Joost Jongerden called for direct talks between political leaders and the removal of obstacles between Öcalan and the PKK.
The historic call made by Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February opened the door to a new phase and sparked widespread debate both in Turkey and internationally. Following the call, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced its decision to end its nearly 50-year armed struggle, responding positively to Mr. Öcalan’s initiative, a development that has since drawn significant attention.

Despite these steps by Mr. Öcalan and the PKK, the Turkish state has yet to take any concrete action.

Joost Jongerden, a Dutch academic whose books have been translated into many languages and who is known for his work on the Middle East, Kurdistan, and the PKK, including his Turkish-language books Writings on the PKK and From Rebellion to Construction: The Kurdish Freedom Movement, spoke to ANF about the new phase that has begun between the Turkish state and the PKK.

Joost Jongerden noted that the Kurdish Freedom Movement views this phase as the beginning of a new period of political struggle, while the Turkish state still insists on a policy of annihilation.

Öcalan’s call is not about an end, but about new beginnings

“Öcalan emphasises the necessity of building a democratic society,” said Joost Jongerden, offering the following analysis of the call:

“The PKK announced its decision to dissolve the organisation and end the armed struggle in response to Mr. Öcalan’s call. It is also worth recognising Devlet Bahçeli’s contribution, particularly his use of a conciliatory tone. However, two important points must be noted.

First, Mr. Öcalan’s call was not solely about ending the armed struggle. He also stressed the need to build a democratic society. Although he did not frame it as a set of clear conditions, the message laid out two parallel processes: one, for the PKK to end its armed activities and dissolve itself; and two, for the state to open democratic channels that would allow the movement to transform into a peaceful political actor. When the PKK responded to Mr. Öcalan’s call, it made clear that disarmament and dissolution depended on the Turkish state taking meaningful steps toward democratisation.

Second, Mr. Öcalan’s call, as echoed by the PKK, was not only about endings, but also about new beginnings in which words would replace weapons. And this brings us to the core issue: the creation of democratic spaces that enable people’s political participation.

At the heart of the matter lie fundamentally different interpretations of the situation. For the state, the solution appears to rest solely in disarmament. For the Kurdish movement, however, the issue is essentially political, centred on rights and recognition. While the state tends to view the disbandment of the PKK and the end of armed conflict as the resolution of the problem, for the Kurds, it represents only a starting point for a broader political process.”

At the root of the problem lies the nation-state and its assimilation policies

Joost Jongerden identified the nation-state and its assimilation policies as the root of the Kurdish question, warning of the dangers of nationalist ideologies. He explained:

“The key moment in the emergence of the Kurdish question was the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent establishment of Turkey as a nation-state. This marked a transition from the relatively decentralised Ottoman system, which paid little attention to ethnic or cultural identity, to a centralised nation-state model deeply invested in defining and enforcing a singular national identity.

At the heart of the issue lies nationalism and the increasing capacity of nation-states to implement assimilation policies across society. The real danger stems from the aggressive nationalism of centralised states, which construct the ‘other’, a group defined as outside the national identity, to be silenced, erased, or even annihilated.”

Rojava emerged as a pluralistic space shaped by inclusive and participatory policies

Joost Jongerden pointed to the Rojava experience as a significant example, noting that Kurds there formed a force based on self-defence against the Assad regime, ISIS, and other nationalist and Islamist groups.

Jongerden stated, “The Kurds in Syria initially developed mechanisms of self-defence against the Assad regime and al-Qaeda, then against the Islamic State, and later against various Islamist and nationalist militias operating under the banner of the Syrian National Army.

However, the real strength of the Kurdish movement lies in its development of a political model that challenges the centralised nation-state and its obsession with a homogenised identity. This model is expressed through concepts such as democratic confederalism, democratic autonomy, and the democratic nation.

What distinguishes this model is its encouragement of grassroots democratic self-organisation, allowing people to directly participate in decision-making processes. It is based on the understanding that to live in this world always means living together with others, others who differ in ethnicity, culture, nationality, and gender. As a result, Rojava has emerged as a pluralistic space shaped by inclusive and participatory policies.”

The communication barrier between Öcalan and the PKK must be lifted

Joost Jongerden stated that for the process to move forward in a meaningful way, the communication barrier between Mr. Öcalan and the PKK must be removed. He also stressed that the state must recognise the problem as something far beyond just the PKK. Describing two main challenges facing the current process, Jongerden continued:

“Mr. Öcalan’s call represents a courageous attempt to break the cycle of violence. However, there are two fundamental challenges that need to be addressed. The first concerns the structure and context of the negotiations, which have also hindered past efforts. In the earlier Oslo process (2007–2011), the Turkish state, represented by the intelligence agency, entered into dialogue with the PKK leadership, while Mr. Öcalan largely remained in the background. In contrast, during the later Imralı talks (2013–2015), Mr. Öcalan became the central figure, and the PKK leadership assumed a more secondary role. For any negotiation to succeed, the communication barrier between Mr. Öcalan and the PKK leadership must be removed, and discussions must take place directly between the relevant political leaderships.

The state must recognise that the issue goes beyond the PKK

The second challenge, according to Joost Jongerden, is more fundamental: any political solution requires the Turkish state to acknowledge that the issue goes beyond the PKK. What must be addressed is the broader Kurdish question, which has existed since the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

We have witnessed the collapse of peace processes twice before. Regarding the failure of the Oslo talks, the Oslo Center, which helped initiate the process, later concluded that the Turkish government had become less committed to a negotiated solution and instead turned to a combination of military force and economic incentives, a classic ‘carrot and stick’ approach.

In 2015, the Dolmabahçe Agreement was announced, outlining ten principles around the idea of a democratic republic and a shared homeland for citizens of different identities. This breakthrough was welcomed with optimism, including then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s supportive remarks that the negotiations had entered a new phase. Mr. Öcalan echoed this sentiment in his Newroz message in March 2015, calling on the PKK to end the armed struggle.

However, this moment of hope quickly gave way to renewed violence when the state withdrew from the agreement and abandoned the peace process. It is now critical that the initiatives taken result in a genuine and lasting peace process. For that to happen, the involvement of an authoritative third-party observer may be necessary.”[1]