba’ath Party, which meant I could be arrested at any time.
Despite my opposition and refusal of cooperation with the oppressive regime, I still managed to complete my studies and go into exile outside Iraq and eventually settled in Italy.
Scott Douglas Jacobsen: You were born in Arbil, Kurdistan and are a prominent Kurdish artist. How did you discover the latent talent?
Azad Nanakeli:From the age of seven, when I was at primary school, my art teacher helped me immensely and encouraged me to use different tools. In the same year one of my art works were sent to an international children’s art exhibition in Warsaw-Poland.
My work won a prize. After this, my teachers helped me more in my art lessons. After completing my high school studies, I went on to study at the Institute of Fine Art in Baghdad. I completed my studies there and graduated with honors, first place.
There my teachers were also supportive and advised me to go abroad. At that time, the political situation was very dire in Kurdistan. I traveled to Italy. I started studying at the Academy of Florence and successfully completed it.
My art work was exhibited in various galleries and museums around the world; both in solo and in group art exhibitions.
Jacobsen: When you interact with the media, whether lay people or artistically knowledgeable, how do you convey the purpose and style of your art to them?
Azad Nanakeli:I do not adhere to a particular technique. That is related to the diverse nature of my work. For example: if I want to present a work related to environmental issues, I might use video art because it allows me a better chance to communicate my concept.
Or I can use photograph or installation or performance, or painting on canvas. These and other technical tools can help an artist to convey a message in his/her work. Getting closer, contemporary to modern art is not easy in society, this is why it is important to have involvement from intellectuals, art critics, and cultural organisations to create an atmosphere whereby people and art get closer and interact. The role of cultural centres is vital in commissioning more art work and exhibitions to show case to people.
Jacobsen: As a Kurd, and a long-time artist, do you use art as a means of protest and activism as well as self-expression?
Azad Nanakeli:Without doubt as an artist, I would want to express my own feelings and concepts in relation to environment, identity, war, social unrest, and exile. I came from a place called Kurdistan, from a long time ago my country was divided and has gone through many ordeals.
Colonisers invaded and bombarded our people using chemical weapons. Our people were subjected to genocide and exodus. Our resources were looted.
Jacobsen: Who are some elder and some up-and-coming artists who those interested in Kurdish culture should look out for and learn about their art?
Azad Nanakeli:This is a relative issue, I cannot say which artist should be made a role model in order to learn from them. We as Kurds in order to enjoy art; we need to learn more about the history of art and understand it.
Jacobsen: With a lifetime committed to the artistic life, what have been the most general, consistent principles that you have learned from the representation of your own experience and messages in art, and the ways in which observers interpret the artistic productions?
Azad Nanakeli:As I mentioned above in my answers, my work is related to current events, consumerism, for example, is a disaster in modern day. As an artist, I observe and study this catastrophe and other problems in society. Most artists work along similar lines, I believe.
Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Mr.Nanakeli.
Azad Nanakeli:Thanks to you too.[1]

The aerial and terrestrial attacks against Afrin by the ISIS collaborator Turkish President RTE and the FSA alliance derived from ISIS-Nusra continue on day 11. The racist-jihadist alliance has mobilized all their resources to invade Afrin, and have resorted to bombing civilians with fighter jets and land attacks when they failed to advance in the face of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) resistance.
Erdoğan and his gangs have a massacre list that includes Alevis who survived the Dersim massacre and sought refuge in Afrin, Armenians who fled the 1915 genocide and victims of war who live in refugee camps. This list shows that the attack against Afrin is the continuation of a historic vengeance against the peoples.
Erdoğan has collaborated with looting, rapist groups gathered under the titles Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) throughout his term in power and is now attempting to push Kurds out of Afrin through civilian massacres and to turn the city into a new hub for terrorist organizations.
With this goal, the gangs that were brought to Afrin from Idlib, Hatay, Mersin, Kilis an Ankara and the Turkish army are attacking historic monuments from Afrin’s ancient past in the targeted civilian residential areas with ISIS’ methods. The attack against human heritage by ISIS, who destroyed the Palmyra ancient city, continues with the bombings of the historic Nebî Hûrî tomb in Afrin’s Shera district and the Selahaddîn Eyûbî Mosque in Jindires.
On day 11 of the invasion attack against Afrin by the racist-jihadist alliance, the Resistance of the Age fighters are not letting fascism through. Contrary to the Turkish special war media’s claims, in Afrin center and the Jindirese, Mabata, Shera, Sherawa, Rajo and Bilbile districts, SDF fighters have displayed a historic resistance for days and delivered heavy blows to the AKP-Al Qaeda coalition.
The events of day 11 of the resistance are as follows:
SHIYE
In the Xelil village of Afrin’s Shiye district, intense clashes broke out between SDF fighters and the invading Turkish army while the area was bombed by jet fighters.
RAJO
Intense clashes also broke out in the Mamela village in the Rajo region and fighter jets and scout planes flew over the village.
Turkish fighter jets had been bombing the area last night.
BILBILE
The Bilbile district’s surroundings were bombed by fighter jets and mortars last night.
SHERA
The Dersane village and its surrounding residential areas in the Shera district were targeted by airstrikes last night.
Syrian Democratic Forces fighters retaliated and clashes broke out in many locations.
JINDIRESE
Intense clashes continued through the day in the Hemam village of Jindirese between the invading Turkish army and their gangs and the SDF fighters.
SDF Press Center issued a statement at night and said the invasion attack was pushed back and the village was taken under control by their forces.
YPJ PRESS CENTER MEMBER MARTYRED
Women’s Defense Units (YPJ) Press Center member Avrin Mahsum was martyred as she was monitoring the clashes in the Rajo district.
Avrin Mahsum had been documenting the attacks against Afrin and the resistance with her camera, and was martyred while she was following clashes in the Rajo countryside on January 27.
Another YPJ Press Center member Aras Mahsum who was also following the resistance in Afrin was seriously wounded yesterday Aras Mahsum’s situation remains critical.
STATEMENT BY YPG GENERAL COMMAND
YPG General Command has issued a statement on the martyrdom of Avesta Xabur and said, “Afrin will resist until victory. Avesta Xabur will be the name of this resistance.”
YPG stated that Afrin has taken over the torch of resistance from Kobanê and is being lit by the blood of heroic martyrs today: “With the blood of the martyrs, an epic is being written against invaders and terrorists. Today many heroes go to the free heavens with their sacrifice on Afrin’s lands once again. The Resistance of the Age has entered the second week and continues against the Turkish army and their gangs in a sacrificial resistance.
ALDAR XELIL: THE RESISTANCE IS THE HOPE FOR STATES TOO
TEV-DEM Executive Council Co-chair Aldar Xelîl spoke about the invasion attacks against Afrin on the 10th day and stated that the Turkish state wants to revive ISIS, defeated in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and other locations, with a new identity in Afrin.
TEV-DEM Executive Council Co-chair Aldar Xelîl spoke about the attacks by the Turkish state and the jihadist gangs within them on the 11th day of the attack and said: “The second largest army in NATO, with all the technology it has, hasn’t been able to take one village in ten days. This shows that there is a historic resistance in Afrin and the Turkish state stands no chance of success.”
ANF
#30-01-2018#

Title: INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE EVENTS OF 1915
Author: AVİM
Place of publication: ANKARA
Release date:December, 2022

The booklet prepared by AVİM includes the most common topics on the matter of 1915 events such as reasons behind the relocation decision, Ottoman intentions and efforts to prevent excesses against Armenians, forgeries and unreliable sources in the literature on 1915, and misleading comparisons with the Holocaust. The book contains quotes from the various works of internationally known academicians such as Andrew Mango, Bernard Lewis, Edward J. Erickson, Derk Jan der Linde, Feroz Ahmed, Firuz Karemzadeh, Gilles Veinstein, Guenter Lewy, Gwynne Dyer, Justin McCarthy, Jeremy Salt, Kai Ambos, Michael Gunter, M.E. Yapp, Norman Stone, Norman Itzkowitz, Paul B. Henze, Paul Dumont, Robert Zeidner, Sean McMeekin, Stanford Shaw, Steven Katz, Sydney Nettleton, Thiery Zarcone.[1]

Amnesty International 10 March 2005

#Fréderike Geerdink#

The #PJAK# (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) is the Kurdish party that advocates for democracy in Iran and in Rojhilat (Kurdistan in Iran). Founded in 2005, it is a relatively young party among Kurdish opposition parties in Iran. How does the PJAK assess the demonstrations in the country that started in September last year? And does it want to forge an alliance with other Rojhilati opposition parties? Fréderike Geerdink asked Ahwen Chiyako, board member and EU representative of the PJAK, who was visiting the Netherlands. Chiyako: “Our contacts with other Rojhilati parties have intensified.”

The interview stopped at the question of whether Chiyako had met with Cemil Bayık or Besê Hozat during his last visit to Kurdistan, around half a year ago. Bayık and Hozat are the co-leaders of the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union), the umbrella organisation under which the PJAK (and also the PKK, YPG/J and others) functions. “I can’t say anything about that”, he smiled. Understandable of course. It’s already quite something that he admitted having travelled to Kurdistan, more accurately Qandil, the region close to the Iranian border where the KCK has its head quarters, that recently. Kurds who are active in the movement, also those who live in Europe, as Chiyako does since 2013, always have to balance being open and being covert.

Ahwen Chiyako is leading the European diplomacy efforts of the PJAK. A position that is, of course but let’s make it explicit, unarmed. He outlines, together with many others, the strategy when it comes to organizing Kurds, especially those from Rojhilat, in (mainly) Europe, helps plan demonstrations, maintains contacts with other Rojhilati opposition parties and other groups that share the struggle for peace and democracy in Kurdistan and the wider region. His visit to the Netherlands was just to ‘visit comrades’, he said when he was asked if he was meeting here with representatives of, for example, KDPI. “But our contacts with several other parties have intensifed”, he added. “Especially the last four months.”

The PJAK was founded in 2004, as the latest branche at the KCK tree of organisations that struggle for a democracy that is in line with the ideology of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan. This means they are not fighting for an independent Kurdish state, but for a system of bottom-up democracy on a local level, trying to do justice to the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the people living on the lands.

This paradigm, called democratic confederalism, hadn’t been developed yet in the years that Ahwen Chiyako started to get interested in the political Kurdish struggle, back in the late 1990s when he was still living in Rojhilat, both in Merivan and Kamyaran, while also spending time in Tehran. Even though he’s been living in Europe for a decade, he still has many contacts in Rojhilat and they are among the ones who keep him and his comrades posted about developments. “It’s true”, he said, “that it is a bit more quiet now when it comes to protests, but that in no way means it’s over.”

From what I see on social media, the protests are the most visible in Balochistan in the southeast of Iran, not in Kurdistan in the northwest, while it all started in Kurdistan in September. How do you explain this?

Ahwen Chiyako: “In Balochistan people take to the streets on Fridays, the day that people are gathering anyway for prayers. This is a very good strategy because it keeps the movement alive. Kurdistan is much more secular than Balochistan, so this way of demonstrating after Friday prayers doesn’t fit the conditions in Kurdistan. In Kurdistan, there is a longer history of organized resistance, so people use different ways to protest. There is civil disobedience, like women refusing to cover their hair, and people are organizing and mobilizing covertly. Also, people are busy with the wounded”, he said, referring to the doctors, nurses and volunteers who patch up the people who were wounded by the regime in the demonstrations and who couldn’t go to hospital for treatment out of fear to get arrested.

About Balochistan, Chiyako said: “The Balochi people have caught up with the resistance very quickly. They have caught up on twenty years in only six months. Before, they were mainly demanding religious rights *) but now they also demand ethnic rights. This progress serves the women in the community too, as they have been out on the streets more than before to make their voices heard. Balochistan and Kurdistan have a different dynamic, but what they have in common, also with the other nations in Iran, is that the fear of the regime is broken. This fear will not come back.”
*) Balochi people are, like Kurds, Sunni Muslims, while the regime is Shia, so both Balochi and Kurdish people are discriminated against by the regime on both ethnic and religious grounds.

What is the PJAK currently doing in Rojhilat?

Ahwen Chiyako: “We are well prepared to continue the revolution, both in an organizational and ideological way, and yes, militarily too. We have been working on this for a long time, and we have laid a foundation for this struggle based on the slogan Jin, Jiyan, Azadi, which has now become the slogan of the movement in the whole of Iran. You know that our struggle is a women’s struggle, and the words Life and Free are in the name of our party.

That our ideology is at the root of this, gives us a great responsibility and we have to deal with that wisely. We struggle against the regime, but we also know the regime very well and we know they can do the most horrific things. Look at what they have started to do to the women now, poisoning them. So we don’t want to be adventurous and irresponsible, but meticulous and responsible. Inside Rojhilat, we organize and I dare to say we are present everywhere and in all sections of society. We think the resistance will become more visible again during Newroz [21 March].”

Last week, there was an interview with KDPI leader Mustafa Hijri at BBC World. He suggested that there is an understanding between different Rojhilati opposition parties like KDPI and Komala, and from what I understand, PJAK would be part of that. Is this true?

Ahwen Chiyako: “There is no agreement, but we are in touch and there is a dialogue. It has intensified in the last four months. We would like to have an alliance with them, we are prepared to spread our arms and welcome alliances in the interest of the Kurdish people and the larger society. But there are also forces that don’t want the Kurds of Iran to unite. The first is of course the Islamic Republic, then the Centralists [read: supporters of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the Shah], and then the Barzanis [of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the strongest party in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq].

None of these forces influence us, but other Rojhilati parties are influenced by them. We hope that groups that feel that they are under pressure of any of these forces dare to liberate themselves, so they can move towards Kurdish unity. We work on encouraging the other parties to dare this, and hope for results.”

You say that you are not under influence of any of these forces who don’t want Kurds to unite, but the others might say that you are under influence of the Iranian regime. After all, the PKK reportedly has ties with it, and the PKK operates under the same umbrella as PJAK.

Ahwen Chiyako: “PJAK takes its decisions independently from PKK. We share an ideology, but we are a separate organisation.”

You can say that, but the other Rojhilati parties may not fully trust you.

“That is exactly the psychological warfare that the forces trying to divide Kurds are involved in. The intelligence services of Iran and Turkey are leading this war. Iran does this because the regime is hated by the international community, and tries to make us look suspicious to cleanse itself from its actions. [Turkey’s intelligence service] MIT wants to frame PJAK as terrorist, just like it does with the PKK, to justify its war.”

Iran has bombed KDPI and Komala, but not PJAK, while you are all based in Başur (Kurdistan in Iraq).

Ahwen Chiyako: “Our situation is completely different than that of KDPI and Komala. They have an address, they have known locations where they also live with their families. The PJAK is a guerrilla movement, we have no address where rockets can be sent to, and no civilians that we live close to or live with. We have suffered some losses though. Iran shares intelligence with Turkey, and then Turkey attacks us with its drones, which are technologically more advanced than Iran's weapons.”

It seems that Reza Pahlavi is gathering quite a few supporters, even though it’s not clear how strong his support is in real life, outside online campaigns. But imagine he would come to PJAK for talks, would PJAK be interested?
Ahwen Chiyako: “I would tell the son of the Shah that we would be ready to meet him if he accepts that the Kurds are a nation, that Iran has many nations and that all these nations have rights that have to be respected. He doesn’t accept that, we know that already. So it’s no use to talk to him.”

Are you afraid that the protests that started half a year ago will lead to the end of the Islamic Republic only to be replaced by a new regime, for example Pahlavi, that still doesn’t respect the rights of all people in Iran?

Ahwen Chiyako: “No, we are not afraid. We know they are not an alternative because in their vision, Kurdistan and Balochistan have no place. These people manage to get a lot of media attention in the west, but inside Iran they are not so important. Even if the whole world is behind Pahlavi, he will never have the strength in Kurdistan that we have. And also not in the Balochi community, or in the Arab and Azeri communities, and all the other nations inside Iran. Reza Pahlavi’s father and grandfather have murdered the people of these nations. Whoever sees him as an alternative, is shooting with a blank.”

When is the last time you have been in Kurdistan?

Ahwen Chiyako: “I came back some five months ago.”

Have you met with Cemil Bayık or Besê Hozat?

“Sorry, I can’t say anything about that.”[1]

A genuine report on the Situation of the Barzani Kurd. under the Iraqi President
SADDAM HUSSEIN
prepared and published
by the
SOCIALIST ORGANISATION OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS IN EUROPE (SOKSE)
March 1985

FINAL REPORT
Report Prepared by: Liz St. Jean
With support from:
David Carment
Adam Fysh
Stewart Prest
Feedback is welcome, and may be sent to cifp@carleton.ca
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

Title: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and External Events on Forum Participants Following ISIS Online
Author: Thomas, Evan Nathan Patrick
Place of publication: Canada
Publisher: Simon Fraser University
Release date: 2016

The study monitors the evolution of perceptions and opinions of the terrorist group the Islamic State (#ISIS# ) during its involvement in Syria and Iraq in 2013-2014. Data is drawn from a web-forum discussing current Islamic affairs that followed ISIS as early as September 2013. These data are used to answer the question of whether or not there are opinion leaders facilitating the discussion of violent extremist material. An interrupted time series and ordinary least squares regression are used to address the research question by determining the most impactful events on the thread, and determining the causal role of opinion leaders on the way users connect. Results indicate that the content and success of discussion are most impacted by the involvement of opinion leaders and media related to a specific ISIS event.[1]

By Hamma Mirwaisi

The May 2023 re-election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party-led People’s Alliance in simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections consolidated an authoritarian order that routinely and arbitrarily punishes perceived critics and political opponents and exerts strong control over the media and courts. Erdogan won 52.2 percent of the vote in the May 28 second round of the presidential election to secure a third term in office, beating rival Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), who had been backed by an alliance of opposition parties.

Two devastating earthquakes on February 6, affecting Türkiye’s southeastern provinces and northwest Syria, left over 50,000 dead in Türkiye, at least 100,000 injured, and hundreds of thousands homeless and displaced. A cost-of-living crisis continued, with extremely high price inflation, which the Turkish Statistical Institute estimated to have risen to 61 percent year-over-year as of October.

Freedom of Expression

The Erdoğan government’s control of most media was especially significant in an election year, prompting the international election observation mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe to note that during the election campaign, the ruling coalition “enjoyed an unjustified advantage, including through biased media coverage.” The observers emphasized that public broadcasters, like TRT, “clearly favoured the ruling parties and their candidates” and that continued restrictions on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression “hindered the participation of some opposition politicians and parties, civil society and independent media in the election process.”

The government-aligned broadcasting regulator, the Radio and Television High Council (RTÜK), regularly issues arbitrary fines to the few television channels critical of the government, notably Halk TV. RTÜK did so for comments made on their platforms during the election period. Among those fined and sanctioned was Tele 1, whose editor-in-chief, Merdan Yanardağ, was arrested on June 27 on the pretext of non-inciteful comments he made concerning Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), during a TV broadcast. Prosecuted for “spreading terrorist propaganda” and “praising crime and criminals,” Yanardağ was released from pretrial detention at his first trial hearing on October 4 at which he was convicted and sentenced to 30 months in prison, a sentence he has appealed. The Tele 1 channel was additionally punished for Yanardağ’s comments with an unprecedented seven-day broadcasting suspension in August.

Independent media in Türkiye operate mainly via online platforms. The authorities regularly order the removal of critical online content or negative news coverage relating to government ministers, the president, and members of the judiciary. Journalists face prosecution under Türkiye’s Anti-Terror Law, as well as under criminal defamation charges, including the widely used charge of “insulting the president,” which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) said fails to comply with the right to freedom of expression. At time of writing, at least 43 journalists and media workers were in pretrial detention or serving prison sentences for terrorism offenses because of their journalistic work or association with media. The government significantly expanded online censorship with a series of legislative amendments passed in October 2022.series of legislative amendments passed in October 2022.

Kurdish journalists are disproportionately targeted. In one Diyarbakır trial of 18 Kurdish journalists and media workers accused of “membership of a terrorist organization,” 15 spent 13 months in pretrial detention before being released at their first hearing in July. In an Ankara trial of 11 Kurdish journalists, 9 spent 7 months in pretrial detention before being released in May at their first hearing. The two trials continued at time of writing.
Freedoms of Association and Assembly

Tens of thousands of people continue to face unfair trials on terrorism charges on the basis of their alleged links with the movement led by US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, which the government deems a terrorist organization (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization, FETÖ) responsible for the July 15, 2016 attempted military coup. Many have faced prolonged and arbitrary imprisonment with no effective remedy after mass removal from civil service jobs and the judiciary. The justice minister announced in August that 15,050 remanded and convicted FETÖ prisoners remained in prison.

After the May elections, Türkiye’s intelligence agency continued the practice of organizing the abduction and rendition to Türkiye of individuals with alleged associations with the Gülen movement in collusion with authorities in countries with weak rule of law frameworks. In July and September, Tajik authorities bypassed legal extradition processes in abducting Emsal Koç and Koray Vural before they were flown to Türkiye where they were placed in pretrial detention pending trial.

Provincial authorities regularly ban protests and assemblies of constituencies critical of the government, often flouting domestic court rulings that such bans are disproportionate. Police violently detain demonstrators associated with leftist or Kurdish groups. Some are arrested and placed in pretrial detention for resisting the police or failing to disperse.
Attacks on Human Rights Defenders

In September, the Court of Cassation, Türkiye’s top appeals court, upheld the baseless conviction and life sentence of human rights defender Osman Kavala as well as the 18-year sentences of Çiğdem Mater, Can Atalay, Mine Özerden, and Tayfun Kahraman on charges of attempting to overthrow the government for their alleged role in the lawful and overwhelmingly peaceful 2013 Istanbul Gezi Park protests. The court quashed the convictions of three others, two of whom (Mücella Yapıcı and Hakan Altınay) were released from prison pending retrial. Kavala has been arbitrarily detained since November 2017 and the others since their conviction in April 2022. President Erdoğan has made repeated public speeches against Kavala throughout the trial and the case demonstrates the Erdoğan administration’s high level of political control over Türkiye’s courts and flagrant defiance of Council of Europe infringement proceedings against Türkiye over its failure to implement two ECtHR judgments ordering Kavala’s release.

At time of writing, in direct contravention of an October Constitutional Court decision ordering his release, human rights lawyer Can Atalay, a defendant in the Gezi trial, remained in prison and unable to take up the parliamentary seat he won on behalf of the Workers Party of Türkiye in the May elections.

The authorities continue to use terrorism and defamation charges to harass rights defenders; sometimes lawyers representing terrorism suspects are also targeted for arrest pending trial and prosecuted on terrorism charges.
Torture and Ill-Treatment in Custody

Allegations of torture and ill-treatment in police and gendarmerie custody and prison since 2016 have rarely been rigorously investigated, and perpetrators even more rarely prosecuted. In the days after the February earthquakes, there were multiple reports of police and gendarmerie beating individuals during the rescue effort, justifying it by accusing them of looting. One man, Ahmet Güreşçi, died in gendarmerie custody in Altınözü, Hatay province, after he and his brother were subjected to torture. An investigation into the gendarmerie is ongoing. Some police ill-treatment has been directed at Syrian refugees and also reflects xenophobic motivation.

Alongside continuing reports of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and over-crowding in removal centers where foreign nationals, including asylum seekers, are subject to administrative detention pending deportation procedures, there were well-documented cases of soldiers and gendarmerie shooting at or severely ill-treating migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross the border from Syria to Türkiye.
Kurdish Conflict and Crackdown on Opposition

Türkiye has concentrated its military campaign against the PKK with drone strikes in northern Iraq where PKK bases are located and also increasingly in northeast Syria against the Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where Türkiye’s strikes in October damaged critical infrastructure and disrupted water and electricity for millions of people. Türkiye continues to occupy territories in northern Syria, where its local Syrian proxies have abused civilians’ rights with impunity (see Syria chapter). On October 1, in Ankara, a suicide bombing at the entrance to the Interior Ministry was claimed by a unit of the PKK.

The Erdoğan government pursued a highly divisive discourse against the opposition parties during its May election campaign, regularly accusing the CHP of supporting the PKK and circulating a fake video in which a video of CHP’s Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was merged with footage of the leadership of the PKK.

With a closure case against it pending before Türkiye’s Constitutional Court, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) did not enter the election and instead recommended its supporters vote for another party, the Green Left Party, which ran candidates and won 61 seats. Scores of former HDP members of parliament, mayors, and party officials are in prison on remand or are serving sentences after being convicted of terrorism offenses for their legitimate non-violent political activities, speeches, and social media postings. They include jailed former HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, in prison since November 4, 2016, despite ECtHR judgments ordering their immediate release.

Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu from the opposition CHP faces two ongoing politically motivated prosecutions that could ban him from politics. At time of writing, his conviction for insulting the Higher Election Board was on appeal and, in a second case that began in June, he is accused of corruption in 2015 during his term as mayor of Istanbul’s Beylikdüzü district.
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants

Türkiye continues to host the world’s largest number of refugees. At time of writing, more than 3.2 million Syrians had temporary protection status, and more than 290,000 people from different non-European countries had a form of conditional refugee status. The Turkish government mostly deems people from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other non-European countries irregular migrants and strictly limits avenues for them to apply for international protection, routinely deporting large groups and publishing statistics that show it. Turkish authorities also conduct mass summary pushbacks at the borders.

During the May election campaign, opposition politicians increasingly weaponized xenophobic anti-foreigner sentiment, particularly directing it at Syrians and Afghans and advocating for the return of Syrians to war-torn Syria. President Erdoğan responded with pledges to resettle 1 million Syrians in Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria. Since the election, deportation centers have filled rapidly with Syrians, Afghans, and other groups at risk. The practice of men and some boys being unlawfully deported to northern Syria, often after being coerced into signing voluntary return forms, continues in spite of a 2022 ECtHR judgment and a May 2023 Constitutional Court judgment finding forced return under the guise of voluntary repatriation a violation of human rights on several counts.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights

Two years after Türkiye’s 2021 withdrawal from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the Istanbul Convention, challenges in providing effective protection to women in Türkiye who report domestic violence are reflected in the high number of murders of women and girls. The We Will Stop Femicide Platform, an association campaigning against murders of women and girls and supporting families of victims, reported 254 femicides in the January to October period.

In September, an Istanbul court dismissed a case brought in 2021 by the prosecutor’s office to dissolve the We Will Stop Femicide Platform, rejecting the prosecutor’s accusation that the association acted against the structure of the family and “violated law and morality.”
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The Erdoğan government made anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) hate speech a core part of its election campaign and overall political discourse, appealing to its conservative voter base and fomenting societal polarization while putting LGBT people at great risk. The ninth successive ban on the Istanbul Pride week events in June was accompanied by police arrests of those who attempted to assemble. Authorities regularly and arbitrarily ban other events by LGBT groups.

Local authorities around the country have increasingly been canceling concerts by artists openly supportive of LGBT rights or critical of relevant government restrictions. TV regulator RTÜK has justified imposing fines on digital platforms for airing creative content referring to LGBT people, saying it violates “societal and cultural values,” “the Turkish family structure,” and “morality.”
Climate Change Policy and Impacts

Türkiye is a growing contributor to the climate crisis, which is taking a mounting toll on human rights around the world. While Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021, its climate policies and commitments are “critically insufficient” to meet global goals to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, according to the Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific project that tracks government climate action.

Türkiye’s failure to set and meet ambitious emission reduction targets is matched by a continuing commitment to running coal-supplied power plants and expanding coal extraction. In July, the destruction of the Akbelen forest in Muğla province to feed local coal power plants was met with strong resistance by the local community and climate activists. Police intervened to disperse protests with tear gas and water cannons, and there were numerous arbitrary detentions.
Key International Actors

The European Union in September announced further financial support to Türkiye for the most vulnerable Syrian refugees provided in return for restrictions on the entry of refugees and migrants to the EU. Although Türkiye is still formally a candidate for EU accession, the process is at a standstill.

In its enlargement report on Türkiye in November, the European Commission stressed that the “deterioration of human and fundamental rights continued,” pointing to “serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions” and Erdoğan’s “unjustified advantage” in the presidential election.

In June, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the Turkish government “[e]nsure that children under 18 years of age are not detained or prosecuted under anti-terrorism laws,” that the minimum age of criminal responsibility be raised from its current level of 12 to “at least 14 years of age,” and that the minimum age of marriage be enforced as “18 years without exception.”

In September, the ECtHR issued a judgment (Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye) with implications for tens of thousands in Türkiye persecuted for their alleged association with the Gülen movement. The court found that being prosecuted and convicted for “membership of a terrorist organization” mainly on the basis of having a mobile phone application called ByLock allegedly used by Gülen followers was an arbitrary application of the law, violating the principle of legality. The judgment also found violations of fair trial and freedom of association rights and ruled that Türkiye needed to implement general measures to prevent thousands of similar cases from coming before the ECtHR.[1]